If italy Joined the allies World War 2

It was mostly for the rest of us.

pops-paolo said:

without conflict there is no fun in life

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Said the guy who's younger than my car. Wait a few years and see how much fun and how expensive conflict really is.

SaparotRob said:

Said the guy who's younger than my car. Wait a few years and see how much fun and how expensive conflict really is.

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bro my dad has cars older then his father so

Punctuation.

Conflict is overrated. I'm a lot happier for learning how to accept what I can't change, rather than fighting it every step of the way.

Thumpalumpacus said:

He didn't write that Japan lost because of declining oil stocks. He wrote that Japan's decision to attack in the Pacific when it did was driven by declining oil stocks.

Those are significantly different points.

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I doubt strongly that this is the case :the stocks were 49 million barrels at the end of 1941,while they were only 44 million at the end of 1940 . And Japan did not attack US in 1940 .
While the US embargo was bad for Japan, PH did not result in Japan having more oil : there was no oil in Hawaii .
The truth is that even without oil embargo, it was possible that Japan still would attack US. And, it is also possible that with oil embargo,PH could be avoided .
There is no automatism between the oil embargo and PH .
Japan needed oil (how much is open for interpretation ) ,to have oil,Japan needed
a someone willing to sell oil
b money to buy oil
c tankers to transport oil ( the seller could do this )
d refineries to refine the crude oil .
The embargo meant only that US were no longer willing to sell oil , but there were other potential sellers .But,even without embargo, it was possible that Japan no longer had the money to buy oil and that it would be forced to attack the DEI who produced enough oil for Japan's needs : before the war : 65 million barrels ,in 1943 : 49,6 million barrels .
It was the refusal of the authorities of the DEI to sell oil/sufficient oil to Japan,which forced Japan to attack them .And, for military reasons, it was needed to eliminate the US Pacific Fleet BEFORE an invasion of the DEI.
But, even if the DEI were willing to sell oil to Japan, Japan would need the money to buy the oil, tankers to transport the oil and refineries to refine the oil .
Too much importance has been given to the US oil embargo and the decision of the DEI to sell no longer oil to Japan has been neglected .
Embargo does not mean war, no embargo does not mean peace .

pops-paolo said:

David Glantz, the American military historian known for his books on the Eastern front, concludes:

Although Soviet accounts have routinely belittled the significance of Lend-Lease in the sustainment of the Soviet war effort, the overall importance of the assistance cannot be understated. Lend-Lease aid did not arrive in sufficient quantities to make the difference between defeat and victory in 1941–1942; that achievement must be attributed solely to the Soviet people and to the iron nerve of Stalin, Zhukov, Shaposhnikov, Vasilevsky, and their subordinates. As the war continued, however, the United States and Great Britain provided many of the implements of war and strategic raw materials necessary for Soviet victory. Without Lend-Lease food, clothing, and raw materials (especially metals), the Soviet economy would have been even more heavily burdened by the war effort. Perhaps most directly, without Lend-Lease trucks, rail engines, and railroad cars, every Soviet offensive would have stalled at an earlier stage, outrunning its logistical tail in a matter of days. In turn, this would have allowed the German commanders to escape at least some encirclements while forcing the Red Army to prepare and conduct many more deliberate penetration attacks in order to advance the same distance. Left to their own devices, Stalin and his commanders might have taken twelve to eighteen months longer to finish off the Wehrmacht; the ultimate result would probably have been the same

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The Soviet railways were sufficient strong to supply the Red Army, the LL rail engines were a luxury .The same for LL food and raw materials .
The importance of trucks for the Red Army was very low: trucks need roads and there were few roads in the USSR,most of them were destroyed by the retreating Germans .
WWII was 80 YEARS ago : no Tesla, no highways, no petrol stations, no garages .
And, what Glantz ''forgets '' : most Soviet offensives /advances stalled after a few days . Bagration was an exception,but the Red Army did not advance to Warsaw because it had LL trucks,it would also have advanced without LL trucks .

Thumpalumpacus said:

He didn't write that Japan lost because of declining oil stocks. He wrote that Japan's decision to attack in the Pacific when it did was driven by declining oil stocks.

Those are significantly different points.

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There was no minimum of 13 months of oil ( a meaningless notion ) needed to have a chance to ''win '': Japan could ''win '' with less oil and lose with more oil .

swampyankee said:

The question is whether Germany got more out of Italy's presence than they would have from their absence. Obviously, this is a matter of conjecture. I happen to disagree, as the Italian Navy tied up major portions of the RN, as the British needed to maintain the security of the Suez Canal. With a neutral or allied Italy, this would not be an RN worry: the British would be able to maintain complete control of the Mediterranean. However, since the invasion of Yugoslavia was German-led, this means that there remains a German vulnerability, but the German Navy could not project the sort of power into the Mediterranean as did the Royal [Italian] Navy. If Italy is neutral, this means that the RN could use the Adriatic with reasonable risk; if Italy is allied, then the Adriatic becomes an allied lake, and German forces in the Balkans are subject to the sort of harassment as, say, Malta. This also leaves Germany's allies, Romania and Hungary, vulnerable to a potential invasion through a liberated Yugoslavia. Also, supporting the various partisan movements in Yugoslavia would be far easier.

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ONE point : if Italy was neutral or a Western ally ,there would be no German invasion of Yugoslavia .

ljadw said:

I doubt strongly that this is the case :the stocks were 49 million barrels at the end of 1941,while they were only 44 million at the end of 1940 . And Japan did not attack US in 1940 .
While the US embargo was bad for Japan, PH did not result in Japan having more oil : there was no oil in Hawaii .
The truth is that even without oil embargo, it was possible that Japan still would attack US. And, it is also possible that with oil embargo,PH could be avoided .
There is no automatism between the oil embargo and PH .
Japan needed oil (how much is open for interpretation ) ,to have oil,Japan needed
a someone willing to sell oil
b money to buy oil
c tankers to transport oil ( the seller could do this )
d refineries to refine the crude oil .
The embargo meant only that US were no longer willing to sell oil , but there were other potential sellers .But,even without embargo, it was possible that Japan no longer had the money to buy oil and that it would be forced to attack the DEI who produced enough oil for Japan's needs : before the war : 65 million barrels ,in 1943 : 49,6 million barrels .
It was the refusal of the authorities of the DEI to sell oil/sufficient oil to Japan,which forced Japan to attack them .And, for military reasons, it was needed to eliminate the US Pacific Fleet BEFORE an invasion of the DEI.
But, even if the DEI were willing to sell oil to Japan, Japan would need the money to buy the oil, tankers to transport the oil and refineries to refine the oil .
Too much importance has been given to the US oil embargo and the decision of the DEI to sell no longer oil to Japan has been neglected .
Embargo does not mean war, no embargo does not mean peace .

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Yet --

By 13 March 1941, the Japanese had managed to stockpile about 42.7 million barrels of oil, primarily from California and Tarakan. This was stored in some 7000 oil storage tanks, also purchased from the United States. Navy petroleum product reserves on 1 December 1941 were 1,435,000 tons of crude oil; 3,634,000 tons of of bunker fuel; 473,000 tons of aviation gasoline; 27,000 tons of isooctane; 6400 tons of aircraft lubricants; 13,600 tons of ordinary lubricants; and 921,000 tons of petroleum derivatives already loaded on ships or distributed to overseas bases. This was thought to be sufficient for the first year of war, but consumption greatly exceeded prewar projections. The Army estimated it would require 5.7 million barrels of oil per year while Navy requirements were estimated at 17.6 million barrels per year and civilian requirements at 12.6 million barrels per year. This proved to be a considerable underestimate in the first two years of the war.

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The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Oil

At around 300lbs/barrel, the IJN had about 43.5 million barrels of reserve POLs of all sorts, which gives roughly 30 months of combat ops -- but with stepped-up training and operations in the last half of 1941, that estimate shrank to roughly 18 months. That's why the IJN argued for the push south into NEI -- to secure more fuel.

Toland goes into the war discussions of the Imperial Cabinet in the autumn of 1941, in which the Navy successfully argued its case, in The Rising Sun.

I don't think anyone here is arguing that the oil embargo made their decision to go to war certain, but I do think it was a significant factor, myself.

ljadw said:

There was no minimum of 13 months of oil ( a meaningless notion ) needed to have a chance to ''win '': Japan could ''win '' with less oil and lose with more oil .

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Tell that to the IJN's high command; they're the ones who calculated, in Oct 1941, the 18-month on-hand supply for combat ops.

I believe the US got the Dutch Government in exile to either join the embargo or severely restrict sales to Japan.
The US had also closed the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping meaning that may other oil fields would have difficulty supplying Japan. Many more tankers needed to move the same amount of product in the same time.

swampyankee said:

The question is whether Germany got more out of Italy's presence than they would have from their absence. Obviously, this is a matter of conjecture. I happen to disagree, as the Italian Navy tied up major portions of the RN, as the British needed to maintain the security of the Suez Canal. With a neutral or allied Italy, this would not be an RN worry: the British would be able to maintain complete control of the Mediterranean. However, since the invasion of Yugoslavia was German-led, this means that there remains a German vulnerability, but the German Navy could not project the sort of power into the Mediterranean as did the Royal [Italian] Navy. If Italy is neutral, this means that the RN could use the Adriatic with reasonable risk; if Italy is allied, then the Adriatic becomes an allied lake, and German forces in the Balkans are subject to the sort of harassment as, say, Malta. This also leaves Germany's allies, Romania and Hungary, vulnerable to a potential invasion through a liberated Yugoslavia. Also, supporting the various partisan movements in Yugoslavia would be far easier.

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Without Italy in the war then as you state the Mediterranean is almost a British lake and the heavy losses that the RN suffered would not have been incurred. It's a worth a thought that if the Japanese then launched the attack on Pearl Harbour the RN would almost certainly have been in a position to give significant assistance to the USN. The POW and Repulse would almost certainly have had at least one modern carrier, maybe two as its quite likely the Ark Royal wouldn't have been sunk. Not forgetting the additional modern cruisers and destroyers that would have been available. When Admiral King requested assistance it was turned down, that response might well have been yes not no.

We tend to think of the ships that were sunk in the Med but just as important were the ships that were heavily damaged and out of action for many months. These would also have been available.

Hey ljadw,

Please read what is written more carefully.

Note the words I used were "the US led oil embargo". DEI was willing to sell to Japan, even after the war in Europe started, until the US convinced them not to. Also, check where the oil they "imported" during the war was coming from. The US, UK, and DEI supplied around 80% of the oil Japan used before the war. When the war in Europe started the UK stopped selling oil to Japan, as did the French. After that point the US was selling Japan about 80% of their imported oil. In August 1941 the US put a full embargo of oil in place, reducing Japan's import of oil to ~20% of what they needed annually - in peacetime.

The estimates for oil needed, in the coming war were somewhere over 30 million bbl for the first year. In 1941 Japan produced only about 3 million bbl domestically (including synthetics), and after the total US oil embargo the expected peaceful import of oil for the next year was only about 5 million bbl. So the total oil supply would have been only about 8 million bbl out of the 24 million bbl needed during peacetime. The numbers I have read vary considerably on just how much oil the war required, but they seem to range 10-20 million bbl per year more that pre-war needs.

Note the words I used were "the approximate date of the attack was determined by the Japanese high command, based on a minimum of 13 months of oil required to have any chance of winning a war with the US. The 13 months required was the amount needed to accomplish the operations laid out in their war plan, plus a reserve." The Japanese high command were the ones who decided the 13 month supply was the trigger for attacking the US, not me or any other party. This has been documented thoroughly by historians, from US and other nation's debriefs after the war, and is included in the official history(s) of the US armed forces and of the Japanese armed forces. There are also some very good books on the subject. My favorite book on the thinking during the run up to war in the PTO is "War Plan Orange: The U.S. Strategy to Defeat Japan, 1897-1945" by Edward S. Miller, published by the United States Naval Institute, and by Shinchosa Ltd. in Japanese. Although the book is sold publicly it was originally written for the USN as an official historical study.

As to the chance of a Japanese "win", what you said does not make sense to me??

Thumpalumpacus said:

Yet --



The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Oil

At around 300lbs/barrel, the IJN had about 43.5 million barrels of reserve POLs of all sorts, which gives roughly 30 months of combat ops -- but with stepped-up training and operations in the last half of 1941, that estimate shrank to roughly 18 months. That's why the IJN argued for the push south into NEI -- to secure more fuel.

Toland goes into the war discussions of the Imperial Cabinet in the autumn of 1941, in which the Navy successfully argued its case, in The Rising Sun.

I don't think anyone here is arguing that the oil embargo made their decision to go to war certain, but I do think it was a significant factor, myself.



Tell that to the IJN's high command; they're the ones who calculated, in Oct 1941, the 18-month on-hand supply for combat ops.

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It is not correct to say that 43,5 million barrels give 30 months of combat operations, because it is impossible to calculate in advance how many oil is needed for a month of combat operation and because it is impossible to know how the war will evolve .
PH could fail.
PH could result in the loss of the IJN.
Midway could be a success
Etc
The war could be over after a few months,with a Japanese or US victory .

Thumpalumpacus said:

Yet --



The Pacific War Online Encyclopedia: Oil

At around 300lbs/barrel, the IJN had about 43.5 million barrels of reserve POLs of all sorts, which gives roughly 30 months of combat ops -- but with stepped-up training and operations in the last half of 1941, that estimate shrank to roughly 18 months. That's why the IJN argued for the push south into NEI -- to secure more fuel.

Toland goes into the war discussions of the Imperial Cabinet in the autumn of 1941, in which the Navy successfully argued its case, in The Rising Sun.

I don't think anyone here is arguing that the oil embargo made their decision to go to war certain, but I do think it was a significant factor, myself.



Tell that to the IJN's high command; they're the ones who calculated, in Oct 1941, the 18-month on-hand supply for combat ops.

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Predictions are guesses,unreliable guesses .No one can tell in advance how a war will evolve and how long he will last .
PH could be a failure
Midway could be a victory
No one can predict how much oil will be consumed in one month of operations .
Japan could win the war ,even if the IJN was short on oil and lose him even if the IJN was swimming in oil .
Japan consumed 44 million barrels in 1943 and only 25 million in 1944.
The reason was not that the stocks were exhausted, but that there was less need of oil and that less oil was available because there were less tankers available than in 1943 .
The DEI produced in 1941 65 million barrels of oil,in 1942 25,9 million and in 1943 49,6 million .But that does not mean that the oil tankers could transport 49,6 million barrels to Japan .
About US oil exports to Japan
they were 21 million barrels in 1935,22 million in 1936,28 million in 1937, 31 million in 1938, 28 million in 1939, 23 million in 1940, 21 million in 1941 (7 months annualized ) Source :Bankrupting the enemy P 177.
Japan did not attack US in 1940 because it got 5 million barrels less than in 1939 .
The exports were not determined by the US but by Japan : Japan imported what it needed and could pay .

Japan could only win if US gave up ,and for this the oil stocks of the IJN were irrelevant ,because the war would not be decided by the IJN alone .
If US losses at Guadalcanal were the triple of the actual losses and US public opinion said that the war was too costly and that US should negotiate peace, Japan would have ''won ''.
If US attack on Iwo Jima failed ,there could be a negotiated end of the war .
And,again about the US oil exports : before the embargo Japan consumed less oil than after the embargo :1938 : 39 million of barrels,1943 : 44 million ,1942 :41,8 million .And the IJN was able to fight Midway notwithstanding the embargo .Thus, the threat of the US embargo was not that big .Neither was the benefit of the capture of the DEI .

One can discuss the numbers of production,imports,consumption, stocks ,(Japanese oil puzzle gives different ones ) ,but one should not forget that the biggest problem for Japan was not the embargo,but the war in China : a war Japan could not win, not lose, not continue indefinitely .
The politicians blamed the Army for its failure,the army replied that China continued the war only because it received/hoped on moral and material support from the US ( a very big exaggeration ) and, that because the IJN had failed to intercept this aid,there was only one solution = to expel the US from the Pacific. This would mean the end of the war in China and the possibility to have oil for free from the DEI.
While this does not mean that the embargo had no effect, it is very possible that Japan would have started war with US even WITHOUT the embargo .It is also possible that a collapse of China would have stopped war with the US even WITH an embargo .

ljadw said:

It is not correct to say that 43,5 million barrels give 30 months of combat operations, because it is impossible to calculate in advance how many oil is needed for a month of combat operation and because it is impossible to know how the war will evolve .

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The Japanese admirals clearly didn't get that memo, because they estimated that they had 18 months' stock on hand for combat ops. You don't think they had an idea of their plans, and of the fuel-use of their ships? From there, it's a simple bit of math to figure out how much your current stocks can hold out over time, barring exigencies.

You really should read up on this stuff some time. It's pretty interesting.

Thumpalumpacus said:

The Japanese admirals clearly didn't get that memo, because they estimated that they had 18 months' stock on hand for combat ops. You don't think they had an idea of their plans, and of the fuel-use of their ships? From there, it's a simple bit of math to figure out how much your current stocks can hold out over time, barring exigencies.

You really should read up on this stuff some time. It's pretty interesting.

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Combat operations were not decided by the IJN, but by the IJN AND the US Navy .The USN was not obliged to react as the IJN was expecting, guessing, theorizing
Estimates are guesses, mostly unreliable guesses. Nothing more .
The Japanese admirals said: if we do A, the US will do B,and than we will reply by C. Their answer will be D.
Etc .
But if the USN remained defensive and did something else, the IJN would consume and need less oil .......
The German generals made the same mistake : Thomas said that there would be fuel for Barbarossa til September,and he was wrong : Typhoon started after September .
Before 1914, Fisher claimed that shortly after a declaration of war,there would be a super Trafalgar where the RN would defeat the Hochseeflotte . But this did not happen .Before 1939 the Trenchard lobby pontificated that the war would start with a big attack of the LW to destroy the British cities,on which Bomber Command would reply with the same attack on the German cities .
We know that this did not happen .
The German U Boat lobby said that they would do what their predecessors had failed to do = to starve Britain . We know that it was a failure .Doenitz had also plans and knew the oil consumption of his U Boats .
And Harris ..: he told Churchill that BC could force Germany to capitulate ...by destroying Berlin . He was wrong .
The IJN could act offensively or defensively ,but it could not say before PH how the naval war would evolve . It could even not say this after PH .
Besides : if politicians ask military how long their supplies will last , the answer will always be an underestimation of the supplies .A general who says : my supplies will last 6 months will not be fired if they last 12 months, but if he is saying that they will last 12 months and after 6 months,they are exhausted ,what will happen ? We know what will happen .
It is not because you make plans and know how many fuel your ships are consuming,that you know how long your stocks will last .

Apparently you don't understand the concept of tentative projections. Managers of all sorts, including military leaders, understand making logistical projections in order to ensure that efforts are properly supplied.

That doesn't mean that exigencies and emergencies don't happen. But that's why we maintain reserves.

The Air Force taught me that failing to plan is planning to fail. I don't doubt the Japanese military understood the vital necessity of planning based on stocks and usage, even if you don't.

I should know better than to engage you. I won't make this mistake again. *plonk*

When planning for anything you make assumptions and these form the basis of the plans. Are they perfect obviously no, and they are often way out in both directions. Also factors come into play which totally throw them out of the window, for example:-

The German U Boat lobby said that they would do what their predecessors had failed to do = to starve Britain
This was based on the assumption that the war wouldn't start until 1944. Had it done so the German U Boat forces would have been infinitely stronger when was was declared and there was a better than average chance that they would have succeeded.

Before 1939 the Trenchard lobby pontificated that the war would start with a big attack of the LW to destroy the British cities,on which Bomber Command would reply with the same attack on the German cities .
Almost all airforces believed this to be the case, the phrase 'The Bomber will always get through' was widely believed and from the experience of the Spanish Civil War there was reason to believe this.

And Harris ..: he told Churchill that BC could force Germany to capitulate ...by destroying Berlin . He was wrong.
If I remember correctly, what he said was 'That some people don't believe this can be done, my reply is that no one has tried it yet'.

It is only in the intense cauldron of actual war, can we tell if the assumptions were correct.

The following is the only part of your posting which I suspect to be wrong.
Besides : if politicians ask military how long their supplies will last , the answer will always be an underestimation of the supplies .A general who says : my supplies will last 6 months will not be fired if they last 12 months, but if he is saying that they will last 12 months and after 6 months,they are exhausted ,what will happen ? We know what will happen .

I have no experience of dealing with or presenting proposals to senior Politicians from a military perspective. But I do have experience of developing and presenting plans to senior civil servants and politicians, their advisors and senior business executives. From this experience its far more likely that the plans are presented with suitable care and include contingency, which is removed or ignored by the Politicians and business executives, because they want to look good.