Japan and the Soviet Union

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The Chines suffered from poor communication. Many of the troops fighting for the Chinese where led by cooperating "warlords"...if one where too assume that that the "re-enforced"-"re-equipped" Chinese would have been a (more) formidable adversary, one would have to believe that cohesion (coordination) between "generals" was improved too...

Their is reason to believe that the Japanese would have used the same "surprise" tactics they where well know for...if they where able to keep the pressure on the Russian airbases (bombing sorties) they might have been able to keep the Russians on the defensive...in the air anyways.
 
The interesting thing about alternative history is that many things could have happened that might not make sense at the present time. After the humiliating defeat of the Japanese on their Lake Baikal campaign they correctly surmised that they could not match the Soviets in artillery, armor and especially logistics. They did change their plans for the invasion of the USSR to reflect this. They knew that a campaign into the Lake Baikal region could not work mainly due to the Trans Siberian railroad being such an excellent way to move man and materials to the region. The Incident at Nomonhan made the Japanese realize that a campaign needed to be shorter and closer to its frontier to succeed. Luckily the linchpin of the entire Eastern Maritime District depended on the Trans-Siberian railway for any resupply due to the terrain of the region as pointed out by Parsifal, it was swampy forest and rugged mountains. The key to the region was Voroshilov, a mere sixty km from the Japanese positions.

The Japanese decided that for the Hachi-Go plan to work they needed 30 divisions to jump off and another10 divisions to continue the plan. They would need to pull 10 divisions from the homeland and another 10 divisions from China to add to the Kwangtung army for the initial phase of attack. And then another 6-7 Divisions from the homeland anda further 3 divisions from China for the next phase. With the campaign being much closer to the sea the IJN could play a huge part in the siege and assault of Vladivostok and the destruction of the Russian navy, airfields and subpens.

The Red Army fielded about 19 rifle divisions, 6 tank divisions, 2 motorized divisions, 4 mechanized divisions, a calvary division and about 10 brigades of rifles. Pretty formidable but at a disadvantage because they had to be spread out from Mongolia to the ocean. Under those circumstances the Japanese could choose how and where to attack. They had pretty good intelligence on the fortifications put up to protect the railway and could find a way to seep through the Soviet lines to sever the Trans-Siberin railway and cut off the resupply of the province from the west.
 
Lucky13 said:
How good were these Russian Subs?
Click to expand...

Soviet subs were cut to pices in in the Baltic, thats true, mostly from Mines. They were effectively penned in from the beginning of the war, and as a result, had lost 12 boats by December 1941, nearly all of them to mines. In exchange for this they had managed to sinck about 80000 tons of Axis shipping.

However judging Soviet subs by their experiences in the baltic or the Black sea will yield a biased result inmy opinion. In the case of both seas, they are very constricted and shallow (as a swede you would know better than I actually), and mines absolutely massacred them as a result. In the far north, there were nine boats, and during the war they managed to sink about 100000 tons of shipping which is not too bad.

In the Pacific, the seas are neither shallow, nor are the Japanese strong in ASW defence. The actual boats deployed in the pacifc include 12 x Serie I/ II/XI/XIII, 30 x Serie III/V/VBis/X and 16 "S" class (or Serie XVI). These were the Soviet "fleet" types. They also fielded at least 60 of the Type VI "Coastal Boats

The broad characteristics of these boats is not as good as either the German or the Japanese, but compared to the prewar US types (with the very significant exception of the Gatos) were equal to or superior to the US types. There is one exception to this. US Boats later in the war were fitted with radar, which was never used by Soviet Subs

The Serie I/II/XI/XIII had respectively the following general characteristics
Displacement: 1354/1372/1400/1416 tons
Speed: 15.3/8.7, 15/9, 16/10/, 18/10
Dive limit: 300 ft (all)
Dive time (secs)30/30/20/20
Endurance 7500/132@2, 6000/135@3 (Serie II XI),14000/130@3.5
(surfaced/Subnerged @sp specified)
Torps: 6/2(14), 6/-, (12)(Types II,XI), 6/2(28 )
(bow/stern/reloads):
Guns All generally armed with a 100/52 deck gun, a 45 mm AA and either 1 or 2 AAMG
Mines Types II, XI and XIII each carried 20 contact mines as an alternate warload


The Serie III/V/VBis had the following characteristics

Displacement: 704 /708/749/708 tons
Speed: 12.5/8.5, 14/8, 12/7.5, 14/9
Dive limit: 340 ft (all)
Dive time (secs) about 18-25 secs for all (Serie IIwere slower, Serie X were very quick divers) 30/30/20/20
Endurance all, typically, 6-6500/105 @3
(surfaced/Subnerged @sp specified)
Torps: 4/2(10) (all)
(bow/stern/reloads):
Guns All generally armed with 2 x 45 mm AA and either 1 or 2 AAMG
Mines None


The Series VI (and related) were small coastal boats with the following characteristics

Displacement: 200 to 351 tons
Speed: 15.7/7.8
Dive limit: 260ft (all)
Dive time (secs) Unknown, but quick
Endurance all, typically, 3000/90@2
(surfaced/Subnerged @sp specified)
Torps: 2 or 4 (Bow)
(bow/stern/reloads):
Guns All generally armed with 1 x 45 mm AA and 1 AAMG
Mines None

The "S" class were the culmination of the prewar building program, and incorporated the following characteristics. They bore a striking resemblance to Type VIIs but larger

Displacement: 1090 tons
Speed: 19/10
Dive limit: 360 ft
Dive time (secs) about 15 secs
Endurance 9500/135@4
(surfaced/Subnerged @sp specified)
Torps: 4/2(12) (all)
(bow/stern/reloads):
Guns 1x 100 mm, 1 x 45 mm AA and either 1 AAMG
Mines None, carried Deguassing equipment

The earlier types showed poor workmanship and design, these were gradually worked out by the outbreak of the war. The Type Is were particulalry poorly designed. Convesely, the Type XVIs were on par with the German Type VIIs, with additional range, speed and protection (from mines).

In terms of manpower, whereas the Black and Baltic fleets were subjected to the effects of the purges, the Pacific Fleet was largely spared, Further it did not suffer from the manpower comb outs that characterised the European fleets. It is reasonable to expect that the fleet would have performed better than in the west. It certainly performed creditably in 1945, when called upon to organise and execute a number of amphibious assaults in the north, against defe3nded targets
 
The Soviets had about 70 subs in the Pacific and they were the number one priority of the IJN to be destroyed, even more important then the bomber airfields, because they would threaten any resupply to the armies fighting on mainland Asia. The Combined Fleet of Japan would try to destroy most of these subs at dock by an airstrike similar to the Pearl Harbor attack. It would be essential to any campaign against the USSR to do so.
 
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Another interesting bit of information is regarding the make up of a division between the two beligerants. A Red Army division was almost always made up of 20,000 men. The Japanese divisions in the early war always had a reserve division organic to each division to replace casualties. That made a Japanese division roughly twice the size of the typical european style division. Though the organic reserve was made up of second line soldiers, usually older men they helped fill the ranks substantially.
 
I admit to getting a little confused about the scenario. I can understand that the Japanese are for the purposes of the exercise to launch an attack in co-ordination with Germany in the summer of 1942 and that the USA stay out of the battle. For this to happen we are using the forces and equipment that were in place.

Should we stray from this all the assumptions are distinctly one way.
 
Crap! Just wrote freaking 3 A4 page worths of stuff and then my internet stopped working so I lost it

To be continued!
 

The Japanese only had an army of 51 Division in December 1941, and 31 of them were engaged in holding China. 14 were in Manchuria, and 6 were earmarked for operations in South east asia and the Pacifc. There were four divs in the Home Islands (some of the southern force units were drawn from China, plus the South Seas and other marine assets of the IJN can be included to increase that 51 to about 53 Divs). However, at least two divs were needed to watch the northern parts of Japan from invasion, whilst the IGHQ was concerned for the safety of the emperor, and allotted one complete Div....the Imperial Guards Div, to his protection.

Quite simply, the numbers you are touting dont exist in the japanese army, unless we are going to start navel gazing like some around here.

Now, as far as being able choose where they could attack, this is another furphy that needs to be put to bed early. There was a railway leading northwest into Transbaikal, intersecting the main reanssiberian line near Chita. From the border to this junction is a distance of 270 miles, and the main railhead in Manchuria, the town of TsiTsihar, is a further 560 miles beyond that. There were some frontier depots and villages, no roads, and couple of camels. There is no way this direction is going to work as an MLA for a 30 division attack.

Then there is the long frontier stretching from the Khentii Mountains in the Northwest to the Amur River near Komsolosk in the east. The Khentii Mountains are formidable, to say the least, there are no roads (it takes four solid days of riding on horseback to even reach the foothils) rising up to a massive 9180 feet, ther is just no crossing this range with any large body of men.

The area between the Khentii mountains to the Amur is dark, mountainous forest no roads, and the nearest railheads are Hegang and Nunjiang, on the manchurian side of the border. These are some 240 miles from the frontier, with the Transsiberian line passing to about 80 miles from the border, at Kubyshev. A 300 mile trek across trackless freezing tundra....yeah right.

In addition ther is the obstacle of the Amur River, which also has navigable tributaries further to the south (and therefore represent a risk to the activities of the Soviet River Flotillas). The Amur is a major river system that the Japanese would find extremely difficult to cross, and even harder to maintain as a supply line. In 1941 ther were no bridges across the Amur, any large scale crossing would need to wait until a reliable bridge had been built, and that would have taken weeks of months, and would have been under extreme threat from Soviet air power and the Amur River flotilla. In 1941 the flotilla boasted 9 monitors, 17 large gunboats and over 150 guardboats (about 60 tons from memory) . It was the biggest river flotilla in the world, and a major obstacle to crossing the Amur. In winter, the Amur is impassable to river traffic, and unsuitable to pontoon bridges and the like. It is, in effect, impassable.

The only real game in town for the Japanese is the eastern flank of this long border, and even here it is limited. The area north of Khanka Lake to the Amur River is low lying and swampy at the frontier, but once again rises sharply into deeply incised mountain ranges further to the east. Once again there are no roads on either side of the border, the nearest railheads are more than 200 miles from the frontier for the Japanese. In short, another nightmare

To the south of Khanka lake, which really a small ocean, again dominated by the Soviet naval gungoats, stretching for more than 180 klms from north to south, lies the only real corridor into Siberia. There are no roads, as usual, but at least the japanese have a railway close by (about 30 miles from the frontier). Here there is a mountain range, rising about 6000 feet here, and heavy fortifications. If they are going to attack it will have to be here, albeit at a terrible cost. There is a lesser route further to the south, along the coast from Chosen (Korea) which is flatter, but mined and again with no roads and heavily fortified. These approaches to Vladivostock are all fully covered by the 12 inch (and smaller) batteries I mentioned earlier. An advance by a large body of men in this direction would need to wait until the coastal batteries were dealt with, and that would take at least a month, if at all

Taking out the Soviet Far Eastern Forcesis simply beyond the capacity of the Japanese.

And for the record, I am a fan of the Japanese military (not their behavioour). They proved their tenacious attitudes and military prowess on many occasions as far as Im concerned. I am no great fan of the Russian, but lets just say I am in a position to know how tough a nut to crack Vlasdivostock is, and leave it at that
 

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Bear in mind that the locations and dispositions of the Japanese military would be much different if the North plan was decided upon instead of the south. This is all speculative of course and would depend upon political negotiations and stealth.

Also if we start delving into the tactical situations such as terrain and the plans to attack the railroad it can get real murky. But realize that in war the situation is fluid and ever changing. I can gaurantee that the Japanese had a plan to nuetralize Vladivistock by cutting them off from their resupply. You simply cannot put the idea to bed by showing somepictures of the terrain. Just like any campaign, the invasion of the Maritime Province would be made up of maneuvering and deception. Those forests and mountains were not impenetrable.

If the premise of the whole thread is; could Japan attack the Soviets while they maneuvered against the US, then no. That is preposterous. If the North Strike Group Plan was implemented instead of the South Strike Group Plan, then they could have been successful and that is precisely what I am writing about. It is also alot more interesting to me.
 
It's been done before, with a far less well-equipped army. And a bunch of elephants...

By now Hannibal had abandoned his Spanish base with his army of 100,000 mercenaries (2) and embarked on one of the most daring maneuvers in military history. He had successfully crossed the treacherous Rhone River (3), avoided a confrontation with the Roman army, and replenished his troops on "the island" by following the river northward... ...he was successfully guided to the foothills of the Alps. Hannibal had now come to the Alpes du Dauphine. Although formidable mountains of from four to five thousand feet high, behind them, miles and days ahead loomed the most difficult part of the march at even higher altitudes and over more dangerous roadways. Eventually, after being ambushed by the shadowing allobroges and a three-day march, Hannibal's army had reached the Durance river valley.
The last and the most difficult leg of the march laid in full view for the army to stare at in awe.
The Carthaginian column now stood at the valley of the Hautes Alpes, the highest and most difficult mountains in the French Alps and the last barrier that stood between them and Italy. They stood and gazed at the giants that lay before them, the peaks of these mountains soared into the sky and touched the clouds. These were mountains whose summits rose to 13,000 feet (1), and stood like an unassailable wall guarding Rome and daring the mercenaries to scale their heights.
 
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Parsifal,

So far we've only been listing the manpower equipment available to the Japanese, so we're not really speculating much in regards to strength. Simple addons to existing equipment can't really be said to be highly speculative under these circumstances either, as based on where the fighting was expected to take place the various equipment available would be adapted towards it as best as possible.

If we were to really start speculating a lot then we might as-well have concluded from the start that if the Japanese planned a land based invasion of the USSR instead of a war in the Pacific, then tank production would've recieved a much higher priority status and thus a lot more tanks would've been produced in the 1939 to 41 time frame. This would also be the most likely thing to occur actually. But for now we're just gonna stick with what was available in 1941 at the time where a war in the Pacific had been the original goal.

Furthermore in the case of an invasion of the USSR, China wouldn't have been given much priority at all. The Japanese weren't importing any meaningful amount of important resources from the place yet anyhow. So it would've really been no concern to the Japanese at that point, esp. as they would know that after the defeat of the USSR an invasion of China would prove a lot easier. All they needed to do was hold on to the areas already conquered, and they had over 2 million reserves ready for that task. Way more than was ever needed. The airforce over there wasn't needed either. It was just about having the reserves dig in and hold the ground already gained.

Moving on..

The Japanese air strength:

By July 1941 around 600 A6M2 Zeros had been produced, of which 400 had so far been delivered to the Navy, 108 of which were used for the raid on Pearl Harbour. Another 200 were stationed in mainland Japan, just sitting there waiting for Navy pilots to come fly them (Sounds cute eh ? ).

But like you already stated the IJN had only a little under 300 pilots for its Zeros, with an extra 100 a/c standing without pilots.

However in the scenario suggested the IJN would be stationing all its Zeros near the Russian east coast, while the entire reserve would be handed over to the IJA, which was a total of roughly 300 a/c, 100 of which were from the IJN reserve.

So combined the IJN IJA could muster around 600 A6M2's for the invasion of the USSR. Half being flown by the Navy Airforce and the other half by the Army Airforce. The Japanese knew that they had one of the worlds best fighters in the A6M2 and would've no doubt wanted them all ready in an invasion of the USSR.

In addition to this around 300 or so newly built Ki-43Ia's were standing ready in Japan. These would've been handed over to the army.

So the Japanese could at least gather roughly 900 new fighters for the invasion of Russia, which would be opposing the roughly 1,400 mixed bag fighters of the VVS. And knowing that the Japanese fighters pilots were in general much superior to the Soviets', this would've proven no hard task for the Japanese. The VVS would've been swepped from the skies in a relatively short space of time. Also while the VVS pilots stationed in the east were destined to later become Guards, at this point in time (1941) they didn't have much experience, and it must also be said that throughout the war the Germans in general didn't notice any real distinction between guards regular pilots, it was all the same to them; There were the occasional good ones, as Hartmann said.

Also lets us not forget the number of Ki-27's, A5M's A4N's available either ofcourse.

On top of this the Japanese also had a good number bombers ground attack a/c ready for operations. These included the Ki-51, D3A, B5M G4M1 etc etc. These would be tasked mainly with destroying Soviet airfields tanks, and once far enough in land also target Soviet production facilities.

The numbers available included:

G4M: >100 (~120)
G3M: >400 (?)
D3A: >250 (~300)
B5M: >150 (~200)
B5N: ~250
Ki-30: 704
Ki-49: >100 (~120)
Ki-51: ?
Ki-46: ~60 to 70

So plenty of a/c were available for role of ground attacks bombing.

Next are the land based forces available to the Japanese;

By mid 41 the Japanese had at their disposal 2.25 million trained soldiers and another 4.5 million armed reserves. All of the trained soldiers would be needed for the war against the USSR, with at least an extra 1.5 million reserves standing ready. ~2 million could be stationed in China over time.

To add to this the trained Japanese soldier was just as well equipped as the average Soviet soldier, and better trained in many respects as-well.

As for armour, the Japanese had amongst others available:

Type 97 Tankette: 557
Type 95 Light tank: ~500
Type 97 Medium tank: ~850

So a total of around 2,000 tanks, not a really impressive number, but these tanks had proven very effective in forested areas, and they were certainly a match for the far majority of the tanks that the Soviets could ever afford to deploy in the east.

So that means that for the invasion of the USSR the Japanese could have available atleast 900 new fighters (+ the older a/c), over 1,000 bombers ground attack a/c, ~2,000 tanks, 2.25 million trained troops 1.5 million armed reserves.

This would be more than enough to take a lot of pressure off the German army in the West while at the same time putting an unsustainable amount pressure on the Soviets.

Next comes the navies, which I'll deal with later, the Japanese had it all over the Soviets there.

But the whole point of the Japanese invasion would simply be to divert as much of the Soviet manpower as possible, letting the Germans do the true damage.
 
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After the Japanese
first began their invasion of China in 1937, in each place the Japanese captured, a collaborationist army might be formed and given various names, such as IJA Assistant Army, Peace Preservation Corps or Police Garrisons and so on. Later on, particularly under the Nanjing Nationalist Government they were re-organized in a system of Divisions, Corps and Armies.
This system would have come in highly useful for policing the Chinese territories whilst the IJA troops they released could be deployed in the invasion, I don't think there'd be a political or military vacuum in China as a result of the invasion. Conceivably, some of these units could be used in the invasion.
 
Lucky13 said:
Knock out the railroad and roads to cut off the peninsula...?
Click to expand...

You are correct. The IJN covers the sea approaches and the rail line should be cut from the north by attacks at Voroshilov and Iman. The Kwangtung fortifications in Miaoling area provide for the attack near Lake Hanka, and push south into the Maritime Province to link up with the attacks in the Mo River area and a spearhead into the rear of the fortified zone near Voroshilov. Cut the Trans-Siberian railway and it renders the Maritime Province as encircled from resupply. The Japanese would hope the the German armies would make the transfer of any army groups to the region from the west, unlikely.

There was also alot of planning into "political" sabotouge after having contact with many dissedants and anti-Stalinists who looked forward to the fall of Stalin. The Japanese knew that the USSR was so large that a military victory over the entire nation was not feasible and looked to the Siberians, Mongolians, and even Serbians for political support.
 
This is getting interesting....


BUT I have a question regarding Russian leadership? How many Generals did Stalin have to spare? Who would he have sent east? So much of warfare rests on (Napoleons) luck...
 
proton45 said:
This is getting interesting....


BUT I have a question regarding Russian leadership? How many Generals did Stalin have to spare? Who would he have sent east? So much of warfare rests on (Napoleons) luck...
Click to expand...
Stalin's 37-38 purge decimated the Soviet high command, many of whom were seasoned veterans...

The purge removed:
3 out of 5 Marshals (equivalent to a 6 star General)
13 out of 15 Commanders (equivalent to a 4-5 star General)
8 out of 9 Admirals
50 out of 57 Army Corps Commanders
154 out of 186 Division Commanders
16 out of 16 Commissars
25 out of 28 Army Commissars
 
.
However, the Soviet forces in the far east were winter trained, and the Japanese would have had a hard time in winter. Now if the attack occured in summer, maybe different


renrich said:
What would have happened if, instead of attacking the US at Pearl Harbor, Japan had only attacked the British in China and Burma and the Dutch in the East Indies and had mounted an attack against the Soviet Union in the Spring of 1942?
Click to expand...


There is one big factor to consider though - the US had a secret deal with the UK the Dutch to enter the war if Japan attacked. It has only been hinted at, but it's the only logical conclusion. In ~1940 the UK closed down the Burma road to avoid conflict with Japan, and in 1941 the Dutch were prepared to sell oil to Japan. Then as tension with the US increased, the UK the Dutch suddenly have a hard-line position - the UK reopens the Burma road, and the Dutch refuse to sell oil.

Now ask yourself, why would the Dutch, having already lost their homeland, want to provoke the Empire of Japan? Why would the UK, seriously in trouble in Europe, not make a deal with Japan to keep out of a Pacific war?

The only reason that makes sense is that their was a Quid-pro-quo. The Allies agreed to go along with Washington's policy, and the Americans promised to support the UK Dutch should they be attacked.

Remember that while the US public was against involvement in a EUROPEAN war, there was coniderable support for action agaist Japan, even before Pearl.
 
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Sorry, but this was not just a "morale boost", it's been estimated that due to huge Soviet tank losses in the summer/fall of 1941, that from a quarter to a third of the tank forces in the defence of Leningrad Moscow in the winter of '41 were British supplied. A substansial number of aircraft were supplied as well, not very many compared to the total, but they were desperately needed at the time.
 
Soren said:
To add to this the trained Japanese soldier was just as well equipped as the average Soviet soldier, and better trained in many respects as-well.
Click to expand...
The average Japanese soldier wasn't nearly as well equipped as the average Soviet soldier but was in many ways better trained with some surprising omissions. For example on the plus side, at the start of the war every Japanese soldier was issued with a compass and trained how to use it which was very unusual. On the negative side, they generally were poor shots and even snipers were only trained to shoot out to 300yards.
The rifle was 6.5mm which even the Japanese found wanting and was in the process of being reissued in 1939 in 7.7mm but both continued in use causing complications.
The LMG's varied but were basically
The type 11 which was very poor and jammed as soon as you looked at it.
The Type 96 which was a major improvement but was in the now obsolete 6.5mm
The type 99 which was the best of the lot and now came with the 7.7mm round.

HMG The best of the bunch was the Type 92 which had a rate of fire of 450 rpm which is low.

As for armour, the Japanese had amongst others available:

Type 97 Tankette: 557
Type 95 Light tank: ~500
Type 97 Medium tank: ~850
Click to expand...

Type 97 Tankette
Designed for a 37mm AT gun which had a penetration of 45mm at 300 yards, however most were fitted with an LMG instead. Max armour 17mm

Type 95 Light Tank
37mm gun 25mm at 500yds with a one man turret that only turned 45 degrees each way, max armour 12mm

Type 97 Medium Tank
Came in two types one with 25mm armour and the other 33mm but with thinner side armour. Most had the 57mm low velocity gun which could penetrate 20mm at 500yards.

Russian Tanks
T26
45mm gun penetrating about 40mm at 500yards, 25mm at a 1000 yards, armour 16mm

T28
76mm howitzer, 80mm of armour

T34/KV1
Need I mention them

To sum up, the T28/KV1 and T34 are almost immune to Japanese tank fire and the T26 has a massive advantage in range.
 

Serbians? Could you explain that with more detail? I assume you made some sort of unintentional mistake. Serbians always had strong pro Russian attitude because of Ortodox tradition and Slavic heritage and affection. Now, its true that as traditionally monarchists Serbians were not much fond of communism and after defeat in civil war and establishing USSR many Russian monarchists found refuge in Kingdom of Yugoslavia (for example baron Vrangel found refuge and later died and was buried in Belgrade). However, I fail to see how this nation could influence the events in Far East while fighting German occupation forces in guerilla war in the Balkans.

Sorry to divert off topic, but I needed to ask that because I was surprised with what Amsel wrote.
 
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