Japan and the Soviet Union

[Juha]

Small additions to Glider's list
T-26, last model, Finns called it T-26C, was that Model 37 or 38, has 25mm frontal armour and IIRC already the older T-26B had 10-25mm turret armour.
BT-5 11.5ton Cruiser type tank, 45mm gun, armour 10-13mm, narrow tracks
BT-7 13,8 tons, development of BT-5, same gun, 10-22mm armour, narrow tracks

And Soviet had more A/T guns than Japanese. And good LMG, some troops had automatic rifles, but those were not usually much liked. Some Finns on the other hand valued highly war booty Soviet semi-automatic rifle.

On generals, there were generals in FE already, IIRC names of some are shown in Dr. Niederhorst's OoBs which Parsifal posted.

Juha

 

[Glider]

There was at least as big a difference in the Artillery

The Divisional Artillery for a Russian Rifle Division when compared to a standard Type B Japanese are as follows:-

Russia
Artillery Regiment of two Battalions each with 8 76mm guns and 4 122mm Howitzers
Howitzer Regiment of 24 122mm Howitzers and 12 152mm Howitzers
Anti Aircraft Battalion of 12 x 37mm and 12 x 76mm
Anti Tank Battalion of 18 x 45mm

Total 12 x 152mm Howitzer, 32 x 122mm Howitzer, 16 x 76mm Guns, 12 x 76mm Anti Aircraft/field gun, 12 x 37mm AA, 18 x 45mm Anti Tank

Japanese Type B 36 x 75mm Howitzers

I should emphasise that the above are purely divisional weapons. Both sides had additional weapons within the Infantry units, I have that for the Russians and will put it up when I have the same info for the Japanese.

 

[Amsel]

Serbians? Could you explain that with more detail? I assume you made some sort of unintentional mistake. Serbians always had strong pro Russian attitude because of Ortodox tradition and Slavic heritage and affection. Now, its true that as traditionally monarchists Serbians were not much fond of communism and after defeat in civil war and establishing USSR many Russian monarchists found refuge in Kingdom of Yugoslavia (for example baron Vrangel found refuge and later died and was buried in Belgrade). However, I fail to see how this nation could influence the events in Far East while fighting German occupation forces in guerilla war in the Balkans.

Sorry to divert off topic, but I needed to ask that because I was surprised with what Amsel wrote.

Hello Imalko, I believe we are still on topic concerning this elusive part of the Go-North strategic plan of the Japanese military. It is an elusive subject as well and I did make an error in my mention of the Serbian anticommunists. The Serbians that were in contact with the Japanese intelligence were in fact living in Siberia and possibly were communists as well. The Japanese learned from these Serbians in Siberia that the Siberians were stealing and hoarding arms for an eventual social revolution against the communists. It appears that the Japanese had agents all over Russia and Mongolia interviewing anticommunist factions. Many of these anti-Stalinists supported the defeat of the communists. This was extremely important to the Japanese to have support from Chinese, Koreans, Mongolians, Siberians, White Russians and very surprising, the anticommunist Jewish paramilitary that lived in the east region.

The Japanese command put as much importance on the political subterfuge as they did the war plans for the North Strike Plan. They did so in case of the failure of Germany to win in the west and just the vastness of Russia itself. The Japanese considered the defection of the NKVD General Lushkov to Japan to be a "gift from the war god" and did in fact use his anti-stalinist contacts to began to build a web of support.

 

[parsifal]

Some understanding of the nature and scope of the war in China is needed here. It appears that some view it as a minor sideshow, in which the Japanese could basically ignore or reduce the scales of deployment in with no ill-effects.

The Chinese war did ultimately develop into a sideshow, but only because the Japanese widened the scale of the conflict, because they found they could not win there. They believed that continued Chinese resistance was due to the support being provided by the western allies the Soviets, and Germany (yep, thats right, the Germans were gunning for a Chinese victory against the Japanese, this continued even after the signing of the Tripartite Pact, just proving, incidentally that agreements with the Nazis were worthless)

Another little political reality that sort of erodes the notion that Japan and Germany might somehow co-operate over Russia was that the 1939 non-aggression pact between Germany and Russia was viewed with great anger on the part of the Japanese, and led directly to some major offensives in China in which the Japanese were heavily defeated ). Under those circumstances the Japanese would never have been properly informed of an impending attack (as indeed they werent.....officialy at least. The Japanese high command was as surprised as everyone by the German attack). So, this notion of German -Japanese coperation before 1941 is basically navel gazing. It was never going to happen...

Anyway, to return to the issue of China, the Japanese are often assessed as having suffered about 1.5 million army casualties. However this is not correct, because it only measures the losses from 1941 to 45. In fact, Japan had been waging war in China, more or less continuously since 1931. Since 1937, the fighting had intensified, and in total Japanese military deaths in the period 1937-41 (excluding operatiuons outside China) amounted to 1.6 million additional losses(they had lost about 200000 before 1937). Thus the casualties 1931-41 amounted to 1.8 million, in addition to those lost after 1941. The Japanese army had suffered approximately 50% casualty rates amongst its frontline formations, which of course had been replaced, but it was these causalty rates that influenced the Japanese to decide to attack the west directly. That (or at least the relaisation that they could not win under the current conditions) plus the threat of the Allied oil embargo (which would have brought them to their knees in less than 10 months unless they did something about it) were the reasons why the war was expanded by the Japanese. Whilst China became a backwater eventually, in 1937-41 it was not viewed that way by anybody.

So why did the Japanese come to believe they could not win, and in fact were facing ultimate defeat if things remained the same as they were. Its not that they did not try to seek a result in China, but from 1939-41 they actually suffered a series of quite heavy defeatsas they stepped up their efforts to achieve a decisive result in the theatre.

The following is a list of the major Battles fought in China from 1937-41. It shows that the battles fought in 1937-38 were uniformly Japanese victories, whilst those fought after 1939 were uniformly Japanese defeats. I have marked the clear Chinese victories by the words (China) after the relevant battle


Battle of Lugou Bridge (Marco Polo Bridge Incident) July 1937 (Jpn)
Beiping-Tianjin July 1937
Chahar August 1937
Battle of Shanghai August 1937
Beiping–Hankou August 1937
Tianjin–Pukou August 1937
Taiyuan September 1937
Battle of Pingxingguan September 1937 (China)
Battle of Xinkou September 1937
Battle of Nanjing December 1937
Battle of Xuzhou December 1937
Battle of Taierzhuang March 1938 (China))
Northern and Eastern Honan 1938 January 1938
Battle of Lanfeng May 1938 (China)
Xiamen May 1938
Battle of Wuhan June 1938
Battle of Wanjialing (China)
Guangdong October 1938
Hainan Island February 1939
Battle of Nanchang March 1939
Battle of Xiushui River March 1939
Battle of Suixian-Zaoyang May 1939 (China)
Shantou June 1939
Battle of Changsha (1939) September 1939 (China)
Battle of South Guangxi November 1939 (China)
Battle of Kunlun Pass December 1939 (China)
1939-40 Winter Offensive November 1939
Battle of Wuyuan March 1940 (China)
Battle of Zaoyang-Yichang May 1940 (China)
Hundred Regiments Offensive August 1940 (China)
Vietnam Expedition September 1940
Central Hupei November 1940 (China)
Battle of South Henan January 1941 (China)
Western Hopei March 1941 (China)
Battle of Shanggao March 1941 (China)
Battle of South Shanxi May 1941
Battle of Changsha (1941) September 1941(China)

The biggest defeat for the Japanese was at 100 regiments, where Japanese casualties ran at 35-50000 men.

Ther are several important observations to be made from all this. Firstly, China was not a walkover. The KMT decreased their levels of activity after 12.41 for the obvious reason that they expected the US to win the war for them, plus their ability to wage offensive war had been severely curtailed after the Burma Road had been closed. If the Soviets had been attacked in 1941, the Chinese can be expected to continue, and intensify their actions, because they could now supplement their re-equipment via the Silk Road through Kazakhstan. To believe that the the Japanese could decrease their level of committment in China, leaving the collaboratuionist armies to hold more of the line, is sheer wishful thinking. The more likley outcome is a renewed effort by the Chinese, particulalry the CCP formations and therefore an increased force level for the Japanese, just to hold the current line. They could try and withdraw from China to Manchuria, but this would only allow the Chinese to advance in their wake, and permit a link up with the British forces, which one could expect to be advancing up through Vietnam.

And this talk of 2000 Japanese tanks does not take into account the losses that had been suffered in China since 1937, or the continued need to provide tank support there as well. The Japanese had lost somewhere in the vicinity of 1000-1200 tanks since 1937 (I can be no more accurate than that).

So this idea of raising another 50 divisions and another 1000 aircraft needs to be balanced against the fact that the Japanese were locked in a bitter struggle that they appeared to be losing, were not aware of the impending german attack (and were never going to be told either),

The other furphy was this idea that the japanese were going to win hearts and minds. Whilst as at December 1941 they had raised collaborationist forces in China totalling 669000 men, these were very rarely risked in battle, because they were so unreliable. 50% desertion rates were not unheard of, with the wepons they carried usually ending up in KMT or CCP hands. After the rape of Nanking, and the deaths of over 20 million Chinese citizens, the sparse populations in Far Eastern Russia were under no illusions as to what they might expect under a Japanese occupation. After the initial greetings, the true intentions of the nazis had soured any real hopes of "turning" the Russian population (though torture, racism and brainwashing did have its successes). This was never going to work in the Far East any better than in the West with the Russian population , in fact past Japanese abuses would probably have returned even less than it did for the germans

 

[Soren]

Parsifal,

Please remember that I only listed three types of AFV's available to the Japanese. The Japanese had been using lots others in China from 1937 on. So the Japanese in all likelyhood actually had more than 2,000 tanks available by July 41.

 

[Colin1]

Amounts of land lease equipment handed over to Soviet Union became huge only in 1943. Before that Allied help went to USSR in much smaller quantities. In September 1941 British sent what they could but this was more significant as morale buster then its actual value on the front.

(Why do we always have to return to this issue is beyond me.) Look at the total numbers of aircraft for example

Conversations with N G Golodnikov Part Four
A.S. I was referring to the arguments that one frequently hears now, that if the quality of our aviation had been better, we could have accomplished what was required with fewer numbers.

N.G. Those who hold this position have a poor understanding of the subject. Numerical superiority with parity in equipment quality and flight crew training is a great thing. It will bring victory.
At the beginning of they war the Germans were beating us, and why? Tactics, radio communications, and so on. But what was the main reason? The Germans were able to create tactical and strategic numerical superiority.
In their initial attacks the Germans destroyed an enormous number of aircraft. The Germans bombed our equipment directly on the airfield and shot us down in aerial combat. What we were unable to evacuate we destroyed ourselves to prevent it falling into enemy hands. This all happened. But there was still another cause that few mention.

A.S. Insufficient training of Soviet pilots?

N.G. No, that's not it. Our pilots were not bad. In fact, we had good pilots and we had outstanding pilots. The main reason was that the Germans captured enormous number of facilities to produce and, particularly important, to repair aircraft. Plus gigantic reserves of spare parts were seized by the Germans.

This is why we did not have enough aircraft in the first half of the war.

The production of new aircraft had fallen sharply and it was impossible to rehabilitate and restore old types in the required quantities. No aircraft! We had to get aircraft from every possible source!
The Germans achieved numerical superiority and did not allow us to catch up. Continuous combat with no time to catch our breath! Losses, of course, occurred on both sides.

First half of the war takes us into the end of 1943, which is a little after your 'failing at the gates of Moscow' scenario.
If the Soviet Union 'had to get aircraft from every possible source' (bar their own, which seem to have been denied them) then where would those precious aircraft have come from, in sufficient numbers, to repel the Germans at Moscow?

Is it not fair to say that the Soviets were being kept on their feet by Lend-Lease aircraft from the US?

 

[imalko]

Is it not fair to say that the Soviets were being kept on their feet by Lend-Lease aircraft from the US?

Short answer: in December 1941 - no. Simple because there wasn't any US land lease aircraft delivered to USSR at that time, but only limited British shipments.

If this is your argument, then why did Germans fail at the gates of Moscow in 1941 if not because of their mistakes, logistic problems and stiff Soviet resistance. Moscow was defended almost completely by fighter units armed with Soviet build aircraft. Land lease equipment was (to my knowledge) mainly used at Leningrad and Murmansk at that time. But again in 1941 Soviets received only that amount equipment which British were able to spare. This was valuable but not decisive.

In 1942 maybe, but to answer that correctly I would have to check for number of aircraft produced in USSR and those received by land lease during that year. First half of 1942 was critical in Soviet aircraft industry because many factories were relocated to the East and only beginning to restart their production. Later in the war land lease aircraft continued to provide usefull service supplementing Soviet aircraft production...

 

[m kenny]

Hkans Aviation page - Sino-Japanese Air War 1937-45

East Asian / Pacific Area Minor Air Forces

Changing* from Donkeys to Mustangs



1931-39 The Japanese Army was issued 1,976 tanks and 167 A/Cars.

1n 1941/42 they got a further 1,941 tanks and 593 AFV's

By December 1941 The Army had 2,200 tanks

From Tank Power 10, Japanese Armour Vol 2

AJ Press TankPower GunPower

 

[Glider]

Parsifal,

Please remember that I only listed three types of AFV's available to the Japanese. The Japanese had been using lots others in China from 1937 on. So the Japanese in all likelyhood actually had more than 2,000 tanks available by July 41.

Not really as the new types replaced the old tanks in the fighting units. They didn't create new units and keep the old ones running. Also as you would expect the older tanks were even worse that new ones.

 

[m kenny]

Of the 70 Divisions used in the Soviet counter-attack before Moscow 11 had been transfered from Siberia. Thus though useful the Siberian's were hardly critical.

 

[vikingBerserker]

That's 16% of the total, not exactly a small force.

 

[m kenny]

Add in the 16 Divisions on the Kalinin Front and the 18 on the South West Front (the left/right flanks of Moscow)and that is another 34 non-Siberian Division.

 

[vikingBerserker]

Perhaps you have lost me then, as I'm not sure how that affects the 11 Divisions transferred from Siberia still representing 16% of the force - which IMHO is a nice chunk.

 

[parsifal]

Just as an aside. I think this has been an excellent choice of topic, and an excellent debate, whatever peoples opinions are. I have learnt a lot from all the submissions

 

[parsifal]

Perhaps you have lost me then, as I'm not sure how that affects the 11 Divisions transferred from Siberia still representing 16% of the force - which IMHO is a nice chunk.

I think what MK is alluding to is that the defence of Moscow, contrary to ppopular opinion, was not contingent upon the arrival of the Siberians. I concede that is rather controversial, but the fliup side is that the germans were so comprehensively defeated that an 11% shift in force availabilty is not going to make much of sa difference either way. Also, that the german attacks had actually stalled before the arrival of the Siberians....

 

[m kenny]

Perhaps you have lost me then, as I'm not sure how that affects the 11 Divisions transferred from Siberia ..................

17 in total were transfered. However only 11 used for the Moscow fighting. 6 were used in places as far apart as Finland and Smolensk. It seems they were not that 'critical' to Moscow and they could afford to spread them around.

And to clear another point up of the 104 Soviet Divisions on the 3 fronts around Moscow 11 were Siberian transfers.

 

[parsifal]

17 in total were transfered. However only 11 used for the Moscow fighting. 6 were used in places as far apart as Finland and Smolensk. It seems they were not that 'critical' to Moscow and they could afford to spread them around.

And to clear another point up of the 104 Soviet Divisions on the 3 fronts around Moscow 11 were Siberian transfers.

To be fair, though, these new formations were fresh, up to strength, and experienced as compared to many of the existing formations, would you not agree. They certainly are given prominent billing in many accounts, relating to the counterattack.

My opinion is that this counterattack could have occurred with or without the Siberians, but their presence facilitated the process so to speak

 

[Glider]

I have added to my previous posting to try and complete the picture.

The Divisional Artillery for a Russian Rifle Division when compared to a standard Type B Japanese Infantry Division are as follows:-

Russia
Artillery Regiment of two Battalions each with 8 76mm guns and 4 122mm Howitzers
Howitzer Regiment of 24 122mm Howitzers and 12 152mm Howitzers
Anti Aircraft Battalion of 12 x 37mm and 12 x 76mm
Anti Tank Battalion of 18 x 45mm

Total 12 x 152mm Howitzer, 32 x 122mm Howitzer, 16 x 76mm Guns, 12 x 76mm Anti Aircraft/field gun, 12 x 37mm AA, 18 x 45mm Anti Tank

Japanese Type B 36 x 75mm Howitzers

Looking at the Infantry component
Japanese
A Japanese Type B Infantry Division had three Infantry Regiments, each of which had

114 light machine guns (LMG),
108 50mm mortars (LMRT) (also known as grenade dischargers.)
24 heavy machine gun (HMG)
6 37mm or 47mm anti-tank guns (ATG),
6 70mm battalion guns,
4 75mm regimental guns

Russian
A Russian Rifle Division in July 1942 had three Infantry Regiments each with
4 x 45mm AT Guns
4 x 76mm Guns
4 x 120mm Mortars
27 x 82mm Mortars
54 x 50mm Mortars
48 x AT Rifles
27 x HMG
168 x LMG

 

[Freebird]

Of the 70 Divisions used in the Soviet counter-attack before Moscow 11 had been transfered from Siberia. Thus though useful the Siberian's were hardly critical.

To be fair, though, these new formations were fresh, up to strength, and experienced as compared to many of the existing formations, would you not agree. They certainly are given prominent billing in many accounts, relating to the counterattack.

My opinion is that this counterattack could have occurred with or without the Siberians, but their presence facilitated the process so to speak

Actually they were more critical than numbers suggest. In addition to being "fresh", they were tough, veteran divisions {the ones that had thrashed the Japanese earlier} not the green conscripts that STAVKA was throwing at the Germans. More importantly, the Siberian divisions were all WINTERIZED. The regular green Soviet divisions were almost as useless as the summer-equipped Germans, but these tough winter-equipped Siberian divisions played a huge role in the success of the attack.

 

[parsifal]

There were experience and full strength units also on the western front. Its just that the Siberians represented an easy access ready reserve of assault troops