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No but you can always use mathematical frames or gapsHi Erich
I am frustrated by the lack of finality and precision in the figures. Doing my best to come up with a balanced estimate of losses for both sides, but I alays knew it would be difficult. Happy to stand back and listen to what others have to say regarding strengths and losses.
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Hello
I'll not bother to open a dedicate "SB possibilities of LW in the East" tread, so a short comment. IIRC LW's June 43 small SB campaign wasn't very costly and delivered some effective blows to Soviet armament industry and PVO wasn't especially effective against those night raids.
Juha
But despite the destructions, the plant continued to live and to work. The largest Gorky factories: лRed Sormovo", лThe engine of revolution", лRed Etna", the aeronautic factory of Orjonikidze and other enterprises were engaged in reconstructive work. Workers, restoring the plant, at the same time increased the tempoes of manufacturing. And on the 18 of august of 1943 all the workshops of the Gorky Automobile plant were working…."
This is rignt, since prior to the Kursk battle there were relentless struggle on EF for air superiority (with field attacks), raids over production centers and communications.I'd say this proves my point. For any SB campaign to be utimately effective, it was be sustained and dedicated, and even then it takes a long time to make a really serious impact. Doublely so if as with the above example you are talking raids at night. As with BC you cannot gurantee that every or even most raids, even with the numbers BC started employing would cause the required amount of damage via Area Bombing. Even in this one example, the long term results of the raid were negligable in the end. Production increased and the more bombers you devote to this task the less bombers are available for vital mission on the front as described in Bergstrom's three volumes.
This is true, i have red in a russian magazine that the means, time and coast were 28 times higher for the TB-7 programm (Pe-8 after Tupolev's arrest) than for a light fighter as an I-15 or I-16.One can argue the LW "missed the boat" back in the 30's when SB was contemplated but its debatable. There were some within the growing Luftwaffe who saw (with far more accuracy than SB's proponents) that a SB campaign's predicted ability to quickly smash civilian morale and/or industry was doubtful.
BTW TB-7 programm was lauched in 1934, it flew in dec 1936 and was not even fully operational in 41.
The B-17 in 1934, flew in 1935, and was not used oparationnaly before 1940.
Actually, i would like to know, what programm ReichLuftministerium would have like to sacrify or slow to develop the strategic bomber mid -30ies. The FW-190, the 109, the Stuka or something else?
And i'd disagree that this isn't OT, so i'm going to cease here. The topic is Kursk and the air war directly over it.
Well, about Strategic raids. Khazanov noticed from march to july 1943 some happy hits by Luft maid on the soviet industry, the best results were the lack of 800 planned Yak-1 from saratov factory during the Kursk battle , and total fail of Luft raids over Kursk communication centers and railroads. About 3 572 trains and 1 71789 wagons went to reinforce both Kursk fronts despide Luft efforts, on the same time ADD concentrated on german communication performed > 10 000 sorties at rear and 2 600 on close stations, considerably slowing german's armies (particulary Model's one) growth. No mention about 2th end 16 VA that performed more than 2 000 sorties on Heer's communications.
As someone wrote:. For any SB campaign to be utimately effective, it was be sustained and dedicated...
In French we say you can't have at the same time, the butter, the money for the butter...and the dairywoman ass!
TE, one has to make choices, sometimes...
Rivet I've a question that research on my part cannot resolve. Where would one find accurate information regarding the ground vehicle motor pools of either Luftwaffe or VVS units involved in the frontline effort during the 1943 efforts we are considering here? It is my believe, just a gut reaction, that operational efforts on both sides were hampered by the need to support the Infantry as a first priority in transportation. Any thoughts/new research venues regarding this aspect of the Kursk?
My thougts, the question is irrelevant, Russia 1943 is not Florida or Clafirornia owerdays. No hiways, no motorways, only spring razputitza (mud) that makes only vehicules with caterpillar tracks could be usefull...and trains.
Otherway, considering 600 000 moto-vehicules delivered to SU by LL, soviets were hugely beatting the germans at this point, even without local production deliveries!
Regards
AFAIK the electricity network was not the Achille's heel of the soviet union but logistics, "communism + elecricity" programm launched by Lenin in 20ies was not just a propaganda slogan. The network was dense and oversecured by old unactivated stations working on peat or wood.But what I meant the "missing the boat" wasn't a heavy bomber development but that just before LW was to be ready to deliver their massive attack on SU electricity generating plants and transferring systems they lost the Orel bulge and so the targets became too distance to the plane they had thought would carry the main burden of the attacks, the He 111H. So no need to sacrifice anything for a heavy bomber designs only earlier execution.
Difficult to say, the SU-76M made it's trials in may of 1943. First were delivered during Kursk battle in july. If the Luft bombing did not stopped or affected the process, it certainly did not facilitate itI would say that more than some happy hits, over 1500 bombs hit the GAZ factory area in Gorgiy. Even if the tank production was not totally stopped, only in Aug 43 they succeeded to surpass the production figure of May 43, so maybe a production loss of 300 tanks, bad to Germans that the tanks were not T-34s but T-70ms. Also the automobile and armoured car production at GAZ was totally stopped for a while. BTW do you know if the production of SU-76M was affected by these raids on GAZ
As I wrote earlier, the CoS of the LFl 6, Friedfich Kless in his post-war study to US Army mentioned VVS attacks on the railconnections of LFl 6 areas, which according to him, didn't produce much problem to logistics On the other hand the increased partisan activity against those lines were more effective in disturbing rail transportation. Of course one must remember that the damage achieved by VVS indicated failures by the LFl 6 and the damages achieved by partisans indicated failures by the Heer.
It seems americans didn't trust him that much, from german collected docs:
Main rail junctions in Orel and Bryansk almost nightly raided Russian air force, - in the German chronicles. - The resultant loss of supplies and materials was immediately felt, as railroads are now serving not only the 2nd Panzer Army, but the prepared operation "Citadel". In Orel station, loaded with rations for one million soldiers, received a direct hit and burned. Spread a fire destroyed the army food store, which did not have time to disperse and whose contents are not moved to an underground storage facility*
*Rear Area Security in Russia. The Soviet Second Front Behind the German Lines. Washington: 1951. P. 27.
Regards