Luftwaffe's ideal night fighter: you are in charge

[stona]

The problems between Messerschmitt and the RLM pre-date the Me210 debacle and can certainly be traced back to the inefficiency of the Augsburg plant,a long time bone of contention between the two. Messerschmitt AG in 1942 was the only major aircraft manufacturer outside the direct influence of the RLM. The removal of Prof. Messerschmitt and everything else done at Messerschmitt to clear up the chaos after the cancellation of the Me210 by the RLM was done,principally by Milch and Lucht,with the full knowledge and approval of Goering.
It wasn't until March 1941 that a Hungarian delegation visited the Messerschmitt-Werke at Regensburg and Augsburg and obtained manufacturing licences for the Bf109G and Me210. According to the licence half of the aircraft built were to be delivered to the Luftwaffe. The Hungarians didn't even start production until the end of 1942,a bit late for our nightfighter. In the period 1942-44 only 302 Me 210s were built by Dunai Repulogepgyar RT. Don't forget that the Hungarians removed most of the armour and reduced the forward firing armament to two MG 151/20s.
It was not a dog. The Luftbeobachtungsstaffeln (Air Observation Squadrons) flew them with GM-1 and 300 litre auxiliary tanks under the wings,at high altitude, tracking and reporting USAAF bomber formations well into 1944. They only suffered one combat loss on 11/2/44.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Siegfried]

"... How is it that the Hungarians were able to use the 210 effectively - all-be-it as a heavy fighter bomber-killer, not a Night Fighter?

MM

The Hungarian Me 210 had the fixes, the extended tail and slats. Why did the Hungarians end up specifying these and the Germans not?

Possibly the Hungarian procurment types had greater technical competance; Hungary punches above is weight in inventiveness. I suspect however Messerschmitt engineers had long solved the technical problem and dare not speak openly of the cost of the fix which would be embarrasing to Managment, the RLM(Reichs Luftahrts Ministerium) and people in high political places who had an agenda. The Hungarians clearly weren't caught up in the nonsense, embarrasment and recriminations. Hence they were able to make clear headed decisions and probably able to obtain the aircraft at Bargain Basement prices, demonstrating its usefullness.

Milch seems to have been of a mindset that mass production of existing types was the only way forward rather than the introduction of risky new types. He did support some new types. He believed that the war was lost if the Me 262 couldn't be in service by 1943 and championed the Ta 154 in part this was his motivation for attacking the He 219 programm which had been placed in production behined his back by Josef Kammhubber.

 

[michaelmaltby]

"... Hungary punches above is weight in inventiveness."



MM

 

[davebender]

Milch seems to have been of a mindset that mass production of existing types was the only way forward rather than the introduction of risky new types.

The historical result is practically the worst that could have happened for the German war effort. A considerable portion of airframe and machine tool industries were tied up while producing only a few hundred Me-210C aircraft. Then more machine tools were used converting the Me-210 production line into the DB603 powered Me-410. Never mind that previous RLM actions insured there would not be enough DB603 engines to support mass production of the Me-410.

It's almost as if RLM intentionally sabotaged the German war effort.

 

[wuzak]

It's almost as if RLM intentionally sabotaged the German war effort.

A while ago I was corresponding with a guy at the RRHT aboutthe Vulture, and I mentioned the DB604 and its cancellation to which he said:

"Don't know much about the DB604 but one of our best allies during the War was the RLM!"

 

[davebender]

20 January 1942. Wannsee Conference.
German Government officially approves extermination of the Jewish race.

FM Erhard Milch was of Jewish ancestry. Goering protected Milch by having him officially declared to be of German ancestry but Milch knew his linage.

April to August 1942.
RLM headed by FM Milch wrecks the promising Me-210C program.

Coincidence?

 

[Erich]

the Hungarians also fitted their Me 210's with the single 3.7cm weapon forward. poor guys were shredded by the US 15th AF.

 

[Siegfried]

20 January 1942. Wannsee Conference.
German Government officially approves extermination of the Jewish race.

FM Erhard Milch was of Jewish ancestry. Goering protected Milch by having him officially declared to be of German ancestry but Milch knew his linage.

April to August 1942.
RLM headed by FM Milch wrecks the promising Me-210C program.

Coincidence?

I would read David Irvings biography of Milch, available for free on Mr Irvings site. Page 168 covers the Me 210.

It's possible to see what Milch was trying to do. It wasn't Milch that created the Me 210 mess though he may have reduced its production run.

"During an angry discussion between Milch, Vorwald and Messerschmitt at the ministry Milch gave the
professor one last chance: the Me 210 was to revert to Voigt's original design.
Ten samples were to be produced immediately, the first six being delivered by April."

Göring later proposed an eventual epitaph for himself: 'He would
have lived longer but for the Me 210.' The aircraft had originally been designed
by the company's leading designer, Waldemar Voigt, but the professor had
adapted Voigt's blueprints to lessen the aircraft's weight and wind resistance.
Although this produced a radically different aircraft, the ministry (in Udet's
time) had ordered one thousand straight away, without waiting for the prototype
to fly. Test models went into a flat spin, side-slipped or suffered undercarriage
collapses on landing (the professor had substituted a weaker undercarriage
than Voigt's to save weight). (one week their were 17 fatalities)


A major dictum revoked by Milch was the heresy that this was to be only a short
war. 'We have to accept that this is a Thirty Years' War,' he warned his own
staff. 'Not that this means it will last thirty years, but we must act as though it
could. I forbid under penalty of extreme punishment any such expression as
that things still under research or development will be too late to be of purpose
in this war.

 

[stona]

Milch's reluctance to develop new types might be conditioned by the continual failiure of the German aircraft industry to produce viable ones. The Me210 is probably the biggest **** up but it is one of many.

I don't think Milch's supposed ancestry has anything to do with this. The German aircraft industry and RLM displayed some surprising incompetence throughout the war. Too much power with the companies (initially) and too many egos at work combined with disorganised and fragmented development programmes.
The RLM's complete inability to match airframes with the requisite engines is a good illustration of the left hand not knowing what the right hand was doing.

Cheers
Steve

 

[riacrato]

The Hungarian Me 210 had the fixes, the extended tail and slats. Why did the Hungarians end up specifying these and the Germans not?

Possibly the Hungarian procurment types had greater technical competance; Hungary punches above is weight in inventiveness. I suspect however Messerschmitt engineers had long solved the technical problem and dare not speak openly of the cost of the fix which would be embarrasing to Managment, the RLM(Reichs Luftahrts Ministerium) and people in high political places who had an agenda. The Hungarians clearly weren't caught up in the nonsense, embarrasment and recriminations. Hence they were able to make clear headed decisions and probably able to obtain the aircraft at Bargain Basement prices, demonstrating its usefullness.

Milch seems to have been of a mindset that mass production of existing types was the only way forward rather than the introduction of risky new types. He did support some new types. He believed that the war was lost if the Me 262 couldn't be in service by 1943 and championed the Ta 154 in part this was his motivation for attacking the He 219 programm which had been placed in production behined his back by Josef Kammhubber.

IIRC the 210 was originally conceived with a longer tail in the early drawings but Willy Messerschmidt thought the 210 was too large and heavy for a fighter, had it shortened and must take most of the blame for screwing up the original 210 design. One must also remember the Hungarians were flying some very outdated designs, so even a 2nd class fighter was better than what they had to offer.

Milch gets a lot of blame from everywhere. He was a man who had to make unpopular decisions with limited information and he didn't have the luxury of hindsight that we do:

- Trying to cancel the He 219 was absolutely understandeable: It was a very modern but expensive plane, but only somewhat better than the existing Ju 88s which were in already in full-scale production.
- Supporting the Ta 154: A cheap alternative with performance about on part with the He 219 (albeit not popular) using lots of non-strategic resources.
- preparing for the big step with the Me 262 and ignoring the small step of the He 280: Debatable, but he tried to have the industry focus on specific tasks instead of every company tring to do engines and airframes. He poorly executed this though.
- the Me 210: see above by Siegfried

 

[Siegfried]

Night defences. The RAF's inability to intercept the Luftwaffe by night led to everybody (even senior naval officers) suggesting just how Dowding should go about his job. The idea you have mooted was presented several times but good old Hugh was having none of it.
Steve

That is quite harsh as the technology wasn't really there; albeit a fast twin engine two or three crew fighter able to navigate at night and have several sets of eyes out would have helped.

 

[davebender]

Whose idea was it to convert the perfected Me-210C into the Me-410A even though DB603 engines were scarce?

 

[davebender]

Albert Speer assumed control of German weapons production during February 1942. He must have been involved in Me-210 aircraft production decisions made between April and September 1942. However he doesn't discuss the Me-210 program in his book.

What was his role in the Me-210C / Me-410A fiasco?

 

[Maximowitz]

Albert Speer assumed control of German weapons production during February 1942. He must have been involved in Me-210 aircraft production decisions made between April and September 1942. However he doesn't discuss the Me-210 program in his book.

What was his role in the Me-210C / Me-410A fiasco?

None whatsoever.

 

[Siegfried]

Whose idea was it to convert the perfected Me-210C into the Me-410A even though DB603 engines were scarce?

I don't know where that came from but the reason is obvious: the Me 410 needed the extra speed to fulfill its day time role. I am not sure as to whether the Me 210C had the deepened fuselage that was introduced to provide the volume for all of the extra equipment needed (avionics) and probably rescue equipment etc. I think it did. A speed of 388 mph for the Me 410 was impressive as was a penetration speed of 360mph at a time the two stage Spitfire and Mosquito had only just entered service. I suspect this speed, which is maybe 15mph less than the Spitfire/Mosquito FB was however equal to those British aircraft at altitudes of around 15,000ft where their superior two stage superchargers were of no relative advantage.
Full pressure altitude of the DB603A was 5.7km ( 19000ft).

However a night fighter Me 210C powered by DB605 offers only slight advantages over the Me 110G2 powered by DB605, there is no speed advantage at all. The Me 210C has more range, an internal bomb-bay (irrelevant for a night fighter) and better rear armament. The Me 110 has good handling, can fit the radar and a3rd crew member.

The Me 410 can push itself into enemy airspace at 360mph reaching peaks of 388 mph with an internal bomb load unaffected by drag of its weapon, dive bomb using its Stuvi 5B computing bombsight and dive brakes; all things the Me 110 can't do.

So the Luftwaffe made the logical choice: Me 410 for daylight use or night strikes, for which it absolutely required the performance of the DB603 provided while Me 110G for night fighrer use with the more obtainable DB605.

It's fairly obvious that the Luftwaffe either needs to dedicate its best engines to the night fighter force in aircraft such as the Ju 88 or come up with outstanding airframes.

It's possible to see what the Ta 154 was about: using non strategic materials and readily available engines such as the Jumo 211 to achieve high performance but that concept was too late, it achieved maturity too late and the the Goldshmitt TEGO film factory for laminating the plywood with a special glue was destroyed just after the first dozen had been produced and thereby permanently crippled the program.

The opportunity to have a super fast night fighter, one that could carry a second crew member and at least some equipment (eg a radar or other electronic seekers but perhaps not both and navigation equipment) was lost when the FW 187 was not put into production before the war started.

 

[wuzak]

FB Mosquitoes never had two stage Merlins.

The Me410 top speed was slightly above that of the single stage Mosquitoes, but less than two stage Mossies. Two stage NFs were introduce later also.

 

[wuzak]

Also, how much equipment could an Fw187 realistically carry? After all, some of the engine instruments were on the engine nacelles....

 

[Siegfried]

The instruments on the engine nacelle either reflects cockpit space issue for fully instrumenting 2 engines or the placement of secondary instruments out of the cockpit.

The aircraft could carry 2 crew (one facing forward the rear) which the singles could only do for training aircraft stripped of fuel capacity. Even if a radar was not fitted the second man can provide vital help in navigation and operating radio and other navigation equipment (eg triangulating to beacons) that allows the pilot to concentrate on instrument flying and fighting in this case the aircraft would be guided by ground radars (eg two Wurzburgs) to visual contact with the enemy aircraft. I agree its not the ideal aircraft from the space point of view but its much better than a single: the FW 187 I only see as a machine designated to intercept Mosquito pathfinders. A He 219 or Ju 88 couldn't intercept a Mosquito, only specialized single seat night fighters could do that.

The Luftwaffe managed to fit FuG 217 Neptune radars to both FW 190 and Me 109. The Lichtenstein radar would have been an easy fit to a FW-187 since the antenna was merely and array attached to a single pole. Neptune was also relatively easy to fit. A 10cm radar would not fit and nor would SN-2 I suspect however a 3cm radar would fit.

 

[Siegfried]

FB Mosquitoes never had two stage Merlins.

The Me410 top speed was slightly above that of the single stage Mosquitoes, but less than two stage Mossies. Two stage NFs were introduce later also.

It's worth considering that the Night fighter Mosquito would have had difficulty intercepting the faster Pathfinder Mosquito and the PRU Mosquito.

Also what altitude needs to be considered. A faster Me 410 that was only faster at high altitude would profit an aircraft that was performing low level attacks very little.

 

[Siegfried]

Milch's reluctance to develop new types might be conditioned by the continual failiure of the German aircraft industry to produce viable ones. The Me210 is probably the biggest **** up but it is one of many.

I don't think Milch's supposed ancestry has anything to do with this. The German aircraft industry and RLM displayed some surprising incompetence throughout the war. Too much power with the companies (initially) and too many egos at work combined with disorganised and fragmented development programmes.
The RLM's complete inability to match airframes with the requisite engines is a good illustration of the left hand not knowing what the right hand was doing.

Cheers
Steve

I think the failures of German procurement have several causes, for some of which there are excuses.

Of course if a type fails to meet expectation an alternative solution should be ready and in this there were managerial failures.

Consider the most damaging
1 Ju 288
2 He 177
3 Me 210
4 Engine performance deficit, especially at high altitudes between late 1942 to early 1944 (a deficit of 1.5 years) during which turbo supercharged P-47, P-38 and duel stage supercharged Merlin spitfires attrition the Luftwaffe.

in regards to the Ju 288 had the Germans succeeded to introduce into service a 400mph (some sources say 416mph) aircraft with 4 crew and an operational radius of over 2000km (1200) miles with 2 tons of bombs powered by a pair of 2500hp engines running of 87 octane fuel on schedule in 1941 or even 1944 they would have pulled of an incredible accomplishment. The aircraft had 4 remotely sighted heavy guns and a pressurized ejectable crew escape capsule.

The engine of course was too ambitious though it seems to have finally been ready in 1944 and in derated form in 1941. Plan B was the DB606 (two paired DB601 engines) whose travails in the He 177 are well known. The DB610 (two paired DB605) was apparently quite reliable in the Ju 288 but the engine produced disappointing performance in range.

It appears that the problems stemmed from two areas:

1 Big weight growth from radical re-engineering from lessons learned from BoB that widened the fuselage, demanded better superchargers, added a 4th crew member and extra armament this made 2500hp instead of 2000hp.

2 The Jumo 222 production was canceled and the engine was put on low priority in December 1941 even though it achieved a successful 100 hour test run in April 41, this killed the Ju 288 since this engine was essential for the Ju 288. It was Milch that killed of the engine in December 1941, thereby also killing the aircraft. He handed over the massive factory built for the Jumo 222 to Daimler Benz to build the DB610 to power the bomber instead but as Daimler Benz was overloaded with work the factory remained empty till the end of the war. This meant no Jumo 222 and no increase in DB610 production so the bomber had no engine.

Development of the engine continued at low priority and it was ready to produce 2500hp as the Jumo 222A3/B3 and the 2700hp Jumo 222E/F at the end of the war. It was expected to achieve 4500hp eventually.

It appears the engine was ready to produce 2000hp in April 1941 having passed 100 hour endurance tests but was not ready for 2500hp even though it could produce 3000hp in short test.

Info from Auto Union und Junkers von Peter Kohl,Peter Bessel

This if you use translation tools is also interesting:
FlugzeugLorenz: Junkers Ju 288

The Jumo 222A/B engine, was in theory capable of propelling the Ju 388 at 410 mph and the Jumo 222E/F at 444 mph so had it been developed at full pace it would still have provided an outstanding bomber anyway. The Ju 188A probably would have had a speed of 345 mph with 2000hp.



***************


The He 177 started development about 1 year before the B-29. Hence if the B-29 performed its first unreliable missions in June 1944 the He 177 should have been doing so in June 1943, which is more or less what happened. The He 177A5 with new DB 610 engines arrived in November 1943 and cured the fire problems (though a3 was still in production).

Of course the RLM gambled the farm with the He 177 and should have had a 4 seperate engine version developing in the background as a backup or another manufacturer.

Had they allowed for seperate engines, which would have meant dive bombing was impossible, they probably would have had a stunning aircraft entering reliable service sometime in 1942 that was free of the He 177A1 and he 177A3 problems and able to use either Jumo 211J or DB605 engines.

Such and aircraft would easily have upgraded with better engines and by mid 1944 would have been operating with DB605AS, DB603 or Jumo 213

As it was the He 177A5 only solved the problems in early 1944.

In reality the Luftwaffe missed its opportunity when if failed to develop the Ju 89.

The Spanish civil had taught the Luftwaffe that level bombing was completely ineffective and that only dive bombing was of much value. The solution of course was better bomb sights not dive bombing but Goering only rescinded the requirement in late 1942.

***************

The Me 210 fiasco seems to have been caused by Professor Herr Direktor Willi Messerschmitt over rulling his chief designer and shortening the tail of the Me 210 by 1m and removing the slats (according to Rudiger Kosin). The other problem was that it had been ordered of the plans with Jigs and tooling made before the first test flight and no one was ready to take responsibility for the faulty design and the money spent on producing an unstable aircraft.

In modern terms this is called 'fast tracking' ie design and construct in parrallel. It is seldom cheaper but it can be faster.

What should have happened is
1 Risk analysis
2 Plan B and Plan C backup running in parrallel. This means building long tail versions and slated versions even if they are not going to be needed and even if it means that the jigging and tooling for the short tailed versions is wasted.

***********]

The engine issue is more difficult to understand, part of it gets down to shortages of C3 fuel i think but it looks like high altitude development was confined to research into ultra high altitude interception (50,000ft) rather than just raising ceiling from 37000ft to say 44,000ft.

The fact that MW50 and the bigger superchargers did not come into service till March 1944 for the Me meant inexperienced German pilots were at a disadvantage at a critical time.