operation sea lion

[syscom3]

I don't see why the number of merchants would matter. When trained, soldiers can execute their orders under fire. In any case, the freighter will be unloaded and back in the Channel the next night.

And a freighter unloading is a freighter thats standing still. A perfect target for a sub or attacking plane.

No, that's why the Germans wanted to land on a broad front in the first place. For exactly that reason.

Which violates miltary doctrine of concentration of force. Your broad front is doomed to failure from the start because you dont have any capital ships to provide fire support, and the LW cant be everywhere at all the time. And stop with this hogwash about your BB's and CA's being there because they will have been disabled early on by mines, torpedo's or gunnery.

British artillery will be firing on preregistered beaches with deadly effect. And theres nothing your LW or KM could do to stop them.

The first assault will happen by assault forces in 1,400 Sturmboote. On the first day, they will be supported by the German warships and bombers.

And all this will happen without air or sea superiority, on a defended beachhead, with your enemy having interior lines of communications, and you without the possibility of providing support at nighttime.

Well, no one was able to explain to me why they managed to get 150,000 men ashore in the first 24 hours, and after that only 1 division every two months.
My guess is that they were concentrating on bringing in supplies and transport vehicles, to mass them together for the final outbreak.

Because hauling armoured divisions takes a lot of shipping. And then you have bring in ever more supplies to keep an ever expanding number of men fed, clothed and armed. And its even more amazing the allies did it using the most advanced logistical methods available knowing they had absolute 24/7 superioity in the air and sea.

Youre also not understanding the problems the Germans had in moving their supplies quickly from the beachhead inland to depots. You had no Higgins boats, LST's or DUKW's. Quite simply, youre just going to jam the beaches with material and it will sit there and be destroyed from British bombers and arty.

The KM also had no "beachmasters" which were the single most important men during an invasion. You have no one with amphib experience in which to direct the loading and disembarkment or incoming men and material.

Everything you have written about this invasion fails to account for the logistics of the matter. Everything so far has run the gamut from "best case sceneario" all the way to the absurd. Youre projecting your invasion on what you want the allies to do, not what they were capable of. And when inconvenient details get in your way, you quote meaningless skirmishes from 1940 and 1941 which were totally different from what was prevalent in 1942.

Remember what I said about trying to compare the invasions of Guadalcanal in 1942 and Leyte in 1944? It certeinly applies here. Tactics and weapons changed rapidly and theres a worlds of difference between an invasion of Crete against a poorly equiped British force and an invasion of England against a vastly larger force that only had to travel a short distance to engage your invasion forces. The channel dash by your BB's? Big F***ing deal. This invasion in 1942 means they will be having to stay and fight and learn some important lessons.....

And supposing that even if all your KM is intact (extremely unlikely) you have so few ships to provide support to your broad front, your invasion force would be at the mercy of the accuracy of the british guns. Hardly an inspiring way to start your invasion.

Think that your LW will always be around for air support? Hah..... a little bit of low hanging clouds and your air support goes to crap. All of your aircraft will take no loss's? Hah..... think again. The allies never had a problem shooting down your medium bombers. Think your LW will be around to cover your KM? Think again. Off Okinawa, the USN had thousands of fighters and an effective radar vectoring system AND still the Kmaikazi's got through. It will be no different in the channel.

Speaking of kamikazi's, ever plan on what would happen if the Brits did ask for some volunteers to actually do that? If my homeland was about to be invaded by a bunch of barbarians, and the only hope of disrupting the invasion would mean for me to crash my plane into a warship or freighter, I certeinly would entertain the thought.

Again, all your plans assume 100% performance from your forces and the Allies to follow your plans to the letter. Your weapons and tactics work all the time, and Allies fail all the time.

Amatures talk tactics. Professionals talk logistics.

 

[Civettone]

I don't know anyone who's claiming the RN was all powerful, or even as powerful as they'd like to have been.

Well, I do read alot of how the Royal Navy would decimate the landing barges, kill of the Kriegsmarine and destroy the invasion forces.
Given their large size, the Royal Navy performed poorly against the Germans.

Actually, the RN submarine fleet was the second most successful in the war, in terms of tonnage sunk for boats lost, after the US.

Kurfürst made the valid argument that the British built so many U-boats to do little with it and you reply by saying they sunk a lot compared to the losses they endured. That's got nothing to do with it.

Btw, how many British submarines operated in the Far East?

Um, no. Websites make notoriously poor resources. The book I quoted is one of the official histories of the RN.

The main reason why some of use online sources is because they can be consulted by all participants in the discussion. I could easily browse through my books and quote what is written. But who can tell that I'm not making it up?
I've actually seen an image of either the QE or the V (can't remember) where she is shown to be resting on the bottom of the port. But she did not submerge totally. Does that mean she sunk?
What's the definition of "to sink"?

What's certain is that Z1 was bombed by the Luftwaffe, and heavily damaged. She began firing her anti aircraft again a few seconds before two more explosions that sank her.

The He 111 made two attacks on the 2. Zerstörerflottille. The Z3 sank while it was trying to rescue the men of the Z1.

Kris

 

[Hop]

Small numbers? You're sending over the bulk of the Royal Navy and that's small numbers?

It's not going to be the bulk of the RN. It's going to be scores of destroyers, a handful of cruisers, and lots of smaller craft.

But they are going to be operating in small groups, not in one mass.

And all in all it's ridiculous to think that the Luftwaffe wasn't capable of directing a 1000 bombers.

Can you name a single case in their entire history when they did?

The most they ever managed against Britain was just over 500.

If the British can launch 1000 bomber raids on a single target, then I don't see why the Germans couldn't.

There's a big difference between a city and a few warships. Cities don't tend to move as much.

What's the point if you can't shoot them at a high angle. They would be defenseless against the German dive bombers.

Huh? Are you suggesting the 20mm, the 2lbrs and the 40mm guns couldn't be fired at high angle? Where on earth did you come up with such an idea?

Bofors mounts almost always had 90 deg elevation, Oerlikons 80+

Well, no one was able to explain to me why they managed to get 150,000 men ashore in the first 24 hours, and after that only 1 division every two months.

Supply, and teeth and tail.

The men who landed on the first day were mostly front line soldiers. The field hospitals, storemen, clerks, drivers etc tended to come later. In other words, parts of several divisions landed on day 1, the rest of the same divisions on subsequent days.

Secondly, supply. All the artillery shells, bullets, grenades, field dressings, food, etc used on day 1 had to be landed again on day 2. And again on day 3, and on day 4, and on and on and on. You can't just land your troops and abandon them.

Churchill said: "At all costs the ships must be intercepted and made to pay dearly for their audacity." That makes me conclude it was top priority.

He said that when he heard they were actually passing through the channel. Bit late to concentrate forces then.

The point is the RN were concerned about Tirpitz breaking out into the Atlantic, not about 3 damaged ships running back to Germany.

Which events? The only thing that I remember is the small force the British had in the Channel and the tumbling organization of the British when faced with a sudden threat.
Both of these elements would probably still be around in the Summer, regardless of the weather.

You think if the Germans have beaten Russia, and are massing troops, aircraft and ships inFrance, the British aren't going to react?

If you change the situation, the response will change.

If you assume the British would have brought in reinforcements for the anticipated invasion, I can also think about what would have happened without Russia in the war and with an invasion of Britain planned. As the Germans would now have 5 times as many fighters in France, As the Germans would now have 5 times as many fighters in France, I don't think they would have moved their BCs to the North Sea.

They moved them to Germany because they kept getting damaged in Brest. If they hadn't moved to Germany, they wouldn't have incurred the damage they did on the Channel dash, but then again the RAF would have continued bombing them. With the threat of a German invasion, they'd have been much higher priority targets, too.

The problem with "what ifs" is that you have to apply the changed circumstances to both sides. If the Germans had won in Russia in 1941, of course they'd have reacted differently. But so would the British.

Compare the British fleet around Crete with the Channel Fleet. Compare the number of German aircraft in Greece with the number which would have been assembled in France.

And compare the RAF presence on Crete (0) with the RAF presence in Britain (many thousands)

The RN operated with no air cover in Crete, against over 600 German combat aircraft. In the Channel they'd be operating against perhaps 5 times as many aircraft, but with far more ships, and an infinitely greater RAF presence.

I think it's a pity you don't take the effort to read my previous posts. Bletchley Park and Enigma has already come up. And as nobody mentioned it since, I think my arguments were convincing that British Intelligence wasn't that all-knowing. They could decode about 20 messages a week.

Source for the 20 a week figure?

From The Second World War by Horner:

The first regular decryption of Luftwaffe signals began on 21 May 1940 but beginning in the summer of 1941 this success was extended to the Enigma keys used by the German Navy, Army and High Command. As a result the number of enemy signals decrypted rose steadily from a few hundred a week during the winter of 1940-41 to 4,000 a day by the end of 1942, and remained at that level until the end of the year.

Edit: Hinsley, in the official history of British intelligence in WW2, notes that 140,000 Abwehr (German intelligence) Engima messages were decrypted (that's just Abwehr messages, and excludes the army, Luftwaffe, KM, high command etc)

They failed to know about the Channel Dash or the outbreak of the Bismarck.

They actually knew about both, of course.

The first hint the British had that Bismarck was about to break out was Enigma decrypts from Luftwaffe Condors, paying unusually close attention to the position of the edge of the Arctic ice sheet.

Next, a Spitfire photographed Bismarck and PE 2 hours after they arrived in Bergen fjord.

Another recce aircraft confirmed next day that both ships had left Bergen.

And the British knew about the Channel Dash, too, although not the date.

First, Enigma decrypts from December 1941 revealed that the gun crews of the 3 ships had been sent for firing practice about German heavy cruisers in the Baltic, indicating they were about to break out.

On 3rd Feb an Admiralty message said "Most probable course now will be for all 3 ships to break eastwards up the Channel towards their home ports"

In both these cases the British knew exactly what the Germans were up to, and even knew approximate dates. And that's when only a few ships were involved. An invasion is going to involve thousands of ships, thousands of aircraft, and hundreds of thousands of men.

It's not going to be a secret.

 

[Udet]

Hop: i really do admire your style of dicussing. I am serious here, meaning i am not joking. Some postings made in response to your comments -although not expressly offensive- try to ridicule your idea, and yet your response always seem to be peaceful, laid back that is.

I admire that.

While you make some good points, there are other of your points which really have no grounds. Perhaps you should accept you do not know everything, and that you can not have a response to everything. Also accept the fact the Royal Navy performed poorly during the war. Also notice there are several good points when dicussing "what ifs" that favour Germany.

I believe the fact Great Britain ended the war in the victorious side makes some people overlook significant details regarding the actual performance of the armed branches of the empire.

Just my thoughts.

 

[Glider]

Granted the RN was building on quantity rather than quality, that was never challanged they had numerical superiority - I wonder how many destroyers were available to the British for home defense, not being in the Med, India, or PTO, or on escorting vital merchant convoys against the ever-present Uboot threat.. The point being the Germans had better naval background in 1942 than in 1940.

Well how many of the invasion force was sunk by the British then...?

Well, the German Naval Command's plan was to invade Norway. They did. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau's mission was to protect the invasion fleet, minimize risking the big ships - they did. Renown's mission was to destroy the invasion fleet - she failed.

For them, there would be no point risking their ships - as you noted they'd feel it a lot more. Perhaps some British commanders would put glory ahead of the actual weighting of gains and losses, the Germans were certainly more calculative and tactical.

Well, they still won, despite the fact they had far less of a force at hand, an amazing achievement. And that was all that mattered. They could afford the losses more than loosing Norway.

Taking it one at a time
I don't know how many would be available but the Home fleet always had its escort which wasn't committed to convoy escort. Generally those used for convoys were the early A-I class, not all of them and it was a changing situation. However the RN had large numbers of the Hunt Class (62 launched by end of 1941) designed for North Sea duties and well armed with DP and AA guns. These would be a significant boost to the British forces. There is no way you can say the Germans had a beter naval background in 1942 compared to 1940. A small number of destroyers against a much larger RN in a situation where to defend an invasion you would have to stand and fightm not run away.

Dumb luck we didn't find the invasion fleet. It was a significant risk and one the Germans were rash to take. The safe option would be to sink the Renown which was well in there capability.

The difference in Norway was airpower. The Germans had it, the british didn't.

 

[Glider]

Hop: i really do admire your style of dicussing. I am serious here, meaning i am not joking. Some postings made in response to your comments -although not expressly offensive- try to ridicule your idea, and yet your response always seem to be peaceful, laid back that is.

I admire that.

While you make some good points, there are other of your points which really have no grounds. Perhaps you should accept you do not know everything, and that you can not have a response to everything. Also accept the fact the Royal Navy performed poorly during the war. Also notice there are several good points when dicussing "what ifs" that favour Germany.

I believe the fact Great Britain ended the war in the victorious side makes some people overlook significant details regarding the actual performance of the armed branches of the empire.

Just my thoughts.

This made me smile. How you can say that the RN performed badly during the war and the Germans did well with a straight face and no facts, did make me smile.

 

[Kurfürst]

Taking it one at a time
I don't know how many would be available but the Home fleet always had its escort which wasn't committed to convoy escort. Generally those used for convoys were the early A-I class, not all of them and it was a changing situation. However the RN had large numbers of the Hunt Class (62 launched by end of 1941) designed for North Sea duties and well armed with DP and AA guns. These would be a significant boost to the British forces. There is no way you can say the Germans had a beter naval background in 1942 compared to 1940. A small number of destroyers against a much larger RN in a situation where to defend an invasion you would have to stand and fightm not run away.

Of course they were in a much better position. They'd have 3 capital ships ready for support, when in 1940, they had 0. They have 19 destroyers ready vs the 10 they had in 1940. Not sure about the number of T-boote. They would have over 350 U-boots, operating from the French bases and Norway, being mostly of modern ocean-fairing types, vs. the about 50 they had in 1940, with half of those being small coastal Type IIs. All the torpedo fuse problems they had in 1940 was long fixed. They'd would have powerful coastal batteries at Calais with 15" and 16" guns.

The subs are simply the scariest prospect for the RN. Since there are about 2 subs available for every destroyer the British may have, spread all over the world, I'd say it would be damn near impossible to get through that cordon in one piece. A single destroyer just cannot chase two subs at one time. If just half a dozen subs manage to get into firing position, the RN losses go up increadibly fast.

Dumb luck we didn't find the invasion fleet. It was a significant risk and one the Germans were rash to take. The safe option would be to sink the Renown which was well in there capability.

It wasn't dumb luck, it was missing the train. Most of the invasion fleet already detached from the protective cover of S+G, the last group departed about 8 hours before in the evening before in the morning S+G run into Renown. I'd guess if Renown shows up a day before, where the transports are still around, they wouldn't disengange, but with their mission accomplished, it would be foolish to risk the only two capital ships of the KM for the gain of what - sinking an old British battlecruiser, one of the many? Especically as both S and G had technical troubles coming up during the engagement with the FC gear. IMHO tactically and strategically, they did the right thing. Even if they would sink Renown, a few hits would be unavoidable, putting out the ships out of action for some time, at the time absolutely nobody knew how's the Norway campaign is going to continue.

 

[Udet]

Mr. Glider: i am glad to know i can make a person smile.

Where in my posting did i say the Germans did well?
I assume you were referring to my ideas in previous posting within the thread.

In short, what i have come to suggest is that the performance of the Kriegsmarine was not as bad as many guys wanto to point out here.

There were several German naval operations which were successful; so i find amazing to read several comments that either ridicule or make fun on the Kriegsmarine potential, warning on some "imminent" and "definitive" Royal Navy intervention that would come to crush any German naval attempt.

Do not forget the value of British seamanship is included in my postings, but i do not see any indication the British were capable of sustaining the naval fight all by themselves.

As you might have noticed there are guys here which simply ridicule any idea which might indicate the Germans could have been capable of launching an invasion force against England.

On the other hand, i have presented facts and opinions to illustrate a bit further on the fact the performance of the Royal Navy, the great western naval power of the time, is far from brilliant as some tend to forget, and that Britain´s handling of naval assets was also full of tragedies, mishaps and desperate/foolish decision making.

Only that Mr. Glider

 

[Hop]

They have 19 destroyers ready vs the 10 they had in 1940.

Just to be clear, the Germans had 16 destroyers in the summer of 1942, not all of which will be serviceable.

Kurfurst is adding 3 more destroyers:

Z37, which was commissioned in mid July 1942. However, commissioning is when a warship is handed over to the navy. It takes some months after that before it is operational.

Gerard Callenburg, a Dutch destroyer captured in 1940. She was commissioned in October 1942, too late for an invasion, but didn't become operational until October 1943 (due to the fact all the equipment was Dutch, and unfamiliar to the Germans)

L'Opiniatre, a French destroyer captured in Bordeaux in 1940. However, she wasn't finished in 1940 when the Germans captured her, and indeed was never finished. All work on her stopped in 1943.

Hermes, a Greek destroyer. Whilst she was operational at the correct time, she was in Greece, and had no way of reaching the Atlantic.

And as for serviceability, Whitley gives the record of 1 German destroyer as an example, Erich Steinbrinck. She underwent a refit and repairs until 22nd March 1942. From then until 12th May she was undergoing trials. On 12th May she suffered turbine damage, and had to go in for a new turbine, which took until 5th August. On 3rd September, she ran aground. Repairs took until 1943.

So in the period in question, she was serviceable from the 22nd March to 12th May, and from 5th August until 3rd September.

 

[Kurfürst]

Any claim is as good as the credibilty of it's claimer. Did you find the names of those 3 Italian BBs sunk by the British - as you claimed?

You fail to address your previous false claims. Why would I believe anything you claim?

 

[Glider]

Of course they were in a much better position. They'd have 3 capital ships ready for support, when in 1940, they had 0. They have 19 destroyers ready vs the 10 they had in 1940. Not sure about the number of T-boote. They would have over 350 U-boots, operating from the French bases and Norway, being mostly of modern ocean-fairing types, vs. the about 50 they had in 1940, with half of those being small coastal Type IIs. All the torpedo fuse problems they had in 1940 was long fixed. They'd would have powerful coastal batteries at Calais with 15" and 16" guns.

U Boats never operated in the North Sea either in WW1 or WW2 without huge losses as the waters are too dangerous. There shallow apart from certain lanes, fast flowing with dangerous sandbanks. Its narrow and recharging batteries alone would be a nightmare as the seas would be crawling with coastal forces who could be guided by radar. Plus of course you are leaving the Atlantic wide open freeing up a lot more destroyers and escorts.

Coastal Batteries never hit a thing and are only good for defence at short ranges, ie the British batteries. Big mistake to rely on them to help you out.

The subs are simply the scariest prospect for the RN. Since there are about 2 subs available for every destroyer the British may have, spread all over the world, I'd say it would be damn near impossible to get through that cordon in one piece. A single destroyer just cannot chase two subs at one time. If just half a dozen subs manage to get into firing position, the RN losses go up increadibly fast.

Half a dozen subs would only get half a dozen shots, not all of which are going to hit.

It wasn't dumb luck, it was missing the train. Most of the invasion fleet already detached from the protective cover of S+G, the last group departed about 8 hours before in the evening before in the morning S+G run into Renown. I'd guess if Renown shows up a day before, where the transports are still around, they wouldn't disengange, but with their mission accomplished, it would be foolish to risk the only two capital ships of the KM for the gain of what - sinking an old British battlecruiser, one of the many? Especically as both S and G had technical troubles coming up during the engagement with the FC gear. IMHO tactically and strategically, they did the right thing. Even if they would sink Renown, a few hits would be unavoidable, putting out the ships out of action for some time, at the time absolutely nobody knew how's the Norway campaign is going to continue.

On this we will have to differ

 

[Glider]

Mr. Glider: i am glad to know i can make a person smile.

Where in my posting did i say the Germans did well?
I assume you were referring to my ideas in previous posting within the thread.

In short, what i have come to suggest is that the performance of the Kriegsmarine was not as bad as many guys wanto to point out here.

There were several German naval operations which were successful; so i find amazing to read several comments that either ridicule or make fun on the Kriegsmarine potential, warning on some "imminent" and "definitive" Royal Navy intervention that would come to crush any German naval attempt.

Do not forget the value of British seamanship is included in my postings, but i do not see any indication the British were capable of sustaining the naval fight all by themselves.

As you might have noticed there are guys here which simply ridicule any idea which might indicate the Germans could have been capable of launching an invasion force against England.

On the other hand, i have presented facts and opinions to illustrate a bit further on the fact the performance of the Royal Navy, the great western naval power of the time, is far from brilliant as some tend to forget, and that Britain´s handling of naval assets was also full of tragedies, mishaps and desperate/foolish decision making.

Only that Mr. Glider

I admit to being one of those that doesn't believe that German had any chance of launching an invasion in 1940 or 42 but I try not to ridicule, I try to point out the optimistic assumptions and bend my views when my information is incorrect or imcomplete.

Both Germany and the UK made errors in the handling of their forces but my view is that the majority of the British errors were forced on the Navy by the actions of others. Crete is a good example. Someone should have decided that we either
A) defend it properly in which case it needed proper fighter forces and integrated defences or
B) abandon it
The powers that be fudged it and the RN was left with doing what it could to help protect the island and ended up evacuating what they could under what were very difficult circumstances. What they did they did as well as any other navy in the world put in the same situation and better than most.
Norway and Dunirk were similar situations

 

[Civettone]

It's not going to be the bulk of the RN. It's going to be scores of destroyers, a handful of cruisers, and lots of smaller craft.

Oh? Given the good weather and having a 1000 bombers flying up to 5 missions a day, I see this force eradicated in two days max.

But they are going to be operating in small groups, not in one mass.

Which makes them even more vulnerable against bombers as you would no longer have concentrated AA fire. Guess what would have happened if the Pacific TFs would have been split up into smaller groups?

Can you name a single case in their entire history when they did?
The most they ever managed against Britain was just over 500.

So that makes you conclude that they couldn't manage to handle a 1000? It's not up to me to prove that they could. It's up to you to prove that they couldn't. Give me a reason why you think they couldn't. I don't see any indication for this. If the allies can do it, so can the Germans.

There's a big difference between a city and a few warships. Cities don't tend to move as much.

1000 (mostly) 4 engined bombers at night compared to more agile aircraft during the day. Remember, that there would be good visibility. As you know you can see Dover from Calais. From the sky you can see groups of ships over a distance of what? 50 miles? Hundred miles? And don't forget that the Germans had specialized reconaissance aircraft with radar to locate these groups.

Huh? Are you suggesting the 20mm, the 2lbrs and the 40mm guns couldn't be fired at high angle?

No, but the DP guns couldn't. That means that the destroyers only had short range weapons with would have meant that their losses against dive bombers would have been unacceptably high: the bombers couldn't be destroyed until they had entered their dive pattern.

The men who landed on the first day were mostly front line soldiers. The field hospitals, storemen, clerks, drivers etc tended to come later. In other words, parts of several divisions landed on day 1, the rest of the same divisions on subsequent days.
Secondly, supply. All the artillery shells, bullets, grenades, field dressings, food, etc used on day 1 had to be landed again on day 2. And again on day 3, and on day 4, and on and on and on. You can't just land your troops and abandon them.

I'm still not convinced. The big majority of troops were soldiers, not docters, storemen, clerks and drivers. Also the supply bit I don't understand. If the amount of troops hardly increased, why would they need more supplies than on the first day? So the amount of supplies for the first-day-troops were already being delivered on the first day and should hardly increase on the following days.
I really don't understand why they managed to go from 100,000 soldiers on the first day to 10,000 on the next.

The point is the RN were concerned about Tirpitz breaking out into the Atlantic, not about 3 damaged ships running back to Germany.

Bomber Command had been bombing Brest for months. The Admiralty, the Air Ministry, the heads of Coastal, Fighter and Bomber Commands had planned to monitor and intercept the ships: Operation Fuller.

[/i]The British had watched the Germans preparing the ships for sea, and realized that there was a possibility of the large Kreigsmarine ships breaking out, and even recognized the possibility of them trying to ruinn the Channel. However, early 1942 was a lowpoint in the war, and the British Military was spread rather thin. Force Z had been destroyed by aircraft, Singapore was about to fall, the war in North Africa was not going well, aircraft carriershad been lost or damaged in the Med. The British response options were... limited.

Admiral Pound had decided that capital ships would not be called in the event of a breakout up the channel. He was concerned about what would happen if battleships came under the Luftwaffe's air umbrella. The Royal Navy's response was limited to:

a gathered flotilla of MTBs from alongthe Channel Coast
One squadron of old destroyers in Harwich
The RAF could offer

Fighter Command units for escort (for which they seldom trained)
Bomber Command's Light, Medium, and Heavy bomber units (which had not trained for Maritime attack)
Coastal Command had three Beaufort squadrons. These were stationed in St.Eval (against a breakout into the Atlantic), Thorney Island, and one moved from Scotland to Coltishall.
FAA could offer a half-squadron of Swordfish torpedo bombers (no. 825) that was training up since the sinking of the Ark Royal. These were moved to the fighter base at Manston.
The selected repsonse plan included a joint operation of torpeedo bombers and MTBs in the Channel at night, which was when they British assumed the Germans would tryto run the Channel, with a backstop of a squadron of old destroyers from Harwich.

Most the on-alert forces were released the morning of 12-Feb-42, since there had been no breakout since the beginning of February.

The RAF ran both night and day patrols up and down the channel. The night patrols were equipped with ASV Mk II, an early surface search radar. As luck would have it, all three aircraft had radar problems that evening/night/morning. A replacement aircraft was sent off Ushant, but by the time it arrived (three hours after the breakout began), the German flotilla was nearly 90 miles away and undetected.

The German Flotilla was only discovered after daylight at 10:00 AM, already approaching Dover. The British scrambled to respond. All thought of a coordinated attack went out the window, as time for coordination was gone.[/i]

Naval forces assigned to Operation Fuller were:

SUBMARINES: Admiral Sir Max Horton, flag officer

HMS H.34
HMS Sealion—Lt. Cdr. G.R. Colvin, off Brest replaced one other H class on 6th February, with the discretion to go inside Brest Roads.

5th Submarine Flotilla, Portsmouth:
1 "U" class
1 "T" class
3 "S" class, including Sealion
1 Porpoise class
1 "R" class
1 "P" class
1 ex Turkish
1 R. Nor. N.
4 Free French
H.M.S. Graph

7th Submarine Flotilla, Western Approaches:
2 "O" class
2 "L" class
7 "H" class
3 R.Net, N.
1 R. Nor. N.
1 Polish

HOME FLEET:

Sir John Tovey refused to risk the one effectively available battleship, HMS King George V, in the Channel, so close to the U-boats bases and Luftwaffe bomber bases.

Of the Home Fleet battleships available in the second week of February 1942:
HMS King George V was watching the Tirpitz;
HMS Duke of York was working up and would not join the Fleet until the end of the month;
HMS Rodney was too slow to catch Scharnhorst, Gneisenau or Prinz Eugen, and was in need of another refit;
HMS Renown (Force H) was in the UK to escort a troop convoy to the Middle East.

PLYMOUTH AND PORTSMOUTH COMMANDS:

At Devonport
HMS Manxman (fast minelayer)
HMS Plover, controlled minelayer
HMS Cardiff, Gunnery Firing Cruiser, Western Approaches
HMS Belfast, refitting at Devonport
1st Destroyer Flotilla and 15th Destroyer Flotilla, employed as coastal convoy escorts. The use of these ships to attack the German Squadron was not considered because of their low speed (25 knots), and the lack (on some ships) of torpedo tubes.

At Dover
Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, flag officer, Dover:
HMS Welshman (fast minelayer)
Dover Flotilla—Lt. Cdr E.N. Pumphrey:
MTB 221—Lt. Cdr Nigel Pumphrey
MTB 219—Lt. Mark Arnold-Foster
MTB 45—Lt. Hilary Gamble DSC
MTB 44—Lt. Richard Saunders RAN
MTB 48—Lt. Anthony Law, RCN

MGB 43—Lt. P.F.S. Gould, DSC
MGB 41—Lt. R. King

ASB 31

Ramsgate Flotilla
MTB 32—Lt. D.J. Long
MTB 18—Sub Lt. I.C. Trelawney, RNVR
MTB 71—O.B. Mabee, RNVR

At Harwich
21st Destroyer Flotilla—Capt. Mark Pizey Harwich, reporting to Admiral Ramsay
HMS Campbell—Captain Pizey
HMS Vivacious—Lt. Cdr. Alexander

16th Destroyer Flotilla—Capt. J.P. Wright, Harwich, reporting to Admiral Ramsay
HMS MacKay—Capt. J.P. Wright
HMS Whitshed—Lt. Cdr. W.A. Juniper
HMS Walpole—Lt. Cdr. John Eadon
HMS Worcester—Lt. Cdr. Colin Coates
The destroyers formed as follows:
1st Division: HMS Campbell, Vivacious, Worcester;
2nd Division: HMS Mackay, Whitshed, Walpole.

Having all these forces put on alert is not caring about three ships sailing through the Channel?
Hop, I don't understand how you draw the conclusions you draw from rather clear-cut information?

You think if the Germans have beaten Russia, and are massing troops, aircraft and ships inFrance, the British aren't going to react?

Where did I say this?
I'm saying that the British were in a lot of problems in 1942: on the Atlantic, in the Far East and in North Africa. They only overcame these when America started to bail them out.
I am more than willing to assume that the British would have reacted differently but hardly anyone comes up with alternative stories. I already gave some explanations on what would have happened if they had given more resources to their own defence. They might lose the battle of the Atlantic or would leave Malta unprotected. Another one is El Alamein. I think it's likely that the British would have lost this battle and with it control of the Suez Channel.

They moved them to Germany because they kept getting damaged in Brest.

That's incorrect. That would have meant that they would have withdrawn all the other surface vessels too as they were just as exposed to the RAF.
Of course it's an argument which played a part but it's not THE reason and I think you know that. The real reason was that Hitler wanted a stronger naval presence in Norway. In all honesty, I do not think that they would have been withdrawn in case of an invasion and with 5 times more fighters to protect the fleet.

Kris

 

[Civettone]

(message was too long so here's the rest)

If the Germans had won in Russia in 1941, of course they'd have reacted differently. But so would the British.

Once again, give me some examples. And don't leave out what they would have given up.

And compare the RAF presence on Crete (0) with the RAF presence in Britain (many thousands)

Many thousands? You're a bit too enthusiastic
And what makes you conclude that the outcome would have been different if the British had fighters? The Germans had about 200 fighters which remained unopposed.
You're logic is flawed as you cannot support that the outcome would have been any different. As such you cannot support that the outcome of Sealion 42 would have been different.

Source for the 20 a week figure?

Well, it was 50...

Here's from answers.com in case you don't believe me: Ultra staff and technology successfully decoded over 50 messages a week. However, by 1942, German radio and wire traffic increased exponentially. The 1,200 member staff of Bletchley Park could not efficiently decipher the thousands of intercepts received daily.

Only with the arrival of Colossus were the British able to decode enough. Why were the British unable to predict when the Bismarck and the Scharnhorst/Gneisenau were going to leave port?
I think that clearly shows that the British could not direct their required information. The messages they decoded sometimes held important information, sometimes it didn't. They were able to get little indications but rarely direct information. Your examples support this: The first hint the British had that Bismarck was about to break out was Enigma decrypts from Luftwaffe Condors, paying unusually close attention to the position of the edge of the Arctic ice sheet.(...)First, Enigma decrypts from December 1941 revealed that the gun crews of the 3 ships had been sent for firing practice about German heavy cruisers in the Baltic, indicating they were about to break out.
On 3rd Feb an Admiralty message said "Most probable course now will be for all 3 ships to break eastwards up the Channel towards their home ports"

In both these cases the British knew exactly what the Germans were up to, and even knew approximate dates. And that's when only a few ships were involved. An invasion is going to involve thousands of ships, thousands of aircraft, and hundreds of thousands of men.

The Germans also knew exactly what the allies were up to in 1944: they knew an invasion was coming and knew the approximate dates...
The Germans were going to be well prepared and use many decoys and tricks to lure the British into confusion. Thinking of something simple like the Channel Dash, I don't think that will be too difficult. If they couldn't even handle such a small scale operation, I doubt they could deal a full-scale battleplan which would take the British by surprise as they wouldn't expect an invasion without a preliminary air campaign.
I don't see any reason why the Germans wouldn't be able to fool the British even if the fact that there would be invasion was clear well in advance. They still wouldn't know if it wasn't an exercise, a distraction manoeuvre or what the target of the invasion would be.

Like Udet said ... it is the "no matter what" operational mode which prevents you from seeing things which could actually have happened but which in historical reality didn't.

Kris

 

[Udet]

This thread has been very interesting so far, but i´ll rest my case now. This ought to be my farewell here.

I would insist on the very fact the Royal Navy, all that size, tradition and experience, was not capable of handling the war all by itself, at all.

As i said, as early as in late 1941 the Royal Navy observed clear exhaustion symptoms; losses had been just too high against an enemy whose navy is most frequently ridiculed and put down.

Facts more than prove it turned out nearly impossible to the Royal Navy to properly guard and secure British operations in the North Sea, Atlantic and Mediterranean...add the Far East and the whole business smells like a nightmare. The Navy of an Empire with overseas possessions that becomes incapable of securing those possessions and operations while in a state of war is a force in decay.

Before you commence throwing eggs, lettuces and rotten tomatoes, i know they had their fine episodes for sure, but it was far from being enough.

Evacuating British forces can be one of the responsibilities included on the Royal Navy procedure manual, but it is not the only one. Prior to the entrance of the USA into the war, the Royal Navy spent a good deal of time evacuating British troops that got beaten on the battlefield.

Do you guys forget the Dieppe Raid? Where was the Royal Navy "doctrine" and "experience" regarding amphibious operations, as claimed by syscom?

It seems like the Royal Navy with all those battleships and cruisers did a lousy job in softening the German defences before the arrival of the invasion troops; upon landing they were promptly annihilated.

Following the logic of some guys here (the Kriegsmarine is a miniscule force, badly battered by the time Dieppe occurred, incapable of mounting any signigicant operations) is that i assume the Royal Navy had "absolute control" of the sea areas around the stormed beaches and there "was absolutely nothing to fear" from the Kriegsmarine. Unbelievable. A critical failure.

I know the RAF was far from being in a comfortable position, since the Luftwaffe had fearsome units in the sector, but what the RAF certainly had was the numbers to put up a braver fight to support the failed invasion attempt. We now the RAF too got beaten, big time. The RAF is awarded the donkey ears too.

In fact, it would seem like Dieppe is the only 100% British-Commonwealth amphibious invasion attempt in the ETO:100% a failure. Not what you´d call a good record.

Again i will bring forward the experiences of the US Navy in the Pacific in the form of a question:

Was there any amphibious operation carried out by the Navy that ended with the extermination of the Marine force landed? I believe the answer to this simple question should be a loud "NO".

As i seem to recall not a single US amphibious operation failed, ever...and please notice i am not referring to Okinawa or Iwo Jima which occurred in a time when the IJN had virtually ceased to exist or was battered in such a manner it no longer implied any sort of significant risk against the amphibious operations. No. The amphibious operations of the Navy in the Pacific were successful even in times when the IJN was still a formidable naval army, including the presence of significant Japanese aerial forces. Not without mistakes, mishaps and losses (that were certainly high), but successful in the end.

Why the success? Sufficient numbers at the right time in the right place and proper coordination between warships, aircraft and the landed troops.

Akcnowledged are the differences between naval warfare in the Pacific and Europe. There is, however, one element that should be common whatever the theather of operations: victory. And it was victory that the Royal Navy proved incapable of contributing to attain without the critical aid of the US Navy in Europe.

 

[Civettone]

That's a worthy final post

I also think we've pretty much repeating our arguments in these last posts. This has been a rollercoaster discussion, at least a page a day!

But I have a feeling it ain't over yet!
Kris

 

[Jabberwocky]

Lets take a look at the Dieppe raid and wonder if the Germans would of/could of done better (or worse) in a Sealion invasion, where they faced a more difficult tactical situation:

The RN attached no vessles larger than a destroyer to Operation Jubilee, and then only 8 of those (out of the 70 or so available in Home Waters), as well as 45 smaller vessels. The destroyers did not have the weight of fire to destroy German defences, or permission to close to shallower waters to provide direct fire support (which would of been difficult as there were no ship to shore communications). Even with such a small naval force, the KM made no more than a token appearance.

The operation required over 200 landing craft for just 1 division, 1 battalion and 3 small commando units. Despite an MGB/ML escort one of the LCT cloumns got scattered and took losses from a by German S-boat patrol, while another was broken up through a combination of poor naviagtion at night and heavy seas. The German's would have a thinner defensive screen for far more lading craft and face heavier naval opposition than the Allies did at Dieppe.

At the actual landings fixed beach defences managed to inflict significant casualties, preventing the landing forces from advancing and eventually prompting them to retreat. The S-boats that had encountered the landing craft had warned the German defences, so that they were prepared. There was no element of surprise. If the original Sealion landing plans were to be followed, the Germans would arrive in a similarly thick defensive belt (around Dover and Folkestone). Given that the LW and WM signal traffic was compromised, having the element of suprise for a 1942 Sealion is unlikely.

Despite overwhelming aerial superiority (70 squadrons of fighters) the Allies lost in the air at a roughtly 2:1 ratio (91 Allied fighters lost vs 48 LuftWaffe aircraft lost ). Pilot losses were far worse: 64 Allied pilots lost, compared to 14 pilots lost from JG 2 and JG 26. The Allies could not completely prevent fighters from straffing the beaches and landing vessels either, as the Luftwaffe began to use the advantages of radar, ground co-ordination and local superiority when they arrive (i.e. picking their fights). The RAF would enjoy a similar advantage over home territory.


Germany is going to face these problems, plus the additional handicaps of no numerial aerial superiority and no numerical naval superiority. Do you really believe they can just brush aside the aerial, naval and land defences with a wave of the Furher's hand?

 

[Hop]

Oh? Given the good weather and having a 1000 bombers flying up to 5 missions a day, I see this force eradicated in two days max.

And in good weather, with 1,000 bombers, in a month in 1940 the Luftwaffe managed to sink a few destroyers and a handful of coasters.

I foresee, given good weather, the AA gunners of the RN warships shooting down all 1,000 German bombers in two days max.

Of course, that's about as realistic as your prediction, but hey, if we are basing things on what could possibly happen, rather than on historical performance...

Which makes them even more vulnerable against bombers as you would no longer have concentrated AA fire.

And yet in Crete, with no air cover, small groups of warships operated under German attack for days. Some were lost, the rest carried out their duties.

So that makes you conclude that they couldn't manage to handle a 1000? It's not up to me to prove that they could.

On the contrary. As the Luftwaffe never managed a thousand bomber raid against any target, ever, it's very much up to you to prove they could. Especially as no air force has ever managed a thousand bombers against a fleet in a day, ever.

If the allies can do it, so can the Germans.

The allies never flew 1000 bombers against a fleet of warships.

1000 (mostly) 4 engined bombers at night compared to more agile aircraft during the day. Remember, that there would be good visibility. As you know you can see Dover from Calais. From the sky you can see groups of ships over a distance of what? 50 miles? Hundred miles?

A hundred miles? Where do you come up with such figures?

And don't forget that the Germans had specialized reconaissance aircraft with radar to locate these groups.

No. The Germans entire stock of ASV radar aircraft in 1942 was a single He 111, fitted with a captured British radar, and operating in the Mediterranean.

I'm still not convinced. The big majority of troops were soldiers, not docters, storemen, clerks and drivers.

According to Dupuy, in US infantry divisions 50% were front line troops, the other 50% were support staff. In German infantry divisions, 60% were front line troops.

However, that's just infantry divisions. Armoured units had far fewer front line, and a much longer "tail". And headquarters units, engineering units etc were all tail.

Also the supply bit I don't understand. If the amount of troops hardly increased, why would they need more supplies than on the first day?

They'd need a bit more in the way of supplies to replace broken equipment. However, the main point is that even with the same supplies each day, you have far less capacity.

Don't forget, the "self loading cargo" (people) is the easy bit. They get off by themselves, and make their way off the beach. The difficulty is the supplies and equipment they need. And they need the same supplies, and some equipment, every day.

Naval forces assigned to Operation Fuller were:

Having all these forces put on alert is not caring about three ships sailing through the Channel?

I don't think you are reading what the source is saying. Those are the forces present in the area, and some forces that weren't even in the area at all. Few of those were "put on alert".

To take a few examples, HMS Belfast is in that list. In Feb 1942 she was in dry dock being repaired and refitted. She didn't become operational until November 1942. How do you put a ship in dry dock, in the middle of a refit, "on alert"?

4 battleships are listed, but the source points out none of them were used for Fuller.

Hop, I don't understand how you draw the conclusions you draw from rather clear-cut information?

The clear cut information is very different from how you are trying to portray it.

Card on the table. Can you tell me the source for the list of British naval forces you posted? Because doing a Google search for one of the lines "HMS Plover, controlled minelayer " comes up with only one site:
Order of Battle - Operation Cerberus - 11-13 February 1942

Now, I haven't bothered going through the list to see if there are discrepancies, but one thing jumps out. You listed all these vessels under the heading:

Naval forces assigned to Operation Fuller were:

That site lists them as:

NAVAL FORCES

Nothing about "assigned to operation fuller". That smacks of a deliberate attempt to mislead.

I'd really, really like to see a different site you quoted from, that says exactly what you quoted.

As to what was actually assigned to operation Fuller. From Engage the Enemy More Closely by Barnett:

Both the Admiralty and the Royal Air Force began to put into operation contingency plans matured over a whole year for dealing with a German dash up the Channel and through the Straits of Dover. Air squadrons were placed at indefinite short notice, while the C-in-C Nore (Vice Admiral Sir George H D'O. Lyon) was requested to reinforce Dover Command with six destroyers and up to six motor torpedo boats. The Admiralty also placed the minelayer Manxman under Dover's orders. The Naval Staff History rightly comments that the striking power of these naval forces "was not great". At the request of the Vice Admiral, Dover (still Bertram Ramsay), six Swordfish of 825 squadron, Fleet Air Arm, at Manston in Kent were placed at his disposal.

That's about it for the naval forces.

That's incorrect. That would have meant that they would have withdrawn all the other surface vessels too as they were just as exposed to the RAF.

It's exactly correct. They withdrew all their major surface vessels, everything destroyer sized and above.

Once again, give me some examples. And don't leave out what they would have given up.

If the Germans were planning an invasion, a few simple changes would be decreased RAF bombing of Germany, and increased attacks on the channel ports, and in particular Brest.

Another would have been moving the fleet out of Scapa Flow if German heavy units were in the south to support an invasion.

Another would be even more mining of the beaches, and even more mining of the channel.

Well, it was 50...

Here's from answers.com in case you don't believe me: Ultra staff and technology successfully decoded over 50 messages a week. However, by 1942, German radio and wire traffic increased exponentially. The 1,200 member staff of Bletchley Park could not efficiently decipher the thousands of intercepts received daily.

Answers.com is a mirror for wikipedia. Anyone can go in and change any of the figures. As such, it's not very reliable.

Can I ask you a question?

You claim that the Channel Dash, a quick run through the Channel by German warships in poor weather in the short nights of February proved the British couldn't stop a German invasion by barges and freighters.

What does the daily running of slow convoys of merchants through the channel in July 1940 prove about German capabilities to stop the RN?

Because those convoys, which ran almost every day in July, are a damn sight easier targets than RN warships at speed. And the German naval force in February was a damn sight harder target than a load of barges and freighters approaching the British coast would be in July.

 

[Kurfürst]

And in good weather, with 1,000 bombers, in a month in 1940 the Luftwaffe managed to sink a few destroyers and a handful of coasters.

Well that's the usual boasting statement but where are the facts?
How many destroyers, how many steamers were sunk? How many of those 1000 bombers were flying sorties against shipping, what % of it's force the LW was committing into the attack? A tiny fraction at best, the attacks on shipping were chiefly performed by dive bombers, and during the July a mere 12 of those were lost to enemy action, and generally German losses being slight, which gives you the idea on the 'scale' of the operations, or rather, initial skirmishes.

Of course your story changes every time. I've seen you argue that the Germans were waging vast scale terror bombing campaign in July 1940 against te British mainland, now when it fits you claim actually they were concentrating on shipping in all July with full strenght. The fiction changes according to the needs.

The evacuation of Dunkeque, which lasted only a few days and saw limited LW action, resulted in 9 destroyers sunk (5 to air attacks), 19 being damaged and put out of service, and over 250 other smaller vessels sunk. That was achieved by, IIRC apprx. 1000 or less bomber sorties flown, in less than 4 days operation.

And yet in Crete, with no air cover, small groups of warships operated under German attack for days. Some were lost, the rest carried out their duties.

In fiction. In reality, the first air attacks were pressed against RN units around Crete on the morning of 21st May 1941. At around 04:30 on the 23rd Cunningham was force to recall all forces to Alexandria.

At this time Cunningham was very conscious of the exhausted state of his men, and the dangers from the air. He signaled the Chiefs of Staff that it was his view that the fleet could not operate off Crete in daylight. The view of the Chiefs of Staff was that the situation on the island could not be allowed to deteriorate further, and the fleet must operate in daylight to prevent the Germans from strengthening their position.

Losses so far in the 3 days; 2 cruisers, 4 destroyers, 1 battleship out of action, 2 cruisers and 4 destroyers seriously damaged. A signal from Middle East to London gave the situation; "Situation with navy critical. Unable to reinforce or supply Crete except by fast warships at night."

That caused by a fraction of the LW's bombers operating against shipping.

On the contrary. As the Luftwaffe never managed a thousand bomber raid against any target, ever, it's very much up to you to prove they could.

Hop, even you should understand that if the LW has well over 1000 bombers at hand (closer to 1500 in fact), then it can be done.

Of course, there's hardly any military target that would require a concentration of 1000 bombers. That's not to say 1000 bomber sorties are not possible.

What does the daily running of slow convoys of merchants through the channel in July 1940 prove about German capabilities to stop the RN?

Well you still owe the facts regarding those convoys to make your point.

Cunnigham found that after 2 days of continous LW attacks performed by a fraction of the LW bombers, he could no longer operate in daylight due to air attacks. Men were utterly exhausted, AA munition was all used up - these are the realities of ships vs. endless air attacks.

 

[Glider]

Before everyone signs off can I ask anyone else who thinks that the Germans could have pulled off an invasion to reply to this posting that I entered a few days ago.
They say silence is golden but these points are pretty important and as far as I can tell often ignored as the those in favour of the invasion working tend to ignore the airforces available to the UK whilst making some big assumptions as to how they are going to increase the number of aircraft available to their own forces.

Kris
Quote
The various info regarding the testing of the british barges and their seaworthiness.

Reply
Many thanks for the info, I need to amend my views, but, and it's a big but, they were not assault craft. It's a huge risk. The quote was from Ian Allen book British Warships of WW2 re the use of derricks and seaworthiness.

Quote
Re the Japanese comments on the invasion plans and preparations

Reply
Its not on line but in a book called the Burning Blue ISBN 0-7126-6475-0. The book is supposed to be about the BOB which contains nothing new but it does have some comments on the American and Japanese views of the BOB including a section on the aftermath including the comments mentioned re the invasion.

Quote
Re the resources assigned to the Channel Dash
The Germans had 250 fighters for that job. In my scenario (with increased production and the fighters withdrawn from the Ostfront) they would have had 5 times more fighters, if not more.

Reply
I realise this, but the area covered is hundreds of times larger and the resources are going to be thin, very thin even with 5 times the aircraft. You yourself said that to keep one unit overhead on a CAP requires 5 in total, I was allowing for a surge due to the invasion.
Using the 1 to 3 ratio 1500 fighters will give you 500 overhead all day and that is pushing it.
If you want to hold back a reserve to support bombers attacking a key area or a RN attack then you have less overhead.
The RAF in May 42 had 42 squadrons of Spits (Squadrons of the RAF) call it 650 planes a number that would have increased with the threat of invasion. 650 alone would be sufficient to give your 500 planes overhead a very hard time as they can attack and retreat at will, choosing their moment. Not forgetting the 21 attack squadrons of fighter bombers mentioned before.
Remember these were in place and are minimum numbers. An invasion threat would have pulled out all the stops.
Remember these numbers exclude the RCAF who were in the UK at the time.

Quote
Even more than three units! So with only 1/5 (or so) of the German fighters destined for CAPs they would form a truly minimal CAP while the bulk of the Luftwaffe would attack the Royal Navy. That's the choice I'm making, that's the gamble. With the bulk of the Luftwaffe attacking the Royal Navy, the RAF would have to choose too. Attack the troops or attack the German dive bombers. My guess is that they would probably try to do both. Do you agree?

Reply
The British have 650 plus fighters to escort the RN and 21 squadrons plus of GA planes to run amok attacking your troops, support vessels anything they can find against minimal opposition. They would have a field day

Quote
The Kriegsmarine was quite capable of dealing with the British Channel Fleet.

Reply
With what?, the BC's are in the Atlantic and you have a handful of cruisers and destroyers. The RN has KGV's, Nelsons, Queen Elizabeth class, numerous cruisers and compared to the Germans, almost unlimited numbers of destroyers. All intent on death and destruction and hang the losses as this is make or break time for the war.

Quote
And I'm just wondering if torpedoes wouldn't go underneath barges??

Reply
Actually they wouldn't go under, but it doesn't matter, one 4in or 4.7in shell would do the job. Torpedo's would be a waste but the MTB's would use them.

Quote
Well, that's exactly what I'm planning on doing. If the Germans can hold on to Stalingrad, they can also hold on to the British beaches for a couple of days.

Reply
Then Germany lose, big time. The key to an invasion, any invasion, is that you build up your forces faster than the enemy.
If the defender wins the race, the Invasion forces are trapped and unable to move against dug in defenders with support.
If the invader wins the race, they break through and get into the rear of the enemy forcing a retreat.
Give the British 2 days and you are trapped, with nowhere to go.

Quote
Where are you going to get those Australians from? Australia decided that its troops would fight in the Pacific. SAAF was already in Africa. So if you pull back the RAF I can also pull back the Luftwaffe?
As such I don't think pulling back your units will do you any good.

Reply
You have said it yourself. If the GAF pull out of North Africa then the RAF can leaving the Italians to face the SAAF. Fair comment on the RAAF but my money is on the SAAF.
It gives the RAF an additional 10 squadrons of Hurricanes, 3 of Spitfires and 4 of Kittyhawks. You now have 31 squadrons of GA planes causing hell while your CAP is close to zero. The German army is going to love you.

Quote
I don't care what the British are capable of. You said the Germans didn't have the minesweepers needed. I showed they did.
Reply
Not quite. You showed me a number which I didn't disagree with, plus I gave a suggestion as to how the difference could have been made up and the basis for my number. I have done more digging and the Germans had a class of Motor Minesweepers called R Boats and these are small naval vessels designed for the job and more likely to have been the cause of the difference. Basically these were the size of an S boat but slower and used for a number of roles including minelaying and escort.
The British equivalent was the Fairmile B, and both were considered as part of coastal forces by the German and British navies.

Quote
Re the ability to destroy the BC in dock
Read Kurfürst post: BC tried for months and couldn't destroy their target!! And you say it's good enough?

Reply
As per my last posting yes, that's good enough for me. 350 bombers would play merry hell in the enclosed landing area.
By the way this is based on Sterlings, Halifax's, Manchesters, Wellingtons, Whitleys and Lancasters in front line squadrons, so my original assumption of 6000lb a plane as payload is on the low side by some margin, its probably around 8-9000lb.
Nowhere have I included the Bostons, Hampdens, Hudsons, Blenhiems who would have done something. Also the first 1000 bomber raid was in 1942 so the 350 assumption is also way down on what would have been possible.

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Re opposing forces at Anzio
Don't change your point. You said the Allies were outnumbered. Do you take this back or not?

Reply
Sorry but I never said the allies were outnumbered. My whole point has been that the Allies had the greater numbers but couldn't get off the beach as the area was under artillery fire and to small to manoeuvre in. Please point out where I made this statement and I will change it.

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Re ability of nightfighters.
In essence you are saying that my premise that having Ground Radar under local control directing the defending British nightfighters onto the incoming German nightfighters wouldn't be a great advantage. This is because the ground radar at the time is not accurate enough to direct the defending fighter to with the radar range of the incoming German planes.
Also that the Me110 had little to fear from the Beaufighter, as few 110 nightfighters were lost to Beaufighters.

Reply
I am absolutely confident that Erich would support my premise because the British had been using this basis for interceptions since Oct 1940 and by May 1942 it was well practiced and very successful. German losses on raids at night over Britain were alarming as a percentage of the planes involved which backs up the scenario.

Over to you, enjoy