operation sea lion

[syscom3]

Digging in to a beach under constant attack, does give you a better position. Plus the British would not need to advance on you, it's the invasion that has to move. If you're contained and dug-in on the beach, you've lost the battle.

Yes!

 

[Civettone]

David, I still don't really understand. You copied an older post of yours to which I already replied. See on this page:
http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/operation-sea-lion-2795-15.html

Seems tough for you to comprehend that BC would be bombing at night on the beaches? And flak isnt going to be a problem because you neglected to bring them for your invasion.

You didn't read my posts. Flak would come along as was planned in Sealion 40. No Luftwaffe Flak but the Flak attached to the divisions.

SHAEF specifically told the AF's (of the Brits and US) not to bomb the beaches themselves as it would create obsticals for the trucks and tanks, and for follow on landing craft.

That sounds strange as the beaches were already obstructed by concrete/metal anti-tank constructions.

And what are your forces going to do at night for heavy artillery?

Digging in.

And what will your forces do during the daytime when low hanging clouds limit the LW?

Blaim the weather guy who told them the weather would be good and try to make to most out of it.

And once your forces retreat for the night, the allies can sail right on in and mine them again.

Yes

The RN could station subs in the channel to be used solely for anti shipping. Hazardous, but well worth the risk.

Got ya! The Germans could place their submarine force in the Channel and sink every Royal Navy that the Luftwaffe fails to sink/neutralize.

Why is your LW not degrading as a force after intense combat and sortie rate?

For the second time in a row, I didn't say it's not degrading. But so is the RAF. And as most combat will happen over the Channel and the German held beaches, the RAF wil lose more pilots per shot down plane than the Germans.

Why is your LW able to defend on a broad front, both your bombers and your own ports and the KM at sea?

I didn't say the LW would protect the troops over a broad front. I said the LW would protect the bomber and only a part would be used for CAPs over the beaches.

Your divisions are all light infantry.

Why are they light?

The Germans wont have any surprise. Theres only a few specific dates you can invade, the weather and sea state dictates whether you sail or not, the resistance will tell the allies whether your forces are boarding the barges, etc, etc.[/quotes]D-Day was to be a surprise yet the Germans also knew when the weather and sea state would have been right. In that case, no invasion is ever a surprise.
The British wouldn't know for sure that the invasion would take place. Until they have certainty their units will stay where they are. Else they'll be moving back and forth every week.

theres no guarentee that the allied navies wont be able to bust through a thin defensive line your navy has set

With the ships the British had in the Channel? I doubt it.

you have no amphib forces to facilitate the rapid movement of supplies from off shore directly inland off the beach.

I disagree.

1941, risky. 1942, failure was guarentee'd.

Now that's interesting. Why were things easier in 1941 than they were in 1942?

Syscom, if you don't have anything new to add, don't bother to post. I'm tired of repeating the same and pointing out that you don't read my post and that you keep putting words in my mouth.
Kris

 

[Glider]

Kris
My mistake I missed it. Time to find me a rock to hide under.

Hi David. I'm going to rush through things. From what year is "Burning Blue"? And what does the title refer to?

It refers to the BOB in 1940. The part I am referring to was written by the Japanese military diplomats based in Germany and the UK, obviously the review of the German invasion preparations was from the German reps.

Spot on! Germans will have to be using CAPs on the first day but if the Channel Dash was an indication, the British were easily taken by surprise and not very well organized. That makes me conclude that on the first day the British won't be able to muster all their aircraft.
From the second day onwards the German fighters will mainly be used to escort the bombers, so no more CAP. (Except for the 250 or so over the beaches). I am thinking about the possibility of forward escorting though. As the Royal Navy would place itself in firing range of the beaches, the German bombers would attack them and the German fighters in their forward escorting style as favoured by Galland would in effect be flying over the beaches. This is not wishful thinking from my point - well that too - but it's the only way it could have gone down.
In any case - given the fact that the British lost twice as many fighters as the Germans in 1942 - I think the Germans would have been able to seriously reduce the threat of the RAF. I also said before, that 1/3 of the barges were expendable (of course after delivering their loads). I don't think this is such a wild assumption.

So from day 2 of the invasion you abondon the CAP over the beaches and in effect give control to the RAF GA squadrons all 31 of them to do hit and run attacks.
As they say in all the bad movies, For You the War is over.
Don't mistake the escort of a bombing raid with a CAP the two are different. The raid lasts an hour or two, the CAP an all day affair taking three units to keep one in the air.
Remember to keep 250 over the beaches takes up 750 of your fighters

Are you sure? I think they had more of them (over 60 in August) though I could be mistaken. Unless you mean 42 in Britain alone?

Certain, the 42 squadrons in May 42 were only those in the UK at the time.

Ok. How many RCAF squadrons were there by 1942?

I don't know, which is why I didn't try to guess or estimate or try to include them.

Please David, I already explained this more than 5 times. The KM would protect and support the invasion of the first day after which it would retreat. As such it will only have to fight the forces which are already in the Channel. The bulk of the Royal Navy was at least a day away from the Channel.
German E-boats were far superior to the British MTBs.

As mentioned before if you abandon the support for the beaches from day two then For You the War is Over

E Boats are technically better than the British boats But when it came to fighting they didn't perform and the British had the advantage and initiative for the whole war.

I agree.
But let's take Anzio as an example again. The allies failed to exploit their numerical advantage and soon they were up against an enemy as strong as they were. They were hard pressed to hold on but they did, for months! I'm only asking the Germans to hold on for two-three days. And in the end ... the Allied army broke through the German lines and conquered central Italy within weeks.

I don't think the German army is going to love me anyhow as I plan on using them as a bait for two-three days.
In any case, German AF was capable of holding off the CW AF in North Africa, so I think moving both forces to the Channel will result in the same stalemate. .

You have just agreed that the Germans by stalling for two/thee days would be trapped.
Remember the level of air attack suffered by the Allies at Anzio was nothing compared to that the Germans would suffer on the coast of the UK.
Remember that the UK could bring in reinforcements more easily that German could at Anzio
Remember that the Allies at Anzio had overwhelming fire support from the sea, which the Germans wouldn't have.
Dare I say it For You the War is Over

So these German boats couldn't have been used along the English coast during the invasion?.

I think they could have done but would be vulnerable to attack being small slow wooden vessels.

No, it's not. I told you that Bomber Command had less than 500 bombers available in the middle of 1942. The 1000 bomber raids were a result of saving of bombers and use them once every month. So sure, you could use 1000 bombers once. Normal availability however was less than 500.
And again, the British bombers would suffer the heaviest night time losses ever, with 300 German night fighters knowing exactly where to find them!

Be fair Kris, All I have ever said was that my assumption is 350 heavy bombers a night, which is more than achievable with 500 available.

Re bomber command losses. Think about it. On the 1000 bomber raid the Germans had hours to track the incoming raid and many hundreds of miles to vector their fighters onto the bomber stream, plus the advantage of Ground director control, plus heavy AA fire and they only shot down 40 bombers. Why on earth would the RAF lose heavily when the Germans have minutes of warning before the planes are overhead, little AA fire and no ground control.
Plus, the Beaufighters would be able to intercept the incoming German fighters.

Losses on the German bombers was high but not on German night fighters, and that's what I was talking about!

I understand this but the RAF nightfighter losses were also small over this period. Sir Issac Newton caused far more losses than enemy fire (accidents) at this time

 

[Civettone]

I see you're resorting to childish behaviour without actually facing the challenge. My point: one ship attacking does not make it a fleet action. Why? Because for it to be a fleet action two opposing fleets must meet in battle, one ship does not make a fleet.

Yes, childish to loosen up a bit. You may call it whatever you want but one ship out of a fleet attacking another ship out of a fleet is a fleet action. Is there a clear-cut definition of "fleet action"?

Defeating the Soviet Union would not increase the German naval assets elsewhere.

Were we talking about Royal Navy or about reinforcements in general? Weren't we talking about moving RAF units from Africa to Britain? Divisions and tanks maybe?

as I mentioned it would take a few days for Force H to sail to the Channel. So, they would not need to be returned as soon as Soviet Russia was defeated.

I don't get it. You'll retreat Force H because the SU is defeated?

I'm sure you do. Pray tell your wonderful plans for shipping your exhausted troops from Soviet Russia and through the Med, past all those roaming Royal Navy and RAF assets?

Exhausted troops? What's this all about???? They fought in Russia so they can't be transferred?
And what about moving troops past Royal Navy and RAF? How did they get troops and supplies to North Africa before?
From all the posts you made ...

It would be nice to increase the numbers Rommel had, but the fact of the matter is you'd have to prepare the exhausted soldiers and ship them to North Africa before the battle.

What? What are you on about? Sending two extra divisions will mean victory at El Alamein and close down Alexandria and the Suez. And in time, the end of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean due to attrition and finally retreat.

It would have been completely different had there been a squadron of Hurricanes or two on Crete. Given that the Luftwaffe used close escort the air battles would rage around the bomber formations, which means the raids would have been disrupted and bombers would have been shot down.

Would the outcome have been different? Can you guarantee that less ships would be sunk?

How old are you? It's like "discussing" with a child. No, I didn't say all the Kriegsmarine had was Battlecruisers, Destroyers and Submarines.

Well, I didn't ask you to discuss with me. The last thing I need is a Brit thinking Britain is still an Empire.
And you were implying that the Germans didn't have cruisers and destroyers as you said the Germans didn't have anything to defend the invasion fleet when its battlecruisers were sent out. How else should I interpret this?

The Royal Navy would deploy more guns, meaning the Kriegsmarine would be out-gunned.

On the first day?

Is that why the heavy Fallschirmjager losses at Crete, around 50% (KIA and WIA), caused a big upheavel in German High Command and with Hitler?

You may know your stuff about British forces, you really need to read up on Hitler and German HQ. Do you really think Hitler cared about those dead soldiers? The only thing it caused was him concluding that FJs weren't as effective as he had hoped. He drew the opposite conclusion of the allies who promptly stepped up the paratrooper program.

Do you even read your own words? Seriously, to proclaim that an invasion would go through without the British having a single idea about the time or place is beyond belief.

I never said they wouldn't have a single idea. I say they could have been tricked and confused by spreading false information, including in the decoded messages. There's nothing sci-fi about that, these are simple precautions which hardly take effort. You have a very limited view of German ingenuity as if they were completely incapable of ingeniouty, always thinking they'll walk right in to whatever trap the British have waiting for them, never giving them any credit to beyong that what you're aware of.

It's surprising you don't fall over more often given that your sense is wandering.

Friendly. Can't win the discussion so why not start that way?

Of course, Kris, all those radar installations would be destroyed just like they weren't in the Battle of Britain. If you look at the Battle of Britain in some more detail instead of simply reading the part about how Britain won, you'd see that the Germans took great effort in destroying the radar chain and didn't do it.

Took great effort? I already dug up the day-by-day air missions and don't see a very concentrated attempt to knock them out. The Germans tried to knock them out but when they saw that the British were still scrambling their fighters in time, they gave up. As many of those radar installations are close to the shore, many would be taken by German forces or at least shelled by them while others could be attacked by German bombers once they had finished neutralizing the RN. That means that the British radars would have to moved to other locations which would surely take time. A similar thing happened in Germany in 1944 when the allies conquered territory up to the Rhine giving away German early radar warning for western Germany.

Actually a lot of the time aircraft would be able to fly some distance before crashing. This gave pilots chance to get back to friendly terrority before bailing. Drowning in the Channel would be a problem for both air forces.

Of course many aircraft would make it back to British territory. But the majority of shot down planes go down instantly which is indicated by the fact that half the pilots of shot down planes are killed.

If you're contained and dug-in on the beach, you've lost the battle.

What about Anzio? They were contained for months and broke out? And it's not like my troops will be contained on the beaches. I was thinking of advancing up to 5 miles in certain areas.
Remember, that these are elite forces as I already said in my first post. This is the most important thing. Numbers don't say it all, it's the training, leadership and experience of troops which matter most.

Kris

 

[syscom3]

You didn't read my posts. Flak would come along as was planned in Sealion 40. No Luftwaffe Flak but the Flak attached to the divisions.

More and more goodies are brought along.

That sounds strange as the beaches were already obstructed by concrete/metal anti-tank constructions.

The metal and concrete obsticals were going to be blown up in place. bringing in specialized bulldozers needed to fill in craters on water saturated soils or in surf was not something the allies wanted to deal with.

But of course you knew that.

Digging in.

Fixed in place and waiting to die.

Blaim the weather guy who told them the weather would be good and try to make to most out of it.

I suspected as much.


Yes

Got ya! The Germans could place their submarine force in the Channel and sink every Royal Navy that the Luftwaffe fails to sink/neutralize.

Perhaps. They might be running for their own lives once the shooting starts. I foresee the RN subs ambushing your subs to deadly effect.

For the second time in a row, I didn't say it's not degrading. But so is the RAF. And as most combat will happen over the Channel and the German held beaches, the RAF wil lose more pilots per shot down plane than the Germans.

Your bombers will by default be over english territory. Did you realize that? And of course, I forgot..... all your pilots are going to be magically blown right into hands of your troops on a small beachhead. So what is it.... your bombers patrolling the sea's for allied ships, or over English territory supporting the invasion?

I didn't say the LW would protect the troops over a broad front. I said the LW would protect the bomber and only a part would be used for CAPs over the beaches.

Well what is it... a broad invasion or a narrow invasion? And now that your dividing your fighter forces, then thats improving the odd's for the allies isnt it.

Why are they light?

Because you dont have the amphib necessary to bring in heavy eqmt in numbers on the first day (small numbers, yes). Plus you have no way to resupply them ona reliable 24/7 basis.

D-Day was to be a surprise yet the Germans also knew when the weather and sea state would have been right. In that case, no invasion is ever a surprise.
The British wouldn't know for sure that the invasion would take place. Until they have certainty their units will stay where they are. Else they'll be moving back and forth every week.

D-Day was a total surprise for the Germans because they didnt know that there was going to be a weather reprive for a couple of days, and thought the storm was going to last a week. And no big deal for the brits to move their forces around on a weekly basis. youre only moving the troops around and not their eqmt.

With the ships the British had in the Channel? I doubt it.

The allies had the warship advantage and if they're willing to suffer the losses, they could send their ships up to your undefended beaches at night and blast you. And then in the morning, your barges and auxilliaries will have to run a gauntlet to get to the beaches. In fact I would plan on an RN task Force sortie from the from the north to engage your KM, and a second task force to come down through the Irish sea and then up to the channel for a night attack on your beaches. Id even have the carrier dive bomber and torpedo bombers stage through land bases and hammer your forces in an sunrise attack prior to your fighters being able to get to station int he morning.

Now that's interesting. Why were things easier in 1941 than they were in 1942?

Playing dumb now?

Syscom, if you don't have anything new to add, don't bother to post. I'm tired of repeating the same and pointing out that you don't read my post and that you keep putting words in my mouth.
Kris

Youre right. Your arguments for your invasion are pathetic, ill considered, poorly thought out and amaturish. And I will keep adding my comments if I damn well like to.

 

[plan_D]

"Yes, childish to loosen up a bit. You may call it whatever you want but one ship out of a fleet attacking another ship out of a fleet is a fleet action. Is there a clear-cut definition of "fleet action"?"

Fleet against fleet defines fleet action, not one ship vs. fleet.

"Were we talking about Royal Navy or about reinforcements in general? Weren't we talking about moving RAF units from Africa to Britain? Divisions and tanks maybe?"

I never mentioned moving RAF units from Africa to Britain. The RAF was already larger than in Britain than it was 1940. The Luftwaffe would not have been larger in ratio to the RAF during your so-called invasion attempt. Divisions and tanks in the millions in France make no difference to the invasion if you can't get them across the Channel.

"I don't get it. You'll retreat Force H because the SU is defeated?"

I can see why you don't get it, I said Force H wouldn't need to be pulled back because the Soviet Union was defeated. If, or when, an invasion attempt was made ULTRA would be aware of the general time and date - if considered Force H could be there in a few days.

"Exhausted troops? What's this all about???? They fought in Russia so they can't be transferred?
And what about moving troops past Royal Navy and RAF? How did they get troops and supplies to North Africa before?
From all the posts you made ..."

I never said they cannot be transferred, but they would need rest and refit which can take weeks. Since they would have suffered heavily in Russia, it may have taken months.

Those supplies going to North Africa suffered heavily at the hands of the Royal Navy, RAF and USAAF. You propose sending more shipping through, which is going to get hit just the same. I'm pointing out the simple fact that while you propose to send all that to North Africa, most will not make it - just like real life.

"What? What are you on about? Sending two extra divisions will mean victory at El Alamein and close down Alexandria and the Suez. And in time, the end of the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean due to attrition and finally retreat."

Two extra divisions? Infantry? Motorised? Armoured? What kind of divisions are you proposing to send? And I see you're 100% sure that two extra divisions (of what, we don't know) will secure victory in North Africa. No, it doesn't work like that. Rommel was out-numbered in tanks and artillery, even two extra panzer divisions would render his tank numbers and artillery numbers less than that of the 8th Army. Since Rommels divisions in N.Africa were under-strength by El Alamein.

"Would the outcome have been different? Can you guarantee that less ships would be sunk?"

I cannot guarantee that less ships would be sunk because there's no way to test it. However, with two squadrons of Hurricanes on Crete the Luftwaffe would not have been unopposed.
With opposition the bombing raids would have been less accurate and transports, bombers and fighters would have been shot down. It's only reasonable to assume that the Royal Navy would have not been hurt as much as it was.

"Well, I didn't ask you to discuss with me. The last thing I need is a Brit thinking Britain is still an Empire.
And you were implying that the Germans didn't have cruisers and destroyers as you said the Germans didn't have anything to defend the invasion fleet when its battlecruisers were sent out. How else should I interpret this?"

Since when did I say Britain still maintained an Empire?

No, I wasn't implying such a thing. But I didn't think it was required to list every type of vessel the Kriegsmarine floated. Obviously I was wrong to assume you'd be reasonable.

"On the first day?"

Yes, the Royal Navy would out-gun the Kriegsmarine from day one to end day.

"You may know your stuff about British forces, you really need to read up on Hitler and German HQ. Do you really think Hitler cared about those dead soldiers? The only thing it caused was him concluding that FJs weren't as effective as he had hoped. He drew the opposite conclusion of the allies who promptly stepped up the paratrooper program."

No, pal, you need to read up on Hitler and the German High Command instead of listening to the clichéd stories of them not caring about life. During the Russian conflict, Hitler constantly complained about the losses suffered right up until he became practically insane in 1944.

And the German High Command always considered high losses unfortunate. While they may not have cared about individual people, any military leader wishes for lower losses. The difference between German command and the West was the simple fact the Germany was willing to suffer heavy losses to achieve its goals.

"I never said they wouldn't have a single idea. I say they could have been tricked and confused by spreading false information, including in the decoded messages. There's nothing sci-fi about that, these are simple precautions which hardly take effort. You have a very limited view of German ingenuity as if they were completely incapable of ingeniouty, always thinking they'll walk right in to whatever trap the British have waiting for them, never giving them any credit to beyong that what you're aware of."

I'm most surprised about the "hardly take effort" part. Have you read about the deception effort the Allies made for Neptune?

You have a very limited view of reality. Germany never knew about ULTRA until after the war, they continued to maintain that their enigma was unbreakable. Because of this the German High Command never took great effort to be deceptive, for that reason the ULTRA team knew about every invasion made by the Germans.

Your invasion would be exactly the same, the British would know. It might be hard to stomach that fact, but Britain knew what Germany was doing and Germany didn't have a single idea about it.

You have the benefit of hindsight, you know about the British ULTRA but Germany didn't. Just think, if you had an encoder that was believed to be unbreakable - why would you bother with deception?

Plus, I'd like to point out that the RAF had the best PRUs in the war. The PR Spitfires took more pictures of Europe than any other aircraft. How do you propose stopping them taking pictures of your invasion build-up and reporting it?

"Took great effort? I already dug up the day-by-day air missions and don't see a very concentrated attempt to knock them out. The Germans tried to knock them out but when they saw that the British were still scrambling their fighters in time, they gave up. As many of those radar installations are close to the shore, many would be taken by German forces or at least shelled by them while others could be attacked by German bombers once they had finished neutralizing the RN. That means that the British radars would have to moved to other locations which would surely take time. A similar thing happened in Germany in 1944 when the allies conquered territory up to the Rhine giving away German early radar warning for western Germany."

The Germans gave up because they good not destroy the radar chain. Radar towers are easily repaired, you need to bomb them day after day to keep them down.
Most of the radar stations were further inland than 5 miles. And since there were chains in Dover and far around, you aren't going to capture them all.

"What about Anzio? They were contained for months and broke out? And it's not like my troops will be contained on the beaches. I was thinking of advancing up to 5 miles in certain areas.
Remember, that these are elite forces as I already said in my first post. This is the most important thing. Numbers don't say it all, it's the training, leadership and experience of troops which matter most."

What about Anzio? The Allies at Anzio were constantly supplied and supported by air and sea. Any counter-attack made by the Germans was smashed by naval bombardments. You have already said you would abandon your troops after the first day.

Elite forces mean nothing when they don't have the heavy weaponary and support. Your forces would be contained and starved out, as you foolishly abandon them in the hope of destroying the Royal Navy.
Your forces would be human like everyone else, storming up a beach is suicidal for anyone. Then you propose shoving these men five miles inland and digging in.

For all the leadership, experience and training - the German troops would be against determined defence, dug in frontline troops, heavy artillery and aerial bombardment. Then you'd abandon them and watch them starve. I'm not saying these troops, if they did make it across the Channel wouldn't be able to push off the beach - but I'm saying that you'd abandon them - and they'd wither and die.

You can't dig in during an invasion, you have to capture ports or bring your own. You have to supply the station and push far enough to start bringing in the heavy guns and armour before the enemy brings there's in. Just because you believe your men are super, British armour would wipe them from the beach unless you get yours in first or provide some kind of artillery support.

Sorry pal, but you'd waste these people.

 

[Civettone]

More and more goodies are brought along.

If you would have bothered to read my posts, you would have known about it.

Playing dumb now?

Does that mean you don't think I'm smart but just playing dumb?

Youre right. Your arguments for your invasion are pathetic, ill considered, poorly thought out and amaturish. And I will keep adding my comments if I damn well like to.

Go ahead, just don't expect me to respond. Goodbye Syscom...

Kris

 

[Civettone]

I never mentioned moving RAF units from Africa to Britain. The RAF was already larger than in Britain than it was 1940.

Must have been someone else who suggested that. I can't remember who said what.

I said Force H wouldn't need to be pulled back because the Soviet Union was defeated. If, or when, an invasion attempt was made ULTRA would be aware of the general time and date - if considered Force H could be there in a few days.

Ok. And I consider them to arrive too late if they arrive in a few days. If you're going to send the Royal Navy in bit by bit, I think it's easier to take these ships out.

I never said they cannot be transferred, but they would need rest and refit which can take weeks. Since they would have suffered heavily in Russia, it may have taken months.

No, German divisions were usually moved from one front to another without R&R. German HQ didn't require their divisions to up to full strength. They would rather take two divisions at half-strength than to get one up to full strength. And that worked out fine.

Those supplies going to North Africa suffered heavily at the hands of the Royal Navy, RAF and USAAF. You propose sending more shipping through, which is going to get hit just the same. I'm pointing out the simple fact that while you propose to send all that to North Africa, most will not make it - just like real life.

This is simply not true. You're probably confusing it with late 1942 when the allies stopped supplies reaching Tunisia.
And especially with Malta being isolated (again), I don't see much in the way of getting more forces across with less losses during transfer.

Two extra divisions? Infantry? Motorised? Armoured? What kind of divisions are you proposing to send? And I see you're 100% sure that two extra divisions (of what, we don't know) will secure victory in North Africa. No, it doesn't work like that. Rommel was out-numbered in tanks and artillery, even two extra panzer divisions would render his tank numbers and artillery numbers less than that of the 8th Army. Since Rommels divisions in N.Africa were under-strength by El Alamein.

I was thinking of one PzDiv and one InfDiv. How many divisions did Rommel have in 1942? How close was he to victory with those?

It's only reasonable to assume that the Royal Navy would have not been hurt as much as it was.

Two squadrons versus 200 German fighters as escort? Disrupting the bombers at the same time they're attacking the ships? I think the result would have been negligable.

Since when did I say Britain still maintained an Empire?

Just a joke. I'm childish, remember?

No, pal, you need to read up on Hitler and the German High Command instead of listening to the clichéd stories of them not caring about life. During the Russian conflict, Hitler constantly complained about the losses suffered right up until he became practically insane in 1944.

The only reason why he complained about losses was because it reduced the battle strength of the army.
Here's one word for you: Stalingrad.

The difference between German command and the West was the simple fact the Germany was willing to suffer heavy losses to achieve its goals.

That's what I was saying!!

I'm most surprised about the "hardly take effort" part. Have you read about the deception effort the Allies made for Neptune?

Again, a typical example of how you make Neptune a standard. Had the allies done half of their deception the same result would have been achieved. 135 out 136 SS intelligence reports said the invasion would take place outside of Normandy.
But how much resources did it take for the allies? How many divisions and tanks were given up to achieve this goal?
All I'm saying is that the Germans could have deceived the British without too much effort.

You have a very limited view of reality. Germany never knew about ULTRA until after the war, they continued to maintain that their enigma was unbreakable. Because of this the German High Command never took great effort to be deceptive, for that reason the ULTRA team knew about every invasion made by the Germans.

Didn't they change the Enigma a couple of times? Germans after the war said they thought it would have been possible to break the code but that the allies wouldn't go to the trouble of decoding all of their messages.
Tell me, did the allies know EVERYTHING which was wired by the Germans? The answer is no though you're 100 % sure the British would know everything about Sealion 42.
On the Eastern Front the Germans did their best to deceive the Russians as to where their troops were, about commanders, about false reports. I'm also thinking of the great deception plans prior to May 10 when they spread false plans in Belgium (together with the real ones one time by mistake.) To believe that the Germans didn't go to great lengths to deceive enemy intelligence, makes it clear to me that you know little

How do you propose stopping them taking pictures of your invasion build-up and reporting it?

We've been through that before. I do think the British would have photographed the lot. But then there's the matter of interpretation. The British would know the Germans were going to invade and that they were assembling their invasion forces. I already said that. But the Germans could deceive the British. To name one way, they could sail a couple of times before as an exercise.

The Germans gave up because they good not destroy the radar chain. Radar towers are easily repaired, you need to bomb them day after day to keep them down.
Most of the radar stations were further inland than 5 miles. And since there were chains in Dover and far around, you aren't going to capture them all.

Typical. So now I need to destroy all of them to get a result? Why were there so many radar installations if only a few were needed?
And how many were in range of artillery and naval guns?

What about Anzio? The Allies at Anzio were constantly supplied and supported by air and sea.

And yet I'm only saying the Germans would have to hold out for two-three days. To say that it was the naval guns that saved them is simplistic. It contributed but it was not the main factor. Infantry and aircraft were more important.

Elite forces mean nothing when they don't have the heavy weaponary and support. Your forces would be contained and starved out, as you foolishly abandon them in the hope of destroying the Royal Navy.

Starved after two days? Elite forces mean nothing if they don't have support? You're getting desperate in your arguments.

Kris

 

[daishi12]

Hi Kris,
Just checked through the latest posts, could you please reply to my post on page 18 of this thread?


As an alternative theory for the invasion of Britain in 1942, in my opinion, the following criteria would need to be met:-

1/ Churchill has either stroke or heart attack in 1938 and died then.
2/ Goering is removed as head of LW at about the same time and is replaced with someone as brilliant as Doenitz
3/ Germany invades Poland, France, the Netherlands, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Norway.
4/ Britain ignores the treaty of Versaille and carries on the appeasement policy and as such does not have a force in Northern France during the invasion.

The above preconditions allow Germany to strengthen all aspects of it's military, including a massive increase in it's U-boat fleet and surface ships.

During the late part 1941, Germany declares war against Britain and launches massive anti-shipping raids to force a near capitulation of Britain due to lack of supplies.

During the summer of 42 a massive invasion is launched utilising all the men and equipment which had either been saved from not invading Russia or from the build up of the military from 1939.

As I say this is just my opinion which would give Germany the best opportunity to invade the UK

 

[Hop]

Are you saying 5 missions a day is impossible?

For very small numbers of aircraft, for very short period, on very short missions, it's possible. For large numbers, no.

No, that's still not the reason why the Germans shot down twice as many fighters as the British did. What's the difference in dogfighting over Britain or dogfighting over France? I see three differences: fighting time, AA ground fire and pilots being captured when shot down.

The biggest difference is what you do when you don't have advantage. I read recently of a British squadron sent to intercept a German raid during the BoB. There were over 100 bombers, and over 100 fighters escorting them, and 9 British fighters. They were also below the Germans.

3 fighters were climbed to engage the German fighters, the other 6 climbed to engage the bombers.

The reason for semi-suicidal actions like that is the British had to defend against the German raids. In France in 1941 and 1942, the Germans didn't have to defend. If they couldn't attack with advantage, they didn't attack at all.

But as I said, the bulk of the Luftwaffe would have been called back from the Ostfront and have confronted the RAF. As the Germans shot down twice as many as they lost,

Whilst the British were carrying out fighter sweeps over France. That's likely to be one of the first things that changes if the Germans bring the rest of the Luftwaffe back to France.

and they only had 250 fighters in France,

They didn't. Hooton in Eagle in Flames gives the German day fighter force in Western Europe as a low of 430 in Sept 41, rising steadily to 636 by the end of 1942. There were 564 in mid 1942.

Hooton also gives sortie figures. For the second half of 1941, Fighter Command flew 20,495 offensive day fighter sorties, the Luftwaffe scrambled 16,150 day fighters in response.

I'm not going to state that the British would have lost 5 times more fighters but I don't see how one can disagree that British losses would have been much higher.

Only they had that many fighters in July 1940, and still lost. And Fighter Command had expanded greatly since the BoB.

Now you make it sound as if 3,000 aircraft were trying to sink ships over a month. Their primary mission was not to sink ships and how many of those aircraft were bombers capable of sinking ships?
And again, they weren't trained in anti-shipping.

Exactly the same will be true in 1942.

It seems you make the BoB the standard for all Luftwaffe operations. The BoB was going to last for a longer period.If the Germans were planning on keeping up the offensive, they couldn't fly too many sorties.

The BoB was planned to destroy the RAF in a matter of days (5, iirc).

German bombers could fly up to 5 short-range missions a day. That's perhaps not your reality but unfortunately it's historical reality. I suggest you read up on Luftwaffe operations on the Eastern Front.

Maximum effort is not the same as average effort. Hooton quotes a British study on Luftwaffe efforts on the eastern front. The Luftwaffe rarely had more than 2500 aircraft in Russia between June and October, but averaged 1,200 sorties a day. Sometimes as many as 2000 sorties were flown per day.

Stuka units sometimes averaged 75% sortie rate (ie 75 sorties per day per 100 aircraft available), fighter units 60% and bomber units 40 - 45%.

Now if you want to argue a couple of units might manage several missions a day, you'd be correct, but that's not the case for large numbers of units.

If you take those figures and apply they to the BoB in 1942, the Germans with a force of 1500 bombers and dive bombers could make about 900 sorties a day, but that doesn't take into account the availability of escorts.

I see Rommel winning in El Alamein and taking Alexandria and the Suez Channel.

The problem for Rommel is he didn't pay enough attention to logistics.

At El Alamein, Rommel is about 900 miles by road from his main port, Tripoli. All supplies have to be brought by road. A typical 3 ton truck could carry 3 tons, but went about 8 miles to the gallon. That means the 1800 mile round trip required about 225 gallons of fuel, which weighs just over a ton.

That means 1 truck can transport at most 2 tons to the front, without counting it's own spare parts, water, oil etc.

There were two closer ports, Benghazi and Tobruk, but both had very low capacity, and couldn't handle many supplies.

Van Creveld goes into this in some detail in Supplying War. His conclusion is that a German advance into Egypt was an impossibility because of the North African infrastructure:

Given that the Wehrmacht was only partly motorized and unsupported by a really strong motor industry; that the political situation necessitated the carrying of much useless Italian ballast; that the capacity of the Libyan ports was so small, the distances to be mastered so vast; it seems clear that, for all Rommel's tactical brilliance, the problem of supplying an Axis force for an advance into the Middle East was insoluble. Under these circumstances, Hitler's original decision to send a force to defend a limited area in North Africa was correct. Rommel's repeated defiance of his orders and attempts to advance beyond a reasonable distance from his bases, however, was mistaken and should never have been tolerated.

You don't get it. The Germans had fighter aircraft in Greece. As the British didn't have fighters, these fighters were unopposed. If the British did have fighters, it wouldn't mean things would have been different: the Germans could have protected their bombers.

Look at the record of Stuka operations against Britain, which were well escorted, but still suffered horrendous losses. And with air cover, bombing accuracy tends to go down, because the bombers are more worried about protecting themselves than hitting the target.

 

[Jabberwocky]

And yet I'm only saying the Germans would have to hold out for two-three days. To say that it was the naval guns that saved them is simplistic. It contributed but it was not the main factor. Infantry and aircraft were more important.

Kris

If we go with the original Sealion plan, then after three days there will be a total of 6 German infantry and 2 airborne divisions in the UK, supported by 140 tanks and a further 200 armoured vehicles, if everything goes to plan.

If we enlarge this by 50%, to take account for more German resources in a 1942 hypothetical, then there are an additional 3 divisions landed. One for each of thee landing areas? If the German focus on armour transport, they could possibly more than double the numbers of tanks with the landing forces. Lets say 300 tanks and 500 armoured vehicles?

I don't see how these three two-three division sized formations, supported by batallion/regiment sized armoured forces, are really going to make significant headway against determined opposition and fixed defences. The TA is hardly going to roll over onto its back as the sight of German infantry, and the RAF is going to be causing chaos on the widely spread, narrowly held, bridgeheads.

If the German landings are widely spaced, then they have no mass. The TA can assemble behind the front and counterattack on the second or third day. The LW is going to be A. Covering the beachheads. B. Covering the Channel. C. Covering the ports in France. D. Escorting dive bombers to support the beach heads E. Escorting bombers to hit the RN. F. Escorting day bombers to destroy British defensive strong points. Adding ground attack missions 20-30 miles inland to that list in order to disrupt the British Army is a hard ask.

I think the best (read: only feasible) German plan would be to advance as hard as possible in the first 72 hours, say 8-12 miles inland and secure the best possible space for resupply before even thinking of digging in. If the precondition of suprose is achieved (extreemly dubious proposition in my mind), then the initial forces are going to be relatively better off than the following forces, which would have to deal with RN and RAF attacks in the Channel and British artillery hitting the bridgeheads. Its these 4-6 divisions that would have to do the most work of the entire invasion force, in order to create a favourable position for the Phase II landing of the heavy follow-on forces (which were originally planned for NINE days after the initial landings).

If one of these inital assault formations are halted, or even driven back, in the first 48-72 hours, without significant progress, then I would be inclined to write off and withdraw from that particular bridgehead (unless it was the centre, anchoring landing) and divert supply and reinforcements to one of the other two and have a go with enlarge assault formations of 4 divisions or more.

 

[Civettone]

For very small numbers of aircraft, for very short period, on very short missions, it's possible. For large numbers, no.

Why would number of aircraft matter? Most German aircraft flew several missions a day near Kursk. For a short period and very short missions, which I have in mind for Sealion '42.

3 fighters were climbed to engage the German fighters, the other 6 climbed to engage the bombers.[/quoted]Finnish fighter training was the first to stress how a small number of fighters can hold the initiative against a much larger force. They did this by a loose finger-two formation. This was later adopted by the Germans.

In France in 1941 and 1942, the Germans didn't have to defend. If they couldn't attack with advantage, they didn't attack at all.

Same thing goes for the British over France. Yet they lost twice as many as they shot down. The Germans showed what the British had shown them a year earlier: you don't need to have numerical superiority to win an air battle.

They didn't. Hooton in Eagle in Flames gives the German day fighter force in Western Europe as a low of 430 in Sept 41, rising steadily to 636 by the end of 1942. There were 564 in mid 1942.

Is Western Europe the same as France?

Only they had that many fighters in July 1940, and still lost.

As I said before, having more fighters doesn't result in winning air battles. In the end, the Bf 109 shot down more British fighters than lost, especially considering that the Bf 109 could not make emergency landings like the British fighters. If damaged, the Bf 109s often didn't make it back to base.

If the Germans were planning on keeping up the offensive, they couldn't fly too many sorties.

I believe the first part is the essential one. Once they have secured the Channel, they can fall back to their normal amount of missions.

Now if you want to argue a couple of units might manage several missions a day, you'd be correct, but that's not the case for large numbers of units.

I don't know where you got that from but I have accounts of Luftwaffe units flying up to 5 missions a day on the Eastern Front.

If you take those figures and apply they to the BoB in 1942, the Germans with a force of 1500 bombers and dive bombers could make about 900 sorties a day, but that doesn't take into account the availability of escorts.

Van Creveld goes into this in some detail in Supplying War. His conclusion is that a German advance into Egypt was an impossibility because of the North African infrastructure

Van Creveld is interesting. I read his work back in '03. It really opened my eyes as I had never really considered logistics to be important. Since then I have adopted some other views and have noticed that Van Creveld is an expert on logistics but is not really accurate when it comes to German doctrine and capabilities. For all the criticism he puts down on them, the Germans still managed to advance at a speed unmatched in WW2. They weren't fully motorized and lacked pretty much everything, yet they arrived near Moscow and Leningrad in a matter of weeks. Rommel moved 644 km in 36 days. His troops were exhausted and out of fuel but he got there and held the initiative.
You say he had to be supplied from Tripoli yet I wonder why you leave out Benghazi and Tobruk. Don't worry, I'm not going to accuse you of deliberately giving false information again. That leads to nothing.

Von Creveld states that Tripoli had a "comfortable" capacity of 50,000 tons per month, Benghazi had a theoretical capacity of 81,000 tons per month, and Tobruk's capacity is put at 20,000 tons per month, out of a
theoretical capacity of 45,000 tons per month when the Italians
were using it. As you know these capacities were never met as the Italians didn't use enough ships. I don't recall Von Creveld mentioning that this was because the Italians chose to use their ships to supply the forces in Albania and Greece which could also be supplied by road (though it would take longer). What's really strange is that they stopped doing this when it was already too late: after the Allies landed in Algeria. Suddenly they moved and supplied 300,000 men to Tunisia only to get their ships sunk by the new warships and aircraft and the ones from Malta.
But Rommel did manage to get to El Alamein and get his troops supplied. But by then he was defeated because the British had received more aircraft and American Shermans and guns. Given that in early 1942 Rommel would have gotten more resources and two extra divisions (practically doubling his force!) he would have taken Tobruk much earlier and could have advanced towards El Alamein when the British were unprepared and weakened.

Look at the record of Stuka operations against Britain, which were well escorted, but still suffered horrendous losses.

Horrendous losses? How many did they lose? 40? 50?

And with air cover, bombing accuracy tends to go down, because the bombers are more worried about protecting themselves than hitting the target.

What do you base this on? Does this also apply to the American 8th AF?

Kris

 

[Civettone]

Daishi, I didn't reply to your mail because I considered it to be off-topic. I don't want to discuss Barbarossa in this thread. I made the premise that Russia was neutralized. Does it mean it is defeated? Does it mean the non-agression pact still remains? I don't know and I don't really care.

But if Russia was defeated back in 1941, it must have been because Stalin made a deal with Hitler. Stalin had discretely asked what the terms for a ceasefire were. If a peace agreement had been signed, then the Germans would need less troops to occupy and guard what they had than when they first had to conquer it. The Germans would also build defensive lines.


I enjoyed your alternative scenario.

I do wonder why you want to invade Hungary? Is it to get Romania on your side? And how will the other countries react when you attack the Netherlands? I can't see Britain not going to war over Holland and Norway when they did go to war over far away Poland. As a suggestion, I think you should wait for the invasion of Holland and Norway until 1941 and immediately launch the offensive against Britain from your newly conquered airports.

And if you're looking for a brilliant successor to Göring, may I suggest the guy in my avatar: Erhard Milch?? 8)
Kris

 

[Civettone]

Jabberwocky, although you're criticizing my plan, I have to say that I admire your plan, your logic and the way you present it.

I don't agree with everything you say but I'm going to think about incorporating your constructive thought into my plan. I will get back to you!

Kris

 

[plan_D]

"Ok. And I consider them to arrive too late if they arrive in a few days. If you're going to send the Royal Navy in bit by bit, I think it's easier to take these ships out."

In the event of Great Britain knowing about the invasion, Force H could be moved into position along the western entrance to the Channel before the invasion begins.

"No, German divisions were usually moved from one front to another without R&R. German HQ didn't require their divisions to up to full strength. They would rather take two divisions at half-strength than to get one up to full strength. And that worked out fine."

Wrong. 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were in Holland in September 1944 because they were resting for the up and coming December Ardennes Offensive. German forces rested, just like anyone else.

"This is simply not true. You're probably confusing it with late 1942 when the allies stopped supplies reaching Tunisia.
And especially with Malta being isolated (again), I don't see much in the way of getting more forces across with less losses during transfer."

I'm not confusing it with anything. The Allies were cutting Rommel supply all through the N.African campaign and keeping Malta supplied.

15 June, HALRPO B-24s with two 160 Sqdn. Liberators attack Italian fleet with no losses and damage to BB Littorio. The Italian fleet is forced to abandon its attack on a supply convoy heading for Malta.

21 June, nine B-24Ds attack Benghazi.

24/25 June, ten B-24Ds hit Benghazi.

25th and 26th, HALPRO B-24s hit Tobruk.

28th June, B-24s hit motor transport on Sollum-Matruh road.

2nd July, B-17Es and B-24Ds of USAMEAF attack Tobruk.

3rd July, Tobruk is attack by USAMEAF.

4th July, USAMEAF attack Med convoy, setting a tank alight.

5/6 July, Benghazi harbour is attack with ammo ship probably destroyed.

9th July, B-24s attack another convoy losing one to Bf 109s but claiming two air kills.

21st July, two ships hit at Suda Bay, Crete.

25th July, ship damaged in Tobruk by USAMEAF B-17s.

28th July, two ships hit in open sea off Suda Bay.

30th July, B-24s sink supply ship in Navarino Bay.

In total, 21 attacks were made by USAMEAF against Tobruk and Benghazi alone during the month of July, 1942. All this in direct support of the British 8th Army. That does not include the operations of the RAF, especially the 160 Sqdn. Liberators operating in the same fashion.

"I was thinking of one PzDiv and one InfDiv. How many divisions did Rommel have in 1942? How close was he to victory with those?"

Rommel had 21st and 15th Panzer divisions and 90th Light division from Germany. He also had under his command the X and XXI Italian Corps, and XX Motorised Corps along with 133rd Armoured Division Littorio.

How close to victory was he? 70 miles away from it with a withering supply line, no flank to go around, several miles of minefield to go through with the 8th Army out-numbering him in gun and tank.

"Two squadrons versus 200 German fighters as escort? Disrupting the bombers at the same time they're attacking the ships? I think the result would have been negligable."

You're contradicting yourself here. In every other argument you go on about how smaller numbers of aircraft can, in fact, disrupt larger formations. The RAF went up against similar odds in the Battle of Britain, why assume they'd mean nothing over Crete?

"The only reason why he complained about losses was because it reduced the battle strength of the army.
Here's one word for you: Stalingrad."

I'm glad you've actually realised he cared about losses. Hitler actually believed he could win Stalingrad, hence the reason he threw people in there. Your plan doesn't have any sense of victory for the troops on the beach, you said yourself that you're abandoning them.

"Again, a typical example of how you make Neptune a standard. Had the allies done half of their deception the same result would have been achieved. 135 out 136 SS intelligence reports said the invasion would take place outside of Normandy.
But how much resources did it take for the allies? How many divisions and tanks were given up to achieve this goal?
All I'm saying is that the Germans could have deceived the British without too much effort."

Neptune is the best example of the problems involved when organising an invasion force across the Channel. Unless you want to use the Norman invasion of Great Britain in 1066 as a starting point?

I realise that's all you're saying and there's problem, you're just saying it. There's no evidence from the real world that suggests Britain could be so easily duped.

"Didn't they change the Enigma a couple of times? Germans after the war said they thought it would have been possible to break the code but that the allies wouldn't go to the trouble of decoding all of their messages.
Tell me, did the allies know EVERYTHING which was wired by the Germans? The answer is no though you're 100 % sure the British would know everything about Sealion 42.
On the Eastern Front the Germans did their best to deceive the Russians as to where their troops were, about commanders, about false reports. I'm also thinking of the great deception plans prior to May 10 when they spread false plans in Belgium (together with the real ones one time by mistake.) To believe that the Germans didn't go to great lengths to deceive enemy intelligence, makes it clear to me that you know little"

Yes, Germany changed the Enigma quite often. They increased the number of turns a couple of times. Germany didn't have a clue that the Enigma had been broken, that's a fact.
No, Great Britain didn't know every single detail about Germany's private life. But it found out more than it needed to know about events in Germany, and concerning Germany.

I never said Britain would know everything about Sealion '42, I'm saying that Great Britain would know the invasion was going to happen and at generally what date. You might say you'd be deceptive, and you probably would be given you know that ULTRA has your codes cracked.

I never said that Germany didn't attempt to deceive the enemy. But the fact remains that ULTRA, even in its infancy, knew about the German invasion of France. ULTRA knew about the invasion of Russia, and knew about the Kursk offensive in 1943.

Great Britain knew about every invasion attempt made by the Germans, what makes you think we wouldn't know about yours?

"Typical. So now I need to destroy all of them to get a result? Why were there so many radar installations if only a few were needed?
And how many were in range of artillery and naval guns?"

You need to destroy a sufficient amount to secure holes in the system, yes.

I will answer your second question with a question; why do you think there's three hydraulic lines in the DC-10 all doing the same job?

You haven't got artillery ashore, there's not enough room. And what naval guns have you got that's going to fire that far inland?

"And yet I'm only saying the Germans would have to hold out for two-three days. To say that it was the naval guns that saved them is simplistic. It contributed but it was not the main factor. Infantry and aircraft were more important."

Obviously the infantry were important, without them there was actually no beach-head - what a silly statement. Without the naval gunfire and artillery support, the Anzio beach-head would have been overrun by the 14th Armee.

"Starved after two days? Elite forces mean nothing if they don't have support? You're getting desperate in your arguments."

How is that desperate, stating a fact. No matter how elite you claim your forces are, if they have no food to live or ammo to kill - then they're useless.

What's a tank without its crew? A lump of expensive metal.
What's a soldier without his rifle? A clerk.

You have to maintain your troops through supply, you cannot drop them ashore and abandon them. Or they will be starved into surrender, not literally starve to death ...if that's what you thought I meant.

 

[Civettone]

Wrong. 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions were in Holland in September 1944 because they were resting for the up and coming December Ardennes Offensive. German forces rested, just like anyone else.

It's wrong because you know divisions that were resting? I'm saying German divisions were usually given no R&R when they were ordered to move from one front to another. This is a bit typical of German forces: pulling units back for R&R unless they're decimated and needed to be rebuild. British and Americans managed their units better, especially the air units.

The Allies were cutting Rommel supply all through the N.African campaign and keeping Malta supplied.

They were interfering but IIRC 80% of all supplies went through unharmed. This would even be less with Malta being cut off.

The RAF went up against similar odds in the Battle of Britain, why assume they'd mean nothing over Crete?

I simply disagree with the outcome being different. The odds in Crete would be 1:10 fighters which is worse than Britain 1:2. And contradict me if I'm wrong but I don't remember the British building a radar network in Crete.

I'm glad you've actually realised he cared about losses. Hitler actually believed he could win Stalingrad, hence the reason he threw people in there.

But how did we start this? You said he wouldn't sacrifice those men in an invasion of Britain although my plan suggests heavy losses. Clearly that won't be the case.

Your plan doesn't have any sense of victory for the troops on the beach, you said yourself that you're abandoning them.

I never said that. I would leave them without reinforcements for two days.

There's no evidence from the real world that suggests Britain could be so easily duped.

Everyone can be duped. You overestimate Britain.

I never said Britain would know everything about Sealion '42, I'm saying that Great Britain would know the invasion was going to happen and at generally what date. You might say you'd be deceptive, and you probably would be given you know that ULTRA has your codes cracked.

Well, you're treating Ultra as being the wonderweapon it wasn't. And I'm not implying that the Germans magically know about it.

I never said that Germany didn't attempt to deceive the enemy. But the fact remains that ULTRA, even in its infancy, knew about the German invasion of France. ULTRA knew about the invasion of Russia, and knew about the Kursk offensive in 1943.

And didn't know of other German offensives. Yet you're absolutely sure the British would know of Sealion 42. That's where I disagree. I say it's possible but not certain. That's the difference.

Great Britain knew about every invasion attempt made by the Germans, what makes you think we wouldn't know about yours?

But what if the Germans send out false information? Germany never planned anything like Sealion 42. Let's compare it to other offensives where Germany did manage to deceive the enemy. Barbarossa is one. The British may have found out but the Russians with their extensive intelligence did not manage to find out about the biggest invasion of WW2. I didn't know the British found out about it by Ultra, I thought it was a spy (or the Lucy Ring?) who told them. But I can imagine that the secrecy was not the same towards Britain as towards Russia. The only case where I can remember the Germans doing their best to deceive the western allies was the Ardennes. Oh yeah, and ULTRA couldn't save Market Garden from defeat because it didn't know of that SS division that moved there just days before.

You haven't got artillery ashore, there's not enough room.

I don't have artillery? A German division without artillery? I don't think so. The German plan talked about full German divisions, so with its AD, AT and Arty.

You have to maintain your troops through supply, you cannot drop them ashore and abandon them. Or they will be starved into surrender, not literally starve to death ...if that's what you thought I meant.

Oooh... that's what you meant. (Let me delete a long reply about German rations and Stalingrad.... )
I think this is a matter on which we won't agree upon. I am thinking beyond conventional strategy. Leaving those troops without reinforcements (some supplies would get through) to lure in and defeat the Royal Navy and secure the logistics from then onwards.

Kris

 

[plan_D]

"It's wrong because you know divisions that were resting? I'm saying German divisions were usually given no R&R when they were ordered to move from one front to another. This is a bit typical of German forces: pulling units back for R&R unless they're decimated and needed to be rebuild. British and Americans managed their units better, especially the air units."

All German units received R R when redeploying, especially in 1942. Even this suicidal German Command knew that resting your troops was vital to success. Those two divisions I mentioned off the top of my head are an example of two units moving from East to West, and resting inbetween.

"They were interfering but IIRC 80% of all supplies went through unharmed. This would even be less with Malta being cut off."

Rommel's supply was being sunk in the Med, smashed in the ports and trashed on the roads. From Germany to the front-line, a lot less than 80% arrived. Most of the aerial assaults on Rommels supply were coming from Eygpt and Palestine, not Malta.

"I simply disagree with the outcome being different. The odds in Crete would be 1:10 fighters which is worse than Britain 1:2. And contradict me if I'm wrong but I don't remember the British building a radar network in Crete."

Of course there's going to be a difference. Less ships would have most likely not suffered damage, the Fallschirmjager would have suffered more, and German planes would have been shot down. Even 24 aircraft providing air cover for the Royal Navy would have made a difference.

"But how did we start this? You said he wouldn't sacrifice those men in an invasion of Britain although my plan suggests heavy losses. Clearly that won't be the case."

Hitler wouldn't throw troops onto British beaches in the hope of destroying the Royal Navy. At Stalingrad there was a large chance of success, your proposed invasion depends on so many British blunders and blind luck ...it'd be a considered a complete waste of manpower. But this is a waste of time, since you're going to do it in this hypothetical situation.

"But what if the Germans send out false information? Germany never planned anything like Sealion 42. Let's compare it to other offensives where Germany did manage to deceive the enemy. Barbarossa is one. The British may have found out but the Russians with their extensive intelligence did not manage to find out about the biggest invasion of WW2. I didn't know the British found out about it by Ultra, I thought it was a spy (or the Lucy Ring?) who told them. But I can imagine that the secrecy was not the same towards Britain as towards Russia. The only case where I can remember the Germans doing their best to deceive the western allies was the Ardennes. Oh yeah, and ULTRA couldn't save Market Garden from defeat because it didn't know of that SS division that moved there just days before."

"Well, you're treating Ultra as being the wonderweapon it wasn't. And I'm not implying that the Germans magically know about it."

First off, the ULTRA team were a wonder "weapon" for the British. Many lives were saved because of British decoding efforts.

ULTRA knew about Operation Barbarossa, the information was handed to Stalin but believing that Britain was trying to drive a wedge between Russia and Germany; ignored it.

Fragments of the Ardennes Offensive were known about by ULTRA, SHAEF ignored the information because they didn't believe the Germans had any fight left.

You've stated a common myth about Market Garden; it seems easy to mention bad intelligence alongside Market Garden. However, documents released in 2002 actually showed that ULTRA knew all about the presence of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions in Holland, this was on top of the pictures taken of the SS armour in the area.

"I don't have artillery? A German division without artillery? I don't think so. The German plan talked about full German divisions, so with its AD, AT and Arty."

You don't invade with a division just like that. The infantry make the gains; spread out and then capture the space to set up your heavy weapons. The Allies had to push miles inland before heavy guns were brought in and deployed. Your assaulting forces would be relying solely on aerial and naval support.

"Oooh... that's what you meant. (Let me delete a long reply about German rations and Stalingrad.... )
I think this is a matter on which we won't agree upon. I am thinking beyond conventional strategy. Leaving those troops without reinforcements (some supplies would get through) to lure in and defeat the Royal Navy and secure the logistics from then onwards."

How many landing craft and support vessels (not combat) do you suppose you will have during the landing, then supply?

 

[Civettone]

Apparently the Germans did have landing craft.

Landungfahrzeuge

The Naval Landing Crafts - called "Marinefährprahm" in German were the largest landing craft used by the Kriegsmarine. Although required for Operation Sealion (Invasion of England) in 1940, the first of this transport ships were delivered in 1941. They were mainly used for transport and supply duties and not for their initial invasion role and could transport 200 Soldiers or 100ts of equipment, including tanks. They were armed with a 7,5 cm gun and a 2 cm gun. Maximum speed was 10 knots.

With a length of nearly 35 meters, the Marine Artillerie Leichter (MAL) were the smallest landing craft in Kriegsmarine services. Designed after the requirements of the German Army, those small vehicles should be used during Operation Barbarossa, the attack on the Soviet Union. Their projected operational area was the Caspian Sea where the MAL should be used to attack Soviet oil transports from Baku to Astrakhan.
It carried two 8,8 cm guns and eight 2 cm guns.

Artilleriefährprahm (AFP) : Based on the Marinefährprahm Type D, those Artillery Ferries were used for several different kind of operations. Although being first though as a provisional design, they took over the role of gunboats in various operational areas, including the British Channel, Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
Besides their use as escort vessels, they were also occasionally used for shore bombardments and mine laying, they proved to be very usable crafts.
The ferries had a light armor protection, 20 mm armor steel and up to 100 mm concrete armor at the superstructures and ammunition stores.
250 - 380 Ton, length 50m, 2 x 88mm, 1 x 37mm Flak, 2 x 20mm Flakvierling and 2 x 20mm Flak, 8 knots.



[B]Siebel Fähre[/B]: During the preparation for Operation Seelöwe - the invasion of England - it soon got clear, that the Kriegsmarine needed a high number of landing crafts. Therefore all branches of the German Army made proposals for such a craft - the Luftwaffe proposal was is known as the Siebel-Fähre (Siebel Ferry) named after its inventor, Oberst Siebel.
The Siebel-Ferries were constructed from existing material, pioneer pontoon originally used to build auxiliary pontoon bridges. Two of those pontoons were connected side-by-side, a propulsion unit with BMW aircraft engines was added in the back and a large platform mounted on top of the pontoons was used to carry the payload. Vehicles could enter or leave the craft over a ramp on the bow of the ferry.
There were multiple version of those crafts build, from transport crafts over artillery ferries to staff command ships or hospital ferries.
[ATTACH=full]388813[/ATTACH]


[B]Land-Wasser-Schleppe[/B]: In 1936, Rheinmetall Borsig AG was approached by the German army general staff to build a special amphibious tracked vehicle for landing operations. The tractor would be able to two behind it a floating trailer capable of accommodating vehicles or other cargo weighing up to 18,000kg. On water the tractor would function as a tug for the floating cargo trailer. After landing the tractor would still have to move the trailer to a safe place to unload the cargo.
Rheinmetall tackled the project and the product became known as the Land-Wasser-Schlepper (land-water tractor) or LWS. The LWS was actually and simply a motor tug built with tracks. It was a large and strange machine that nonetheless turned out to be a rugged vehicle (or boat?). There were two long sets of tracks, one on the flat bottom on each side of the LWS. There were four pairs of roadwheels suspended from leaf-spring suspensions on each side. The boat part of the LWS had a clean, pronounced bow, and on top there was a compartment for the crew of three and extra room for another 20. The funnel-like structure on top of the cabin was actually the engine's air intake. Two large propellers were installed at the rear, or stern, for propulsion in water. To make the LWS more boat-like there were portholes on both sides of the crew cabin.
On land the floating trailer looked like a large slab-sided vehicle, and was supported by wheels on one forward axle and two rear ones. On the back side a ramp could be opened for unloading. A typical load was an SdKfz 9 18-tonne halftrack, and the crew would be housed in the LWS for the aqueous leg of the journey.
The LWS and trailer idea was tried and tested quite slowly and leisurely until "Seelöwe" (Operation Sea Lion, the invasion of Great Britain) was to become reality after the fall of France. The LWS and trailer could certainly be used in such an amphibious operation, but they were more suited for calmer waters of inland water bodies, not the tempestuous English Channel. The LWS program was for a while carried out with more urgency, but was never materialized. By 1941 the project was dropped, when the prospect of Seelöwe was overshadowed by the much more serious Operation Barbarossa.
[IMG]http://wilk.wpk.p.lodz.pl/~whatfor/cnowe/landwasserschlepper_02.jpg
And in 1942 they developed a version on the Pz IV chassis:


And saving the best for last: the Pionierlandungsboot


Kris

 

[plan_D]

All very interesting, and I certainly won't say I knew about them in any kind of detail. But the question remains; how many do you propose to have during this invasion?

 

[Civettone]

Damn man, that post took forever!! Half of those images couldn't be hotlinked. Then I had to find others and when that didn't work I had to upload them myself.

As to your question on how many I'm planning on using, I don't know. I just found out about German landing craft this evening. Apparently many were build in anticipation of Sealion in 1941 but production slowed down after the cancellation and Barbarossa. I also found out that they could have been built by the existing shipyards (not the ones for U-boats).
In fact I was quite happy about the river barges but when such an opportunity arises...
How many do you think I need??

All German units received R R when redeploying, especially in 1942. Even this suicidal German Command knew that resting your troops was vital to success.

Well, that's rather contrary to Hitler's orders to immediately transfer units from Russia to Italy or to France in 1943 and 1944. Until then there was only one front (North Africa not really being a real frontline). So for 1942 I can only think of the transfers along the Eastern Front. As things were getting desperate near Stalingrad, Hitler ordered divisions from other parts to get in the fight. And let me tell you, he didn't allow even half a day rest. This is from the top of my head but I can look up specific divisions if you want me to.

Rommel's supply was being sunk in the Med, smashed in the ports and trashed on the roads. From Germany to the front-line, a lot less than 80% arrived. Most of the aerial assaults on Rommels supply were coming from Eygpt and Palestine, not Malta.

That seems to be a bit of an exaggeration. Smashed, trashed? I think I have figures of the losses somewhere. If I forget to post them tomorrow, please remind me of it.

Even 24 aircraft providing air cover for the Royal Navy would have made a difference.

They would have to fly CAPs as they wouldn't have radar early warning as in Britain. That means that even less would take it up against 200 German fighters.

Hitler wouldn't throw troops onto British beaches in the hope of destroying the Royal Navy. At Stalingrad there was a large chance of success, your proposed invasion depends on so many British blunders and blind luck ...it'd be a considered a complete waste of manpower. But this is a waste of time, since you're going to do it in this hypothetical situation.

And it wouldn't be the first time that Hitler believed in an impossible situation. He let the 6th army be surrounded believing they would hold out. I honestly don't think that's taking a bigger chance than my invasion plan.

ULTRA knew about Operation Barbarossa, the information was handed to Stalin but believing that Britain was trying to drive a wedge between Russia and Germany; ignored it.
Fragments of the Ardennes Offensive were known about by ULTRA, SHAEF ignored the information because they didn't believe the Germans had any fight left.
You've stated a common myth about Market Garden; it seems easy to mention bad intelligence alongside Market Garden. However, documents released in 2002 actually showed that ULTRA knew all about the presence of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions in Holland, this was on top of the pictures taken of the SS armour in the area.

This I find interesting: I see a certain weakness in ULTRA. Even though ULTRA said one thing, the allies didn't follow it all the time. This confirms my suspicion that the allies could be fooled. If ULTRA says one thing, but other intelligence another, it apparently causes confusion... I didn't know this until just now.

The infantry make the gains; spread out and then capture the space to set up your heavy weapons.

But does artillery need to be heavy? What about the sIGs and the 12cm mortars?


Finally Plan_D, I'm sorry that I reacted a bit harsh in the previous discussions. Won't happen again...
Kris