operation sea lion

[syscom3]

Some of these are indeed quite interesting and usefull.

But not all are true sea going vessels, and would not be able to handle high sea states (maintain steerage or acceptable speed).

 

[mkloby]

But does artillery need to be heavy? What about the sIGs and the 12cm mortars?
Kris

sIG 33 was almost 4000 lbs. I'm not sure what the 120mm mortar weighed, but I'm guessing that it was no less than 500lbs and not able to be manpacked.

I don't know if you have ever had experience with artillery, but you definitely are not squeezing these babies in anywhere and firing from a position 10ft behind your lines...

 

[plan_D]

"As to your question on how many I'm planning on using, I don't know. I just found out about German landing craft this evening. Apparently many were build in anticipation of Sealion in 1941 but production slowed down after the cancellation and Barbarossa. I also found out that they could have been built by the existing shipyards (not the ones for U-boats).
In fact I was quite happy about the river barges but when such an opportunity arises...
How many do you think I need??"

Operation Neptune had 4,126 landing ships and craft, 864 Merchant ships, 736 Ancillary ships and craft and 1,213 Naval combatant vessels.

U.S 4th Infantry division on UTAH. 23,250 landed, 200 casualties.

D,E and F companies of 2nd Ranger battalion landed 225 men at Pointe Du Hoc, 125 causualties from 6 - 8 June.

U.S 1st Infantry Division on OMAHA. 34,250 landed, 3000 casualties.

British 50th Division on Gold. 24,970 landed, 400 casualties.

Canadian 3rd Division on Juno. 21,500 landed, 1000 casualties.

British 3rd Division on Sword. 28,845 landed, 630 casualties.

"Well, that's rather contrary to Hitler's orders to immediately transfer units from Russia to Italy or to France in 1943 and 1944. Until then there was only one front (North Africa not really being a real frontline). So for 1942 I can only think of the transfers along the Eastern Front. As things were getting desperate near Stalingrad, Hitler ordered divisions from other parts to get in the fight. And let me tell you, he didn't allow even half a day rest. This is from the top of my head but I can look up specific divisions if you want me to."

When shifting troops from the East to West and vice versa, they were rested. Even on the Russian front, when permitted, the German troops were rested.
When Hitler ordered units from, say, in front of Moscow to attack Kiev they didn't rest because it was all part of the same offensive.

"They would have to fly CAPs as they wouldn't have radar early warning as in Britain. That means that even less would take it up against 200 German fighters."

British fighters were flying off Malta in the same fashion and achieving success against the Luftwaffe and Italians. The Luftwaffe escort doctrine was flawed so any interception would always take place around the bomber formation, causing losses to the bombers.

"This I find interesting: I see a certain weakness in ULTRA. Even though ULTRA said one thing, the allies didn't follow it all the time. This confirms my suspicion that the allies could be fooled. If ULTRA says one thing, but other intelligence another, it apparently causes confusion... I didn't know this until just now."

Operation Market Garden had no intelligence sources clashing. Dutch resistance, ULTRA and aerial photography all showed that there were SS Panzer Divisions in and around Arnhem.

ULTRA will find out about your invasion, aerial photography will find out and the French resistance will find out. The Allied intelligence operation in Europe was massive - it would not go unnoticed.

"But does artillery need to be heavy? What about the sIGs and the 12cm mortars?"

It certainly does if you plan on matching British heavy guns.

 

[Civettone]

When shifting troops from the East to West and vice versa, they were rested. Even on the Russian front, when permitted, the German troops were rested.

If they were rested it was because they were awaiting transport and refit. Refitting was done not to bring the unit back up to strength but because moving the heavy equipment wasn't worth it. For instance, the SS Leibstandarte was moved from Kursk to the Italian front with a stop in Austria to get their new equipment. They did not fill up their ranks but did get a chance to rest. It's however a different thing that they were drawn back for rest until they were ready to move to France.

When Hitler ordered units from, say, in front of Moscow to attack Kiev they didn't rest because it was all part of the same offensive

At times units had to move a thousand kilometers along the Eastern Front. Yet they weren't given R&R though it could take weeks for them to get there. And these were cases where it wasn't the same offensive. (Kiev and Moscow wouldn't be part of the same offensive IMO)

British fighters were flying off Malta in the same fashion and achieving success against the Luftwaffe and Italians. The Luftwaffe escort doctrine was flawed so any interception would always take place around the bomber formation, causing losses to the bombers.

But Malta had radar, didn't it?
And what do you mean by flawed escort doctrine? Galland sorted that out but Göring interfered. The result was 1/3 close to the bomber, 1/3 above and 1/3 way in front.

Operation Market Garden had no intelligence sources clashing. Dutch resistance, ULTRA and aerial photography all showed that there were SS Panzer Divisions in and around Arnhem.

So the allies weren't surprised to find that new German elite division?

It certainly does if you plan on matching British heavy guns.

I didn't really have counterfire in mind as the Germans couldn't match the British accuracy and numbers. I would use the artillery for fire support, and that's why I was thinking of the 7,5 cm leichte IG and 8 and 12 cm mortars. These were light enough to be towed by their crews.


And I found out something about those German convoy losses. In October 1942 the British started an air and sea offensive (ships, ports, roads) which resulted in 40% of the supplies not arriving. That means that before this time it was considerably less. I don't know how much but couldn't be more than 30% or what I thought, 20%. In my alternative scenario this could no longer be the case for obvious reasons. Also the Italian air force would be bigger as they would no longer be needed in Russia.

Kris

 

[mkloby]

I didn't really have counterfire in mind as the Germans couldn't match the British accuracy and numbers. I would use the artillery for fire support, and that's why I was thinking of the 7,5 cm leichte IG and 8 and 12 cm mortars. These were light enough to be towed by their crews.

Tactically speaking, manually towing 120mm mortars is impractical. Especially in the offense where they would need to continally be advanced to support the infantry. 120mm mortars are generally used as a towed or mounted weapon system. It is much more feasible to manpack small and medium mortars, but that's not a real substitute for an arty regiment. Enemy counter-battery fire would likely smash your fire support positions to pieces.

 

[Civettone]

Well, the way I saw it was that the 120mm mortars would act as substitute artillery while the smaller 50 and 80mm mortars could be carried by the infantry to give them their close support. I also prefer mortars as they form smaller and more mobile obstacles and the enemy has more difficulty getting a position on them.

Kris

 

[Kurfürst]

sIG 33 was almost 4000 lbs. I'm not sure what the 120mm mortar weighed, but I'm guessing that it was no less than 500lbs and not able to be manpacked.

The sIG 33 would be indeed a bit too much, but there was also 7,5cm infantry guns which were rather compact and light at around 400 kg, and can be easily manhandled even on tough terrain.

A possible invasion's first wave would be probably supported by 8cm and 12cm mortars (the latter has wheels, and weights 285/600kg, so it can be manpacked as well), the usual 7,5cm IGs of the infantry, and recoil-less rifles that were first used on Crete, submersible tanks and such. That should suffice for the first waves, after all, the Allies landed and broke through MUCH more fortified defenses than the British would ever manage to build with lighter gear.

 

[mkloby]

The sIG 33 would be indeed a bit too much, but there was also 7,5cm infantry guns which were rather compact and light at around 400 kg, and can be easily manhandled even on tough terrain.

A possible invasion's first wave would be probably supported by 8cm and 12cm mortars (the latter has wheels, and weights 285/600kg, so it can be manpacked as well), the usual 7,5cm IGs of the infantry, and recoil-less rifles that were first used on Crete, submersible tanks and such. That should suffice for the first waves, after all, the Allies landed and broke through MUCH more fortified defenses than the British would ever manage to build with lighter gear.

400kg may not be much in terms of weight of arty, but it certainly is not light. Easily manhandled across tough terrain, like mud, sand, and the like? I'm not saying it couldn't be done, but the tactical efficiency of such action makes it impractical. Again, the delays involved in staging and deploying weapons in such an action is not going to be effective.

Manpacking 120mm mortars is also just, tactically speaking, ridiculous. we train manpacking our 60 and 81mm mortars today, and the increase in fatigue and strain they cause is rough. And what about all the ammunition? We're humping them too...

My whole point is that this is the worst fire support plan, and horribly ineffective. The issue of british counter battery fire has not even been brough up.

 

[Glider]

400kg may not be much in terms of weight of arty, but it certainly is not light. Easily manhandled across tough terrain, like mud, sand, and the like? I'm not saying it couldn't be done, but the tactical efficiency of such action makes it impractical. Again, the delays involved in staging and deploying weapons in such an action is not going to be effective.

Manpacking 120mm mortars is also just, tactically speaking, ridiculous. we train manpacking our 60 and 81mm mortars today, and the increase in fatigue and strain they cause is rough. And what about all the ammunition? We're humping them too...

My whole point is that this is the worst fire support plan, and horribly ineffective. The issue of british counter battery fire has not even been brough up.

Have to agree with everything in this posting. British Artillery was as good as the best overall and some say the best in WW2 in terms of flexibility. To abandon any counter battery fire and let British fire without hinderance is simply asking for trouble.

Mortars have a role but anything over 81mm isn't man portable in practical terms.

 

[plan_D]

"If they were rested it was because they were awaiting transport and refit. Refitting was done not to bring the unit back up to strength but because moving the heavy equipment wasn't worth it. For instance, the SS Leibstandarte was moved from Kursk to the Italian front with a stop in Austria to get their new equipment. They did not fill up their ranks but did get a chance to rest. It's however a different thing that they were drawn back for rest until they were ready to move to France."

In terms of time, it's the exact same. It took weeks to move from the East to the West, fact. And it would take even longer to move from the East to Africa.

"But Malta had radar, didn't it?
And what do you mean by flawed escort doctrine? Galland sorted that out but Göring interfered. The result was 1/3 close to the bomber, 1/3 above and 1/3 way in front."

I've never seen Malta has having radar, the Royal Navy around it had radar which could be used to direct air support. The same would apply for Crete.

The Luftwaffe never adopted the escort doctrine that prevented the fight taking place around the bomber formation; roaming escort. Galland encouraged more fighter sweeps but, as you say, Goring made it close escort and Goring told the Luftwaffe what to do, not Galland.

"So the allies weren't surprised to find that new German elite division?"

New? The SS divisions in Holland were resting and being re-equiped because of the damage done to them in Russia. The only people surprised to see two SS divisions in Holland were the poor paratroopers who hadn't been warned. All of High Command knew about them, as I said, ULTRA, Dutch Resistance and Photo Recon had told them. I even have a Dutch report of Arnhem from the time (a copy, of course) which talks about the numbers of SS troops. If you really want, I'll quote that!

"I didn't really have counterfire in mind as the Germans couldn't match the British accuracy and numbers. I would use the artillery for fire support, and that's why I was thinking of the 7,5 cm leichte IG and 8 and 12 cm mortars. These were light enough to be towed by their crews."

Well, mkloby and Glider had pointed out the flaw in this. The British couter-battery fire would destroy your artillery positions with ease, as they would out-gun and out-range you.

"And I found out something about those German convoy losses. In October 1942 the British started an air and sea offensive (ships, ports, roads) which resulted in 40% of the supplies not arriving. That means that before this time it was considerably less. I don't know how much but couldn't be more than 30% or what I thought, 20%. In my alternative scenario this could no longer be the case for obvious reasons. Also the Italian air force would be bigger as they would no longer be needed in Russia."

What obvious reasons? You would be making the Med a more target rich environment, the U.S 9th Air Force and Desert Air Force would find more targets when over the Med. The Italian Air Force was a poor excuse in 1941-1942 and their numbers would hardly grow because of a Soviet victory.

 

[Hop]

Is Western Europe the same as France?

Is Britain the same as the Channel Coast? The RAF had fighter squadrons in Northern Ireland, the north of Scotland, Wales, the north of England etc that didn't participate at all in the fighting.

As I said before, having more fighters doesn't result in winning air battles. In the end, the Bf 109 shot down more British fighters than lost,

But the British target was the bombers. As Bungay points out, the German fighters achieved about a 1.2 to 1 victory rate, whereas the British fighters achieved 1.8 to 1. They had different tasks.

I don't know where you got that from but I have accounts of Luftwaffe units flying up to 5 missions a day on the Eastern Front.

And yet on average they flew much less than 1 sortie per day, as the figures show.

Van Creveld is interesting. I read his work back in '03. It really opened my eyes as I had never really considered logistics to be important. Since then I have adopted some other views and have noticed that Van Creveld is an expert on logistics but is not really accurate when it comes to German doctrine and capabilities. For all the criticism he puts down on them, the Germans still managed to advance at a speed unmatched in WW2.

But failed to hold on to their advances, which is the point.

They weren't fully motorized and lacked pretty much everything, yet they arrived near Moscow and Leningrad in a matter of weeks.

And never managed to get beyond them.

Rommel moved 644 km in 36 days. His troops were exhausted and out of fuel but he got there and held the initiative.
You say he had to be supplied from Tripoli yet I wonder why you leave out Benghazi and Tobruk. Don't worry, I'm not going to accuse you of deliberately giving false information again.

I did mention them:

There were two closer ports, Benghazi and Tobruk, but both had very low capacity, and couldn't handle many supplies.

Von Creveld states that Tripoli had a "comfortable" capacity of 50,000 tons per month, Benghazi had a theoretical capacity of 81,000 tons per month, and Tobruk's capacity is put at 20,000 tons per month, out of a
theoretical capacity of 45,000 tons per month when the Italians
were using it.

Are you sure? In Supplying War, Van Creveld says of Tripoli:

This was Tripoli, the largest Libyan harbour by far, capable of handling - under ideal conditions - five cargo ships or four troop transports simultaneously. Its capacity, as long as no unforeseen explosions wrecked the quays, and the largely local labour-force was not driven off by air raids, amounted to approximately 45,000 tons per month.

Benghazi:

Though theoretically capable of processing 2,700 tons a day, Benghazi was well within reach of the RAF and suffered accordingly. With an unloading capacity of 700-800 tons only exceptionally reached

Tripoli:

The port was theoretically capable of unloading 1,500 tons a day, but in practice rarely exceeded 600. When consulted about its use, the German navy dismissed it as a disembarkation port for large ships, and bluntly told OKH that it would do well to rely exclusively on Tripoli and Benghazi to keep Rommel supplied. Since in this period (July-August 1941) insufficient coastal shipping was available even to utilize Benghazi fully, Rommel's scheme for solving his supply difficulties by capturing Tobruk seems highly impracticable.

hat's really strange is that they stopped doing this when it was already too late: after the Allies landed in Algeria. Suddenly they moved and supplied 300,000 men to Tunisia only to get their ships sunk by the new warships and aircraft and the ones from Malta.

Capturing Tunisia gave them a much better port, and much shorter supply lines once unloaded. More from Supplying War:

After the war in North Africa was over, Rommel bitterly commented that, had he received but a fraction of the troops and supplies that Hitler poured into Tunisia in a hopeless attempt to hold it, he could have thrown the British out of Egypt many times over. This claim has since been echoed by many other writers. However, it ignores the fact that the Axis' presence in Africa had been put on an entirely different basis by Rommel's retreat and by the Allied landings in North West Africa. Having seized both Bizerta and Toulon, as well as the French merchant fleet, the Axis now possessed the means with which to send reinforcements to Africa at a rate Panzerarmee had never known. Even so, however, they did not succeed in maintaining them there for very long.

But Rommel did manage to get to El Alamein and get his troops supplied.

He managed to reach Alamein. He did not manage to adequately supply his forces there.

Given that in early 1942 Rommel would have gotten more resources and two extra divisions (practically doubling his force!) he would have taken Tobruk much earlier and could have advanced towards El Alamein when the British were unprepared and weakened.

No, the whole point is he could not have supported those forces. From Supplying War:

The only way out of the predicament was to attack and capture the port of Tobruk. However, Rommel had to concede that his requirements for such an operation would be no less than four German armoured divisions - precisely the number originally envisaged by von Thorna. This, however, was an impossible demand. Not only were Germany's forces now fully committed against Russia, but to grant Rommel's request meant that DAK would need another 20,000 tons a month, for which unloading facilities were not available.

Look at the record of Stuka operations against Britain, which were well escorted, but still suffered horrendous losses.

Horrendous losses? How many did they lose? 40? 50?

It was 69 on operations, and another 18 not on operations. And how many sorties did they fly?

If you look at the final nail in their coffin in the BoB, the raid that convinced Goering to stop using them in the main attack, 109 Stukas escorted by 150+ Bf 109s. 8 109s were lost, 17 Stukas, with another 7 Stukas damaged. The RAF lost 5 fighters.

That's a loss rate of about 15% for the Stukas. Sustainable losses would have been on the order of 2 or 3%.

What do you base this on? Does this also apply to the American 8th AF?

Yes.

 

[Jabberwocky]

That should suffice for the first waves, after all, the Allies landed and broke through MUCH more fortified defenses than the British would ever manage to build with lighter gear.

British fortifications were not designed to stop the German advance, but simply to slow and obstruct it. To that point British defensive doctrine in the south of England relied on networks of smaller fixed defensive pillboxes in depth, rather than single massive strong points.

There were no 'Hillman' or 'Morris' style fortified divisional command posts as encountered in Normandy. Rather, covering networks of 3-6 pillboxes were erected, sometimes supported by larger weapons pits for crew served gus (artillery, flak or AT) further inland.

The fixed fortifications built between 1940 and 1942 were meant to canalise inland advances away from transport arteries and into corridors where the TA and British land forces could meet the invaders. Garrison and fixed forces were to fight delaying actions, preventing the Germans from advancing inland to the best of their ability, while regular army forces assembled.

The British never really put their faith in concrete and rebar to stop the invasion. It was counter attack and control of the sea that were seen as the vital keys to destroying any invasion force.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

I somehow missed this when reading through all the posts, but Civettone, look at a map please. France is in Western Europe....

 

[Kurfürst]

Is Britain the same as the Channel Coast? The RAF had fighter squadrons in Northern Ireland, the north of Scotland, Wales, the north of England etc that didn't participate at all in the fighting.

But the British target was the bombers. As Bungay points out, the German fighters achieved about a 1.2 to 1 victory rate, whereas the British fighters achieved 1.8 to 1. They had different tasks.

The problem is with your figures, that the British admitted the loss of 1140 of their fighters, whereas the LW curiously only knows about 1385 of it's combat aircraft of all types (even coastal aircraft and such counted) being lost to enemy action during the Battle of Britiain, no small number to ship and land AAA, balloons and not fighters.

As for the LW fighters record, they lost something like 502 s-e, and 224 t-e fighters to enemy action of all kinds, vs. the said 1140 British fighters lost (not counting damaged).

Either your math is very poor or you're selling poo here again - btw, did you manage to find out the name of those 3 Italian phantom BBs you claimed the RN sent to Davy Jones locker..? About 6th time I ask, is it?

Then this regular trash-talk about Stukas, you seem to be very fond of spreading the same old myth over and over again?

It was 69 on operations, and another 18 not on operations.

Read : The LW was loosing 59 Stukas during the whole BoB due to enemy action, the rest is just pumping the numbers up.

Other than that, the truth is the RAF could did bloody nothing against the Stukas that happily sinking British coastal sinking en-masse during July and August. Ju87 units were active over both Channel convoys and southeast England from July. Losses suffered over the two month period were:

July 14 - 1;
July 20 - 2;
July 25 - 1;
July 27 - 1;
July 29 - 4;
August 11 - 1;
August 12 - 5;
August 14 - 4;
August 15 - 7;
August 16 - 9;
August 18 - 14.

In that two month period the Ju87s

sank 1 ainti-aircraft ship - the Foylebank
sank 1 destroyer - the Brazen
damaged five destroyers - Beagle, Boadicea, Bulldog, Boreas, Brilliant
forced the Dover Destroyers to be withdrawn
sank 4 small warships - Warrior II, Kingston Galena, Roding, Gulzar

sank 14 merchant ships
damaged 29 merchant ships
forced Channel convoys to be halted during daylight

damaged 7 airfields - Detling, Hawkinge, Lympne, Tangmere, Lee-On-Solent, Ford, Thorney Island
destroyed 49 aircraft on the ground - 22 at Detling, 15 at Tangmere, 12 at Lee-On-Solent
damaged three radar stations (putting them off air for a short period) - Ventnor, Poling, Dover.

And how many sorties did they fly?

Overall during the two month period the Ju87's suffered a 7.9% loss rate - hardly the massive losses the British claimed. And achieved an remarkable amount in that period.

If you look at the final nail in their coffin in the BoB, the raid that convinced Goering to stop using them in the main attack, 109 Stukas escorted by 150+ Bf 109s.

He must have meant August 18, which British mythology had declared as the day after Stukas were withdrawn due ot mounting losses. It has no basis, it's part of the BoB-folklore.

The Ju 87 was not withdrawn from the so-called Battle of Britain. When the targets changed from coastal targets to inner-Britain targets, the Ju 87 groups were redirected to attack the coastal merchant ships, since they lacked speed and range. Kesselring's urging due to the fact that the Battle was entering a period where level bombers would be the main thrust, not dive bombers. He believed the Ju87 units should be held in reserve for when air supremacy was gained and could be used to stike at the RN when Operation Sealion was implemented. The Sturzkampfgeschwader were retained at their bases in northern France and Belgium after August 1940, but they were no longer assigned daylight targets in the coastal counties of southern England. They continued to effectively suppress any trade with coastal naval vessels on the British SE and S coasts. They continued to do so till spring 1941, longer than the level bomber campaign lasted. The Achte Fliegerkorps, to which most of the Sturzkampfgeschwader belonged, was to play a key role in supporting Seelöwe until the operation was indefinitely postponed and von Richthofen's Fliegerkorps ordered from France to Romania in January 1941. From September to December, the Sturzkampfgeschwader flew some dawn and dusk attacks on coastal shipping in the Thames Estuary and along the southeast English coast, but mostly they trained and waited for Seelöwe and then their next assignment. The unit histories for St.G. 2 and St.G. 77 bear this out, as does a careful examination of the daily loss reports for all four Geschwader along with scattered ULTRA intercepts and occasional references in the surviving Heer AOK records for northern France and Belgium for fall 1940. The Ju 87 groups were withdrawn from the frontline in spring 1941 for refreshment, as preparation for the attack on Russia.

This is supported by the fact that up to 18 August, 33 Stukas had been lost; however, some 51 were lost on operations in total up to the end of August, and 2 more on operations in September etc.

8 109s were lost, 17 Stukas, with another 7 Stukas damaged.

Compared to that, the RAF reported 37 Stukas destroyed, 2 probably destroyed, 2 damaged.

The RAF lost 5 fighters.

RAF records tell of 22 for that day.

That's a loss rate of about 15% for the Stukas. Sustainable losses would have been on the order of 2 or 3%.

That's the loss rate of one mission, where they had considerable losses as opposed to the avarage of next to zil losses for week after week - a mere 12 Stukas being lost to enemy losses in the whole July, for example. Speaks a lot of the RAF's capability to stop anti-shipping strikes, isn't it..?

It's curious though that now you pick the atypical losses of a single day, and try to apply that to the whole picture, when just recently you were arguing that the LW would not be able to amount a large number of sorties on avarage, and 'it doesn't matter' if they occasionaly did. Now it's a different song, the single worst sortie of the Stukas is representative of their whole operations.

I'd say it's a curious attitude, but since I know you for such a long time, I say it's just the same old old tricks.

 

[Civettone]

British Artillery was as good as the best overall and some say the best in WW2 in terms of flexibility.

Flexibility? I think it will be hard to beat the Finnish and the Americans in that sector.
The British artillery could start firing fast but this was at the cost of accuracy as they didn't take external factors into account as the Germans did like height, wind, temperature, etc. This lack of accuracy can also be deducted from North Africa where British artillery failed to take out the feared German 88mm guns.

Mortars have a role but anything over 81mm isn't man portable in practical terms.

The 120mm was an excellent mortar gun and very light for its calibre, about 400 lbs. The 120 could be taken apart in three pieces and had a special two-wheel carriage. As such it was a very mobile weapon.

Kris

 

[Civettone]

In terms of time, it's the exact same. It took weeks to move from the East to the West, fact. And it would take even longer to move from the East to Africa.

Ok. Plenty of time to rest. But you can forget that only full-strength divisions were committed. If the unit was largely wiped out, sure. But Germans didn't care that much if a unit didn't have their full strength. This is all the more strange as they did form new divisions instead of bringing the old ones up to strength. This became even worse in 1944/1945 when they didn't even bother to strengthen the old ones leading to several good commanders to stick to shrinked little units which could do nothing but watch those new divisions being ripped to pieces. But that's another thing...

I've never seen Malta has having radar, the Royal Navy around it had radar which could be used to direct air support. The same would apply for Crete.

BBC - WW2 People's War - Keeping the Radar Functioning in the Med

The Luftwaffe never adopted the escort doctrine that prevented the fight taking place around the bomber formation; roaming escort. Galland encouraged more fighter sweeps but, as you say, Goring made it close escort and Goring told the Luftwaffe what to do, not Galland.

According to Galland's memoirs, he had to give in to Göring as he got complaints from the bomber crews. So what Galland did was keeping 1/3 of his fighters close to the bombers where they would have been useless (his own words) while the rest stayed above and in front.
Göring relinquished command of the Luftwaffe. He refused to deal with petty affairs like that. That's not me saying so, for instance read the biography of Milch. What makes it worse is that Göring occasionaly took decisions without knowing what it was all about. Sometimes he hadn't even heard of a specific aircraft though it was already flying with the RLM closely monitoring the progress.

The only people surprised to see two SS divisions in Holland were the poor paratroopers who hadn't been warned. All of High Command knew about them, as I said, ULTRA, Dutch Resistance and Photo Recon had told them.

Why weren't they informed?

Well, mkloby and Glider had pointed out the flaw in this. The British couter-battery fire would destroy your artillery positions with ease, as they would out-gun and out-range you.

That's why I'm going for mobile mortars and light artillery. The British could only give suppressing fire over a large area. A thousand guns isn't enough to completely kill off the German forces. During Zitadelle the Russians had sectors of 450 guns per km though the Germans still advanced through it. A 1000 guns may seem a lot but given the large area (100 miles wide, 5 miles across) which they have to cover it isn't something which the Germans can't withstand for TWO days!

What obvious reasons?

That in this scenario Rommel would be advancing towards El Alamein half a year earlier. Several British units would be pulled back to defend England leaving behind a weakened force while the Germans will have two extra divisions and more Italian logistical support. The British would not have those American guns, tanks and Desert AF.

The Italian Air Force was a poor excuse in 1941-1942 and their numbers would hardly grow because of a Soviet victory.

What do you mean by poor excuse? They held their own and could definitely take the fight against those Kittyhawks and Blenheims.

Kris

 

[Hop]

The problem is with your figures, that the British admitted the loss of 1140 of their fighters, whereas the LW curiously only knows about 1385 of it's combat aircraft of all types (even coastal aircraft and such counted) being lost to enemy action during the Battle of Britiain, no small number to ship and land AAA, balloons and not fighters.

As Kurfurst is fairly new to this forum, just a word of warning about how he distorts things.

Note how he compares British fighters "lost", with German aircraft "lost to enemy action". Note that the British figure includes aircraft lost to accidents, the German one does not.

Here is a similar example of his methods from a month or so ago:

The Luftwaffe lost in total 663 fighters (in comparison 1140 Fighters lost by the RAF, Cat.3).
502 of these fighters were due to enemy action on operation, further
98 on operations, but not related to the enemy, and
63 not on operations.

Note those figures. 502 fighters IN TOTAL lost to enemy action.

Now look at his post in this thread:

As for the LW fighters record, they lost something like 502 s-e, and 224 t-e fighters to enemy action of all kinds

See the same 502 figure? Only a couple of months ago he was trying to pass off German single engined fighter losses as TOTAL losses. After he was called on it, he tried to claim the Bf 110 was not a fighter.

As for the LW fighters record, they lost something like 502 s-e, and 224 t-e fighters to enemy action of all kinds, vs. the said 1140 British fighters lost (not counting damaged).

Once again he repeats it. British losses to all causes, German losses only to enemy action.

Wood and Dempster in The Narrow Margin give German losses as

600 single engined fighters on operations
63 single engined fighters not on operations

235 twin engined fighters on operations
17 twin engined fighters not on operations

835 fighters lost on operations, 915 lost in total

(not counting damaged).

He says that as if German figures count damaged aircraft, but of course they don't.

Read : The LW was loosing 59 Stukas during the whole BoB due to enemy action, the rest is just pumping the numbers up.

No, it's actually 69 on operations, and the reason for including the non operational losses separately is both to show total losses, and to highlight the fact non operational losses are not counted.

Overall during the two month period the Ju87's suffered a 7.9% loss rate - hardly the massive losses the British claimed.

Is that the total loss rate, or just the loss rate to enemy action? Because if 59 losses = 7.9% loss rate, then 69 losses on operations would equal about 9.2% losses.

To put those figures in perspective, USAAF heavy bomber losses in Europe in October 1943 (the month of Schweinfurt) were 6.6% of sorties flown. No wonder the Stuka was withdrawn from major combat operations in what remained of the BoB.

When the targets changed from coastal targets to inner-Britain targets, the Ju 87 groups were redirected to attack the coastal merchant ships, since they lacked speed and range.

He believed the Ju87 units should be held in reserve for when air supremacy was gained

From September to December, the Sturzkampfgeschwader flew some dawn and dusk attacks on coastal shipping in the Thames Estuary and along the southeast English coast, but mostly they trained and waited for Seelöwe and then their next assignment.

Translation: Ju 87s were too slow and vulnerable to operate over Britain, and played little further part in the battle.

This is supported by the fact that up to 18 August, 33 Stukas had been lost; however, some 51 were lost on operations in total up to the end of August, and 2 more on operations in September etc.

Made up numbers again. Note that the totals Kurfurst posted earlier in his post show 40 Stukas lost in August up to the 18th.

Note also that now it suits his purpose, he is including operational losses, that he has excluded in all his figures so far.

1385 of it's combat aircraft of all types (even coastal aircraft and such counted) being lost to enemy action

502 s-e, and 224 t-e fighters to enemy action

59 Stukas during the whole BoB due to enemy action

some 51 were lost on operations

See the difference? Normally he wants to minimise German losses, so he excludes operational losses not due to enemy action. But when he wants to claim Stuka losses occured after 18th August, he uses the higher figure of aircraft lost on operations.

I try to use operational losses throughout, because they are a more accurate measure of what's going on, and accuracy requires consistency.

16 Stukas were lost on operations in July, 51 in August, 2 in September.

The August losses amount to at least:

8th - 9
11th - 2
13th - 6
14th - 1
15th - 4
16th - 9
18th - 17

That leaves a maximum of 3 lost on operations in the rest of August.

The RAF lost 5 fighters.

RAF records tell of 22 for that day.

The 18th saw more than just the Stuka operations. The RAF lost 5 fighters against 109 stukas and 150+ 109s, the rest were lost in other actions. In total the Luftwaffe lost 71 aircraft that day.

 

[bigZ]

"Why weren't they informed? "

If I remmember rightly they where informed. But a bit of ego came into play. Various airbourne offensives had been cancelled due to the rapid advance of the allies plus this was a last crack at a narrow front for Monty for an end of hostilties in 44. If he didn't do it now the resoures would be distributed on the wide front of which he was critical.

Generals sometimess act like Prima donnas.

Going back to ULTRA. Although the British could read German codes quickly. It is not the whole story. Very rarely would any single encryption say for example the time and location of an invasion. But instead the intelligence would be gathered from a variety brief messages that had been stored and filed and then systamatically organised into a coherent whole.

 

[Glider]

Flexibility? I think it will be hard to beat the Finnish and the Americans in that sector.
The British artillery could start firing fast but this was at the cost of accuracy as they didn't take external factors into account as the Germans did like height, wind, temperature, etc. This lack of accuracy can also be deducted from North Africa where British artillery failed to take out the feared German 88mm guns.

Kris
Flexibility has a lot more to do with organisation than the individual gun. British Artillery was organised in such a manner that allowed the individual spotter the ability to call down whatever fire was needed without having to ask permission of a higher authority. As a result the responce to a call for fire was faster and it arrived in greater numbers than any other army. There was even an emergency call that could be used, although it was only used a couple of times, that call any artillery up to Army Level that was within range of the target. No other army gave their spotters such flexibility.
Re the Guns the British Army had, well with the 25pd, 4.5 and 5.5 in guns didn't have to apologise to anyone for the weapons at their disposal. More than a match for any of the other forces in Range, ROF and weight as well as having the best tractors around as standard issue.
Re your claimed lack of accuracy of the British fire that is total bull.

The 120mm was an excellent mortar gun and very light for its calibre, about 400 lbs. The 120 could be taken apart in three pieces and had a special two-wheel carriage. As such it was a very mobile weapon.

It was indeed an excellent weapon but that isn't the point. Now work out how many rounds you are going to allow it to fire over your initial 2-3 days when the Army are left to fend for themselves, mulitiply it by the weights involved (gun, ammo, sights, communications equipment, food, personal weapons ect) and work out how many men you have in the unit and then how long it would take to move it a mile.

That in real terms is what is meant by portable

 

[mkloby]

The 120mm was an excellent mortar gun and very light for its calibre, about 400 lbs. The 120 could be taken apart in three pieces and had a special two-wheel carriage. As such it was a very mobile weapon.

I'm not sure you're understanding the reality of actual operations. You seem to just be quoting statistics and figures. 400lbs is NOT LIGHT!!! Broken down into 3 pieces makes is mobile and able to be humped? As a grunt, you carry your pack, your rifle/carbine/sidearm, and other miscellaneous gear plus your helmet. How much do you think that weighs??? We'd go out humping with about 100-120lbs of gear, and we were just leg infantry, not a weapons company. Also throw in your field radios - which are heavy as well. Now, on top of that, you want to manpack "very mobile" 120mm mortars? Plus the ammunition for the tubes, which were probably about 35lbs each? Look at what you'd be asking your bubbas to do... The mortar, I'm guessing, probably has a max effective range of only a couple clicks, I'd say maybe 6-7. With such a short range, a static firing position is not a possibility. This further aggrevates the problem of relying upon a heavy mortar as your primary means of fire support. Your idea might sound good and feasible, but it has serious flaws. I would be dressed down for coming up with a fire suport plan such as that to support my offensive operation.

Glider - good info. In the USMC, all officers receive training in fire support and call for fire. I believe all grunts receive training for call for fire as well. It's important to be able to have many troops that can act as a spotter, as then any man that can man the field radio can control the fire support.