operation sea lion

[Civettone]

Is Britain the same as the Channel Coast? The RAF had fighter squadrons in Northern Ireland, the north of Scotland, Wales, the north of England etc that didn't participate at all in the fighting.

That's not the point Hop! You disagreed with the number of fighters in France by showing a figure of Western Europe.

But the British target was the bombers.

Yes and no. RAF fighters split up to attack both.

And yet on average they flew much less than 1 sortie per day, as the figures show.

Irrelevant

But failed to hold on to their advances, which is the point.

Due to logistics? I don't think so! Unless you consider Stalingrad essentially a logistical defeat.

And never managed to get beyond them.

Irrelevant. This was not due to logistical problems but mainly the weather. That had an effect on logistics too but it's not the root cause.

There were two closer ports, Benghazi and Tobruk, but both had very low capacity, and couldn't handle many supplies.

Are you sure?

Yes, and your quotes confirm this. It's a theoretical capacity for sure but that's what I'm talking about: it was theoretically possible. That they failed to use the ports like they should have, can be avoided. That the axis failed to do the effort to get those ports fully operational, can be avoided.

He managed to reach Alamein. He did not manage to adequately supply his forces there.

He thought it would have been sufficient for a short and powerful offensive. After the October air and sea offensive, 40% of his supplies were stopped.

However, Rommel had to concede that his requirements for such an operation would be no less than four German armoured divisions

So how did he take Tobruk then?

If you look at the final nail in their coffin in the BoB, the raid that convinced Goering to stop using them in the main attack, 109 Stukas escorted by 150+ Bf 109s. 8 109s were lost, 17 Stukas, with another 7 Stukas damaged. The RAF lost 5 fighters.

Strange you still come up with that after you used it in vain at the axis history forum.

What do you base this on? Does this also apply to the American 8th AF?

So you're actually saying that bombing accuracy was reduced due to enemy fighters?

Kris

 

[Civettone]

As Kurfurst is fairly new to this forum, just a word of warning about how he distorts things.

How friendly of you to warn us. Especially because you're supposed to be completely free of distorting information, right?

And what's that stuff what he says about your phantom ships?

USAAF heavy bomber losses in Europe in October 1943 (the month of Schweinfurt) were 6.6% of sorties flown.

I see, of all sorties flown? How many did they lose on the raid to Schweinfurt itself? I think that's what stopped the bombing. You're doing the same distorting you accuse Kurfürst of.

Kris

 

[Civettone]

Going back to ULTRA. Although the British could read German codes quickly. It is not the whole story. Very rarely would any single encryption say for example the time and location of an invasion. But instead the intelligence would be gathered from a variety brief messages that had been stored and filed and then systamatically organised into a coherent whole.

Tell me this: would it have been possible for the Germans to release conflicting information in such a way that the British intelligence would be confused?

Kris

 

[Civettone]

Re your claimed lack of accuracy of the British fire that is total bull.

No, it isn't. The British had the advantage of rapid fire but the aiming of fire wasn't as sophisticated as the German or American artillery which used more accurate data and more variables. This was why the German artillery wasn't as rapid as the British although they also used forward observers. The British forward observers simply gave a position on the map and the British fired at that point without taking into account the terrain, height, wind, temperature, ... Leaving all of this out saved a lot of time.

work out how many men you have in the unit and then how long it would take to move it a mile.

Doesn't the same apply to lighter mortars? The only difference is the mortar itself. Ammo is also heavier but is shot at a slower RoF.

The mortar, I'm guessing, probably has a max effective range of only a couple clicks, I'd say maybe 6-7. With such a short range, a static firing position is not a possibility. This further aggrevates the problem of relying upon a heavy mortar as your primary means of fire support.

Strange, because that's EXACTLY what the Russians used them for, and with great success. You should look beyond American and English warfare tactics.

And don't forget that the Granatwerer 42 had a two-wheel carriage to be towed. If there wasn't enough manpower, a simple Kettenkrad was more than sufficient for this.

Kris

 

[mkloby]

Strange, because that's EXACTLY what the Russians used them for, and with great success. You should look beyond American and English warfare tactics.

And don't forget that the Granatwerer 42 had a two-wheel carriage to be towed. If there wasn't enough manpower, a simple Kettenkrad was more than sufficient for this.

Kris

It's not strange. You are just plain wrong. Are you claiming that Soviet armies pinned their primary method of fire support on the shoulders of man-packed 120mm mortars??? That is utter nonsense. A typical 1943 Guards Div had about 160 mortars. Same for Rifle div. Sources show 18 120mm tubes and 12 120mm tubes, respectively. The vast majority of mortars are owned at Bn and Co level, and are medium/light mortars. Reason being they are relatively light and can be humped. However, that is way off subject.

Civ - you simply do not understand military operations. You're right in that I am a product of the US military, and I have training in doctrine and tactics as employed by the USMC. However, that doesn't mean that the US does not study other methods. What training are you bringing to the table? I'm sorry, but you cannot read a book and look at figures and just make up some ludicrous scheme of maneuver supported by a fantastical fire support plan, then support your claims with a completely unrelated and plainly false "proof" from the eastern front.

 

[daishi12]

I still want to know where Kris gets the amount of men and materials he needs for an invasion. It has been stated on a number of occassions that the army and LW can be brought back from the Eastern front after Russia has been neutralized as an effective fighting force. I do not see Stalin agreeing to the non-agreesion pact after the Motherland has been invaded by the hated Nazis.

Btw Kris you cannot state that YOUR scenario for the non-agreesion pact is valid when you also state that the LW has had extensive training attacking RUSSIAN targets.

As I have said before, in order that you neutralize Russia, you would need to take and hold hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of land, the biggest cities in Russia and both the Artic and Black sea coasts.

I am sure that you are aware that in Stalingrad alone the Reich lost 870,000 men. Even allowing for lower casualties figures for other cities (because Russia would not be able to mount offensive actions on as large a scale as Stalingrad to defend/counter attack numerous cities) I would say that you would suffer between 1.2 and 1.5 million casualties just taking and holding the 6 cities I mentioned on page 18. This does not take into account other losses that the Reich would suffer in other actions.

 

[plan_D]

I didn't know about the Maltese radar network; I'll have to look at it in more depth in future. The Royal Navy would still be able to deploy vessels to act as warning ships; Germany did the same and the RAF nicknamed them Squealers.

"According to Galland's memoirs, he had to give in to Göring as he got complaints from the bomber crews. So what Galland did was keeping 1/3 of his fighters close to the bombers where they would have been useless (his own words) while the rest stayed above and in front.
Göring relinquished command of the Luftwaffe. He refused to deal with petty affairs like that. That's not me saying so, for instance read the biography of Milch. What makes it worse is that Göring occasionaly took decisions without knowing what it was all about. Sometimes he hadn't even heard of a specific aircraft though it was already flying with the RLM closely monitoring the progress."

Galland was right; close escort was useless. The Allied escort doctrine in 1943-1945 put emphasis on roaming escorts that cleared the way in front of the bomber formation. This type of escort was what Galland wanted but never fully achieved.

"Why weren't they informed?"

I don't know. Maybe High Command didn't think it required to tell the troops there was armour in the region; it was good to keep them in high spirits. It took the airborne divisions to find out for themselves what the ULTRA team and Dutch resistance already knew.

"That's why I'm going for mobile mortars and light artillery. The British could only give suppressing fire over a large area. A thousand guns isn't enough to completely kill off the German forces. During Zitadelle the Russians had sectors of 450 guns per km though the Germans still advanced through it. A 1000 guns may seem a lot but given the large area (100 miles wide, 5 miles across) which they have to cover it isn't something which the Germans can't withstand for TWO days!"

The Wehrmacht was extremely efficient at counter-battery fire against the Soviets, this was the reason the Soviet artillery doesn't seem too effective and the troops could advance into it.

You seem to be forgetting that your supply ships and landing craft would be coming under fire from this artillery as well. The British artillery may not cover the whole front; but in many sectors your advance will be broken up. The German front was constantly moving in Russia making it harder to hit, and when not moving they'd use skeleton look outs to draw the artillery fire on empty trenches. On the beaches of England you wouldn't have effective bunkers and you'd be stuck on the beach, under a heavy, constant barrage.

"That in this scenario Rommel would be advancing towards El Alamein half a year earlier. Several British units would be pulled back to defend England leaving behind a weakened force while the Germans will have two extra divisions and more Italian logistical support. The British would not have those American guns, tanks and Desert AF."

How would Rommel be advancing half a year earlier? Britain had enough forces to hold of German invasion, so there'd be no need to send troops back.

Italian logistical support would not be increased to any great extent. And even with a slight increase it wasn't enough to supply both the German and Italian armies.

Why wouldn't Britain get American guns and tanks? Just because Germany isn't at war with the Soviets; it doesn't mean the U.S won't join in. And the Desert Air Force was British, not American. The U.S aircraft arrived for a raid on Polesti and stayed to aid the 8th Army.

"What do you mean by poor excuse? They held their own and could definitely take the fight against those Kittyhawks and Blenheims."

The Italian Air Force did not hold their own in N.Africa; they rarely held their own over Italy. The Italians rarely intercepted the USAMEAF and RAF 160 Sqdn. Liberators and B-17s.

 

[Hop]

That's not the point Hop! You disagreed with the number of fighters in France by showing a figure of Western Europe.

Why France? What's wrong with the fighters based in Belgium and Holland? They were just as much part of the battle.

Yes and no. RAF fighters split up to attack both.

Primary target was bombers.

Due to logistics? I don't think so! Unless you consider Stalingrad essentially a logistical defeat.

To a large extent it was. If the Stalingrad pocket had been able to get proper supplies, a breakout would probably have been possible.

Yes, and your quotes confirm this. It's a theoretical capacity for sure but that's what I'm talking about: it was theoretically possible.

Theoretically possible doesn't cut it in war, and that perhaps is the crux of this argument. What's possible and what's practical are two very different things.

That they failed to use the ports like they should have, can be avoided.

Actually they did use the ports as well as they could. As Van Creveld said:

the problem of supplying an Axis force for an advance into the Middle East was insoluble

He thought it would have been sufficient for a short and powerful offensive. After the October air and sea offensive, 40% of his supplies were stopped.

Van Creveld again:

In all the confusion, one fact was entirely overlooked. Despite everything, the Italians succeeded in putting an average of 72,000 tons - or just above Rommel's current consumption - across the Mediterranean in each one of the four months from July to October. Rommel's difficulties, therefore, stemmed less from a dearth of supplies from Europe than from the impossible length of his line of communications inside Africa. Thus, for example, the German commander discovered that he needed fully ten per cent of his precious fuel simply to transport the other ninety per cent. If Panzerarmee's fuel is put at about one third of its total requirements (excluding water and personnel), then it would be a reasonable guess that thirty to fifty per cent of all the fuel landed in North Africa was wasted between Tripoli and the front. Obliged to cover 1,000 miles of desert each way, thirty-five per cent of the vehicles were constantly out of repair. Under such conditions, any supply service was bound to break down.

So how did he take Tobruk then?

He did it anyway with what he had, helped greatly by Fellers.

Strange you still come up with that after you used it in vain at the axis history forum.

In vain? It's completely true.

Hooton:

The same day ended Stuka daylight operations over England when four fighter squadrons slaughtered Major Clemens, Graf von Schonborn's StG 77 during an attack upon Poling radar station, with 16 Stukas last and two damaged beyond repair (21% of the force) in what Seidemann justly described as "a black day"

Wood and Dempster:

August 18th was the virtual death knell of the Ju 87s over Britain. Losses had been mounting at an alarming rate and, apart from a few isolated sorties, they were pulled out of the battle

Bungay:

Most unusually, Luftflotte 3's post-action report the next day (always called an Erfolgsmeldung - literally a "Success Report") commented on the losses of the Stukas. It attributed them to "British fighters gaining a local superiority due to particularly favourable weather conditions" and carrying out a pursuit up to 30km over the the Channel. StG 77's air corps commander, von Richthofen, confided to his diary that a "Stuka Gruppe has had it's feathers well and truly plucked".

What really struck von Richthofen were not the overall losses of the Stukas, which at 15% were high but bearable in the short term if they were achieving results, but the near destruction of one Gruppe, whose losses ran at 50%. This was on top of the losses of nearly 30% to another single unit, I/StG2, in the Tangmere raid on the 16th, and the loss of 70% of one Staffel of II/StG2 on the 13th. Earlier losses, such as those over convoy Peewit, had been heavy but acceptable. It was becoming clear, however, that any unlucky Stuka unit caught without its escort would be almost wiped out. It was also becoming clear there was at least one such unlucky unit on every major sortie. Some rethinking was called for.

Bungay goes on to quote Goering on the 19th:

"Until the enemy fighter force has been broken, Stuka units are only to be used when circumstances are particularly favourable." With this withdrawal of the Stukas from general operations, the only precision bombing instrument the Luftwaffe had left was Erpro 210

So you're actually saying that bombing accuracy was reduced due to enemy fighters?

Yes.

I see, of all sorties flown? How many did they lose on the raid to Schweinfurt itself? I think that's what stopped the bombing. You're doing the same distorting you accuse Kurfürst of.

Um, no. Compare either the month's operations against the Stukas for a month or two in the BoB, or a single operation against a single operation.

Comparing a single raid, Schweinfurt, against a month and a half of Stuka operations is not comparing like with like.

I compared Luftwaffe operations during the BoB as a whole, (using Kurfurst's figures) against the worst month of the 8th AF. That's a fair comparison.

Comparing the worst raid for the USAAF against an average for the Stukas is not a fair comparison.

If you compare like with like, the worst month for the 8th saw 6.6% of their heavy bombers lost, Stuka operations in the BoB saw 7.9 - 9.2% lost. The Schweinfurt raid saw 20.7% bombers lost, according to Murray, the Thorney Island raid suffered 35% losses, the Stuka operations for the day suffered 16% losses.

No, it isn't. The British had the advantage of rapid fire but the aiming of fire wasn't as sophisticated as the German or American artillery which used more accurate data and more variables. This was why the German artillery wasn't as rapid as the British although they also used forward observers. The British forward observers simply gave a position on the map and the British fired at that point without taking into account the terrain, height, wind, temperature, ... Leaving all of this out saved a lot of time.

Can I ask the source of this claim?

Might I suggest you read Site Directory

It might take some time, as it goes into British artillery methods in great detail. See in particular METEOR

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

The 120mm was an excellent mortar gun and very light for its calibre, about 400 lbs. The 120 could be taken apart in three pieces and had a special two-wheel carriage. As such it was a very mobile weapon.

Kris

You want to try pulling that two wheel cart under fire...

Not very mobile and not very smart.

Now granted you probably would not use them on the front because you are going to be hitting targets from the rear several clicks behind. But in this scenerio of using them on the beach head, how is that going to work? Not very well. Just listen to mkloby because he has experience in this matter because he played with morters as a leg infantry in the USMC.

 

[bigZ]

Tell me this: would it have been possible for the Germans to release conflicting information in such a way that the British intelligence would be confused?

Kris

No doubt the Germans would release conflicting information to confuse the inteligence. But I would think they wouldn't do it through the enigma encryptions as they where sure it was secure.

But in order to confuse the British The Germans would have to make sure that the majority of messages encrypted(even down to unit level) would substantiate the hoax. I am no ULTRA expert but the resources and the brains pumped into it are staggering.

Canaris may also be a problem?

 

[syscom3]

Fundamentally, there is nothing the Germans could have done to confuse the Allies.

A build up of landing craft at ports is a pretty good indication that an invasion is planned. And since the smaller landing craft cannot be expected to cover long distances, whichever ports they are stockpiled at, is close to wehere the intended invasion will be.

Plus the capabilities of the Germans were such, that they could conceivably cross the channel at the narrower points, but they could not at the wider points.

Then there are those actual days of the month that are favorable for invasion.

Taken as a whole, the Allies would have 2 - 3 months of warning that an invasion will happen, and then 72 hours or more that an invasion is underway.

One material fact that civette cannot explain away, is the dispersal his invasion fleet will need among several ports, and the different sailing times means different loading dates and sailing times. The further the port is from the invasion beach, the sooner it must sortie.

 

[Civettone]

It's not strange. You are just plain wrong. Are you claiming that Soviet armies pinned their primary method of fire support on the shoulders of man-packed 120mm mortars??? That is utter nonsense.

I'm just saying that the Russians used the 120mm mortar as a substitute for artillery. And it was the only country which did this to my knowledge. Red Army doctrine authorized massing mortars from many units under a central command, and the Soviet 120mm mortar was so good that the Germans copied it.

Civ - you simply do not understand military operations. You're right in that I am a product of the US military, and I have training in doctrine and tactics as employed by the USMC.

Your opinion is duly noted. But I disagree that your or the USMC has it right all the time. Theirs is by no means the standard of military doctrine. My scenerio may be unorthodox but these are often succesful as they take the enemy off guard.

Kris

 

[Civettone]

I still want to know where Kris gets the amount of men and materials he needs for an invasion.

Daishi, this is the last time I will come back to this as it is off-topic.

I do not see Stalin agreeing to the non-agreesion pact after the Motherland has been invaded by the hated Nazis.

Well, the guy wanted to make peace with Germany in late 1941, so why not?

Btw Kris you cannot state that YOUR scenario for the non-agreesion pact is valid when you also state that the LW has had extensive training attacking RUSSIAN targets.

Of course I can.

As I have said before, in order that you neutralize Russia, you would need to take and hold hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of land, the biggest cities in Russia and both the Artic and Black sea coasts.

No, you don't. Neutralizing is not the same as occupying. I am ok with leaving up to 150 divisions behind to guard the occupied territories and prevent the Russians from restarting the war.

I would say that you would suffer between 1.2 and 1.5 million casualties just taking and holding the 6 cities I mentioned on page 18. This does not take into account other losses that the Reich would suffer in other actions.

You build your case on wrong premises. The offensive against Russia would be stopped at the end of 1941. There would be no more taking of cities.

And again, I said Russia would be neutralized which can mean two things: it's defeated or Barbarossa is cancelled and the NAT is still valid. In both cases I'm thinking of leaving behind 150 out of 250 divisions and a few hundred aircraft behind to guard the Russian bear. Plus, the armies of the German allies.

Kris

 

[Civettone]

I didn't know about the Maltese radar network

I'm always happy when I can pass over some useful information to other members!

This type of escort was what Galland wanted but never fully achieved.

You're right. Galland's solution was a compromise, basically misusing 1/3 of his fighters.

The Wehrmacht was extremely efficient at counter-battery fire against the Soviets, this was the reason the Soviet artillery doesn't seem too effective and the troops could advance into it.

That's true but it's not the whole picture. The threat of those guns was mainly neutralized by their own accuracy, the German armoured advance and the Luftwaffe.

You seem to be forgetting that your supply ships and landing craft would be coming under fire from this artillery as well.

But those 1000 guns wouldn't be assembled and installed on the first day.

The British artillery may not cover the whole front; but in many sectors your advance will be broken up.

Again, I agree. But that's also why I am going along with the original German plan of a broad front.
Yesterday I was reading up on the German offensive on the Dutch Beveland- islands. While under fire from artillery and 2 navy ships they managed to get from one island to another and defeat the French/Dutch forces there. Surely not the same thing but it's not like the Germans will be shell shocked from a relatively low number of British guns. I'm also thinking of the 650 guns near El Alamein which failed to give the British their breakthrough. At least in the beginning.
I also don't really understand why it's such a problem to use artillery from the beaches as the allies also took artillery with them on the first day.
Sure, it's a lot of work to get it all ashore and operational but it's not like the British were going to unleash hell on the first day. It's going to be tough but let's not make it into an impossibility. At the time nobody knew how to fight under fire like the Germans did. They had the best lead and most experienced army in the world.

I think they could have done quite a bit of good with their LeG 40 guns (both the 75mm as the 105mm models) which were very light and still had a good range. German doctrine states that artillery positions must be dug in unless the ground is unsuited for digging or unless the position will be held for only a very short time.

How would Rommel be advancing half a year earlier? Britain had enough forces to hold of German invasion, so there'd be no need to send troops back.

Well, here's where it becomes confusing. I'm replying to some people (maybe Hoppian?) pointing out that the British would pull back their divisions and squadrons to defend Britain. I responded that this could lead to the AK moving up to Alexandria and the Suez Channel.

Italian logistical support would not be increased to any great extent. And even with a slight increase it wasn't enough to supply both the German and Italian armies.

With the Italian army no longer fighting in Russia, there would be more resources and trucks available. Half of the Italian shipping was used to supply their forces in Yugoslavia and Greece. This could also be done by road (of course then that's where those trucks would go to). In any case, the Italians weren't using their full capabilities until late 1942 when they used all their shipping for supplying their forces in Tunesia.

Why wouldn't Britain get American guns and tanks?

Because I'm talking about the Spring of 1942. They were delivered in the late Summer IIRC.

The Italian Air Force did not hold their own in N.Africa; they rarely held their own over Italy. The Italians rarely intercepted the USAMEAF and RAF 160 Sqdn. Liberators and B-17s.

Perhaps that's because they didn't have a radar chain nor nightfighters?
But the Italian pilots were well respected by their Commonwealth opponents over the African desert.

Kris

 

[Civettone]

No doubt the Germans would release conflicting information to confuse the inteligence. But I would think they wouldn't do it through the enigma encryptions as they where sure it was secure.

Well, just look at Wacht am Rhein which ULTRA failed to recognize. To maximize secrecy the Germans basically stopped radio traffic.

And there have also been cases where ULTRA was mistrusted. And even though these occasions never became known, I can imagine that there were also instances where the guys at Bletchley Park drew the wrong conclusions from the information obtained by ULTRA. As said before, ULTRA rarely found the exact orders for an offensive but found indications which were then puzzled together. There's a human weakness in this process.
All you need is confusion to hold off the British anti-invasion plans for a few hours more.

Canaris may also be a problem?

Why is that?

Kris

 

[plan_D]

The British artillery would capture the German forces in the open; unlike that at El Alamein. The best comparison of artillery against an invasion is Neptune - the Allied command recognised the potential of the German artillery batteries and took great effort to destroy them. All those guns that did remain come D-Day Operation Neptune laid heavy fire on the beaches and caused great problems.

I don't recall the Allies landing heavy guns on the beaches during the first day, especially not during the assault. In the seaborne invasion, the Allies relied on the naval fire support and roaming TacAir to neutralise the enemy gun positions. However, it must not be forgotten that many German large batteries were knocked out by the airborne divisions during the night and day of June 5th/6th.

"With the Italian army no longer fighting in Russia, there would be more resources and trucks available. Half of the Italian shipping was used to supply their forces in Yugoslavia and Greece. This could also be done by road (of course then that's where those trucks would go to). In any case, the Italians weren't using their full capabilities until late 1942 when they used all their shipping for supplying their forces in Tunesia."

The number increase would be a benefit to the Italian fighting unit, but the extra transport capacity would be the greatest increase and help. If, however, the situation was recognised as being dire in North Africa then Great Britain would not divert forces to the Far East and may even pull some home.
Britain thought of Burma and India as being the holding point for the Suez Canal but were thinking otherwise by mid 1942. If Italy and Germany had proved to Great Britain that there was more at stake by putting more weight, then Britain has the resources to pull back from the Far East.
Rommel was only able to reach North Africa in the first place because Britain moved troops to Burma when on their last march to Benghazi and victory in 1941. The Italians could have been expelled from North Africa then, and Germany would have never landed.

"Because I'm talking about the Spring of 1942. They were delivered in the late Summer IIRC."

I cannot remember exact dates when American equipment began to arrive, however I know it would be a race. Even with solely British equipment the DAK was out-numbered in guns and armour, the U.S supply just made it moreso.

Will the increase in transport be able to keep an extra armoured and extra infantry division supplied? How many transports have you got available for the cross channel invasion, is it enough to move your assault force in one day? What if the Soviet Union starts pressurising Romania and Hungary, are you going to react by reinforcing the east?

 

[Civettone]

The British artillery would capture the German forces in the open; unlike that at El Alamein.

Correct. That's why I see the Germans advancing in the beginning but needing to dig in when the British get their guns into position.

great problems.

Did the allies really encounter great problems other than those at Omaha?

I don't recall the Allies landing heavy guns on the beaches during the first day, especially not during the assault.

No, not heavy guns but that's not what I was talking about.

German large batteries were knocked out by the airborne divisions during the night and day of June 5th/6th.

Aaah, nice to hear. The Germans were going to paradrop 2 divisions. We haven't discussed this before. I think it will be a difficult endeavour but they can prove to be very valuable to the German offensive.

then Britain has the resources to pull back from the Far East.

Interesting. But I have difficulty imagining the British giving up on their Empire. The Far East Forces were crying out for reinforcements.

Rommel was only able to reach North Africa in the first place because Britain moved troops to Burma when on their last march to Benghazi and victory in 1941. The Italians could have been expelled from North Africa then, and Germany would have never landed.

That doesn't make sense, Plan_D: Rommel landed in the Spring of 1941, long before Burma was in danger.
At the end of 1941 Rommel made a tactical retreat because of logistics. The British didn't have the troops, weapons nor logistics to kick the Germans out of Africa.

Even with solely British equipment the DAK was out-numbered in guns and armour, the U.S supply just made it moreso.

Sure, but that's nothing new. That was also the case during Rommel's advance. He was outnumbered yet defeated the British at Sidi Barrani, Benghazi, Wadi al something, ...

Will the increase in transport be able to keep an extra armoured and extra infantry division supplied?

As the Italians only used half of their naval transport capacity and the ports of Tobruk was capable of handling more than it actually did, I think supporting two extra divisions wouldn't have been such an obstacle.

How many transports have you got available for the cross channel invasion, is it enough to move your assault force in one day?

In 1940 the Germans had enough river barges to move 9 divisions in the first wave. And that's without the Sturmbooten and Fährprämen they later built.

What if the Soviet Union starts pressurising Romania and Hungary, are you going to react by reinforcing the east?

There's a book called 'Icebreaker' about Russian plans to attack Germany when it was occupied in the invasion of Britain. Perhaps you've heard of it. That takes into account that Germany would committ most of its forces against Britain. I already said that I would hold half of my divisions guarding the Russian bear. I think Russia would better lay low in case Britain would be defeated.

Kris

 

[mkloby]

I'm just saying that the Russians used the 120mm mortar as a substitute for artillery. And it was the only country which did this to my knowledge. Red Army doctrine authorized massing mortars from many units under a central command, and the Soviet 120mm mortar was so good that the Germans copied it.

It can act in its stead in LIMITED circumstances. VERY LIMITED.

Your opinion is duly noted. But I disagree that your or the USMC has it right all the time. Theirs is by no means the standard of military doctrine. My scenerio may be unorthodox but these are often succesful as they take the enemy off guard.

OK pal, I'll stay out of this too, because as you have shown in all threads, you know better than all. You are even better versed in military affairs, tactics, and doctrine than professional military officers and enlisted personnel.

 

[Civettone]

Why do you even post in a forum? Wouldn't a blog better suit you? That way you can educate all readers to what the truth is. You basically back up all your claims by either stating you know the truth because you're a pilot or because you're a professionally trained marine. That doesn't cut it for me. Do you see me using the same thing by saying I'm a master in international affairs and conflict management? How easy it would be for me to say you know nothing about international politics. But I refuse to think that way and I consider your opinion to be as much worth as my own.

So, if you want to convince me that heavy mortars cannot replace light artillery, explain to me why not instead of simply stating that the USMC told you so...

Kris

 

[mkloby]

Why do you even post in a forum? Wouldn't a blog better suit you? That way you can educate all readers to what the truth is. You basically back up all your claims by either stating you know the truth because you're a pilot or because you're a professionally trained marine. That doesn't cut it for me. Do you see me using the same thing by saying I'm a master in international affairs and conflict management? How easy it would be for me to say you know nothing about international politics. But I refuse to think that way and I consider your opinion to be as much worth as my own.

So, if you want to convince me that heavy mortars cannot replace light artillery, explain to me why not instead of simply stating that the USMC told you so...

Kris

Just read up the pages, master civettone. Reason upon reason has been listed as to why your fire support plan isn't worth a darn, yet you dismiss it all. It's the same as in all the threads. You are right, and you are always right. You don't have heavy mortars replacing just light arty, you have it replacing virtually all arty! You have no 105s, 150s, or 170s! I'm guessing your divisions will be engaging without their artillery regiments. Do you understand military orgranizational structures? Which assets are owned at which levels. Don't give the "Your a US Marine" deal, because it's fairly standard throughout the world.

Let's review:
- The weight of the heavy mortar, although you seem to think it's light and extremely mobile, even though you have NO EXPERIENCE! I know you think that studying books makes you Clausewitz incarnate, but guess what... your armchair analysis isn't worth much when you're talking guys that have actually participated in these types of ops and exercises. Even if it has a trailer, we're going to tow that thing under fire to a point just behind our lines since our range is so limited...
- Again, the range of mortars is limited! I feel like a broken record. I don't know the exact specs, but I would guess that a 120mm heavy mortar has a MER of about 6 clicks or so.
- Due to your lack of arty, you have no means to answer British counter battery fire, which will likely smash your mortar positions to pieces well out of range.
- When your infantry advances, your firing positions will continuously have to move as well. The same problem keeps cropping up, relating to the weight of the weapon system, and it's range.
- Your accuracy is not going to be as great as arty. I have crewed a US M2 105mm gun. The position we were firing at was miles away, and after the first round, the forward observer adjusted, and we received "fire for effect."
That isn't going to happen with the mortar. This is the type of fire that will be falling on your forces. British 5.5" will lob 100lb shells on you, in contrast to your 35lb rounds, with a much greater casualty radius.
-Speaking of your 35lb(or so) rounds, how are we going to keep this ammo in supply? In addition to your pack, weapon, and other gear weighing in at let's just say 100lbs, we're going to hump the field radios and toss in a mortar shell for each man to carry as well, I imagine.


Mortars are great weapons. But, they are best used as infantry weapons, at the Bn and Co level. In typical fashion you back nothing up. You have NO REASON WHATSOEVER to think that heavy mortars can replace divisional arty. You haven't given any, except a misplaced statement about russian tactics - which was unrelated.

Of course, I haven't stated anything in this post except that I'm a US Marine and that's why your fire support plan is nonsense. I didn't give any reasons.