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That's not the point Hop! You disagreed with the number of fighters in France by showing a figure of Western Europe.Is Britain the same as the Channel Coast? The RAF had fighter squadrons in Northern Ireland, the north of Scotland, Wales, the north of England etc that didn't participate at all in the fighting.
Yes and no. RAF fighters split up to attack both.But the British target was the bombers.
IrrelevantAnd yet on average they flew much less than 1 sortie per day, as the figures show.
Due to logistics? I don't think so! Unless you consider Stalingrad essentially a logistical defeat.But failed to hold on to their advances, which is the point.
Irrelevant. This was not due to logistical problems but mainly the weather. That had an effect on logistics too but it's not the root cause.And never managed to get beyond them.
There were two closer ports, Benghazi and Tobruk, but both had very low capacity, and couldn't handle many supplies.
Yes, and your quotes confirm this. It's a theoretical capacity for sure but that's what I'm talking about: it was theoretically possible. That they failed to use the ports like they should have, can be avoided. That the axis failed to do the effort to get those ports fully operational, can be avoided.Are you sure?
He thought it would have been sufficient for a short and powerful offensive. After the October air and sea offensive, 40% of his supplies were stopped.He managed to reach Alamein. He did not manage to adequately supply his forces there.
So how did he take Tobruk then?However, Rommel had to concede that his requirements for such an operation would be no less than four German armoured divisions
Strange you still come up with that after you used it in vain at the axis history forum.If you look at the final nail in their coffin in the BoB, the raid that convinced Goering to stop using them in the main attack, 109 Stukas escorted by 150+ Bf 109s. 8 109s were lost, 17 Stukas, with another 7 Stukas damaged. The RAF lost 5 fighters.
So you're actually saying that bombing accuracy was reduced due to enemy fighters?What do you base this on? Does this also apply to the American 8th AF?
Kris
How friendly of you to warn us. Especially because you're supposed to be completely free of distorting information, right?As Kurfurst is fairly new to this forum, just a word of warning about how he distorts things.
I see, of all sorties flown? How many did they lose on the raid to Schweinfurt itself? I think that's what stopped the bombing. You're doing the same distorting you accuse Kurfürst of.USAAF heavy bomber losses in Europe in October 1943 (the month of Schweinfurt) were 6.6% of sorties flown.
Tell me this: would it have been possible for the Germans to release conflicting information in such a way that the British intelligence would be confused?Going back to ULTRA. Although the British could read German codes quickly. It is not the whole story. Very rarely would any single encryption say for example the time and location of an invasion. But instead the intelligence would be gathered from a variety brief messages that had been stored and filed and then systamatically organised into a coherent whole.
No, it isn't. The British had the advantage of rapid fire but the aiming of fire wasn't as sophisticated as the German or American artillery which used more accurate data and more variables. This was why the German artillery wasn't as rapid as the British although they also used forward observers. The British forward observers simply gave a position on the map and the British fired at that point without taking into account the terrain, height, wind, temperature, ... Leaving all of this out saved a lot of time.Re your claimed lack of accuracy of the British fire that is total bull.
Doesn't the same apply to lighter mortars? The only difference is the mortar itself. Ammo is also heavier but is shot at a slower RoF.work out how many men you have in the unit and then how long it would take to move it a mile.
Strange, because that's EXACTLY what the Russians used them for, and with great success. You should look beyond American and English warfare tactics.The mortar, I'm guessing, probably has a max effective range of only a couple clicks, I'd say maybe 6-7. With such a short range, a static firing position is not a possibility. This further aggrevates the problem of relying upon a heavy mortar as your primary means of fire support.
Strange, because that's EXACTLY what the Russians used them for, and with great success. You should look beyond American and English warfare tactics.
And don't forget that the Granatwerer 42 had a two-wheel carriage to be towed. If there wasn't enough manpower, a simple Kettenkrad was more than sufficient for this.
Kris
That's not the point Hop! You disagreed with the number of fighters in France by showing a figure of Western Europe.
Yes and no. RAF fighters split up to attack both.
Due to logistics? I don't think so! Unless you consider Stalingrad essentially a logistical defeat.
Yes, and your quotes confirm this. It's a theoretical capacity for sure but that's what I'm talking about: it was theoretically possible.
That they failed to use the ports like they should have, can be avoided.
the problem of supplying an Axis force for an advance into the Middle East was insoluble
He thought it would have been sufficient for a short and powerful offensive. After the October air and sea offensive, 40% of his supplies were stopped.
In all the confusion, one fact was entirely overlooked. Despite everything, the Italians succeeded in putting an average of 72,000 tons - or just above Rommel's current consumption - across the Mediterranean in each one of the four months from July to October. Rommel's difficulties, therefore, stemmed less from a dearth of supplies from Europe than from the impossible length of his line of communications inside Africa. Thus, for example, the German commander discovered that he needed fully ten per cent of his precious fuel simply to transport the other ninety per cent. If Panzerarmee's fuel is put at about one third of its total requirements (excluding water and personnel), then it would be a reasonable guess that thirty to fifty per cent of all the fuel landed in North Africa was wasted between Tripoli and the front. Obliged to cover 1,000 miles of desert each way, thirty-five per cent of the vehicles were constantly out of repair. Under such conditions, any supply service was bound to break down.
So how did he take Tobruk then?
Strange you still come up with that after you used it in vain at the axis history forum.
The same day ended Stuka daylight operations over England when four fighter squadrons slaughtered Major Clemens, Graf von Schonborn's StG 77 during an attack upon Poling radar station, with 16 Stukas last and two damaged beyond repair (21% of the force) in what Seidemann justly described as "a black day"
August 18th was the virtual death knell of the Ju 87s over Britain. Losses had been mounting at an alarming rate and, apart from a few isolated sorties, they were pulled out of the battle
Most unusually, Luftflotte 3's post-action report the next day (always called an Erfolgsmeldung - literally a "Success Report") commented on the losses of the Stukas. It attributed them to "British fighters gaining a local superiority due to particularly favourable weather conditions" and carrying out a pursuit up to 30km over the the Channel. StG 77's air corps commander, von Richthofen, confided to his diary that a "Stuka Gruppe has had it's feathers well and truly plucked".
What really struck von Richthofen were not the overall losses of the Stukas, which at 15% were high but bearable in the short term if they were achieving results, but the near destruction of one Gruppe, whose losses ran at 50%. This was on top of the losses of nearly 30% to another single unit, I/StG2, in the Tangmere raid on the 16th, and the loss of 70% of one Staffel of II/StG2 on the 13th. Earlier losses, such as those over convoy Peewit, had been heavy but acceptable. It was becoming clear, however, that any unlucky Stuka unit caught without its escort would be almost wiped out. It was also becoming clear there was at least one such unlucky unit on every major sortie. Some rethinking was called for.
"Until the enemy fighter force has been broken, Stuka units are only to be used when circumstances are particularly favourable." With this withdrawal of the Stukas from general operations, the only precision bombing instrument the Luftwaffe had left was Erpro 210
Yes.So you're actually saying that bombing accuracy was reduced due to enemy fighters?
I see, of all sorties flown? How many did they lose on the raid to Schweinfurt itself? I think that's what stopped the bombing. You're doing the same distorting you accuse Kurfürst of.
No, it isn't. The British had the advantage of rapid fire but the aiming of fire wasn't as sophisticated as the German or American artillery which used more accurate data and more variables. This was why the German artillery wasn't as rapid as the British although they also used forward observers. The British forward observers simply gave a position on the map and the British fired at that point without taking into account the terrain, height, wind, temperature, ... Leaving all of this out saved a lot of time.
The 120mm was an excellent mortar gun and very light for its calibre, about 400 lbs. The 120 could be taken apart in three pieces and had a special two-wheel carriage. As such it was a very mobile weapon.
Kris
Tell me this: would it have been possible for the Germans to release conflicting information in such a way that the British intelligence would be confused?
Kris
I'm just saying that the Russians used the 120mm mortar as a substitute for artillery. And it was the only country which did this to my knowledge. Red Army doctrine authorized massing mortars from many units under a central command, and the Soviet 120mm mortar was so good that the Germans copied it.It's not strange. You are just plain wrong. Are you claiming that Soviet armies pinned their primary method of fire support on the shoulders of man-packed 120mm mortars??? That is utter nonsense.
Your opinion is duly noted. But I disagree that your or the USMC has it right all the time. Theirs is by no means the standard of military doctrine. My scenerio may be unorthodox but these are often succesful as they take the enemy off guard.Civ - you simply do not understand military operations. You're right in that I am a product of the US military, and I have training in doctrine and tactics as employed by the USMC.
Daishi, this is the last time I will come back to this as it is off-topic.I still want to know where Kris gets the amount of men and materials he needs for an invasion.
Well, the guy wanted to make peace with Germany in late 1941, so why not?I do not see Stalin agreeing to the non-agreesion pact after the Motherland has been invaded by the hated Nazis.
Of course I can.Btw Kris you cannot state that YOUR scenario for the non-agreesion pact is valid when you also state that the LW has had extensive training attacking RUSSIAN targets.
No, you don't. Neutralizing is not the same as occupying. I am ok with leaving up to 150 divisions behind to guard the occupied territories and prevent the Russians from restarting the war.As I have said before, in order that you neutralize Russia, you would need to take and hold hundreds of thousands of square kilometers of land, the biggest cities in Russia and both the Artic and Black sea coasts.
You build your case on wrong premises. The offensive against Russia would be stopped at the end of 1941. There would be no more taking of cities.I would say that you would suffer between 1.2 and 1.5 million casualties just taking and holding the 6 cities I mentioned on page 18. This does not take into account other losses that the Reich would suffer in other actions.
I'm always happy when I can pass over some useful information to other members!I didn't know about the Maltese radar network
You're right. Galland's solution was a compromise, basically misusing 1/3 of his fighters.This type of escort was what Galland wanted but never fully achieved.
That's true but it's not the whole picture. The threat of those guns was mainly neutralized by their own accuracy, the German armoured advance and the Luftwaffe.The Wehrmacht was extremely efficient at counter-battery fire against the Soviets, this was the reason the Soviet artillery doesn't seem too effective and the troops could advance into it.
But those 1000 guns wouldn't be assembled and installed on the first day.You seem to be forgetting that your supply ships and landing craft would be coming under fire from this artillery as well.
Again, I agree. But that's also why I am going along with the original German plan of a broad front.The British artillery may not cover the whole front; but in many sectors your advance will be broken up.
Well, here's where it becomes confusing. I'm replying to some people (maybe Hoppian?) pointing out that the British would pull back their divisions and squadrons to defend Britain. I responded that this could lead to the AK moving up to Alexandria and the Suez Channel.How would Rommel be advancing half a year earlier? Britain had enough forces to hold of German invasion, so there'd be no need to send troops back.
With the Italian army no longer fighting in Russia, there would be more resources and trucks available. Half of the Italian shipping was used to supply their forces in Yugoslavia and Greece. This could also be done by road (of course then that's where those trucks would go to). In any case, the Italians weren't using their full capabilities until late 1942 when they used all their shipping for supplying their forces in Tunesia.Italian logistical support would not be increased to any great extent. And even with a slight increase it wasn't enough to supply both the German and Italian armies.
Because I'm talking about the Spring of 1942. They were delivered in the late Summer IIRC.Why wouldn't Britain get American guns and tanks?
Perhaps that's because they didn't have a radar chain nor nightfighters?The Italian Air Force did not hold their own in N.Africa; they rarely held their own over Italy. The Italians rarely intercepted the USAMEAF and RAF 160 Sqdn. Liberators and B-17s.
Well, just look at Wacht am Rhein which ULTRA failed to recognize. To maximize secrecy the Germans basically stopped radio traffic.No doubt the Germans would release conflicting information to confuse the inteligence. But I would think they wouldn't do it through the enigma encryptions as they where sure it was secure.
Why is that?Canaris may also be a problem?
Correct. That's why I see the Germans advancing in the beginning but needing to dig in when the British get their guns into position.The British artillery would capture the German forces in the open; unlike that at El Alamein.
Did the allies really encounter great problems other than those at Omaha?great problems.
No, not heavy guns but that's not what I was talking about.I don't recall the Allies landing heavy guns on the beaches during the first day, especially not during the assault.
Aaah, nice to hear. The Germans were going to paradrop 2 divisions. We haven't discussed this before. I think it will be a difficult endeavour but they can prove to be very valuable to the German offensive.German large batteries were knocked out by the airborne divisions during the night and day of June 5th/6th.
Interesting. But I have difficulty imagining the British giving up on their Empire. The Far East Forces were crying out for reinforcements.then Britain has the resources to pull back from the Far East.
That doesn't make sense, Plan_D: Rommel landed in the Spring of 1941, long before Burma was in danger.Rommel was only able to reach North Africa in the first place because Britain moved troops to Burma when on their last march to Benghazi and victory in 1941. The Italians could have been expelled from North Africa then, and Germany would have never landed.
Sure, but that's nothing new. That was also the case during Rommel's advance. He was outnumbered yet defeated the British at Sidi Barrani, Benghazi, Wadi al something, ...Even with solely British equipment the DAK was out-numbered in guns and armour, the U.S supply just made it moreso.
As the Italians only used half of their naval transport capacity and the ports of Tobruk was capable of handling more than it actually did, I think supporting two extra divisions wouldn't have been such an obstacle.Will the increase in transport be able to keep an extra armoured and extra infantry division supplied?
In 1940 the Germans had enough river barges to move 9 divisions in the first wave. And that's without the Sturmbooten and Fährprämen they later built.How many transports have you got available for the cross channel invasion, is it enough to move your assault force in one day?
There's a book called 'Icebreaker' about Russian plans to attack Germany when it was occupied in the invasion of Britain. Perhaps you've heard of it. That takes into account that Germany would committ most of its forces against Britain. I already said that I would hold half of my divisions guarding the Russian bear. I think Russia would better lay low in case Britain would be defeated.What if the Soviet Union starts pressurising Romania and Hungary, are you going to react by reinforcing the east?
It can act in its stead in LIMITED circumstances. VERY LIMITED.I'm just saying that the Russians used the 120mm mortar as a substitute for artillery. And it was the only country which did this to my knowledge. Red Army doctrine authorized massing mortars from many units under a central command, and the Soviet 120mm mortar was so good that the Germans copied it.
Your opinion is duly noted. But I disagree that your or the USMC has it right all the time. Theirs is by no means the standard of military doctrine. My scenerio may be unorthodox but these are often succesful as they take the enemy off guard.
Why do you even post in a forum? Wouldn't a blog better suit you? That way you can educate all readers to what the truth is. You basically back up all your claims by either stating you know the truth because you're a pilot or because you're a professionally trained marine. That doesn't cut it for me. Do you see me using the same thing by saying I'm a master in international affairs and conflict management? How easy it would be for me to say you know nothing about international politics. But I refuse to think that way and I consider your opinion to be as much worth as my own.
So, if you want to convince me that heavy mortars cannot replace light artillery, explain to me why not instead of simply stating that the USMC told you so...
Kris