You will need more than a barge with a motor to make it across the Channel. The currents are often more than 5 knots which is faster than barges can go.
And yet the British used them too for the invasion of Normandy.
in all probability they would also be scattered across the sea, at worst a large proportion will run aground and or be sunk due to the weather.
They were tested and this did not happen. I already mentioned that. Only few received damage at BF 8.
Due to the confusion and lack of time as the BC's were going like the clappers to run away, the British were unable to organise a co-ordinated attack.
Yet, they were aware it was going down. It was high priority! They knew so weeks in advance. And yet, when they heard the news their organisation tumbled. Lack of time? Still no reason for the organisational mess. And that was just a couple of ships. And you want an even bigger challenge? You want 2500 planes to fight instead of 250?
From:
::Operation Cerberus::
The British very quickly became aware of increased Germany activity not only in Brest but also along the French northern coastline. The French Resistance reported that former French coastal airbases were being more and more used by the Luftwaffe. The Royal Navy concluded that they knew the ships would be leaving Brest at night – they just did not know when! In response to this, the Royal Navy tried to predict the route the ships might take and laid more mines – a total of 1000+ British mines were already placed in the English Channel.
A study of weather predictions led the Navy to conclude that the ships would sail between February 10th and 15th 1942, as cloud cover would make such a journey much safer. Coastal Command, the Fleet Air Arm, Fighter Command, etc were all put on the alert. A submarine, the 'Sea Lion', had been positioned off of Brest – its task was to watch the harbour as opposed to attacking the ships.
The Germans had put a great deal of thought into Operation Cerberus. British coastal radar had been jammed as a matter of course – but by February 1942, the success of the jamming had become extensive.
And from:
Scharnhorst - The History - Operation "Cerberus" - The Channel Dash
In spite of Ciliax's insistence on security and his efforts to mislead, there was no lack of clues. It was noticed that the destroyers that had escorted Tirpitz to Trondheim had not remained there, but had departed for a destination in the south. On 8 February aerial photographs of Brest revealed the three big ships in the harbour, four large destroyers and a number of Schnellboats and minesweepers. Photos taken on the following day brought the score of destroyers up to six.
The forces detailed to oppose the progress of Ciliax's fleet were slender enough in all conscience. Six destroyers equipped with torpedoes had been loaned to Admiral Ramsay by the C-in-C Nore. They were normally stationed at Sheerness and Harwich, but they should have been at four hours' notice in the Thames Estuary. In fact, at the crucial moment, they were out in the North Sea off Orfordness, practising gunnery. In addition to this, there were the Hunt class vessels which had been built for escort work. They had no torpedoes and consequently were virtually useless in this instance. Finally there were thirty-two motor torpedo boats that were no match for the German Schnellboats (Fast boats).
So far as aircraft were concerned, Coastal Command had agreed to provide three squadrons of Beaufort torpedo bombers. The Fleet Air Arm was able to contribute one squadron of Swordfish torpedo-carriers. Bomber Command had 300 bombers on stand-by, and there was the promise of considerable fighter support. Ideally the torpedo-carrying aircraft would have made a concerted attack with fighter cover. But this was impossible. For one thing, the Swordfish had a cruising speed of 153 kilometers per hour (95 mph) whilst the Beauforts were very much faster. For another, there was the question of bringing them all together. One Beaufort squadron was stationed at Leuchers in Scotland, another at St Eval in Cornwall, and the third at Thorney Island near Portsmouth.
And you want to attack an invasion fleet many times bigger than that, escorted by over a 1000 fighters? I admire your optimism.
However the point I was making was that despite the Germans being well prepared they didn't stop any of the small uncoordinated attacks taking place, neither did they sink any of the attacking ships. Even the 5 MTB's attacking on their own, in daylight, made it in and out. Hardly a ringing endorsement of the Germans ability to stop a serious attack by the Home Fleet.
That was not their mission. What would you have expected them to do? Turn the ships around and start attacking those unimportant British vessels?
I think the following quote says it all:
To the men on board Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the engagement had been no more than a small inconvenience. It had not even consumed very much antiaircraft ammunition as the action had largely been in the hands of Galland's fighter pilots. The sailors had watched with fascination and awe as the fragile biplanes flew towards them.
I believe your assumptions to be false. The RAF was a lot bigger than the GAF in 1942.
There are not many differences in my scenario. But one of them is an increase in ship and aircraft production. What's more the bulk of the Luftwaffe would return from Russia and put pressure on the British again. As such, the RAF would have suffered more losses up to Sealion '42.
In addition GAF would need standing patrols over the invasion area during the daylight hours to stop hit and run attacks.
No, their job was simple: first defend the fleet. After the invasion fleet is returned, escort the bombers. Only a minority would be used for CAPs over the invasion beaches. Instead, it would be the RAF that would have to fly constant CAPs to protect the Royal Navy!
Barges, tugs and transports are sitting ducks. To defend from a wing of 3 squadrons of Spits with 2 covering one in the FB role who could attack the area and be on the way home in 10 minutes would require huge resources every minute of the day.
Don't forget that all the barges had AA armament and were steel and concrete strengthened.
And if you start using the valuable Spitfire for these tasks you cannot use them all for attacking the German bombers or for escorting the British bombers. You too have to make a choice!
Your assumption that Germany would increase its production and that the British wouldn't at least concentrate its forces to match the threat is optimistic at best. Also to assume that we wouldn't include all combat aircraft in the country including the US forces is even more optimistic.
Go ahead and give up North Africa. Give up the Battle of the Atlantic. Get non-operational American troops killed.
With what would the Germans sweep the mines? By the end of 1941 the whole GN only had about 50 minesweepers capable of operating in enemy waters.
My figures show much more minesweepers than that. They had 90 ready for Sealion in 1940. Don't think this dropped to 50 a year later as production was still going on. Besides that they had dozens of other auxiliary ships which could be used for minesweeping.
I do consider the British mines a problem. Perhaps the biggest problem. I see them minesweeping that very night, under the cover of the Kriegsmarine. But just as I don't see the mines stopping them but only holding them up, I see the same thing happening for the British: holding them up.
We would be a lot more accurate over the short distance to the Landing sites. Plus the landing sites would be easily identifiable
That has nothing to do with it. That's not why British bombs were inaccurate. Do you think they couldn't see the ships in Brest? They had lousy bombsights.
I am not treating this as a tactical mission; a carpet bombing mission would do the job. A 3-5 mile scatter would be acceptable as the landing zone would have to be that size to be safe.
It is a tactical mission even if you use carpet bombing. Problem is that carpet bombing is a lousy way to achieve a tactical objective.
It was the Germans holding off vastly superior forces
Is that so?
22 Jan 1944: 36,000 soldiers and 2,300 vehicles versus 20,000 German soldiers.
End May:150,000 soldiers and 1,500 guns versus 135,000 German soldiers.
British night fighters were at least as good and as numerous as the Germans, plus would be operating under ground control. The Germans would be at a significant disadvantage and the Hunter would become the Hunted.
Ground control is unnecessary, David. Ground control only guides you to an area where the enemy is. It's not accurate enough to pinpoint the enemy. That came later.
Same thing for the Geman NFs: they knew where the British bombers would be.
Both parties would have to look for the enemy by visual contact. In fact, up to 1945 visual contact was still necessary for both sides.
Yet, you have to understand that it's more difficult to intercept a fighter than it is to find a big and slow Sterling. Because the Bf 110 had a speed advantage, the Bf 110 could have avoided the Beaufighter and attacked the British bombers.
Kris