RAF's alternative doctrine and procurement between 1934 and 1940 (1 Viewer)

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Well, in 1934-1939 the idea of using heavy bombers as torpedo bombers needs to be looked at long and hard. Using 4 engine bombers at under 100ft and at speeds barely over 120-150mph is really trading bombers for torpedo hits. Skip the torpedoes and just have the pilots crash into the ships. All it did was give you a big bomb bay you could use for other things.
The USAAC's first skip bombing attacks were conducted using B-17s which seems to me to be even riskier than dropping torpedoes which can be released at greater distance.
 
The USAAC's first skip bombing attacks were conducted using B-17s which seems to me to be even riskier than dropping torpedoes which can be released at greater distance.
You may be right, but the skip bombers were flying faster, The skip bombers, while they should be flying level, only had to be flying level when the released the bombs. Many torpedo bombers were required to fly straight and level for a number of seconds before they released the torpedo or the torpedo gyros wouldn't work properly.
The B-17s were an expedient. The may have been used because there wasn't anything else. Buying hundreds of planes with the intention of using them like that is a bit different.
 
Another pet project of mine: have Bristol improve the superchargers on their engines, predominantly on Pegasus and Mercury. Intakes were wrong (air is tumbling around before encountering the impeller; rectified by late 1944 for Hercules 100 series + Centaurus; curiously enough; problem was shared by other radial engines of the world and some V12s), impeller was bad (straight blades all the way; again rectified by late 1944 for Hercules 100s + Centaurus; eg. the R-1820s have had better blades with curved initial section; most of the V12s also have better blades), perhaps also the impeller entrance was too narrow.
(see here for illustration of Bristol's S/C as used on their 'legacy' engines; thread)
Semi-shrouded impeller instead of non-shrouded unit?
We won't see a huge increase of power, but the respective rated altitudes can gain, hopefully, another 3000+ ft. That can allow for cruising altitudes at about 18000 ft for the bombers instead of 15000, and also reap benefits once higher octane fuel is around. Should make the Blenheim night fighter and Gladiator a more useful aircraft.
Yes, better engines are not a cure for bad navigational aids, lack of training, lack of doctrine and tools for daylight escort and questionable target choice.
 
We won't see a huge increase of power, but the respective rated altitudes can gain, hopefully, another 3000+ ft. That can allow for cruising altitudes at about 18000 ft for the bombers instead of 15000, and also reap benefits once higher octane fuel is around. Should make the Blenheim night fighter and Gladiator a more useful aircraft.
take two pitch propellers and march on Whitehall (the air ministry) and use the props to beat in the heads of the officials.

Want to improve the dive speed of the Blenheim?
Fit a constant speed prop.
The two pitch prop limited the dive speed because if the plane dived too fast the prop drove the engine too fast and the high engine rpm wrecked the engine.
The MK Vs with constant speed props were allowed to dive 40mph faster than the planes with 2 pitch props.
Now you can't always dive on your target but limiting your dive speed to your best level speed sure reduces you options.

Bristol got away with (and didn't notice) the problem with the superchargers because they weren't using very high boost.
Some of the early Hercules engines when running 87 octane were running at 5lbs of boost. some of theme were at 3lbs of boost.

You are right, the basic designs had problems, but the low efficiency was masked by the low boost. AS you start to run a low efficiency supercharger you need more power to get the same amount of boost and the low efficiency means the intake charge heats up more for the same amount of boost.

You are going to need somebody like Hooker to straiten some of this stuff out.
P&W was having all kinds of trouble with their two stage supercharger (parts of which were designed by General Electric) and that got them to give up on General electric and start designing their own superchargers. Wright starting do the same thing about the time they were building the two speed superchargers, but it took a while to go from changing just a few parts to designing the whole thing, from fresh air intake to manifold.

And sometimes there problems with the intake vanes or the diffuser that masked the problems with the impeller itself. They all had to work together.
 
In order not to clog the current thread about the Gloster's fighter, and because it is that time of the year ( ;) ), I'd start the thread about how the RAF's doctrine and procurement should've looked like in the time frame between 1934 and 1940.
Better competition process to prioritize on best types, and earlier on force factories to produce other firm's aircraft. For example, why produce both the Botha and Beaufort? Choose the best options, make just those few aircraft. So…. make just the Hurricane and Spitfire. No Whirlwind or Defiant. Choose the best of Wellington, Whitley and Hampden and make just one. Choose the best medium transport of the Harrow and Bombay, and make many of those. Without hindsight we can't always know what would be best, such as the Manchester later becoming the superlative Lancaster and canceling the need for the Halifax and Stirling, but there are opportunities for efficiencies and resource prioritization to be seized upon. For example, the RAF focused on the Blenheim as their light twin engined bomber… making the Spec to suit, canceling out any others.

And have more open minded folks in charge. Obstructionists not blocking the jet program and wooden fast bombers may see the Meteor and Mosquito enter service earlier.
 
Want to improve the dive speed of the Blenheim?
Fit a constant speed prop.
The two pitch prop limited the dive speed because if the plane dived too fast the prop drove the engine too fast and the high engine rpm wrecked the engine.
The MK Vs with constant speed props were allowed to dive 40mph faster than the planes with 2 pitch props.
Now you can't always dive on your target but limiting your dive speed to your best level speed sure reduces you options.

Blenheim night fighter is a darned night fighter, improvement of dive speed is not a requirement. 1st requirement it to fly faster in horizontal (fast would mean here gaining an extra 10 mph).
It was far easier to upgrade propellers on aircraft, than to upgrade their superchargers.

Bristol got away with (and didn't notice) the problem with the superchargers because they weren't using very high boost.
Some of the early Hercules engines when running 87 octane were running at 5lbs of boost. some of theme were at 3lbs of boost.

You can notice that I'm trying to improve the workhorses 1st, hopefully just before the war. Yes, Hercules will gain a lot with a better S/C, too, however having an improvement in Hercules' production numbers is a #1 priority.

You are going to need somebody like Hooker to straiten some of this stuff out.

Agreed. Even though Merlin was with a much better impeller even before Hooker was in RR.
 
For example, why produce both the Botha and Beaufort? Choose the best options, make just those few aircraft. So…. make just the Hurricane and Spitfire. No Whirlwind or Defiant. Choose the best of Wellington, Whitley and Hampden and make just one. Choose the best medium transport of the Harrow and Bombay, and make many of those.
In some cases there may have been some behind the scenes shenanigans going on.

Given the pitiful state of Coastal Command or what would become Coastal Command one does wonder about the provision of large numbers of twin engine torpedo bombers.
Leaving aside the 700 built in Australia that means the British ordered over 1900 Botha's and Beauforts, granted not all at once but hundreds were ordered before the prototypes and that caused all kinds of trouble with both planes. The 1900 planes ordered were about 30 planes for every single German warship of destroyer size or bigger and that included not the ships they had in 1938 but all the major ships for the duration of the war. For reference the Japanese built around 3500 GM3 and G4Ms combined over 1936 to 1945?
The actual need for 1200-1600 mile range torpedo bombers for Europe is also a question.
In Jan 1938 the RAF had one, count it, ONE torpedo bomber squadron in Service at home bases (Vildebeest) and one squadron at Singapore.
Now using the ordered 'torpedo bombers' to substitute as light bombers for existing Hart, Wellesley, Blenheim and Battle squadrons would increase the RAF's bomber punch considerably. (what those guys in the treasury don't know won't hurt them).

The Botha was especially suspect. They knew, as did anybody that could multiply and divide that the thing was underpowered, Blackburn asked for more powerful engines and were denied. At the mock up inspection the view for the crew was criticized, a black mark against a plane that had a recon role as a secondary task.

In some cases we do have the advantage of the retrospectroscope. When the Whirlwind was ordered and indeed when it was flown as prototype it filled a legitimate need.
Development was hindered by the late arrival of the engines and having only a single prototype (a failing in many British programs).
Pease note that the Whirlwind could carry four 20mm guns about 30mph faster than a MK II Hurricane and the cannon armed Hurricane wouldn't show up until middle of 1941 and the cannon armed Typhoon showed up when? RR was late delivering production engines to Westland and Westland was busy making Lysanders per the war office request.

Picking the "winner" out of the Wellington, Whitley and Hampden race is a lot harder than many think. The prototype Wellington looked like this
5938186704_4360c8559d_o.jpg

So basically they changed a whole bunch of stuff before the 1st production model (and they didn't get the good power turrets until late 1939).
The first 3 marks of Whitleys were total junk because of their Tiger engines (around 80 planes).

The Hampdens may have been the best plane of the 3 in 1938/early 39 but it was the worst plane of the 3 in 1942. (The others had gotten a lot better, the Hampden didn't)
So when do you decide????
For example, the RAF focused on the Blenheim as their light twin engined bomber… making the Spec to suit, canceling out any others.
A little more detail please?
The Mosquito was supposed to replace the Blenheim bomber. A light bomber that could carry four 250lb bombs. The development of the Merlin engine allowed much improved performance from the Mosquito.
And have more open minded folks in charge. Obstructionists not blocking the jet program and wooden fast bombers may see the Meteor and Mosquito enter service earlier.
Unfortunately it may have easier to change around production priorities than to change some peoples minds on doctrine.

The heck with jets, just try to figure out if your bombs are actually hitting the city you are trying to hit.
Figure out if your anti sub bomb will actually sink a submarine or just require a few gallons of paint.
Try to figure out if a bomb that barely hurt a mud hut on the North West frontier is really what you want to use on European masonry or stone factories.
Dropping crap bombs from the Mosquito wasn't going to change much.
 
The first 3 marks of Whitleys were total junk because of their Tiger engines (around 80 planes).
I guess that's why they eventually got Merlins. Whitley and Mosquito…. four years apart, did any other wartime bomber operate with twin Merlins? Postwar we have the Hornet and Short Sturgeon and we have wartime fighters in the Welkin, but no other twins? I suppose we have some trials with Merlin-powered Beaufighters.
 
I guess that's why they eventually got Merlins. Whitley and Mosquito…. four years apart, did any other wartime bomber operate with twin Merlins?
The Tiger powered Whitleys were banned from over water flights for the safety of the crew and that was before the war broke out.
Also lends perspective to how desperate the the British were at times. Armstrong Siddley begging for just a bit more time to sort the Tiger Engine out.

They did build 401 Wellington MK IIs with Merlin X engines while they were trying to sort out the Hercules problems,
640px-Vickers_Wellington_Mk2.jpg

Now this is not quite right. Wellingtons were being built in at least three factories at this time.
The plant at Weybridge was the the only one to use Merlins.
The plant at Broughton in Flintshire used P & W R-1830s
The Plants at Broughton in Flintshire and Blackpool used the Early Hercules engines.
A lot of the Pegasus powered version (MK Is) were also built at Weybridge and Broughton with some of the MK IC being built in Blackpool.

And here we run into some of the production problems, a LOT of the British planes were made in more than one factory so it wasn't a question of shutting down one production line/building but of shutting down multiple factories and retooling multiple factories. Some of the Vickers plants used side areas for component construction.

This factory was used for Air Bus construction 80 years later.
Airbus-Wellington-factory-e1562044696800.jpg

Initial Wellington production was supposed to be done at four plants. I don't know if that actually happened.

"In August 1936, an initial order for 180 Wellington Mk I aircraft, powered by a pair of 1,050 hp (780 kW) Bristol Pegasus radial engines, was received by Vickers;..... In October 1937, another order for a further 100 Wellington Mk Is, produced by the Gloster Aircraft Company, was issued; it was followed by an order for 100 Wellington Mk II aircraft with Rolls-Royce Merlin X V12 engines.[17] Yet another order was placed for 64 Wellingtons produced by Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft. "

Once again, picking winners and looser in 1936-37 was not easy and the British were investing an awful lot of time and effort into much expanded production in plants that were often hundreds of miles from the home factories which added much difficulty to managing them.
 
While the Mosquito may have become the replacement for the Blenheim that was not what was intended in 1939/40. That was a variety of US sourced aircraft (Maryland, Baltimore & Ventura) to be followed by a new British design. The starting point for the latter was a proposal from Bristol for a light bomber version of the Beaufighter, the Type 162 Beaumont. Over time that evolved into an entirely new aircraft, the Centaurus powered Type 163 Buckingham, subsequently developed into the Brigand.

 
Better competition process to prioritize on best types, and earlier on force factories to produce other firm's aircraft. For example, why produce both the Botha and Beaufort?
Beaufort and Botha one as insurance against the failure of the other. I know the Beaufort was expected to drop mines, I think the Botha as well. The range requirement would no doubt include being able to patrol off Norway and out to sea looking for and attacking blockade runners and raiders, along with visits to the Baltic. Germany, Italy and Japan had plenty of merchant ships.

Picking winners has the problem of how much improvement can be made to the initial design, while wooden front line aircraft could be seen alongside ideas about reverting to biplanes, besides the trainers were mostly wood.
For example, the RAF focused on the Blenheim as their light twin engined bomber… making the Spec to suit, canceling out any others.
The Blenheim, which apart from range was about the same performance as the Battle, and as well armed, was the design in production when numbers were needed, the British inherited the Maryland but as Ewen notes by mid 1940 had the improved Maryland, the Baltimore and the improved Hudson, the Ventura, under order, plus the Mosquito. Given the industry overload sourcing the next generation of light bombers from the US made sense as Britain moved to build 4 engined heavy bombers. Minor point, in the late 1930's the Blenheim was a medium bomber, the Wellington a heavy one.

The shock of mid 1940 slowed down a whole lot of projects, from the army's 6 pounder, the navy's bigger ships, the new aircraft designs and so on.
When the Whirlwind was ordered and indeed when it was flown as prototype it filled a legitimate need.
Development was hindered by the late arrival of the engines and having only a single prototype (a failing in many British programs).
Pease note that the Whirlwind could carry four 20mm guns about 30mph faster than a MK II Hurricane and the cannon armed Hurricane wouldn't show up until middle of 1941 and the cannon armed Typhoon showed up when?
The Hurricane IIC probably began production in March 1941, Whirlwind production hit 10 that month, the first time it was in double figures, Typhoon Ib production began in February 1942, the month after Whirlwind production stopped.
Now using the ordered 'torpedo bombers' to substitute as light bombers for existing Hart, Wellesley, Blenheim and Battle squadrons would increase the RAF's bomber punch considerably. (what those guys in the treasury don't know won't hurt them).
Coastal Command did drop bombs, for the war 4,778 tons, versus Fighter Command 3,481 tons. In 1940 Coastal Command initiated the attacks against the Sealion invasion fleet, Bomber Command waited until September, and Coastal Command continued to raid ports after 1940. Then there was the 1940 agreement between Coastal and Bomber Commands over mine laying areas, in 1939/40 it was 2 Bomber Command to 1 Coastal Command mines dropped. Hampdens were the main long range mine layers in 1940/41, first mining operation dates were

Hampden 11 April 1940, Manchester 29 September 1941, Lancaster 3 March 1942, Stirling 23 March 1942, Wellington 1 April 1942, Halifax 8 October 1942, the Hampden going on to be an interim longer range torpedo bomber, as did the Wellington
They did build 401 Wellington MK IIs with Merlin X engines while they were trying to sort out the Hercules problems,

The plant at Weybridge was the the only one to use Merlins.
The plant at Broughton in Flintshire used P & W R-1830s
The Plants at Broughton in Flintshire and Blackpool used the Early Hercules engines.
A lot of the Pegasus powered version (MK Is) were also built at Weybridge and Broughton with some of the MK IC being built in Blackpool.

"In August 1936, an initial order for 180 Wellington Mk I aircraft, powered by a pair of 1,050 hp (780 kW) Bristol Pegasus radial engines, was received by Vickers;..... In October 1937, another order for a further 100 Wellington Mk Is, produced by the Gloster Aircraft Company, was issued; it was followed by an order for 100 Wellington Mk II aircraft with Rolls-Royce Merlin X V12 engines.[17] Yet another order was placed for 64 Wellingtons produced by Armstrong Whitworth Aircraft. "
The names for the Wellington factories used in the production reports are Weybridge, Chester and Blackpool

Weybridge built I, Ia, Ic, II, V, VI, VIII, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, October 1938 to September 1943
Chester built I, Ia, Ic, III, IV, X, XII, XIV, October 1939 (but really started serial production in January 1940) to June 1945
Blackpool built Ic, III, X, XI, XIII, XIV, XVIII, July 1940 (but really started serial production in January 1941) to October 1945.

mark I and VIII Pegasus, II and VI Merlin, IV Twin Wasp, other marks Hercules. The pre war Gloster contract was transferred to Vickers, the Armstrong Whitworth contract cancelled. Mark II production, 399 built, from October 1940 to June 1942, mark IV, 220 built, from probably December 1940 to February 1942. Mark III, 737 built, from probably October 1941 to December 1942.

Mark I variants, Weybridge built 180 I, 166 Ia, 4 Ia DWI, 983 Ic, 137 Ic Torpedo, 1 Ic DWI, Chester built 3 I, 17Ia, 1,583 Ic, Blackpool 50 Ic. The final mark Ic rolled off the line in October 1942, a torpedo bomber.
the British were investing an awful lot of time and effort into much expanded production in plants that were often hundreds of miles from the home factories which added much difficulty to managing them.
And added much difficulty to bombing them.
 
. Minor point, in the late 1930's the Blenheim was a medium bomber, the Wellington a heavy one.

There was sort of a sliding scale depending on the year.
in 1936-37 the Blenheim might have been called a medium.

In Jan 1935 there was one medium squadron in the RAF, No 101 Squadron flying BP Overstrand/Sidestrand bombers.
Harts, Fairey Gordon's & IIIFs, Westland Wapiti's equipped light bomber squadrons.

By Jan 1938 the Fairey Battle and Blenheim were taking over the light bomber squadrons (with even more Harts than 3 years earlier)
The medium bomber squadrons were equipped with the Wellesley (5 squadrons at home) so the Blenheim's reign as a medium bomber may have been brief :)
BTW Several (5?) heavy bomber squadrons were flying Handley Page Harrows.

What planes were called in the press may not have been how they were viewed by the RAF or the Air Ministry.

By Jan 1940 the Battles and Blenheims equipped most of the light bomber squadrons, the Hampdens were in medium bomber squadrons (the Wellesley's had been sent East)
The Wellingtons and Whitley's were the heavy bombers in service.

By Jan 1944 the Wellingtons were in medium bomber squadrons and Martin Baltimore's were in light bomber squadrons. Mosquitos were light bomber squadrons, two of them that were not designated as light pathfinders or LPF-Pathfinder Light Bomber.

Now this is squadron classifications, not what a bomber may have been called in development/early production and classifications/reclassifications did not happed on the dates given, those are just snap shots of time. A type of bomber could have been reclassified a month after the lists given or one month before the next date.

The Mosquito was obviously not the Bristol replacement for the Blenheim in the light bomber role. But in 1938-40 light bombers were categorized as having a 1000lb bomb load. (or close). Didn't matter who it was made by. Later light bombers with more powerful engines were asked to have a larger payload.
 
While the Mosquito may have become the replacement for the Blenheim that was not what was intended in 1939/40. That was a variety of US sourced aircraft (Maryland, Baltimore & Ventura) to be followed by a new British design. The starting point for the latter was a proposal from Bristol for a light bomber version of the Beaufighter, the Type 162 Beaumont. Over time that evolved into an entirely new aircraft, the Centaurus powered Type 163 Buckingham, subsequently developed into the Brigand.


Thanks for mentioning the Bristol's aircraft.

(to all: )
What should they be doing in the specified time frame? Blenheim is a given. What about the next step? Have Beaufort being a general-purpose bomber? Already slapping the Pegasus on it instead of Taurus will mean less engine-related problems, a bit less weight, a bit greater drag, and a far better altitude performance.
Having Bristol making Hampdens under licence = greater bomb load over distance, no limiting just for low altitudes as it was the case with original Beaufort before it received R-1830s. Gives Bristols' design shop a clean-sheet opportunity to make a heavy fighter?
How about a fast 1-engined 2-seat bomber by Bristol, powered by Hercules?
 
Trouble is you can't make Blenheim's in January, and something else in Feb/March and something else in April.

And Britian's main problem in 1939-41 was the engine situation.

Forget the Sabre and Vulture, Britian was depending on the Merlin and the old Pegasus/Mercury.
And Bristol is screaming that just give them another week or two (exaggeration) the Taurus and the Hercules will be all sorted out and trouble free. We know that wasn't true now but who knew what when?
Convert production to Pegasus engines? The Pegasus was too small. It only looks good compared to the small Bristol engines.
It also is something of a maintenance hog. The Wright R-1820 used valve gear lubricated by the engine oil system, not grease guns. The R-1820 had 18 valves to adjust, not 36.

They used it. it worked but it was not what people wanted to fall back on after being promised the low maintenance sleeve vale engines.

the Hampden wound up being the loser in the "medium" bomber derby.
Handley Page ended production in July 1940 (probably to build Halifax's)
Good old English Electric stopped production in March of 1942.
The Hampden with it's skinny fuselage could not be upgraded with gun turrets and would have been hard to adopt to electronics or used for long duration overwater patrols. They used them but but wasn't anywhere near the first choice.
From Wiki
"Almost half of the Hampdens built, 714, were lost on operations, with 1,077 crew killed and 739 reported as missing. German Flak accounted for 108, one hit a German barrage balloon, 263 Hampdens crashed because of "a variety of causes" and 214 others were classed as "missing". Luftwaffe pilots claimed 128 Hampdens, shooting down 92 at night"

The Whitley stayed in production until July of 1943. perhaps in small numbers but it was much more useful for ASW.

The Beaufort was only in service in a few squadrons in 1940. Partly because of the engines.
 
Bristols' design shop a clean-sheet opportunity to make a heavy fighter?
How about a fast 1-engined 2-seat bomber by Bristol, powered by Hercules?
Power is the problem.

What is the "heavy fighter" going to do that a Beaufighter won't, or more importantly, a Mosquito?
The Beaufighter starts to show up the fall of 1940, by April 1941 it is shooting down dozens of Germans a month at the end of the night blitz. Starting over with a clean sheet plane will not be ready in time.


How about a fast 1-engined 2-seat bomber by Bristol, powered by Hercules?

When? The Hercules III engines were only good for about 1400hp at low level. about 1250hp at 15,000ft. give or take.
No exhaust thrust, High drag.

and you have to do something with air intake, not saying it can't be done but you can't take a Hercules power egg and throw it on a single engine airframe. Which means a delay.
 
There was sort of a sliding scale depending on the year. in 1936-37 the Blenheim might have been called a medium.
Yes, my comment was a pointer to how rapidly things were changing. When it came to recording the figures from 1935 on in the official history Harrow, Hart, Hendon, Heyford, Overstrand, Wallace, Wellesley, Blenheim, Mosquito (bombers) and Brigand were light bombers. Harts were also trainers. Mediums were Albemarle, Buckingham, Hampden, Hereford, Whitley and Wellington. Battle and Hind were trainers and miscellaneous.
In Jan 1935 there was one medium squadron in the RAF, No 101 Squadron flying BP Overstrand/Sidestrand bombers. Harts, Fairey Gordon's & IIIFs, Westland Wapiti's equipped light bomber squadrons. By Jan 1938 the Fairey Battle and Blenheim were taking over the light bomber squadrons (with even more Harts than 3 years earlier)
The medium bomber squadrons were equipped with the Wellesley (5 squadrons at home) so the Blenheim's reign as a medium bomber may have been brief :)
The following is ignoring the reserve and auxiliary squadrons which began the mid 1930's as bomber types and largely ended the decade as fighter types.

Tare weight pounds, RAF Heavy Bombers in service January 1935, Heyford 10,200, Sidestrand 6,370, Virginia 9,234. The Gordon and Wapiti were army co-operation types, though the bombing force had 2 Gordon, along with 7 Hart, the Sidestrand, 3 Virginia and 2 Heyford squadrons. Overstrands began production in October 1935 at 7,936 pounds tare. All the above compared to a few years later the Hawker Typhoon at 8,800 pounds.

January 1938, Bomber Command, the Battles and Blenheims had a while to go before their take over.
1 Group had 12 Hind, 3 Battle, 1 Battle/Hind, 1 Blenheim and 1 Overstrand squadrons
2 Group had 5 Hind, 2 Battle, 1 Battle/Hind, 2 Blenheim and 2 Wellesley squadrons
3 Group had 4 Heyford, 3 Harrow, 1 Hendon and 2 Wellesley squadrons
4 Group had 3 Heyford, 2 Whitley, 1 Whitley/Heyford, 2 Harrow, 1 Wellesley, 1 Anson/Virginia.
5 Group had 3 Hind, 3 Blenheim, 1 Anson/Blenheim.

By the end of 1938 1 and 2 Groups were Battles and Blenheims, 3 Group was Harrow, Heyford and Wellington, 4 Group was Whitley, Heyford and Wellesley, 5 Group was Battle, Blenheim and Hampden.
By Jan 1940 the Battles and Blenheims equipped most of the light bomber squadrons, the Hampdens were in medium bomber squadrons (the Wellesley's had been sent East)
The Wellingtons and Whitley's were the heavy bombers in service.
Whether the Hampden was at a time the only medium bomber type is unclear, by the time it entered production the 4 engined types were on the way, Blenheim I 8,200 pounds tare, IV 9,780 pounds, Wellesley 6,812 pounds, Whitley V 19,350 pounds, Wellington IC 18,556 pounds, Hampden 11,780 pounds but nearly the same maximum bomb load as the Wellington Ic.
the Hampden wound up being the loser in the "medium" bomber derby. Handley Page ended production in July 1940 (probably to build Halifax's) Good old English Electric stopped production in March of 1942.

From Wiki
"Almost half of the Hampdens built, 714, were lost on operations, with 1,077 crew killed and 739 reported as missing. German Flak accounted for 108, one hit a German barrage balloon, 263 Hampdens crashed because of "a variety of causes" and 214 others were classed as "missing". Luftwaffe pilots claimed 128 Hampdens, shooting down 92 at night"

The Whitley stayed in production until July of 1943. perhaps in small numbers but it was much more useful for ASW.
Hampden Production,
Handley Page, 502 including 1 for Sweden, September 1938 to July 1940
English Electric 770 March 1940 to March 1942
Short Harland 150 Hereford August 1939 to September 1940
Canada (2 lines) 160 September 1940 to May 1942, from which 85 airframes were imported into Britain.

W.R. Chorley Bomber Command losses series plus a cross check with Theo Boiten's Nachtjagd works. Bomber Command operational units lost 718 Hampdens of which 103 were on training, testing or ferry sorties, leaving 615 on operations. Even with the cross check the cause of loss for 231 is not clear. Known causes fighters 87, flak 80, flak and fighter 2. Running out of fuel 60 losses a pointer to why Bomber Command had problems with it, but Whitleys were removed from operations about 4 months earlier due to lower performance.

The 14 and 16 OTU lost 11 Hampdens on operations plus another 156 plus 9 Hereford on training sorties. Coastal Command reports Hampdens flew 1,796 operational sorties, 9,470 hours losing 51 aircraft. Making total operational losses were 677. Bomber Command lost another 259 not on operations. No information on Coastal Command training and non operational losses. Wiki has different ideas from its 1960's sources.

Whitley production hit 50 in June 1940, was back to 21 in January 1941, then generally hovered between 40 and 50 until the final quarter of 1942, down to 29 in December 1942, then a decline until the final 5 in June 1943. Top 3 production months were 65 in May 1942, 57 in February 1942 and 54 in October 1941

Coastal Command "anti shipping and fighters etc."
1939 CC 3,400 sorties 11,381 hours, 1 loss.
1940 CC 15,605 sorties 52,780 hours, plus FAA 392 sorties 1,111 hours, total losses 132.
1941 CC 10,712 sorties 42,078 hours, plus FAA 255 sorties 774 hours, total losses 152.
1942 CC 5,999 sorties 25,474 hours, plus BC 40 sorties 336 hours, plus USA 41 sorties 330 hours, plus FAA 212 sorties 636 hours, total losses 153.
1943 CC 6,681 sorties 27,707 hours, plus USA 33 sorties 298 hours, plus FAA 136 sorties 489 hours, total losses 102.
1944 CC 14,470 sorties 50,622 hours, plus USA 3 sorties 17 hours, plus FAA 1,805 sorties 4,681 hours, total losses 162.
1945 CC 5,213 sorties 24,428 hours, plus USA 1 sortie 5 hours, plus FAA 496 sorties 1,322 hours, total losses 99.

"bombing raids and mining"
1940 CC 77 sorties 201 hours, plus FAA 401 sorties 1,203 hours, total losses 59.
1941 CC 1,182 sorties 3,873 hours, plus FAA 124 sorties 372 hours, total losses 29.
1942 CC 206 sorties 1,090 hours, plus FAA 164 sorties 492 hours, total losses 17.
1943 CC 16 sorties 130 hours, plus FAA 40 sorties 140 hours, total losses 3.
 
Beaufort and Botha one as insurance against the failure of the other. I know the Beaufort was expected to drop mines, I think the Botha as well.
The Botha did drop at least one mine. D H Clark mentions flying a mine laying mission in a Botha in one of his "What Were They Like to Fly" articles in RAF Flaying Review. He did not like the Botha at all.
 
And Britian's main problem in 1939-41 was the engine situation.

Forget the Sabre and Vulture, Britian was depending on the Merlin and the old Pegasus/Mercury.
And Bristol is screaming that just give them another week or two (exaggeration) the Taurus and the Hercules will be all sorted out and trouble free. We know that wasn't true now but who knew what when?
Convert production to Pegasus engines? The Pegasus was too small. It only looks good compared to the small Bristol engines.
It also is something of a maintenance hog. The Wright R-1820 used valve gear lubricated by the engine oil system, not grease guns. The R-1820 had 18 valves to adjust, not 36.

Wrt. abilities and mass production, Britain's engine situation was just fine in 1939-41, Merlin was not worse than the DB 601 or Jumo 211 (and far better than any other V12 engine in production), with mass production covering the needs. 9 cylinder radials were no worse than what Germany was making. Yes, there was no equivalent of the R-1830, but again Merlin and 9 cylinder radials + Hercules covered all the needs. Hercules was available months before the BMW 801 was, and was much more reliable.
Britain's aircraft-tech-related problems were that a lot of resources (including the engines) and manpower was squandered in order to make aircraft that were quickly rendered obsolete (Blenheim - really, a 1000 lb bomb load while using two engines?, Battle), or were really bad apples (Botha, Roc), or were a fruit of the wrong doctrine (Defiant, Roc also qualifies). Or were declared as not needed (Henley, 200 of them). Was there really a need for 750 Lysanders before 1941? Manufacturing biplane fighters past 1935?
Just Botha and Defiant used up more than 2100 engines and good propellers.

Most of companies were unable to make a low-drag aircraft and/or high-lift devices, leaving to the engine to do the heavy lifting (no pun intended).

The Hampden with it's skinny fuselage could not be upgraded with gun turrets and would have been hard to adopt to electronics or used for long duration overwater patrols. They used them but but wasn't anywhere near the first choice.
From Wiki
"Almost half of the Hampdens built, 714, were lost on operations, with 1,077 crew killed and 739 reported as missing. German Flak accounted for 108, one hit a German barrage balloon, 263 Hampdens crashed because of "a variety of causes" and 214 others were classed as "missing". Luftwaffe pilots claimed 128 Hampdens, shooting down 92 at night"

Hampden was taking a part in a shooting war, so one might expect losses. 714 lost over 1000 days/nights makes for about 2 lost every 3 days.

The Beaufort was only in service in a few squadrons in 1940. Partly because of the engines.

Should've been using Pegasus instead of Taurus.
 

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