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Sys, thats probably where you and i diverge. The loss of the four carriers was a remarkable achievement by the USN, and an undeniable victory for them with real benefits conferered on the USN. It was also an enormous deflation to IJN confidence. However, the loss of the carriers was far less important to Japanese capability than might be supposed.
Sys, thats probably where you and i diverge. The loss of the four carriers was a remarkable achievement by the USN, and an undeniable victory for them with real benefits conferered on the USN. It was also an enormous deflation to IJN confidence. However, the loss of the carriers was far less important to Japanese capability than might be supposed. Even before midway, Japanese pilot standards were falling, and they were unable to make good pilot losses even in relatively low loss periods. Akagi for example went to war with a complement of just under 80a/c embarked, by the time of the battle this was down to 63 and still falling. somewhere, ive read the Navy was projecting further falls to an air complement of around 50 aircraft by late Septemeber. this was one of the reasons they wanted to write down the US carriers in a decisive battle....they needed to rest and replace their own losses. But as you say, this was never going to happen.
The IJN fought the remaining carrier battles of 1942, more or less with the survivors of Midway CAGs. They didnt win, but they did fight the USN to the point of exhaustion. Trouble was, they also fought themselves to that same point. from that situation, the USN rapidly recovered, but the IJN could only repleneish at a very limited rate, and with pilots of fairly low quality. Twice in 1943 their CAGs were again committed, as land based elements, and twice these hastily trained aircrews were decimated by the increasingly competent US air forces. It was relentless, and from a Japanese persepective tragic.
By Phil Sea, the Japanese had largely recovered carrier numbers, and fielded a good number of carriers, that again were underutilized in terms of carrying capacity. having four additional carriers might help in the sense of spreading losses out better, but it could hardly affect pilot replacement rates. Ozawas 1st Mobile Fleet would still have gone into battle with about 450 a/c, filled with pilots that were just cannon fodder regardless of the outcome of Midway. Conversely, if the japanese had won their battle, and destroyed all three US carriers in June 1942, the US would have gone to battle in June 1944 with 160 less aircraft than they did. Carrier capacity was the limiting factor for the USN in 1944, not so the IJN.
Had Midway Islands been captured by the Japanese
A: The U.S. would have had to retake the Islands,
B: The Aleutian campaign would not have petered out as the Japanese then would have had a base from which it could have assisted the Aleutians Campaign for rearming while being able to fly reconnaissance missions of what the U.S. fleet was doing from Midway Island.
Plus assuming the Japanese had only lost one carrier and the U.S. two or more, he U.S. would have had what would have amounted to a full-on three front war, not just deadly harassment because the Japanese would have had the U.S. trying to decide where the Japanese were going to strike from next.
As I said in another post, the U.S. response would have massive in rearming but having suffered two serious defeats so early in the war while considering how fiercely as the Japanese fought, it would have made the war far more costly and bloody and longer than it was.
At the same time Germany would have been fully aware that the U.S. was suffering off of its West Coast and may not be able to give as much support to Europe as it wanted to.
Now that might have made Hitler act even more foolish than he did but one simply does not know.
Had Midway Islands been captured by the Japanese
A: The U.S. would have had to retake the Islands,
however, it is highly unlikly that the Japanese could capitalize on this advantage, and in fact further advances by them was about the worst thing they could have done. Their shipping capacities were already stretched past breaking point, and any lengthening of the supply lines is only going to make their logistics even worse, and their defenses even weaker. There was no possibility for the Japanese to further expand, though they wanted to. They were deluding themselves when they thought or spoke of the "2nd Operational Phase". The best they could have done, if they had won at midway, was use the time to rebuild their shattered air groups, rectify the faults in their training regime, fortify their forward positions, and try and improve the construction of shipping. This was not gong to win them the war, but it might have strung things out for a bit. I don't believe this outcome was realistic, but the Japanese as the war moved into its latter phases, consoled them selves by believing that a high rate of attrition might induce the Americans to the peace table. It was a forlorn hope, but a more realistic appraisal, than continuing expansion. ---- You are ignoring what would then have been fact that all that happened after the Battle of Midway would have changed, totally.
As Midway was an airbase that could send aircraft out to attack, how would the U.S. have gone around.I'd say the may have to take Midway as part of an island hopping campaign, or depending on their path they could bypass. But they could have picked when to attack, Midway was not really a base and posed no real threat.
The war in China-Burma would have gone differently as Japan rather than licking its wounds would have still been in full attack mode.
While Japan would have eventually faced a greater variety of aircraft developed just for the Pacific, so would the U.S. have been facing a larger variety of aircraft developed to defend Japan's interest.
As Midway was an airbase that could send aircraft out to attack, how would the U.S. have gone around.
As it was Japan did not leave Alaska till mid-1943, with its tactical advantage they would have stayed longer and U.S. citizens would have been worried in the Northern West Coast and real unhappy that the Japanese were still on U.S. territory.
My father, who did not go because of his very high blood pressure, doctors said he might live to be seventy, said people at home were more than a little annoyed at their miseries brought on by the war by 1944.
Do not ever forget the political issues at play during the war. Not every one loved Roosevelt as much as historian to to say they did.
In the actual time scale, the U.S. government had a populace that was tired of spending money on the war.
Had they lost at Midway, the cost would have been far higher and I doubt Roosevelt would have been reelected the last time, as it was under his fourth term that the U.S. was desperate enough to send the boys who raised the flag on Okinawa out to raise funds from an increasingly impatient populace.
Had Midway fallen they would not have been that close at the time of his fourth campaign, assuming he was still president.
``Pretty simple. Use a more southern approach as proposed by Hector Bywater in his book about the 1925 Pacific War. The US "Orange Plan" of 1934 was a more Northernly route, as this is pretty well what was used. ---- Go South and go through the Marshall Islands which were already lost?
"The Japanese forces occupied the Gilbert Islands 3 days after the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. As a provided token defense of Tarawa, they built a seaplane base on Makin and dispersed troops along the coastlines of the atolls to monitor the Allied forces movement in the South Pacific.[1] Following Carlson's Raiders diversionary Makin Island raid of August 1942, the Japanese command was made aware of the vulnerability and strategic significance of the Gilbert Islands.[2] The largest and most strategically important islands of the Gilberts was Tarawa. Fortifications were quickly built up by the Japanese starting in March 1943 with nearly 5,000 troops stationed abroad. An additional 3,000 Special Naval Landing Force and base force troops and 940 naval construction units were supplemented by 1,247 laborers."
Sounds like you are looking at the US suing for peace because they were unhappy with the war, much as the Japanese had hoped. I don't think this would be the case - the attack on Pearl Harbor I think served to focus the US on winning a longer war. If this were to happen, it would have made the US far more less resolute than Germany, Russia, England or Japan, all nations who were bombed by the opposition and had a lot higher casualties per citizen than the US. ---- No I have not said or implied that.
The U.S. would still have won but it would cost far more in time, money, and lives.
Some are trying to brush off how important the Midway Atoll was because of how the war turned out; what was going on in military equipment prototyping despite of the U.S. winning from Midway on, shows just how uncertain the U.S. still was.
Had Midway fell the war would have been a totally different animal than it became with the successful defense of Midway.
The political scene back home would have been far different also if Midway had fallen.
You seem to be ignoring the other factors that would have changed.
Had Midway Islands been captured by the Japanese A: The U.S. would have had to retake the Islands, B: The Aleutian campaign would not have petered out as the Japanese then would have had a base from which it could have assisted the Aleutians Campaign for rearming while being able to fly reconnaissance missions of what the U.S. fleet was doing from Midway Island.
Pure speculation - not grounded in facts concerning Japan's ability to a.) support occupation of Midway, and b.) ditto Attu and Kiska. Japan had zero ability to project meaningful forces into Alaska or mainland US - even if they disconnected from China which is equally ludicrous. IMO the question confronting Japan Imperial Command had they been able to occupy Midway is "what price are we willing to pay to hold it" and for how long. Yamamoto hoped to force US to sue for peace, a hope he knew to be very slim even if Japan had reached further to (attempt) to take Oahu and facilities there.
Plus assuming the Japanese had only lost one carrier and the U.S. two or more, he U.S. would have had what would have amounted to a full-on three front war, not just deadly harassment because the Japanese would have had the U.S. trying to decide where the Japanese were going to strike from next.
The prime objectives were to protect and secure Hawaii/Midway while destroying the Japanese fleet, coupled with protecting Australia from occupation. Both were important from standpoint of our own logistics network. There is no scenario under which that IJN fleet could have taken Oahu prior to US build up of airpower and land forces - enough in June-August timeframe to start getting the naval assets from the shipyards before Japan could hope to put up an invasion force capable of taking Hawaii. Once established re-taking Midway would not have been a problem.
As I said in another post, the U.S. response would have massive in rearming but having suffered two serious defeats so early in the war while considering how fiercely as the Japanese fought, it would have made the war far more costly and bloody and longer than it was.
True for being longer to get to Guadalcanal - on the other hand Japan's question still would be 'how much do we want to pay to take and hold Midway" versus "where should we dig in and protect"? Under any circumstances the US Sub fleet was the Achilles heel for any adventure that the Japanese could contemplate holding and re-supplying.
At the same time Germany would have been fully aware that the U.S. was suffering off of its West Coast and may not be able to give as much support to Europe as it wanted to.
Now that might have made Hitler act even more foolish than he did but one simply does not know.
Go South and go through the Marshall Islands which were already lost?
The U.S. would still have won but it would cost far more in time, money, and lives.
The U.S. would not have engaged in a major campaign for months at a minimum and probably closer to a year.
The Japanese would not have had the pressure on them they did when they failed at Midway so all ideas based on how the Japanese were stretched would have been totally different as they would have had the tactical advantage across the Pacific.
There is no evidence to support that claim at all. There is some evidence in reverse actually. At the end of guadacanal, there were no operational US carriers , except for the escort carriers, in the SW Pac. The Japanese still had 3, possibly 5. They had aircraft sufficient to put two to sea. made absolutly no difference tyo either the campigns in New Guinea, or in the Solomons.
By the end of 1942, the allies had approximately 1500 aircraft in the TO, the majority RAAF, compared to about 200 japanese aircraft. In terms of ground Troops, the Allies could call upon roughly 16 divisions or equivalent, to 4-5 deployed in the pacific. In terms of Destroyers, the USN outnumbered the IJN by about 4:1. major warships was even worse. Even with an additional 3 carriers, and say an additional 150 aircraft , the Japanese are in no position to alter who has the initiative, and whether the Allies would maintain the pressure on them. Some additional shipping resources would be needed, to get the vast quantities of troops, aircraft and ships into action, because above anything, carriers reduced logistic problems for the allies, but these could have been found (with some difficulty) if the need arose.
There is zero chance of a victorious IJN at Midway, with say two or three additional carriers, having any significant effect on the pace or scale of operations growing and being mounted against the japanese. In that middle phase of the war, carriers were not as important as when the USN (and before that the Japanese) were on a mobile offensive. During the latter part of 1942 through 1943, neither side was really engaged in that sort of attack, until tarawa.
The war in China-Burma would have gone differently as Japan rather than licking its wounds would have still been in full attack mode.
it already was. Like the pacific, the biggest single inhibitor to offensive action in the CBI was supply. By 1944 , the japanese had partially solved the supply issues in Burma, by the construction of the rail link to thailand, and in China, by a wholesale reduction of stockpiles in Manchuria. this enabled them to launch major offensives in both theatres, so much so, that by mid 1945 the china TO was all but written off by the Joint Chiefs. In Burma, the offensive was defeated, and eventually the allies launched their counterattck.
There is nothing contained in a japanese victory at midway that would make one bit of difference to these events half a world away. For a start, both TO wewre army responsibilities, there were was virtually no Navy input at all. Sewcondly, Japanese hesitancy had nothing to do with a lack of confidence, or a lack of carriers in those TOs.
The Aleutians are hundreds of miles closer to the Midway Atoll than they are to Japan 1,700 miles verses 2,000.
It was 2,600 miles from Midway to Japan
In a war that is a huge difference in time in transit and supplies could have easily gone to Alaska first then to Midway or the other way around.
Either way it formed a triangle and the U.S. would have had to find out how to recon and defend much less attack another front that did not exist when Midway did not fall.
While Japan would have eventually faced a greater variety of aircraft developed just for the Pacific, so would the U.S. have been facing a larger variety of aircraft developed to defend Japan's interest.
A victory at Midway would have had no effect on the aircraft development for either side. Your assumption is that a victory at midway would in some way delay the allied counterattack. but carriers would not have that effect at all., or at worst, maybe for a week or two.....
The U.S. was able to send and keep battleships and lessor carriers in the Atlantic because they were not needed else where, with the loss of Midway, and several carriers, that would have changed drastically.
Which ships specifically? Ranger remained in the Atlantic. At the time of PH it was being used for training. One or two of the South Dakotas were in the Atlantic, mostly rectifying faults as they worked up. The slower battleships were of no reall use in the pacific, except as bombardment platforms. From memory there were about 5 cruisers left in the Atlantic as at June 1942, and about 40 destroyers. There is no evidecne to support any notion that there would be large scale redployments of ships as you claim. There were, as yet no escort carriers, except the Long island, and that was working in the pacific as a ferry
Germany was no threat to U.S. territory but Japan was.
As it was Japan did not leave Alaska till mid-1943, with its tactical advantage they would have stayed longer and U.S. citizens would have been worried in the Northern
The Germany first strategy was developed, specifically because of the fact that whereas japoan posed no threat to the security of continental US, Japan did not, or rather, was a far lesser threat. The islands taken by the Japanese posed no benefit to the Japanese, and no threat to the US for that matter. Dutch Harbour was of some value, but not worth the effort to take it. Japan itself never seriously considered themselves capable of invading the HI, much less the pacific seabord of the US. the US. this is just total pie in the sky stuff Im afraid.
West Coast and real unhappy that the Japanese were still on U.S. territory.
My father, who did not go because of his very high blood pressure, doctors said he might live to be seventy, said people at home were more than a little annoyed at their miseries brought on by the war by 1944.
Do not ever forget the political issues at play during the war. Not every one loved Roosevelt as much as historians want to to say they did.
Okay, so some folks wer unhappy. with all due respect to your dad, my suggestion is that he needed to suck it up. There were countries allover the world at that time suffering a lot more than a little indignity or some vague concerns about security
In the actual time scale, the U.S. government had a populace that was tired of spending money on the war.
Had they lost at Midway, the cost would have been far higher and I doubt Roosevelt would have been reelected the last time, as it was under his fourth term that the U.S. was desperate enough to send the boys who raised the flag on Okinawa out to raise funds from an increasingly impatient populace.
Had Midway fallen they would not have been that close at the time of his fourth campaign, assuming he was still president.
With respect, but poppycock. After Pearl Harbour, the US entered the war with a great sense of outrage a national mood that would stop at nothing short of total annihilation of Japan. Several times during the wart, beginning with right after Midway, Japan put tentaive peace feelers out, that were didmiossed as out of hand by the administration.
Japan in her later war strategy was counting on US war weariness to save them, and achieve what they had always aimed for, a negotiated peace. One victory was not going to achieve that. The Japanese would have needed to defeat the US comprehensively stretching over many year for any sort of war weariness to have an effect, and this was simply never going to happen, and certainly one victory was not going to alter that dynamic at all
Good grief, that makes no sense.There is no evidence to support that claim at all. There is some evidence in reverse actually. At the end of guadacanal, there were no operational US carriers , except for the escort carriers, in the SW Pac. The Japanese still had 3, possibly 5. They had aircraft sufficient to put two to sea. made absolutly no difference tyo either the campigns in New Guinea, or in the Solomons.
A: there is not evidence for ANYTHING about what would have happened had Midway fallen.
This is ALL one hundred percent conjecture!
B: You are using what happened two months AFTER the attack on Midway was repulsed for what MIGHT have happened if Japan had taken Midway.
That is more than just a bit illogical.
Had the scenarios given here happened the U.S. could not have launched the Guadalcanal campaign or any you mentioned with the Japanese sitting on Midway and able to use the refueling station there for their submarines.
Hmmm, you are again using what happened after Midway WAS NOT TAKEN by the Japanese as proof of what would or would not have happened had MIDWAY FALLEN to the Japanese.it already was. Like the pacific, the biggest single inhibitor to offensive action in the CBI was supply. By 1944 , the japanese had partially solved the supply issues in Burma, by the construction of the rail link to thailand, and in China, by a wholesale reduction of stockpiles in Manchuria. this enabled them to launch major offensives in both theatres, so much so, that by mid 1945 the china TO was all but written off by the Joint Chiefs. In Burma, the offensive was defeated, and eventually the allies launched their counterattck.
There is nothing contained in a japanese victory at midway that would make one bit of difference to these events half a world away.
IF MIDWAY HAD FALLEN, ALL THAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED AFTER THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY MEANS NOTHING!
A: there is not evidence for ANYTHING about what would have happened had Midway fallen.
This is ALL one hundred percent conjecture!
B: You are using what happened two months AFTER the attack on Midway was repulsed for what MIGHT have happened if Japan had taken Midway.
That is more than just a bit illogical.
s.Had the scenarios given here happened the U.S. could not have launched the Guadalcanal campaign or any you mentioned with the Japanese sitting on Midway and able to use the refueling station there for their submarine
Hmmm, you are again using what happened after Midway WAS NOT TAKEN by the Japanese as proof of what would or would not have happened had MIDWAY FALLEN to the Japanese.
IF MIDWAY HAD FALLEN, ALL THAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED AFTER THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY MEANS NOTHING!
Good grief, that makes no sense.
A: there is not evidence for ANYTHING about what would have happened had Midway fallen.
This is ALL one hundred percent conjecture!
Initiated by your speculation which led Parsifal to outline the facts that confronted Japan in June 1942 - even if they had defeated the US fleet.
B: You are using what happened two months AFTER the attack on Midway was repulsed for what MIGHT have happened if Japan had taken Midway.
That is more than just a bit illogical.
Seek examples of illogical thinking in your own posts.
Had the scenarios given here happened the U.S. could not have launched the Guadalcanal campaign or any you mentioned with the Japanese sitting on Midway and able to use the refueling station there for their submarines.
LOL - explain for the masses just how a.) the Japanese were going to transport diesel/torpedo/food to Midway, b.) they would create a 'refueling station' for submarines when the Japanese by their own admission was going to find it tough to get landing craft over the atoll to invade, c.) the ships would survive a gauntlet of US Fleet Boats sinking their supply ships (and submarines) trying to get to Midway?
Hmmm, you are again using what happened after Midway WAS NOT TAKEN by the Japanese as proof of what would or would not have happened had MIDWAY FALLEN to the Japanese.
IF MIDWAY HAD FALLEN, ALL THAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED AFTER THE BATTLE OF MIDWAY MEANS NOTHING!
All the fecal matter dumped into the conversation that Parsiful responded to was to add facts to rebut your conjecture...Google Midway and take a close look. It has zero strategic value if the Japanese can't build and maintain a supply chain that can't be intervened by assets at Pearl.
Postulate for the masses just how you, the strategic arm of IJN, would cause any disruption to US initiatives by taking Midway?