Strategic Bombing Campaign Impact on German Oil Production

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

another sobering fact of the USAAF determination to knock out Germany's oil/fuel plants ~ supplies:

USAAF loses that directly involved the ' oil campaign '. 5400 aircraft lost of which 4300 were shot down by German fighters.
(source: Masters of the air: America's bomber boys who fought the air war against Nazi Germany).
 
Imagine what could have been achieved if the RAF had spent more time on the synthetic oil plants?

From memory, in Masters of the Air, Miller points out that the RAF caused more damage in the few raids thatthey did do because they used larger, more damaging bombs. Namely they used 4000lb cookies in tandem with 500lb, 1000lb and 2000lb GP/MC bombs and incendiaries. The USAAF, on the other hand, tended to use 250lb and 500lb bombs for the task.

The battle was one of attrition. The damage from the bombings could be repaired, but as soon as they were done there would be another raid, perhaps before.
 
yah, you'd figure after dropping the 4000lb cookie, it would be ' whats there to rebuild ' but, apparently the Germans tried/did. like I said earlier, its a minor miricle on how the Luftwaffe survived mid 1944 until the end of the war...
 
Wuzak - I would seriously doubt that 250 pound bombs (unless incindieries) were used. Standard doctrine for 8th and 15th AF was 500 and 1000 pound HE for industrial targets - 2000 pounders for reinforced/hardened targets.
 
another sobering fact of the USAAF determination to knock out Germany's oil/fuel plants ~ supplies:

USAAF loses that directly involved the ' oil campaign '. 5400 aircraft lost of which 4300 were shot down by German fighters.


Equally sobering was that the LW lost so many fighter pilots in April/May that were Not available to deploy against the Invasion
 
Wuzak - I would seriously doubt that 250 pound bombs (unless incindieries) were used. Standard doctrine for 8th and 15th AF was 500 and 1000 pound HE for industrial targets - 2000 pounders for reinforced/hardened targets.

From 303rd BGA Combat Missions and Reports

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 152
12 May 1944
Target: Launa Synthetic Oil Plant at Merseburg, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 17
Length of Mission: 8 hours, 10 minutes
Bomb Load: 16 x 300 lb M-31 G.P. bombs
Bombing Altitude: 26,000 ft.
Ammo Fired: 570 rounds

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 213
28 July 1944
Target: Leuna Synthetic Oil Plant, Merseburg, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 37
Length of Mission: 7 hours, 50 minutes
Bomb Load: 10 x 500 lb M43 bombs
Bombing Altitudes: 26,200, 25,200 24,200 ft
Ammo Fired: 0 rounds

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 214
29 July 1944
Target: Leuna Synthetic Oil Plant, Merseburg, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 51
Length of Mission: 8 hours, 25 minutes
Bomb Load: 20 x 250 lb M57 bombs
Bombing Altitudes: 26,600, 25,600, 25,200 24,600 ft
Ammo Fired: 3,560 rounds

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 231
24 August 1944
Target: Leuna Synthetic Oil Plant at Merseburg, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 39
Length of Mission: 8 hours, 15 minutes
Bomb Load: 38 x 100 lb G.P. M30 bombs
Bombing Altitudes: 25,100, 24,950 24,500 ft
Ammo Fired: 40,820 rounds

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 275
21 November 1944
Target: Leuna Synthetic Oil Refinery at Merseburg, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 39
Length of Mission: 8 hours, 15 minutes
Bomb Load: 10 x 500 lb bombs
Bombing Altitudes: 19,800, 19,700 18,100 ft
Ammo Fired: 14,700 round

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 279
29 November 1944
Target: Synthetic Oil Refinery at Merseburg, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 39
Length of Mission: 7 hours, 25 minutes
Bomb Load: 12 x 500 lb G.P. M43 bombs
Bombing Altitudes: 25,000, 23,600 25,500 ft
Ammo Fired: 6,540

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 283
6 December 1944
Target: Leuna Synthetic Oil Plant at Merseburg, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 39
Length of Mission: 8 hours, 15 minutes
Bomb Load: 20 X 250 lb G.P. bombs
Bombing Altitudes: 21,600, 21,700, 23,000 ft
Ammo Fired: 1,710 rounds

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 286
12 December 1944
Target: Leuna Synthetic Oil Refinery at Merseburg, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 38
Length of Mission: 8 hours, 15 minutes
Bomb Load: 12 X 500 lb RDX M43 bombs
Bombing Altitudes: 25,200, 24950 25,500 ft
Ammo Fired: 2,390 rounds


That is the 8 missions that the 303rd BG attacked the Leuna Synthetic oil plant at Merseberg. On 4 of these missions 500lb GP bombs were used - the first two of these with 10 bombs and the last with 12.

Twice the bombers were loaded with 20 x 250lb GP bombs, once with 16 x 300lb GP bombs and once with 38 100lb bombs.

A further mission was scheduled to hit Leuna, but the secondary target was hit instead. 10 x 500lb GP bombs were used in that instance.
 
Last edited:
wuzak - i stand corrected on the light loads... it sounds like they were after storage facilites versus cracking units, etc

The USSBS emphasized the 'normal' Refining/chemical plant bomb loadings were 500 and 1000 pound mix (8th and 9th AF)- with contrasts to RAF greater effectiveness using 2000 and 4000 pound bombs.
 
Last edited:
May 12 1944

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

Mission 353: 886 bombers and 735
fighters are dispatched to hit oil production facilities in Germany and Czechoslovakia; there is strong Luftwaffe fighter reaction and 46 bombers and 7 fighters are lost:

1. 326 B-17s are dispatched to Mersenburg (224 bomb) and Lutzkendorf (87 bomb); 1 hits Hedrongen and 1 bombs Bullstadt; 2 B-17s are lost, 3 damaged beyond repair and 189 damaged; 4 airmen are KIA, 6 WIA and 20 MIA.

2. 295 B-17s are dispatched to Brux, Czechoslovakia (140 bomb) and Zwickau (74 bomb); 11 hit Chemnitz, 14 hit Gera marshalling yard, 15 hit Hof and 4 hit targets of opportunity; 41 B-17s are lost, 1 is damaged beyond repair and 162 damaged; 3 airmen are KIA, 8 WIA and 377 MIA.

3. 265 B-24s are dispatched to Zeitz (116 bomb) and Bohlen (99 bomb); 14 hit Mersenburg, 1 hits Ostend Airfield, Belgium and 12 hit targets of opportunity; 3 B-24s are lost, 5 damaged beyond repair and 61 damaged; 7 airmen are WIA and 33 MIA.

Escort is provided by 153 P-38s, 201 P-47s and 381 P-51s; P-38s claim 2-0-0 Luftwaffe aircraft, P-47s claim 26-0-8 and P-51s claim 33-0-3 in the air and 5-0-2 on the ground; 4 P-47s and 3 P-51s are lost and 4 P-47s and 9 P-51s are damaged; 7 pilots are MIA.

Mission 354: 5 of 5 B-17s drop 1.74 million leaflets on Denmark; 1 aircraft is damaged; 2 airmen are KIA and 3 WIA.

USAAF Chronology:
 
I was reading somewhere ( can't remember where at the moment maybe {Adolf Gallands book?}), that German Fighter pilots pretty much ignored the fighter escorts during the later part of the war, as downing the heavies was more important. This led to allied pilots having a free-for-all time picking off Luftwaffe fighters.
 
May 12 1944

EUROPEAN THEATER OF OPERATIONS (ETO)

STRATEGIC OPERATIONS (Eighth Air Force):

Mission 353: 886 bombers and 735
fighters are dispatched to hit oil production facilities in Germany and Czechoslovakia; there is strong Luftwaffe fighter reaction and 46 bombers and 7 fighters are lost:

1. 326 B-17s are dispatched to Mersenburg (224 bomb) and Lutzkendorf (87 bomb); 1 hits Hedrongen and 1 bombs Bullstadt; 2 B-17s are lost, 3 damaged beyond repair and 189 damaged; 4 airmen are KIA, 6 WIA and 20 MIA.

2. 295 B-17s are dispatched to Brux, Czechoslovakia (140 bomb) and Zwickau (74 bomb); 11 hit Chemnitz, 14 hit Gera marshalling yard, 15 hit Hof and 4 hit targets of opportunity; 41 B-17s are lost, 1 is damaged beyond repair and 162 damaged; 3 airmen are KIA, 8 WIA and 377 MIA.

3. 265 B-24s are dispatched to Zeitz (116 bomb) and Bohlen (99 bomb); 14 hit Mersenburg, 1 hits Ostend Airfield, Belgium and 12 hit targets of opportunity; 3 B-24s are lost, 5 damaged beyond repair and 61 damaged; 7 airmen are WIA and 33 MIA.

Escort is provided by 153 P-38s, 201 P-47s and 381 P-51s; P-38s claim 2-0-0 Luftwaffe aircraft, P-47s claim 26-0-8 and P-51s claim 33-0-3 in the air and 5-0-2 on the ground; 4 P-47s and 3 P-51s are lost and 4 P-47s and 9 P-51s are damaged; 7 pilots are MIA.

[/url]

The May 12 battle was one of those situations where a.) the LW chose to strike within range of the P-47 escort, and b.) where they were able to position very large forces of Fw 190A-8s and 109G-6 in a fairly small area.

Specifically the First Task Force of B-17s was 20 minutes late, and 50 miles south of planned route. The 355th, 4th and 357th were orbiting between Bonn and Kassel waiting for them when JG11 and 3 and everyone else hit the lead (un escorted) B-17s head on west of Frankfurt.

The 56th was way out in front in the first deployment of the Zemke Fan - and Zemke was almost shot down by Rall in this famous encounter. The other two P-47 groups that were able to engage in flight deployments were the 78th and 353rd. They arrived after calls for help, from the Koblenz area.

The 352nd FG split away from the 2nd TF heading for Koblenz and went south, the 355th FG dropped back to pick up the vacuum from the 352nd, and both the 357th and 4th FG headed sw fron Giessen/Kassel to engage between Giessen and Frankfurt.

Most of the bomber losses were from 20 miles west of Frankfurt, to Frankfurt, then northeast toward Kassel. Most of the fighter- fighter action between the 8th FC and the LW were in flight versus flights or sections for approximately 30 minutes in the area noted above.

None of the P-38s engaged there, no more of the p-47 groups engaged, and the 339th, 359th, 355th, 361st were out of the battle until the Brux, Zwickau, Leipzig areas were reached etc,

Summary - the quantity of P-51s were 4th FG, 357th Fg and two flights of 352nd FG - ~ 100 Mustangs, the quantity of P-47s were 56th, plus two flights each 78th and 353rd ~ 60 P-47s.
 
Bill, I was replying to Ratsel's question.

What I was pointing out is that the heaviest concentration of LW damage was to the First Task Force - which was unescorted through Frankfurt. It was supposed fly a route through Koblenz-Bonn and then to Kassel but was 50 miles south - thereby missing the 78 and 353rd (P-47) Penetration escort, and missing the 355th, 4th and 357th (P-51) final penetration/Target escort positioned along that line.

The 56th FG is the only force that saved the lead boxes of B-17s from complete disaster from JG11 and JG3. As it happened 25 from just three bomb groups were shot down before any fighters were able to intercept them. This is a classic example where the LW Controllers got it Exactly Right in directing two complete JagdGeschwaders to a point which was completely undefended... and even then it took 10 minutes for the P-47s to dribble in.
 
you seem extreamely knowledgable in this area. question for you, in your opinion do you think some fighter units (like some staffel in JG11) on the western front ignored orders to shoot down fighters and went straight to attacking the bombers during the ' oil campaigns '?
 
you seem extreamely knowledgable in this area. question for you, in your opinion do you think some fighter units (like some staffel in JG11) on the western front ignored orders to shoot down fighters and went straight to attacking the bombers during the ' oil campaigns '?

I believe the case was opposite - they were ordered to ignore the fighters, much to Galland's dismay, and concentrate on teh bombers.
 
wuzak - i stand corrected on the light loads... it sounds like they were after storage facilites versus cracking units, etc

The USSBS emphasized the 'normal' Refining/chemical plant bomb loadings were 500 and 1000 pound mix (8th and 9th AF)- with contrasts to RAF greater effectiveness using 2000 and 4000 pound bombs.

I think this was carpet bombing - the more bombs the merrier.

In the case of Leuna the 8th AF may have decided that destroying some of the facilities was unlikely, but by carpet bombing the area they could do damage to many of the services that ran unprotected between plants - like pipes.

Of course if Harris' Lancasters joined (more often) in they could too have carpet bombed - instead of 12 x 500lb bombs they could have dropped 12 x 1000lb bombs.
 
I believe the case was opposite - they were ordered to ignore the fighters, much to Galland's dismay, and concentrate on teh bombers.
yep thats how I remembered it. many thanks! yet the main reason imo for so many Luftwaffe fighter losses for 1944.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back