Strategic Bombing Campaign Impact on German Oil Production

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In this scenario you would end up with the Soviet Union possessing more of Europe.
All of Germany would be Soviet, plus who knows what else.
 
yes scenarios. an interesting thing. who's to say that the scenario presented would have led to a conditional surrender of Germany to the west? then fought side by side against the COMMUNIST russians? In this scenario Hilter and some of his higher ups would have either commited suicide, or arrested. Germany would then be under the control of the west. this would be an equally plausible scenario.
 
I understand that such overtures were made to the West, and refused.
 
Adolf Hitler committed suicide by gunshot on 30 April 1945 in his Führerbunker in Berlin. Any offers of Surrender to the Allies before that date is bogus. After that date, some Luftwaffe units offered surrender to American and British troops. which were glady accepted. so again, before April 30th, 1945, no such offer was made by anybody authorized to do so.
 
I assume you mean firebombing? if so, then yes. it would be very effective. more so then dropping cookies in my opinion. perhaps the USAAF wanted the site somewhat intact?
 
I assume you mean firebombing? if so, then yes. it would be very effective. more so then dropping cookies in my opinion. perhaps the USAAF wanted the site somewhat intact?

The RAF used cookies with incendiaries.

But i meant more in terms of how they marked an area for bombing and then were able to put most of their bombs in that area.


I think a mix of 4000lb cookies, 1000lb mc, 500lb mc (the RAF didn't have a 2000lb MC, but they did have a 1900lb GP bomb which I believe they rarely used), and incendiaries. For an industrial target like Leuna there would be fewer incendiaries than used on cities, I would think.

They even may find it useful to lob a few tallboys in there.
 
Wuzak - I think the RAF would have made a very strong contribution had Harris permitted them to join earlier..the weakness in the USAAF doctrine was over estimating the effect of 500 and 1000 pound bombs, which curiously lasted through 1966 in Vietnam.

Fire certainly did a lot of damage to the pertochemical plants and the 8th and 15th AF did cripple German petrochemical industry - but in retrospect the USAAF should have used 1000 pound bombs as minimum, with mix of incindieries, and 2000 pounders would have been preferable.

I have often wondered why the 8th AF didn't get intelligence feedback regarding the success of German rebuild efforts and ask the question about bomb types.
 
I don't think the US was trying to minimize civilian casulaties with the smaller bomb loads. I still think they wanted to capture some plants relatively intact.
 
I don't think the US was trying to minimize civilian casulaties with the smaller bomb loads. I still think they wanted to capture some plants relatively intact.

The US wanted the refineries bombed into oblivion. The Russians were amazed at the damage to the "US" owned refineries at Ploesti.
 
I don't think that was it either. I think their main concern was causing damage, and with big bombs in their bombers, primarily the B-17, they couldn't carry too many. So they loaded up with smaller bombs, mostly 500lbs and 250lbs, so that they had a chance of hitting a few things in the target area. Particularly as the synthetic oil plants were spread out installations. It was carpet bombing.

If they had Lancs they could have used 12-14 x 1000lbs for the same carpet effect they were getting with their 10-12 x 500lbs.
 
3. Report of 30th August, 1944.
State Top Secret. Berlin
"MyFuehrer,
The last air attacks have again hit the most important chemical works
heavily. Thereby the three hydrogenation plants, Leuna, Bruex and Poelitz,
although only recently in commission again, have been brought to a complete
standstill for some weeks.
As the home defence against enemy air attacks promises no appreciably
greater ,results in September as against August, chemical (oil) production in
September must now be considerably lowered.
Nevertheless, no effort willbe spared to restore the hydrogenation plants so
that past production, at least, can be made possible in a short lime.
The effect of these new raids on the entire chemical industry are extraordinary
as severe shortages willoccur not only inliquid fuels but also in various other
important fields of chemistry.
(1) Methanol Production. The production of Methanol dropped, as a result of the air-attacks, from an estimated essential production of 34,000 tons in August to 8,750 tons, and will at the outside only attain this figure in September. The reserves of Methanol willonly be 9,000 tons at the end of August therefore heavy inroads willbe suffered in the following essential chemical fields in September if this reserve is completely used. In the powder and explosives sector, the estimated production of precious explosives (Hexogen and Trinitrotoluol) willdrop 30 per cent, inspite of the use of emergency measures and what is more, this notwithstanding that Methanol willbe reserved for powder and explosives and use of itgreatly reduced inother branches. Aparticularly severe inroad is to be expected in artificialresins and plastics, the production of which willdrop from 4,000 tons a month to 2,700 tons a month due to the shortage of raw materials. The production of melamine glue willreach about half the requirements,
while solid fuel for the Wehrmacht (for spirit stoves, &c.) willnow be completely counted out in September.
(2) Buna Production. By the failure of hydrogen from Leuna for Schkopau and the air raid damagein Ludwigshafen, Buna production sank from an estimated possible total of 13,000 tons to 5,400 tons in August. After the new attack on the 24th August on Leuna, this figure cannot be improved in any way inSeptember. The Buna reserves, which we were able to increase in the monthly production during the last months before the attacks, stood at 9,000 tons on the
Ist October so that October is secure as far as Buna is concerned. About one-third of the anticipated production for November willnot be sufficient.
(3) Nitrogen Production. Here also the new attack on Leuna has meant a considerable decrease in production, so that against an anticipated output of 85,000 tons for September, the highest possible figure willbe 45,000. This decrease inproduction willhit agriculture which at the moment holds only about 45 per cent, of its last year's allocation, which means that next year's harvest willsuffer unusual losses. Even worse are the effects in the field of liquid fuel as the hydrogenation plants and oil refineries have again been heavily hit in the last few days in
the Protectorate and round Hanover. [30934]
*

I. Carburettor Fuels. Before the Aprilattacks the carburettor fuel production in the Reich stood at 125,000 tons. In August, as a result of air attacks, at the most 60,000 tons were produced in August instead of the 84,000 tons estimated at the end of July.
Ifsimilar attacks continue the highest figures to be expected in September and October is 40,000 tons.

II. Diesel Fuels. Before the April attacks the diesel fuel production figure stood at
88,900 tons.
Due to air attacks only about 65,000 tons were produced inAugust as against 93,000 tons estimated at the end of July. Ifsimilar attacks continue the highest figure to be reckoned with for September and October is 60,000 tons.
lll.—Bottled Treibgas.
InAprilthe production of bottled gas stood at 37,600 tons (reckoned interms of gasoline.) Only about 3,000 tons were produced in August due to air attacks. Ifsimilar attacks continue a figure of 2,500-3,000 tons is the highest to be
reckoned withinSeptember and October.
IV.—Aviation Spirit.
While 175,000 tons of aviation spirit was produced in April,production fell to 12,000 tons, i.e., to two normal days' production inAugust due to the destruction of the aircraft fuel installations at Leuna, Poelitz and Bruex which had
only recently been restored to working order. For September production, because of the re-building measures, was still estimated at 101,000 tons even on the 15th August.
After the new attacks production willnot rise above 10-15,000 tons because of insufficient home defence.
With these results the enemy has hit the chemical industry so heavily that only by abnormal changes in the conditions is there any hope for the retention of the bases for powder iand explosives (Methanol), Buna (Methanol) and nitrogen for explosives and agriculture. At the same time the loss in carburettor and diesel fuels is so widespread that even the severest measures willnot be able to hinder encroachments on the mobility of the troops at the front.
The possibility of moving troops at the front willtherefore be so restricted that planned operations in October willno longer be able to take place. With this fuel situation offensive moves willbe impossible.
The flow necessary for the supply of the troops and the home country will therefore be paralyzed in the late autumn of this year, since substitute fuels, such as producer gas, are also inadequate to provide the essential help inall sectors.
There— remains only one possibility, and this onljy with a large \amount of luck :—:

Ifthe enemy
(1)
As was his former custom, begins his new attacks only when the plants, at present damaged, are again in commission, i.e., in about three weeks, when
(2)
The German fighter weapon at home can be so considerably strengthened inthis three-to four-week breathing space as to inflict heavier losses on the enemy and to hinder the compact carpet bombardments by splitting up the bomber formations.
(3)
In the coming autumn months, operations are restricted through bad weather conditions and both enemy and German air weapons are more restricted inoperation.
We shall do the troops a bad service bj sending pursuit planes from home
to the front and thereby allow the vitalmaterials for the front (powder, explosives
and fuel) to be hattered.
Ifit were possible to combat the attacks with—some good measure of success
inSeptember, thenitis feasible that there willbe
Onlya10per cent, production dropinpowder and explosives inOctober;
Arise inBuna from 5,000 tons inSeptember to 10,000 tons inOctober ;
A rise in nitrogen from 45,000 tons in September to 60,000 tons in
October;


A rise incarburettor fuel;-from 40,000 tons in September to 65,000 ton'fcj^ inOctober ; A rise in diesel fuel from 60,000 tons in September to 90,000 tons in October ; A rise in aircraft fuel from 10-15,000 tons inSeptember to 75,000 tons in October.
If,however, the homeland is protected only by Flak, then, despite the greatestconcentration, no substantial results from defence can be obtained as the attacks on Leuna, Bruex and Poelitz have proved. In this case the production level in October willremain the same as inSeptember but willnot exceed it.
be ready for this last great stake by the middle of
The Luftwaffe must
September at the latest. They must include their best strength, their flying instructors and their most effective pursuit planes in this undertaking. The most modern machines must be ready for this attempt at an item figure of not less than 1,200 items.
Ifthis course is taken it will,if successful, mean the beginning of a new air force or it willmean the end of the German air force.
Ifthe attacks on the chemical industry continue in the same strength and with the same precision in September as in August the output of the chemical industry willdrop stillfurther and the last stocks willbe consumed.
Thereby those materials which are necessary for the continuation of a modern war are lacking inthe most important spheres.
Hail, my Fuehrer,
Always yours,
SPEER."
 
Thanks for that Ratsel. Informative read.


I have just found a mission of the 8th AF where 1000lb bombs were dropped on a synthetic plant.

The 486th bomb group attacked Leuna/Merseberg on the 28th September 1944 with a total of 110 1000lb GP bombs, from 22 a/c that attacked. ie 5 x 1000lb bomb loads each. One a/c was lost and one returned to base from 24 that were sent.

Flimsy 084, 28 Sep 1944
 
thanks for those links. were you able to find anything from RAF bomber command on oil/chemical/synthetic plant attacks?

continuation:

MAY/JUNE 1944
APPENDIX 12.
The Reports to Hitler on the Effects" of the Attacks.
In the course of the offensive against the oil plants Speer submitted five reports to Hitlerdetailing the damage done and the counter-measures being taken Translations of these reports are given below. Insome of them a certain amount of unimportant detail has been omitted. Many of the figures given by Speer check withstatistics that have been obtained from other sources, and these letters consequently provide an authoritative account of the effects of the attacks. The italics are as given in the original documents.
1. Report of 30th June, 1944.
'' State Top Secret. Berlin.
MyFuehrer,
The enemy's attacks on the hydrogenation works and refineries were intensified during June; his current air reconnaissance and espionage enable him to damage severely, mostly soon after they had started up again, those works whichhad been hitinMay.
Although Herr Generalfeldmarschall Keitel reports precisely to you on the
weightoftheattacks andontheresults,Ifeelitismydutytosendyouanoverall report on the losses of the German fuel production since May this year and of the vitalmeasures resulting from them.

I. 'The focal point of the attacks inMay and June was the German aviation spirit production.
In these attacks the enemy succeeded on the 22nd June in increasing the effects on aviation spirit by 90 per cent. — reconstruction
— Only by the most speedyof the damaged works which was well below schedule can the effects of this catastrophic attack be eliminated.
Nevertheless, aviation spirit production is at the moment utterly insufficient.
In Aprilthe Luftwaffe used 156,000 tons and 175,000 tons were produced.
The average daily production for Aprilwas 5,850 tons daily.
InMay the daily production was as follows
May Tons daily.
Ist to 11th 5,845
12th Attack on Leuna and Bruex ... ... ... 4,821
13th ... ... 4,875
14th 4,842
15th 4,775
16th 4,980
17th ... 4,839
18th 4,920
19th 5,010
20th 4,975
21st 5,025
22nd 5,075
23rd 5,051
24th ... 5,073 25th
Leuna again inproduction at 20 per cent. ... 5,487
26th 5,541
27th 5,550
28th Second attack on Leuna, result 100 per cent. 5,526
29th Attack on Poelitz, result 100 per cent. ... 2,775
30th 2,743
31st ... 2,794
InMay altogether 156,000 tons aviation spirit were produced, compared with an essential production of 180,000 tons. [30934] T 2
124Dtiimtiim

InJune the following production is shown :—:
June Tons daily.
Ist 2,476 2nd 2,535 3rd ... 2,580
4th 2,555 2,511
5th
2,226*
6th
1,823
7th
Bth 3,718 2,756
9th
10th 2,873 11th 3,052 12th ... ... 2,120 13th Gelsenberg drops out 100 per cent. Welheim
slight damage ... ... 1,078 14th ... 1,587
15th Scholven slight damage ... 1,527
16th 1,275 17th 1,214 18th Scholven again attacked, slight fall-off in
production 1,323 1,278
19th
20th Through the attack on Poelitz re-opening of the plant postponed tillAugust 1,392
21st ... 1,268 22nd Scholven fall off in production 20 per cent. Wesseling 40 per cent. ... 632
23rd ..... 868
24th Leuna again inproduction at 20 per cent. ... 1,268
25th ... ... 1,223
26th Moosbierbaum production fall-off 100 per
cent 1,204 27th 1,252 28th 1,241 30th 1,218
Total production in June therefore only 53,000 tons aviation spirit as againstthe requirements of 195,000 tons inMay. After the first attack of the 12th May this year a production figure of 126,000 tons aviation spirit was reported to you inthe Obersalzburg for June. This quantity would certainly have been exceeded, due to the increased speed
of reconstruction, but owing to the continuous attacks in June production was wellbelow the estimated figure. Attention is drawn to the fact that production during the second half of June again decreased considerably and only corresponded to a monthly production of 42,000 tons; should the attacks continue an extra ordinary fallingoffinJuly can already now be foreseen withcertainty.
 
seems that the USAAF wasn't as prolific at destroying targets the first time around. reading some of the documents I have, they had to go back multiple times in the same week to the same plants. Suprisingly also, sometimes they were met with no resistance. That would be a good arguement for one of Gallands recomendations to centalize all the JG units to Germany.
 

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