Strategic Bombing Campaign Impact on German Oil Production

[mhuxt]

Have never seen an 8th AF bomb plot before - just came across this one at the excellent 486th BG website. This is for a November 21 1944 attack on Leuna, so may be of interest to this thread.

http://www.486th.org/Photos/Strike1/LeunaB.jpg

Note that not all of the bomb falls could be plotted.

 

[wuzak]

Reading through some more mission reports.

Found this one:

303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 77
10 October 1943
Target: Center of city, Coesfeld, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 21
Length of Mission: 5 hours, 30 minutes
Bomb Load: 12 x 1,000 lb G.P. plus 38 x MA47A1 Incendiaries
Bombing Altitude: 24,650 ft
Ammo Fired: 7,120 rounds

I think that may be a mistake, and shoudl be 6 x 1000lb bombs plus Incendiaries.


Here is the first Schweinfurt mission:
303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 60
17 August 1943
Target: V.K.F. Ball Bearing Works #1, Schweinfurt, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 30
Crews Lost: S/Sgt. L.A. Kesky (KIA), 1Lt. L.E. McCord (WIA),
3 others wounded
Length of Mission: 5 hours, 55 min. (303), 6 hours,15 min. (Comp)
Bomb Load: 16 x 250 lb British incendiary bombs
Bombing Altitudes: 20,000 ft (303), 22,000 ft (Composite)
Ammo Fired: 98,090 rounds (303), 48,060 rounds (Composite)
Enemy Aircraft Claims: 15 destroyed, 14 probable, 6 damaged (303rd) 18
destroyed, 7 probable (Composite)

I can only assume that not all groups on that mission carried the same load.


On the second mission to Schweinfurt the same group dropped a different bomb mix:
303rd BG (H) Combat Mission No. 78
14 October 1943
Target: V.K.F. Ball Bearing Plant, Schweinfurt, Germany
Crews Dispatched: 20
Crews Lost: 1 crew 1Lt. R.C. Sanders, 2 KIA, 9 POW
Length of Mission 7 hours, 15 minutes
Bomb Load: 3 x 1000 lb G.P. bombs plus 5 M47A1 Incendiaries
Bombing Altitude: 24,050 ft
Ammo Fired: 99,930 rounds
Enemy Aircraft Claims: 24 Destroyed, 15 Probable, 3 Damaged

 

[drgondog]

Have never seen an 8th AF bomb plot before - just came across this one at the excellent 486th BG website. This is for a November 21 1944 attack on Leuna, so may be of interest to this thread.

http://www.486th.org/Photos/Strike1/LeunaB.jpg

Note that not all of the bomb falls could be plotted.

Based on the AP it looks like there was a wind out of 200-180 degrees based on the dift from the aiming point. Or the target may have been partially obscured because virtually all the plotted impact points were 'to the left of the bomb run course'.

 

[drgondog]

The LW developed tactics in the Spring of 1944 that recognized they couldn't 'ignore' the escorts and started flying formations with 109s providing 'high cover' to have an advantage of altitude over the Mustangs. This would have been in late March.

When Rall was leading JG11 on May 12 he was flying this type escort over the JG3 Sturms when he bounced Zemke's flight and nearly got Zemke.

ALL the LW pilots either dove to escape or turned and fought. It was far easier for Goering to order 'just attack the bombers and ignore the fighters' than it was to obey and still have a chance to survive.

Having said this, the orders reduced the aggressiveness of the LW Fighter arm and gave the initiative to the US escorts.

 

[Tante Ju]

Have looked at the mission summaries gave by Milosh for May 1944. May 21 especially bad day for both side...

P-47 and less extent, P-38 did score lot of claim for Luftwaffe fighter. This was ignored so far by drgdog analysis. Of course I cannot get total for this period (too many to list), but it would be a guess that P-47 scored least 1/3 of claims during this first half 1944 period.

So I cannot understand, how can we ignore P-47 sorties when assess the air situation, and relative power in air (outnumber, local, operational etc). And say only P-51 sortie counts, and P-51 was outnumbered, P-47 sorties, hundreds do not count because they had short range.. they still seems to shoot down German fighter, divert German fighter sortie from P-51 group etc.

I understand that US fighter were divided up along bomber route, but so were German attackers.

 

[Ratsel]

yeah in most cases starting around the spring of 1944 the LW was outnumbered. combined with suicidal orders from the higher ups,
made suvivability low for the LW.

drgondog,
many thanks for the info. also, where are you getting it from? most of my stuff comes from unit diaries of JG 11.

 

[drgondog]

Personal deep research with collaboration with others. I did the same for March 16, March 29, April 13, April 24, June 20, July 7, Sept 11, November 26, December 5th and a few others.

Studying an air battle is complex stuff.

 

[Ratsel]

Göring should have been dismissed and Galland appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe in late 1943.

 

[jim]

Göring should have been dismissed and Galland appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe in late 1943.

The "Fat one " should have been dismissed but i dont understant the popularity that Galland enjoys today. He was a great pilot. But what great accomplished as General der Jagdflieger? According to him his finest hour was the Channel Dash in February 42 . Did he provided his pilots with com petitive engines by pussing the superiors?Did he pressure for improvements in airframes fast? No(Many imrovements in Bf109 airframe were ready in 1942 and enter production in 44 or never)No (specially 43 early44) . Did he developed proper tactics in time? No He can have excuses dut the results are so negative and he has great part . And at the end, that shamful,egoistic,arogant fiasco, JV44 .

 

[Ratsel]

alright, so your not a Galland fan, what about Walter Grabmann as Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe?

 

[drgondog]

Jim - I only know several Luftwaffe aces personally and my comments must be taken as pure opinion.

Galland was well respected by his fighter leaders and was highly regarded for advancing their views regarding tactics and requirements with Goering and Hitler. He was not successful, nor was any German leader who advanced views contrary to Hitler's own views.

Galland was very passionate about bringing the 262 into air defense operations, as well as shutting down Me 109 and Me 410 production in favor of the Fw 190 and 190 variants. He was not persusaive.

Galland articulated the need to turn the Luftwaffe Fighter Arm on the fledgling USAAF when it entered extended combat operations and free up LW JG Kommodores to develop and execute tactics they believed in. Goering and Hitler dismissed the idea that 'mongrels' from the US could possibly challenge the LW. Remember that Hitler and Goering believed that the US was only good for making razor blades, cheap automobiles and making movies - how could the US possibly learn to fight?

Galland argued that centralizing the LW LuftFlotte Reich in central Germany was a far more effective deployment than piecemealing units all over Germany. Hitler believed that to be a sign of weakness.

Which of those recommendations do you regard as flawed?

 

[Ratsel]

262's yes. I believe the Germans had 262's during the BoB. anyways, I personally only know one Bf109 ace (R.I.P.), and one with three victories. they bothed believed in:

1. All of the Bf 109 Gruppen should be assigned to engage the U.S. escorts
2. Two Gruppen should take-off ahead of the main interception force to disperse the escort
3. The more heavily armed Fw 190 Gruppen would be directed to the bomber fleets after the bombers had been "stripped of their escorts".

They thought that Galland ideas ( the three points above) would provide an very effective means to defend against the hoards of heavies and escorts. They also believed by this method ( and others outlined) they could fight the allies to a Stalemate, and save what was left of Germany. At this time, niether thought Germany would win the war however.

 

[jim]

Jim - I only know several Luftwaffe aces personally and my comments must be taken as pure opinion.

Galland was well respected by his fighter leaders and was highly regarded for advancing their views regarding tactics and requirements with Goering and Hitler. He was not successful, nor was any German leader who advanced views contrary to Hitler's own views.

Galland was very passionate about bringing the 262 into air defense operations, as well as shutting down Me 109 and Me 410 production in favor of the Fw 190 and 190 variants. He was not persusaive.

Galland articulated the need to turn the Luftwaffe Fighter Arm on the fledgling USAAF when it entered extended combat operations and free up LW JG Kommodores to develop and execute tactics they believed in. Goering and Hitler dismissed the idea that 'mongrels' from the US could possibly challenge the LW. Remember that Hitler and Goering believed that the US was only good for making razor blades, cheap automobiles and making movies - how could the US possibly learn to fight?

Galland argued that centralizing the LW LuftFlotte Reich in central Germany was a far more effective deployment than piecemealing units all over Germany. Hitler believed that to be a sign of weakness.

Which of those recommendations do you regard as flawed?

To be a great soldier is enough to show great effort . to be a great leader you MUST achieve great results. Since his pilots were dying in dozens he should confront both Goring and Hitler ,(and Udet, and RLM)and not in 1945 ,but in early 43 .Even if he had to pay the ultimate price. Rommel,Guderian,Hausser , and others true leaders took their chances and achieved results against impossible odds.
More specificaly:
1)Its easy to ask but how can put Bf109 out of production with the Fw190 poor performance at altitude and without loosing many months of production? Why did not insist to put DB603 in FW190 in early 43? Additionaly Fw190 proved somewhat unfit against soviet fighters. Why while Dora was production ready early 44 was its production delayed and what his reaction was?
2) How bring Me 262 in operation when there were not enouph raw materials to produce Jumo 004A?
3) How leave the eastern front without fighters ? In autumn 43 itwas Jagdwaffe who saved Army group south from total disaster during its reatret .Or Leave ploesti undefended?
4) Local Jafu s had difficulty direct even a few Gruppen . How could they direct masses of fighters in close distances with all the german weaknesses in command and control? (And intelligence)
5) Did favored elitism within the ranks of Jagdwaffe undermining the moral of the less succesful pilots? Did with his behavior encouraged (specially early in war) personal scores and thus indirectly led to abnormal behaviors of the officers pilots(e.g see Marseille complaints during his service with JG52 although when he became famous had similar or worse behavior in combat , read Hanning s account about the behavior of Lang in the day that claimed 18 kills) After the war there were nco reunions in which were not invinted the officers pilots of the same unit!
6) Bf 109 did not -Practically- improved from late 42 to March 44 . It only recieved 1,42 ata clearence in Autumn 43( At last) . Did he ever said anything about this? Was not within his duties to press for continius improvements?
7) About his famous idea to send 2000 fighters in late 44, "to soot down 400-500 bombers" was so far from reality that needs no comment
What about his cigarette-lighter equiped Bf109, or his aunthorised combat flying, or the statement "thus i missed the best years of the war"
Great pilot,adequate wing kommandeur, respect for his personal bravery and his wounds but in my opinion average staff officer at best. Kills can not be the major factor for a staff position

 

[jim]

262's yes. I believe the Germans had 262's during the BoB. anyways, I personally only know one Bf109 ace (R.I.P.), and one with three victories. they bothed believed in:

1. All of the Bf 109 Gruppen should be assigned to engage the U.S. escorts
2. Two Gruppen should take-off ahead of the main interception force to disperse the escort
3. The more heavily armed Fw 190 Gruppen would be directed to the bomber fleets after the bombers had been "stripped of their escorts".

They thought that Galland ideas ( the three points above) would provide an very effective means to defend against the hoards of heavies and escorts. They also believed by this method ( and others outlined) they could fight the allies to a Stalemate, and save what was left of Germany. At this time, niether thought Germany would win the war however.

1) I dont know who Walter Grabmann was.
2)More or less thats the tactics(with variations) that should have been treid but idont believe that even Stalemate was possible. Just more casualties for the alleis.
3) Galland maybe believed these tactics but failed to make them happen. And that was his duty.

 

[Ratsel]

Walter Grabmann was a Luftwaffe Generalmajor.

Galland tactics were made well known, right to Göring by Galland. Göring didn't take to kindly to Gallands demands and thought he was a ' trouble maker '. Long story short, Hilter dismissed accusations made about Galland as 'nonsense', and axed any investigations into Adolf Galland. So, at the end of the day, Göring's say was the final one.

 

[Tante Ju]

Great pilot,adequate wing kommandeur, respect for his personal bravery and his wounds but in my opinion average staff officer at best. Kills can not be the major factor for a staff position

I tend to agree with the opinion. Galland is bit like Rommel in my opinion. Very popular, very talented, but perhaps not the best man to place very high up, where organisational skills are more required..

 

[drgondog]

I tend to agree with the opinion. Galland is bit like Rommel in my opinion. Very popular, very talented, but perhaps not the best man to place very high up, where organisational skills are more required..

It looks like you and Jim have judged Galland and found him deficient. So, who could have had the right strategy, forcefully rammed it down a dictator's throat and prevailed?

LEADERSHIP skills were required and he had them, Experience would be required to properly define the issues. Milch had organizational skills (?) and he took the easy way out. Who was your candidate to replace Rommel and Galland in their roles for a better outcome for Germany?

So, who would have done a better job in your humble opinion(s)??

 

[Ratsel]

I don't think any answers will be forthcoming. Galland imo, was a very good choise.

 

[drgondog]

I tend to agree with the opinion. Galland is bit like Rommel in my opinion. Very popular, very talented, but perhaps not the best man to place very high up, where organisational skills are more required..

An excerpt from a Steinhoff interview - questions about Galland

"Do you feel that Galland's appointment as general of the fighters was good for the service, and if so, why?

Steinhoff: Definitely. . Galland was a very energetic man, a strong leader and great fighter, successful, loyal to his men and a most honorable and honest gentleman.

He was never awed by Hitler or swayed by Göring, and he always answered truthfully when they questioned him on any subject, regardless of how unpopular the truth might have been.

Galland was a visionary who knew how to turn the tide in the air
war and how to rebuild the fighter force. But his standing beside his fighter
pilots, against Göring and Hitler, as well as many others, gave Hitler cause to replace him, which was a bad mistake.

In Berlin honesty was, often, not fashionable.

Excerpts from WWII magazine

Johannes Steinhoff
15 September 1913(1913-09-15) – 21 February 1994(1994-02-21) (aged 80)
By Colin D. Heaton [ abridged ]

 

[Ratsel]

Franz Stigler was of the same opinion. so was Horst Petzschler, Theo Nau, Gunther Rall, Heinz Bar, Anton Hackle, etc.

Galland with his ' Big Blow' plan while not destroying the USAAF as a whole, would have bought time for the Luftwaffe to reorganize, and for fuel/oil refineries, synthetic fuel plants to rebuild. Also in this point of the war, he wanted all fighter units to be centralized in Germany instead of being scattered over four fronts. seems like very sounds proposals to me.

Reminds me of Werner Molders.