Tactics: Spitfire vs Zero

parsifal said:

I think the main problem is that not all the participating IJN and JAAF units are identified in Joes accounts.

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I've never agreed with that argument, but it's also become less plausible over time. When these discussions first came up, I was quoting mainly Alfred Price's little Osprey book "Spitfire Mark V Aces" and a now defunct website using the same Japanese source, private monograph written for a Western reserarcher by retired Japanese officer (postwar officer, JASDF or JMSDF I dont' recall). But since then Baeza's "Solelil Levant sur l'Australie" came out, and what's more, many original records of the JNAF are now online at the National Archives of Japan website, 'JACAR'. The records of 23rd Air Flotilla say the 202nd Air Group was the only fighter unit on the navy's raids on Australia, and the 202nd's own 'kodochosho' or 'tactical operation records', at JACAR, detail each mission where the Spitfires reported meeting Zeroes (except the single mission by Army Type 1's, June 20). They do not reference any other unit (fighter kodochosho on multi-unit missions in Solomons and New Guinea *do* refer to the other units present), and the 753rd AG's (the 'Betty' unit in all the Navy raids) kodochosho also lists the 202nd, only, as their escort on the escorted bombing raids.

With the detail of these sources, there is no longer any plausible argument that Spitfire overclaims against Zeroes represent losses by unknown Japanese units. Saying that's 'not certain' is about the same as saying the Zero overclaims for Spitfires are explained by unknown additional Spitfire units. Show absolute proof other Spitfire units weren't flying from Darwin besides the known ones… it's about the same kind of argument, at this point.

The Spits caused the following loss and damage to Zeroes in the Darwin raids, taken directly from the 202nd's kodochosho except as in ( ), Japanese names are family name first, I didn't bother figuring out the (scribbled) given names in some cases of minor damage, and Japanese names can often have more than one pronunciation which even native speakers can't disambiguate 100% certainly from seeing them written in Chinese characters as in these records:
March 2 1943: 21 Zeroes on escort to Taban (?Coomali), a/c of Sea 1C Hihara Hiroyuki (日原弘行) hit 3 times, a/c of PO2C Tsuda Goro (津田五郞) hit twice. JACAR document: C08051650100 pp 1-2
March 15: 27 Zeroes to Darwin on escort, one mechanical abort, PO2C Tajiri Seiji went missing, no damage to other a/c, C08051650100, pp. 49-50
May 7: 27 Zeroes to Darwin on escort, one mechanical abort, CPO Noda Teruomi(?, 野田光臣)'s a/c was holed 7 times but returned (Price mistakenly reports this as 7 Zeroes hit) C08051650700 pp. 8-9
May 10: 9 Zeroes to Stewart Field on strafing mission. PO1C Sakai Kunio went missing (crashed on Stewart field); CPO Yamanaka Tadao ditched (Baeza has a photo of a Zero leaving the area streaming fuel, taken from the ground); the leader Ens Miyaguchi Morio's a/c had a fire but 'use possible' (repairable); PO1C Yoshida's a/c was hit once. (Spitfire claims in this one case were quite accurate, 2 destroyed 1 probable) C08051650700 pp. 46-47
May 28: 7 Zeroes to Stewart Field on escort. a/c of PO2C Nishi hit once, that of [illegible] also damaged. C08051650900 pp. 43-44
June 20: (this raid was by the JAAF, suffered one Type 1 Fighter loss in 59th Sentai, per numerous sources)
June 28: 27 Zeroes to Darwin on escort, CPO Noda's a/c was hit once (see May 7), that of PO2C Okubo Noto (?大久保野藤) 6 times, that of Sea 1C Hasegawa Shujiro 10 times, latter two a/c classed 'medium damage, use possible'; one pilot was seriously wounded, probably Okubo since he didn't fly the next mission and the other two did; all three were in the same 3 plane 'shotai'. C08051651300 pp. 18-19
June 30: 27 Zeroes to Fenton a/f on escort, no loss or damage. C08051651300 pp. 29-30
July 6: 27 Zeroes to Fenton a/f on escort, CPO Ishikawa Tomotoshi mechanical abort, a/c of PO2C Hayashi Takeshi (林武?) hit 4 times, a/c of WO Sakaguchi Otojiro (坂口音次郎) hit once (this is slighty at odds with Baeza who says Tomotoshi's a/c was damaged in combat and landed wheels up, not what the report seems to say, but Baeza's info is also that only 26 a/c completed the mission and two were combat damaged) C08051651300 pp. 48-49
Sept 7: 36 Zeroes on escort of Army a/c (2 Type 100 Hq. Recon, 'Dinah'), PO1C Terai Yoshio went missing, a/c of PO2C Shimazu Masao (島津正雄) was hit 7 times, a/c of PO1C Goto Koichi (後藤庫一) hit 5 times, a/c of Ens. Miyaguchi Morio hit twice, a/c of Sea 1C Ishida hit once. C08051651700 pp. 3-4

So in total, 3 pilots were lost with their Zeroes, one Zero ditched pilot survived, and 15-16 other Zeroes (not clear if Miyaguchi's fire May 10 was due to combat) suffered repairable combat damage. Note that all the Zero losses were not 100% certainly caused by Spitfires, only the May 10 losses, Sakai and Yamanaka's ditching, were pretty certainly due to Spits, assuming ground fire didn't punch a hole in Yamanaka's fuel tank during the strafe. The other two (Mar 15, Sep 7) just disappeared during/after combat with Spits, probably downed by Spits, but the uncertainty is worth keeping in mind if one would quibble about whether certain Spit losses on these missions were 100% certainly due to Zeroes.

I think it's useful to list the damaged Zeroes, because it gives a better idea how the Spit overclaims could be so high. The kodochosho for other campaigns also show that Zeroes frequently made it back long distances to base with damage, even fairly well shot up. One factor in Allied overclaims might have been their belief that any Zero they hit was as good as dead, so when sure they hit a Zero, perhaps convinced themselves that they saw a dramatic end to the Zero they didn't really see, or felt it wasn't exaggerating to say so even when they knew they hadn't really seen it, because the Zero wasn't going to regain its base anyway…but they often did.

Per Price's account 26 Spits were lost or probably lost in combat with Zeroes in these same combats, excluding the 2 lost to Army Type 1's on June 20.

Japan Center for Asian Historical Records(JACAR) National Archives Japan

Joe

Joe

as usual your research is exceelent and formidable. Yet once again, I need to point out that there is a basic an inherent problem in your approach. You are proving that the forest was not cut down by looking at the individual trees, relying on primary records that should be correct, but for a multitude of reasons might not.

The starting point of any hypothesis needs to be what was the big picture. Just how many aircraft were lost by the japanese, and in what theatre and at what times. For example, the USN claims to have shot down 16000 Japanese aircraft 41-45. We know that the Japanese started with a certain number of aircraft, they finished with another number, produced X pilots and Y aircraft. If they were not shot down or killed, what happened to these planes. if your accounts are to be believed, we should all be speaking Japanese at this point because on the face of it the Japanese could never have lost 16000 aircraft. On the face of it, your research suggests they did not even lose 1600 aircraft in this theatre......

parsifal said:

Joe

as usual your research is exceelent and formidable. Yet once again, I need to point out that there is a basic an inherent problem in your approach. You are proving that the forest was not cut down by looking at the individual trees, relying on primary records that should be correct, but for a multitude of reasons might not.

The starting point of any hypothesis needs to be what was the big picture. Just how many aircraft were lost by the japanese, and in what theatre and at what times. For example, the USN claims to have shot down 16000 Japanese aircraft 41-45. We know that the Japanese started with a certain number of aircraft, they finished with another number, produced X pilots and Y aircraft. If they were not shot down or killed, what happened to these planes. if your accounts are to be believed, we should all be speaking Japanese at this point because on the face of it the Japanese could never have lost 16000 aircraft. On the face of it, your research suggests they did not even lose 1600 aircraft in this theatre......

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You speak about the exhaustivity of japanese archives i suppose and particulary losses lists. I can just speak for Bernard Baëza works since the question existed from the beginning. Just we can say that they seems to be rather complete with some uncertainly margin of course. I mean the account balance is obtained (near 0) with losses, deliveries, and remining strengh in most of battlefield vicinities he's studied.
It's not always mentionned inhis publications in order not to bother the reader, in favor of action but verifications of course are made in the background...

Might be no 100% accuracy like in all archives of the world, but no main arithmetical incoherences too.

Regards

parsifal said:

Joe

as usual your research is exceelent and formidable. Yet once again, I need to point out that there is a basic an inherent problem in your approach. You are proving that the forest was not cut down by looking at the individual trees, relying on primary records that should be correct, but for a multitude of reasons might not.

The starting point of any hypothesis needs to be what was the big picture. Just how many aircraft were lost by the japanese, and in what theatre and at what times. For example, the USN claims to have shot down 16000 Japanese aircraft 41-45. We know that the Japanese started with a certain number of aircraft, they finished with another number, produced X pilots and Y aircraft. If they were not shot down or killed, what happened to these planes. if your accounts are to be believed, we should all be speaking Japanese at this point because on the face of it the Japanese could never have lost 16000 aircraft. On the face of it, your research suggests they did not even lose 1600 aircraft in this theatre......

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With all due respect, I think that line of argument has reached the level of real nonsense. We have the then secret original records of the Zero unit involved in a particular operation, 202nd Air Group. Those detailed records mention no other fighter unit cooperating with them (as such records demonstrably do when it was the case) on those missions, showing the specific encounters that the opposing Allied force recorded. The numbers of a/c mentioned on each mission generally agree with the numbers the opponents reported encounting. The records of the bomber unit on the same mission say that fighter unit was the only escorting them. The records of the next hightest unit, the Air Flotilla of which they were part, also say those two units 202nd AG Zeroes, 753rd AG Type 1 'Rikko', were the ones sent of those missions. And records of overall order of battle say the 202nd was the only Navy fighter unit based within range of Darwin (see Baeza on the flotilla and overall OOB levels).

The second paragraph also makes no sense as saying anything about the specific Darwin raids. Total USN credits amount to 16K OK, so what? It's ridiculous to say we can't account for USN claims v Japanese losses at...say Battle of Coral Sea because we don't know the whole 'forest'. We know which Japanese carriers were there, we have the original handwritten records of the carrier air groups (online, and lots of other records that aren't, which more serious researchers can access in hard copy in Japan). It's just nonsense to say we can't use the records of the specific units involved, which a variety of sources agree were the ones involved, without first doing a whole accounting of all production and losses for the whole war.

And again why isn't it a 'flawed approach' to use the Spitfire unit accounts to determine their losses? The 202nd AG credited its pilots with 101 victories (including 'probables) in those raids. Some were against P-39's, P-40's, Buffalo's and even P-43's defending Darwin in 1943, in addition to Spitfires. Detailed Allied accounts say only Spitfires encountered Zeroes when defending that area in 1943, and only suffered something like 26 losses in air combat to Zeroes. But just turn your approach around... how is looking at the Spit wing's accounts not also trying to 'prove the 101 plane forest was not cut down by looking at individual trees'? Where's the 'proof' those other Allied types didn't also participate, or that only 26 Spits were lost? Where's the big picture of total Allied production minus losses equals ending figure? That hasn't been brought up because it's not really relevant. We have the accounts of the Spit units we know (pretty surely) were the ones involved; same with the Zeroes.

As far as implication of Japanese total losses in the Pacific, you're exatrapolating wildy there from this one series of incidents. The 202nd lost 3 more Zeroes and pilots in just its first combat mission after the Darwin operation, Sept 9 1943, escorting bombers v Merauke, New Guinea against No. 86 Sdn RAAF Kittyhawks. The unit was then wiped out from Dec 1943-spring 1944 at Rabaul and in central Pacific and was deleted from the rolls in July 1944 The Japanese records don't show a consistent story of light losses, or of Allied overclaims as high as those of the Spits (though in some other cases it was as high). The 202nd suffered more heavily even in the 1942 Darwin raids v P-40's than in the 1943 ones.

Joe

Joe,

A small point but the Buffalos and P-43s in Darwin were PR aircraft not defensive fighters and, as far as I know, none were ever engaged in or lost during air combat. IIRC one PR Buffalo was destroyed on the ground.

Cheers,
Mark

I knew this would happen. I'm asking for tactics not statistics. I'm curious how the Spit plots fared against the Japanese as I never really considered it. Did the various Mks of Spits yield different tactics against the Zero or did the Zero have a superiority that only good piloting by Commonwealth pilots could overcome it? And YEs I understand that kill ratios can give a perspective on that outcome but, come on, kill claims are ALWAYS suspect and can only give a general idea of the whole picture.

If this thread degrades into name-calling and underhanded sarcasm, I will close it.

buffnut453 said:

Joe,
A small point but the Buffalos and P-43s in Darwin were PR aircraft not defensive fighters and, as far as I know, none were ever engaged in or lost during air combat. IIRC one PR Buffalo was destroyed on the ground.

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No I don't believe any were engaged in air combat, either, nor any P-39's or P-40's in the Darwin area in '43. But the claims in the 202nd's kodochosho include all those types, in Darwin area '43. The point I'm making is that you, or I, conclude this Japanese impression was mistaken based on published accounts in turn based on the unit records of the Allied fighters which actually did encounter the Zeroes (Spit Wing, as far as 1943 in Darwin area) and higher level Allied accounts saying which units were involved where. But in this particular case we have the same info from the Japanese side; detailed records of the fighter unit involved describing every combat the Allies recorded (except the one JAAF raid we also know), Navy bomber unit records saying the 202nd was their escort, air flotilla records and overall OOB info that also show it was the only fighter unit involved in JNAF operations v Darwin area. So there's no more basis to say other JNAF fighter units were involved than there is to say Buffalo's and P-43's were engaged in combat. In fact there's less basis, because there's nothing even from the Allied side that's inconsistent with the 202nd being the only fighter unit present on the Navy raids. So why is such a different standard of logic and proof applied to similar information from one side v the other? Consistent logic says that each side knew who it was sending up and who didn't come back, but had only unreliable impressions in the heat of combat about who the enemy was sending up and what damage it was inflicting on the enemy. Same with any other case.

Re: Njaco, you asked 'how did the Spitfires do'. I don't see how one could possibly answer that question without settling, to some reasonable degree of certainty, how many Zeroes Spitfires managed to down in the only campaign where those two types met in combat. If it's really true that the outcomes of these combats are seriously uncertain (they aren't, but for argument's sake let's say they were) I don't see how you could possibly say whose tactics worked.

Joe

Njaco

I dont believe that either joe or i are trying to hijack your thread, and i agree with Joe that we need to establish a solid basis of fact in order to move to the questions you put.

If you are not happy with where we are going with this, say the word and we aill desist.



Joe

It wa never my interntion to upset you on this issue. But i need to clarify why I am narking you on this issue.

Firstly, I am not trying to to disrespect you or your research, but I also think you need to sit back just a little and consider what you are saying. I dont know how many different threads I have seen you produce accounts of individual battles that show an immense knowledge on the subject, and are certainly very convincing. I am not one of those that disrespects the efforts of the Japanese. I have a healthy respect for what they achieved. And I do not assert that I have superior knowledge to you on this subject. However the methodology I am suggesting for you to corroborate your findings is valid. Basically it is this.....when there is a hypothesis to analyse, you have to compare that hypotheseis with the known facts. If the known facts are as blunt as the total losses for the war, then we start from there. But usually the set can start from a much smaller starting point than that. Your Coral Sea example is an excellent example of that. We can deduce the total losses, then use the unit records to work backwards, and find out how those losses were sustained. But to undertake research that says that the losses were less than the accepted figure just has to be approached with a great deal of caution. Basing conclusions on unit details over known statistics and then coming to an alternative conclusion as to total losses is wrong, no matter how impressive the research. The only other plausible explanation is that the original statistic (ie the total losses sustained) is wrong, but then that raises a whole bevy of questions about historical facts. If the japanese didnt lose 100 aircraft at Coral Sea, then why wasnt Zuikaku at Midway. If the Japanese duidnt lose 16000 aircraft, then why did they only have 5000 aircraft and no experienced pilots at the end of the war. Historical constants ruin what appears to be a perfectly reasonable hypothesis.

Now, to test the veracity of your research, it would be impossible to check every combat of the war. The set is simply too big to undertake that research. So, in those circumstance, what should happen is what every researcher in other filelds is forced to do, they undertake random sampling from a set of examples where the losses are fairlly certain, and then use that research technique that you are using to see if it arrives at the known result. if it doesnt, for a significant number of the samples, then the statistical error in the technique can be determined.

To be honest I dont understand why you do not want to subject your research to these control checks. its basic quality assurance when undertaking any of this sort of research. if the results dont tally with the known or generally accepted results, then the error factor in that research can be measured, and a truer more accurate estimate arrived at, or, if the research does stand up, then other reasons for the overall outcome need to be found. Say you found positively that only 50 aircraft were lost at Coral Sea, and ther is just no way this number could be wrong, then clearly the no show by zuikaku at Midway , has to be for other reasons other than the traditionally accepted shortage of aircraft.

This is how hypotheses become accepted facts. Because you refuse to corroborate your detailed research findings against accepted verification methods, people like me are going to continue to annoy you by questioning your findngs, because they remain uncorroborated and unproven. I genuinely apologize for that annoyance, but it is the only way I can suggest for your research to become useful.

Regards

Michael

I not saying anybody is hijacking and I'm well aware that we must discuss "how many Zeroes Spitfires managed to down in the only campaign where those two types met in combat." But I'm starting to see negative comments calling into question one's research and such. I've seen this happen before. I get real sick and tired of how things go south when one disagrees with anothers opinion. I really don't want that here. Snide comments don't need to be said.

Now, you've just educated me for I was unaware there was only one "campaign" inwhich those types met. Can anyone elaborate further on that and why wasn't the Spit the dominant crate used by Commonwealth or UK forces in that region?

JoeB said:

No I don't believe any were engaged in air combat, either, nor any P-39's or P-40's in the Darwin area in '43. But the claims in the 202nd's kodochosho include all those types, in Darwin area '43. The point I'm making is that you, or I, conclude this Japanese impression was mistaken based on published accounts in turn based on the unit records of the Allied fighters which actually did encounter the Zeroes (Spit Wing, as far as 1943 in Darwin area) and higher level Allied accounts saying which units were involved where. But in this particular case we have the same info from the Japanese side; detailed records of the fighter unit involved describing every combat the Allies recorded (except the one JAAF raid we also know), Navy bomber unit records saying the 202nd was their escort, air flotilla records and overall OOB info that also show it was the only fighter unit involved in JNAF operations v Darwin area. So there's no more basis to say other JNAF fighter units were involved than there is to say Buffalo's and P-43's were engaged in combat. In fact there's less basis, because there's nothing even from the Allied side that's inconsistent with the 202nd being the only fighter unit present on the Navy raids. So why is such a different standard of logic and proof applied to similar information from one side v the other? Consistent logic says that each side knew who it was sending up and who didn't come back, but had only unreliable impressions in the heat of combat about who the enemy was sending up and what damage it was inflicting on the enemy. Same with any other case.

Re: Njaco, you asked 'how did the Spitfires do'. I don't see how one could possibly answer that question without settling, to some reasonable degree of certainty, how many Zeroes Spitfires managed to down in the only campaign where those two types met in combat. If it's really true that the outcomes of these combats are seriously uncertain (they aren't, but for argument's sake let's say they were) I don't see how you could possibly say whose tactics worked.

Joe

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Joe,

I wasn't arguing, it just wasn't clear from your post. I have no detailed knowledge of IJN or RAAF operations over Darwin, except that 1 PRU was operating from there as a "forward" operating base.

Cheers,
Mark

Njaco said:

I knew this would happen. I'm asking for tactics not statistics. I'm curious how the Spit plots fared against the Japanese as I never really considered it. Did the various Mks of Spits yield different tactics against the Zero or did the Zero have a superiority that only good piloting by Commonwealth pilots could overcome it? And YEs I understand that kill ratios can give a perspective on that outcome but, come on, kill claims are ALWAYS suspect and can only give a general idea of the whole picture.

If this thread degrades into name-calling and underhanded sarcasm, I will close it.

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There wern't alot of Spitfire vs. Zero contests outside of Darwin. Spitfires faced the Ki-43 however on many occasions in Burma and India and the two planes had similar characteristics. The tactics used for the best chance of success (or at least not getting shot down......re: the Shores comments about the "tactical standoff" achieved in places in early 1944)

Your point on kill ratios is well made, it gives an idea but it doesn't explain the why and i've seen such ratios used to justify a wide variety of arguments. Ironically the RAF itself was very confused over what was going on in the PTO and CBI theater and sent a troubleshooter in mid 43 to find out why the Hurricane was faring so poorly in the CBI. I'll reprint the exerpt from Wg Cmdr Paul Richie's report below from Shores Vol III....it does touch on tactics and while it is focused on the Hurricane, it would equally apply to the Spitfire. The report is damning in that Ritchie saw no reason why the Hurricane should not at least be competetive given it's similar strengths to other 1st generation Allied warplanes (p40/Wildcat).


"It is considered however, that the Air Staff has played ostrich for long enough in this matter of the respective points of the Hurricane and the 01 [Ki-43]. If everyone, form the pilots to the AOC-in-C is agreed that Japanese fighters have our fighters at a disadvantage in certain circumstances let it be admitted and let steps be taken to avoid those circumstances. No useful purpose can be served by telling the pilots that they have the best equipment in the world, and because they know they have not and will merely regard the Air Staff as a bunch of nit-wits.

Rather let this be our line: The Japanese fighters have good and bad points. Our own fighters have good and bad points. A comparison of the Japanese Army 01 and the British Hurricane makes it obvious from the start that in a certain type of fighting, the Japanese fighter should come off best. On the other hand, in another kind of fighting we should come off best. This is borne out by experience: The Japs can dog-fight better than we can; however, they are more lightly armed and need to get in good long bursts against our heavily armored aircraft before they can shoot them down. Their manoeuvrability enables them to do this if we try and dog-fight them. On the other hand, one short accurate burst from a Hurricane usually causes the disintegration of an 01 - and the Hurricane is faster. All this being so, the obvious thing to do is to work out tactics to give ourselves the maximum advantage. We won't dog-fight. We will only attack from above, diving and firing a short burst before climbing again. If we are caught out and are below the Japs or at their level we will immediately take steps to reverse this situation by diving away and climbing up before attacking again. We will defeat the Japs by cleverness.


Ritchie's report was not well received in higher circles in charge of the RAF in the CBI and some of his points were hotly disputed. Shores' notes that Ritchie's arguments mirrored that of Chennaults in 1941. Despite this analysis, the Hurricane would continue to fare poorly in the region till war's end. The spitfire did much better, but arguably not as well as it's technical superiority might have indicated. Using the right tactics certainly is a solid base to start but it isn't always as easly to do in practice and some of the enemy Sentais were very good pilots and they continued to fight competetively against both airforces despite being increasingly outgunned and outnumbered in the region.

parsifal said:

1. Your Coral Sea example is an excellent example of that. We can deduce the total losses, then use the unit records to work backwards, and find out how those losses were sustained. But to undertake research that says that the losses were less than the accepted figure just has to be approached with a great deal of caution. Basing conclusions on unit details over known statistics.

2. If the japanese didnt lose 100 aircraft at Coral Sea, then why wasnt Zuikaku at Midway.

3. If the Japanese duidnt lose 16000 aircraft, then why did they only have 5000 aircraft and no experienced pilots at the end of the war. Historical constants ruin what appears to be a perfectly reasonable hypothesis.

4. So, in those circumstance, what should happen is what every researcher in other filelds is forced to do, they undertake random sampling from a set of examples where the losses are fairlly certain, and then use that research technique that you are using to see if it arrives at the known result. if it doesnt, for a significant number of the samples, then the statistical error in the technique can be determined.

To be honest I dont understand why you do not want to subject your research to these control checks. its basic quality assurance when undertaking any of this sort of research. if the results dont tally with the known or generally accepted results, l

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1. The fundamental flaw in your argument, though it sounds reasonable in isolation, is that there is no 'accepted figure' for JNAF losses in the 1943 Darwin raids in contrast to what the Japanese records say. Besides the results in the Japanese records, there are only Allied claims, oh and one recovered wreck of a Zero (Sakai's May 10) that the Japaense also recorded as lost. People may 'accept' one sided claims in the everyday sense of the word, but claims are never 'accepted figures' in any serious historical sense. And there's no 'accepted' maximum value of overclaim ratio that means a certain number of claims *must* represent at least some minimum of real losses. Again, the Spit claims v Zeroes over Darwin were highly overstated, more than average in Pacific War, but not the highest overclaims ever seen.

2. There could have been many reasons Zuikaku didn't show up at Midway as far as the Allies knew during the war. The 'accepted figure' of rough losses of J-aircraft at Coral Sea came from the Japanese after the war, in estimates by officers interviewed by USSBS. It's not in fact vastly at odds with what the carrier groups records say, as naturally it wouldn't be, being from the same basic place.

3. There is no direct interlocking logical connection between the 202nd's detailed records for the Darwin operation, and how many planes the USN downd in the whole Pacific War. But if it's just a matter of generally picturing the situation where one air group could lose only 4 a/c over a few months of low intensity operations but the JNAF/JAAF lost (presumably) some fair % of 16k a/c to the USN in air combat over the whole war, the situation was: Japanese fighter units often suffered a lot more heavily than 202nd at Darwin in 1943, the 202nd itself was wiped out in a few months of combat following the Darwin op; Japanese non-fighters usually suffered worse; the air war got bigger and higher in intensity from the latter part of 43, even the Darwin raids were at a very relaxed pace compared to Guadalcanal campaign (where multiple land and carrier units lost 115 Zeroes in air combat, 188 to all causes Aug 7-Nov 15, per JNAF records) but the Guadalcanal campaign was still small compared to 1944-5 campaigns; the Japanese suffered heavy losses of a/c on the ground, at sea and operationally, especially in the later campaigns. But, in other operations of early war Japanese fighter units often suffered light losses while inflicting much heavier ones on Allied fighters, that is not at all unique to 1943 Darwin.

4. Again back to points 1 and 2. If one chooses to reject what's in the detailed Japanese operational records of the Darwin combats one by one, there is no 'known result' for Japanese losses in the Darwin operation. And this is true in general: very seldom are there 'known results' of losses for the opposing side in particular combats or campaigns other than from the opposing side. And as far as the thing about 'consistency' of combat reports of particular combats with total production and losses of that air arm for the whole war, again, have you checked the 'consistency' of the action by action Spitfire air combat losses at Darwin with total Spitfire V production and losses to all causes for the whole war? I just don't get the logic of that point, and in any case it seems to be applied in an obviously inconsistent manner between sides.

Joe

Are you guys saying that the Spitfire was only operational over Darwin during 1943 in the whole PTO / CBI? Or is that the only time it met the Zero in combat. I'm not very well versed in that area of the war but if this is the case, why wasn't the premire fighter for the RAF used more in that threatre?

Njaco said:

Are you guys saying that the Spitfire was only operational over Darwin during 1943 in the whole PTO / CBI? Or is that the only time it met the Zero in combat. I'm not very well versed in that area of the war but if this is the case, why wasn't the premire fighter for the RAF used more in that threatre?

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As others referred to, the Spifire was used in Burma, but it never met the Zero there. Seafires met Zeroes in at least one real fighter combat on offensive escort mission, the last day of the war. Other claims by Seafires v Zeroes were in close in defense of carriers and quite possibly kamikazes. In the final battle Aug 15 '45, one Seafire was lost v claim of 7 Zeroes destroyed. Only 1 Zero was lost to a Seafire in known Japanese accounts of this action with another pilot WIA by a Seafire but able to land. These accounts are probably complete IMO, but not as certainly complete as in case of the Darwin campaign. The units in question attributed a number of other losses to USN F6F's, which were in the same furball combat at the same time and made numerous claims as well. The Spitfire wasn't used elsewhere in the theater.

Joe

The Spitfire wasn't used elsewhere in the theater.

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Why was that? I would have thought that it would be the main British fighter against the Japanese or were the US fighters handling the situation so there was no need for the RAF?

One reason the Spitfire was not widely used in the CBI was it's short range. Also a lot of the Allied use of fighters in the CBI was in the air to ground role which was not really the Spit's forte.

Thanks Joe, Parsifal and Ren. I guess I'm just a bit ignorant about air ops in this area. I had always thought that while the Spit was the main fighter in the ETO for the UK, it would also continue that role in other theatres. Thanks.

To tie this whole discussion back to your original point though, Joes findings about the very poor exchange has to goad the rest of us into working out why there was such a poor exchange rate in the theatre. At the rates Joe is asserting, it was significantly worse than at the beginning of the war, when zeroes were flying against poorer quality pilots, the allies did not have a numerical advantage, had radar, and the best pilots in the RAAF. Apart from exposing Caldwell as a liar, it means that all the tactical concepts we have accepted as transferring the advantage to the allies were not applicable to the Spitfire equipped units.

This is why I was interrogating Joe. He doers not want to say what his material means, but the obvious conclusion to draw is that for the Spitfires in the pacific, and the men that flew them something was wrong, very wrong.


So, as an adjunct to the original question, one conclusion to draw is that whatever tactics were being employed by the allies, they were not working....

Njaco said:

Are you guys saying that the Spitfire was only operational over Darwin during 1943 in the whole PTO / CBI? Or is that the only time it met the Zero in combat. I'm not very well versed in that area of the war but if this is the case, why wasn't the premire fighter for the RAF used more in that threatre?

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Apart from the handful of combats over Darwin, RAAF spitfires were never in a position to activley engage Zero's in air to air combat. Because of lack of range, Darwin based Spitfires were restricted to interception missions in that region. The same is true for 79sqn RAAF in the Pacific. It was based at Kiriwina from August 1943, by this time most Japanese aerial opposition was to be found at Rabaul on New Britain and several bases on the North Coast of New Guinea. Both areas outside of the squadrons range. During the big raids against Rabaul in Oct-Nov 43, the squadrons role was that of CAP over Kiriwina as US 5th AF bombers refuelled there, 79sqn did fly sweeps over New Britain at this time however, Rabaul (where the Zero's were), was out of range.
When the now MKVIII equipped Spitfires came together under the RAAF's 1st TAF at Morotai in late 44-early 45, Japanese aerial opposition was pretty much none existent. The last few months of the war only saw a handful of twin engine types fall to Aussie Spitfires, who were by now employed almost exclusively in the ground attack role.

Njaco said:

Why was that? I would have thought that it would be the main British fighter against the Japanese or were the US fighters handling the situation so there was no need for the RAF?

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AFAIK apart from some (2?) Australian based transport units, the RAF was represented by only three squadrons in the whole PTO. All three (54, 548 549) were Spitfire units and all based at Darwin. Apart from a few strafing missions flown by these squadrons, 54 was the only one to see aerial combat as part of No1 FW during 43-44. Infact 54 squadron holds the destinction as being the first and last Darwin based Spitfire unit to shoot down an enamy aircarft - both being Ki-46's.