SaparotRob
Unter Gemeine Geschwader Murmeltier XIII
The "I" award is for "ironic".
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The "I" award is for "ironic".View attachment 715446
P-47 Turbo controls were always a serious issue. Ironically the only people with really suitable control systems
were the only ones without enough Nickel to make reliable turbos (Germany).
The initial escort of B-17 was not solely by the Eagle squadrons as you imply. In fact the majority of escort sorties were regular RAF and RCAF.It was the Eagle Squadrons doing the flying of the Spitfires - flown largely by US personnel.
The pursuit squadrons that would be flying US made aircraft were not yet ready.
There were not enough ground staff/bases/spare parts.
Thanks, my point to A at ease was that if a "bomber mafia" existed and they were fixed on the idea that unescorted bombers could get through why would they ask the forces of another country to provide escort.The initial escort of B-17 was not solely by the Eagle squadrons as you imply. In fact the majority of escort sorties were regular RAF and RCAF.
From "The Luftwaffe over Germany":
"The first heavy bomber mission was flown on August 17, when 12 B-17s bombed the Rouen railway yards. Close escort was provided by the RAF four Spitfire IX squadrons. Rear support was provided by the Biggin Hill and Tangmere Spitfire V wings."
The four Spitfire IX squadrons were 64 ,611, 401 and 402. The 133 Eagle squadron didn't get its MK IXs until September and lost most of them on its first mission with them. 133 was a part of the Biggin Hill wing and did provide rear support over the channel.
The 31st Fighter Group was still in training with limited operational missions. It first saw combat at Dieppe but in limited numbers. The 52nd FG was training in Northern Ireland and didn't see action until North Africa.
In 1946, the AAF decided to keep the P51 (till the P-80's were on hand in numbers) and phase out the P47 immediatly. They considered it to be better of the two.
Drgondog, was the effect of RADAR ever discussed? To me the concept of strategic bombing changed with the introduction of RADAR controlled defences, it reduces the chances of surprise to almost nil and means you face more and better placed defenders.It is amusing to see how the attitudes of the fledgling AAC, with visions of becoming a separate branch co-equal to Army and Navy, and disciples of Doughet and Mitchell were assigned the moniker of 'Bomber mafia'. It could actually be true for the Spaatz, LeMay, Emmons and Arnold leadership in 1938. At that time, there were no heavy bombers capable of bomb load/rangeand speed at 25000 feet in the world. There were no fighters on the horizon, including Spit and Hurricane andB 109 and 110 deemed capable of successul interception. Proponents and acolytes in the ranks, such as Chennault foreseeing that Pursuit aviation would grow faster than heavy bombardment techonolgies, were burned at the stake for heresy.
That said - The Spanish Civil War highlighted bomber vulnerability and the air battles in Poland and France tempered even the most ardent (Spaatz, Brett, Armstrong, Olds) to tone the religious fervor from the 'bombers will always get through' to 'most can make it if we have enough inventory for on-board firepower to take a toll of interceptors'. Unfortunately even that vision, while temporarily supported by wildly outrageous bomber gunner claims, unravelled completely during Blitz Week, Ploesti and Schweinfurt/Regensburg.
It was clear that development priorities of 1938/1940 which included computing gunsights had not availed 8th AF B-17s and B-24s with improved survivability. ONLY the 1939 Kilner-Lindberg and Emmons Board findings and objective of the "1500 mi Range Pursuit" was starting to yield external combat tanks and increased internal fuel capacity for existing Pursuit/Fighter aircraft.
Thus, the Fighter Conference in January 1942 - immediately after Pearl Harbor - when the ranges required in the PACIFIC, truly lit a fire under development of the Long Range Fighter. Only with the happy circumstance of the marriage of the Merlin 61 with Mustang I airframe, was s/e LR escort conceived as doable. Republic with P-47B/C was slow to realize the importance of wing and fuselage changes required in time to play the most important role for airpower prior to D-Day. Namely the attrition of the LW via denying sanctuary anywhere in 8th and 15th AF combat radius, whereas retreat to extent of P-47D range had led to successful rates of attrition for LW and devastating heavy bomber losses for AAF
As a postscript - Note also, that RAF never envisioned Merlin Mustang to either perform daylight escort of RAF BC or replace the Spitfire. The Mustang IMO was destined for 2 TAF, continued Army Co-operation, and perhaps medium bomber close escort - an Ace of All Trades - a s/e Swiss Army knife. DITTO for the US Army/AAF CAS Directorate mainstream, encumbered with tactical army requirements and envisioning a battlefield air superiority fighter to replace P-39 and P-40. That the USA and AAF had moved on from 'dive bombing' to glide or low level bombing enhanced the utility of P-51A replacing the A-36, followed by P-51B.
Happy accident #2 was that the base Mustang airframe design, in the case of the P-51B, could achieve the highest internal fuel fraction increase. The fuselage tank, combined with design features of pylon mouted fuel tanks originating in the A-36, combined with superior medium through high altitude performance - became the darling of the 8th and 15th AF.
And everybody (mostly) lived happily thereafter. The AAF sufficiently proved their worth to gain equal status to the Joint Chiefs table. Then the Bomber Mafia resurrected and combatted the Carrier Mafia for $$ for the rest of time. But that is another story.
You write good!It is amusing to see how the attitudes of the fledgling AAC, with visions of becoming a separate branch co-equal to Army and Navy, and disciples of Doughet and Mitchell were assigned the moniker of 'Bomber mafia'. It could actually be true for the Spaatz, LeMay, Emmons and Arnold leadership in 1938. At that time, there were no heavy bombers capable of bomb load/rangeand speed at 25000 feet in the world. There were no fighters on the horizon, including Spit and Hurricane andB 109 and 110 deemed capable of successul interception. Proponents and acolytes in the ranks, such as Chennault foreseeing that Pursuit aviation would grow faster than heavy bombardment techonolgies, were burned at the stake for heresy.
That said - The Spanish Civil War highlighted bomber vulnerability and the air battles in Poland and France tempered even the most ardent (Spaatz, Brett, Armstrong, Olds) to tone the religious fervor from the 'bombers will always get through' to 'most can make it if we have enough inventory for on-board firepower to take a toll of interceptors'. Unfortunately even that vision, while temporarily supported by wildly outrageous bomber gunner claims, unravelled completely during Blitz Week, Ploesti and Schweinfurt/Regensburg.
It was clear that development priorities of 1938/1940 which included computing gunsights had not availed 8th AF B-17s and B-24s with improved survivability. ONLY the 1939 Kilner-Lindberg and Emmons Board findings and objective of the "1500 mi Range Pursuit" was starting to yield external combat tanks and increased internal fuel capacity for existing Pursuit/Fighter aircraft.
Thus, the Fighter Conference in January 1942 - immediately after Pearl Harbor - when the ranges required in the PACIFIC, truly lit a fire under development of the Long Range Fighter. Only with the happy circumstance of the marriage of the Merlin 61 with Mustang I airframe, was s/e LR escort conceived as doable. Republic with P-47B/C was slow to realize the importance of wing and fuselage changes required in time to play the most important role for airpower prior to D-Day. Namely the attrition of the LW via denying sanctuary anywhere in 8th and 15th AF combat radius, whereas retreat to extent of P-47D range had led to successful rates of attrition for LW and devastating heavy bomber losses for AAF
As a postscript - Note also, that RAF never envisioned Merlin Mustang to either perform daylight escort of RAF BC or replace the Spitfire. The Mustang IMO was destined for 2 TAF, continued Army Co-operation, and perhaps medium bomber close escort - an Ace of All Trades - a s/e Swiss Army knife. DITTO for the US Army/AAF CAS Directorate mainstream, encumbered with tactical army requirements and envisioning a battlefield air superiority fighter to replace P-39 and P-40. That the USA and AAF had moved on from 'dive bombing' to glide or low level bombing enhanced the utility of P-51A replacing the A-36, followed by P-51B.
Happy accident #2 was that the base Mustang airframe design, in the case of the P-51B, could achieve the highest internal fuel fraction increase. The fuselage tank, combined with design features of pylon mouted fuel tanks originating in the A-36, combined with superior medium through high altitude performance - became the darling of the 8th and 15th AF.
And everybody (mostly) lived happily thereafter. The AAF sufficiently proved their worth to gain equal status to the Joint Chiefs table. Then the Bomber Mafia resurrected and combatted the Carrier Mafia for $$ for the rest of time. But that is another story.
In a word, no. Recall the surprise inflicted indirectly by coastal radar during BoB in summer 1940. That said, radar defenses while important were susceptible to countermeasures wrt to AAA fire controls. In air war, RADAR primarily a tool for early warning for the defender and target acqusition for he attacker. For the US, RADAR not even discussed in AWPD-1 and -2 guiding the War Plans for AAF airpower.Drgondog, was the effect of RADAR ever discussed?
RADAR technologies continued rapid development and impact to stratgic operations, but only when used with very formidable interception assets was it of sufficient value to discuss as game changer. RADAR in that context was used properly in BoB and for Night Fighter controls for LW. For the first opportunity to make a difference for US, it was a failure at Pearl Harbor because it was not a well known technology at USA command and control levels 18mo after BoB.To me the concept of strategic bombing changed with the introduction of RADAR controlled defences, it reduces the chances of surprise to almost nil and means you face more and better placed defenders.
The "Forktailed Devil" was a product of the Burbank PR shop just as the F4U "Whistling Death" emerged from the Stratford PR shop!
I asked several Luftwaffe pilots about "Gabelschwanz Teufel" and got two responses: a querulous expression or a chuckle.
None had ever heard the term, including Galland, R-A-L-L (damn autofill), Steinhoff, and Stigler.
Did it ever go to war?
Greg reaches a different conclusion in his video # 8 about the Thunderbolt titled, appropriately enough 'Conclusions".Again from real world comparisons Caidin wasn't always as factual as many would have hoped.
The P47 was probably top notch at high altitude and excellent at ground attack. The area between not
so good.
Evaluations by pilots bear this out and by the end of the war certain aircraft types were better all rounders
than others. The Typhoon suffered the same fate as soon as the war was over being another type that no longer
had good enough all round capability.
This is a discussion forum, you cant answer everything by linking to you tube since the maker doesnt answer questions and isnt you. At present you are just spamming for Youtube.Greg reaches a different conclusion in his video # 8 about the Thunderbolt titled, appropriately enough 'Conclusions".
He considers the P47 a better aircraft overall than the P51, and provides ample justification in a video that runs for almost 1 hour on topic.
View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7jeV3wuML2s
I will also be linking to written sources i.e. non video like books(see post #514 above), research papers, doctoral theses & stuff.This is a discussion forum, you cant answer everything by linking to you tube since the maker doesnt answer questions and isnt you. At present you are just spamming for Youtube.
In Gregs calculation for range he allows 5 minutes on WEP, with that he calculates it was possible to reach Schweinfurt. The normal allowance for the calculation is 20 minutes. Since the US bombers were under almost continuous attack, calculating that they would only on max power for 5 minutes is NONSENSE, Greg will not address it, will you? It is just plain wrong.I am also linking to written sources i.e. non video like books & stuff.
I have linked to 2 of his videos.In Gregs calculation for range he allows 5 minutes on WEP, with that he calculates it was possible to reach Schweinfurt. The normal allowance for the calculation is 20 minutes. Since the US bombers were under almost continuous attack, calculating that they would only on max power for 5 minutes is NONSENSE, Greg will not address it, will you? It is just plain wrong.