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Remember that (IIRC) some ~90% of all Me-262's shot to pieces by Allied fighters were so when either trying to land or take off, or whilst just sitting still on the ground, VERY few were shot down in actual combat.
Soren - I'm not sure that is true with respect to all air to air scores. Of the 6-1-2 air shot down by 355th/2SF none were downed in the pattern, although one damaged at altitude blew up at low altitude. No Mustang losses to 262's in the 355th or 2SF.
I would be interested in you data on air to air scores for the 262, particularly with respect to categories of fighters, bombers and recon. This is an interesting research item since the LW records are so poor for the last 6 months of the war. As near as I can tell the 8th AF FC had about 105 Me 262Awards plus 15 more Ar 234's and Me 163's - no He 162's.
I am still researching the month by month breakout of 8th FC losses but the 8th AF FC lost ~ 638 fighters air to air and very few proportionately after September 1944. Even if the number of Allied fighters downed is low, that is a reflection again of 'evade the fighters and go after the bomber' philosophy not the Me 262 superiority.
I do know a lot of the 262's were shot down close to an airfield - either after being chased or while gaining speed and altitude after take off, so I'm not disputing the vulnerability in that mode - nor am I debating the clear superiority of the 262. Nor am I debating that it should have the best ratios even in contrast to the Ta 152 - which is statitistically insignificant.
And the few 262's which did get shot down in combat were so when entering a shallow turn to get back at the bombers, allowing diving escorts to get that vital split second burst needed.
This is true for 4 of the six cited above. Two were caused by engaging the Mustangs and not capitalizing on its advantages ('pilot stupidity' not inferior performance). The 4 were nailed in one engine from long range and chased to closure
However once the Me-262 got airborne it was pretty much unbeatable, and when used purely as a fighter it demonstrated this in a big fashion, acquiring itself probably the highest Kill/loss ratio against other fighters of any a/c of WW2.
Now the Do-335 wouldn't have had the same weaknesses as the Me-262 and would've to the contrary been more vulnerable in the air and not so much when trying to land or take off, which isn't a plus btw.
Also as you rightly point out the Do-335 was only marginally faster than the fastest Allied fighters, and again like you said in a high density escort zone that would've meant only one thing, a lot of Do-335's shot down. The Do-335 simply didn't feature the performance advantage needed to gain an edge over the overwhelming numbers of escorts present.
The Do-335 is to me as-well a waste of funds, but only because there already were aircraft a lot better in all of its possible roles, and not because it was bad design of any sort. In short it was outdated the moment it left the drawing board...
"Circumstantial evidence is a collection of facts that, when considered together, can be used to infer a conclusion about something unknown."I disgree that its circumstantial.
For example the industry and the RLM actually managed to have every 4th Bf-109 be of the latest K-model when the war ended, an achievement considering the type flew for the first time in late '44.These guys clearly demonstrate some really basic and fundamental errors in the LW procurement machine, which are not palatable for you. If you have evidence that proives superior leaderships, or superior management, than bring it forward.
According to wikipedia the Me-262 accounted for around 509 kills while losing something in excess of 100. So a roughly 4-5:1 ratio. Every other German plane of that period (all props) PROBABLY had a ratio of 1:1 or worse. So every prop plane replaced by a jet meant statistically a steep increase in effectiveness and efficiency.Now the statistics i want to see from you are those that establish that having more operational types is a good management decision.
None of this was within reach of the aircraft producing industry. You might aswell argue the RLM was responsible for starting the war altogether. Since we are talking about production capacity, what would you suggest would've been a better project to spend this capacity on except fighters? More wonder weapons?It would also not go astray for you to be able to show that there were not too many fighters produced, that the german petro-chemical industry was going to keep the increased output of fighters being built airborne, and that the numbers of pilots were adequate, and properly trained.
Source? The problems of the He-162 were largely solved and the plane was ready for war. Not only the German pilots say so, this is also mirrored by Eric Brown for example.That is true, but only if he can get airborne, and if there are enough of the jets to make a differnce. If there are a lot of jets grounded because of developmental problems (which the 262 had experienced in spades, and which were just about ironed out by 1945, By comparison, the teething troubles of the He 162 were only just getting started, because the 162 was a design that was 2 years behind the 262). And all of these problems are made worse by introducing an additional type(s) rather than concentrating on more well developed, and basically proven designs like the 262.
Oh yes it does. Because "poor management" is relative. So without a relation that statement is useless. We've been argueing this back and forth for several pages now and you still haven't provided any answer to the two most significant, objective and undisputable facts regarding the whole procurement subject:The allied model has nothing to do with the thread,
The difference between the Allies and Germany is that Germany had brought himself into an impossible strategical situation when it declared war on the two largest industrial nations in the world. For the Luftwaffe this meant it had to fight against at least 2,5 times its own capacity. THAT determined the outcome.But the difference between the allies and the germans is that the allied structure worked well enough to ensure victory. And this did not come automatically. Germany was not outfought, but it was very convincingly outmanaged especially in the air war
This is true for late 1943 and onwards but can be attributed easily to the bombing campaigns on infrastructure that were stepping up. And unlike most Western pilots the Germans had usually been in constant fighting since they were drafted and as a result there was no rotation which seriously effected combat readiness of the pilots themselves.This is utter crap. The German sortie rate was abysmal in comparison to the allied. At the beginning of 1944, a P-51, for example, was flying four times the number of missions daily to that being achieved by the Germans. Most of the time, the Germans fighters were on the ground, unable to fly. In early 1944, this was not due to fuel. This came later. Whereas the Allied were achieving operational readiness rates of better than 80% most of the time, German operation rates of less than 50%.
Yes strategic direction was flawed, not fighter procurement.This is true, but it had gotten to that point for reasons that included poor strategic direction, and overuse of her air forces in support of operations that had stretched them to breaking point, particularly over Stalingrad, and Tunisia. the Germans had arrived at their point of military bankruptcy as much by their own hand as by the efforts of the allies. Yet another example of poor management of resources
Yep, I misjudged the proportions. But let's get this straight: How large were the individual fighter strengths of RAF, USAAF and LW on the channel front in mid 43 and early and late '44?The allies were not just concentrated on one front, they had global commitments. It was the Germans who were concentrated in open area by the latter part of 1943. From mid 1943 onward, the were virtually no LW fighters in the Med, and only 24% of the total force on the eastern front. nearly all the others (about 70%) were concentrated in the Reich defences. By contrast, only 33 of the 97 (IIRC) fighter groups available to the US were concentrated in England at the beginning of 1944, and this number was the same at the end of 1944.
What in the end matters is not whether it is a technological or managerial success, but whether it's an operational success. In the end it of course wasn't as it was introduced when the war was long lost. The decision to produce and introduce it was nevertheless the right one as what little resources could've been saved in the metal industry would've never led to significantly more Me-262s. While if the war had been for some reason prolonged it could've replaced a large portion of outdated piston fighters much faster than the Me-262. Regarding the logistical situation you have the induced complication of another type vs. the reduced complication of a much simpler aircraft than the Me-262.No, adding the he 162 was a technological success, but a managerial disaster. The type should never have been produced. instead the Germans should have concentrated on producing the 262, and possibly the Ta152, or the 109K (whichever is more producible, take your pick). introducing another aircraft to the already inefficient factories was going to slow delivery rates down, not speed them up. Operational rates were going to suffer, not improve, because of the he 162, because it was an additional, and new type which inevitably was going to suffer a high grounding rate as these problems were being ironed out.
One opinion that is in contrast to what the pilots who actually flew the type say."Despite its rapid development, many problems persisted that remained unsolved by the end of the war...." So there is at least one source that challenges your assertion that it was combat ready. It was not fully ready, and suffered very low (even by the LW standards) operational readiness rates as a result
I disagree with those numbers as more than 40 were delivered to Erp.Grp. 162 alone. Not that it really matters. The point was, that the He 162 was much faster and cheaper to produce than the Me-262. Enough to outfit a considerable part of JG 1 only weeks after production started.Err no, this is not true. Actual production figures for completed units was 116, of which just over 50 had been delivered, all with problems, and a further 880 in various incomplete stages of production.
I am not disdainful of them, I merely pointed out that they were very far from logistically easy to handle.The RAF , even with this equipment that you are so disdainful of, was achieving shoot down rates of more than 4:1 by early 1944, and more than 6:1 by the end of the year, in fighter versus fighter engagements. The allies as a whole realized that more than anything, the air war was a war of numbers.
Parsifal said:"An unusual design, with numerous unsolved developmental problems. The He 162 was a foolhardy and ill-considered attempt to address Germany's air defence problems. "
KraztKraut
Quote: "The Mk.XIV mirrors this perfectly: First deliveries to combat units as early as fall 1943, but never really enough operational numbers to have any real impact as a fighter."
What had more Spit XIVs changed? IIRC British army wasn't badly hindered by LW in ETO or in MTO in 1944-45 and I cannot recall many German daytime air attacks on UK in 44-5. On the other hand Heer often complained the lack of air support and unhindered Allied air attacks against it. It was Germans who asked: "Where are our fighters?" not British. Conclusion, RAF had enough air-superiority fighters, LW didn't have. So RAF didn't have urgent need for more Spit XIVs.
Clipped or long wing was not a logistical question it was a simple conversion. 0.5 vs .303 was a question of availability which shows how hard pressed UK economy was during the war.
Quote:" Germany fought on three high intensity theatres."
Now Eastern Front was almost entirely Germany-Soviet show, but against whom Germany fought in ETO and MTO? So Allied had those fronts to worry about and Germany being in centre it had clearly easier to move units between those 2 theatres than Allies. And allies had one major theatre, or actually two very far away, PTO and CBI.
Quote: "According to wikipedia the Me-262 accounted for around 509 kills while losing something in excess of 100"
Actually Wikipedia says "509 claimed Allied kills" which is different thing than 509 kills. Claims and real things are not the same.
Juha
What did the Tempest change? What did the P-51H, P-47M/N or the P-80 change in WW2. Next to nothing. Yet they were all still introduced at a point when the war was basically won. So there must've been a need afterall.
And I'm very aware that kills aren't claims, it was obviously only an illustration of the relative effectiveness of the old and new fighters.
[/B]Since this consumes way too much of my time now I will ignore your second attempt at insulting and belittling and repeat what I believe to be the most important questions regarding procurement management:
Did the Western Allies at any point have significantly less different fighters in production?
Did the Western Allies at any point have significantly less different fighters in serious development?
Care to name some of these "developmental problems" ?? I for one know of NONE. And British test pilots were only impressed with the bird, Eric Brown for one loved to just fly around in it for fun.
The He-162 program suffered from having to do with substitute materials because of lack of the proper materials, nothing was wrong with the design at all, it was an excellent design infact, and when properly built it proved excellent.
Care to name some of these "developmental problems" ?? I for one know of NONE. And British test pilots were only impressed with the bird, Eric Brown for one loved to just fly around in it for fun.
The He-162 program suffered from having to do with substitute materials because of lack of the proper materials, nothing was wrong with the design at all, it was an excellent design infact, and when properly built it proved excellent.