USS Yorktown (CV-5) v. HMS Illustrious v. Soryu?

[Glider]

I didn't make a negative comment about the Ark Royal but a nuetral comment. The Ark was a much better carrier then the Illustrious.

I don't disagree with you about the Ark being a better all round carrier than the Illustrious and was just giving some background to the loss of the Ark Royal.

People tend to jump to the design element and sometimes for get the human element.

 

[parsifal]

I note that your position changed from Post 76 to Post 78. Post 76 was basically that the Illustrious was a failed design in that it could not project its force. Post 78 abandons that position and says that it was better in the constricted waters around Europe and had difficulty in the Pacific. You then throw into the mix some comments about the inability of armouring schemes to stop torpedoes.

Well, before I respond, please clarify to me what your actual and final position is on this.....are you stil saying that the illustrious class are a failure because thay cannot project force, or are you simply saying that they were better suited to operations in Europe.

The difference forme is critical. I totally agree with one position, and totally disagree with the other. I would like you to clarify what exactly is your position on this.

 

[parsifal]

I don't disagree with you about the Ark being a better all round carrier than the Illustrious and was just giving some background to the loss of the Ark Royal.

People tend to jump to the design element and sometimes for get the human element.

So, you think the results of the official enquiry into her loss are wrong?????? Her loss was attributed to a minor extent on poor DC procedures....pilot error if you like, but mostly to faults in her design

 

[Glider]

So, you think the results of the official enquiry into her loss are wrong?????? Her loss was attributed to a minor extent on poor DC procedures....pilot error if you like, but mostly to faults in her design

I have not read the results of the official enquiry so cannot be precise, if you have and have a link to it I would more than welome it. I understood that the inquiry put a lot of the blame onto the Captain only lowering its level of blame on the basis that he wanted to save the crew.
It is true I believe that after the ship had been abandoned due to the level of flooding and loss of power the crew went back on board the ship, restarted one of the boilers and regained some power. There must be a suspicion that the crew were ordered off the ship before they needed to have been and that the flooding had not been the cause at that time. After all if it was underwater when they left, its more than unlikely that the flooding had reduced so that they could restart the boiler rooms again between 30 - 60 minutes later when they reboarded the ship. Differing sources give differing times.

I am not saying that the design of the Ark Royal was without fault, but it would be wrong to concentrate on that aspect. All parts need to be considered.

 

[parsifal]

You keep putting too much into the armor of the Illustrious, when it has been proven that the armor only barely helped it and in one instance actually showed the structural flaw besides the armor. The Ark Royal was not lost due to a design fault, but to a torpedo which has been proven time again that ships could only be theoretically protected by its armor below the waterline to a torpedo hit. It is a good thing that the Illustrious was never hit by a torpedo, especially a Japanese torpedo. If a kamikaze hit below the waterline could put her out of service then imagine a Long Lance hit. I brought up those battleships because of their armored capability. The armor of the Illustrious could not even compare to that of the Yamato and its counterparts. Thus i am saying that the trade off of armored hangers for speed, range, strike capability, maintanence capabilities proves precisely what the advantage the Illustrious had. Slightly better passive protection then the Yorktown class, and much worse strike, ASW, escort, and CAP capabilities.

Please show me where it was proven that armouring schemes only barely helped these carriers survive. Where is it proven that time and again torpedoes could not be defended against? In fact there are many instances that torpedoes dont have much effect. I can go through plenty, but cant be bothered writing them up to be honest, so I will just cut and paste and article from wiki instead....its relating to wwi, but it does illustrate what I am talking about....

"Essentially, the bulge is a lateral compartment at the waterline level that is isolated from the ship's internal volume. It is part air-filled, and part free-flooding. In theory, a torpedo strike will rupture and flood the air-filled component of the bulge and the water-filled part will dissipate the shock and absorb explosive fragments, leaving the ship's main hull structurally intact. Transverse bulkheads within the bulge limit flooding throughout the entirety of the structure.

The bulge was developed by the British Director of Naval Construction, Eustace Tennyson-D'Eyncourt, who had four old Edgar-class protected cruisers so fitted in 1914. These ships were used for shore bombardment duties, and so were exposed to inshore submarine and torpedo boat attack. Grafton was torpedoed in 1917, and apart from a few minor splinter holes, the damage was confined to the bulge and the ship safely made port. Edgar was hit in 1918, this time damage to the elderly hull was confined to dented plating. The Royal Navy had all new construction fitted with bulges from 1914, beginning with the Revenge-class battleships. Older ships also had bulges incorporated during refits. The Royal Navy had its large monitors fitted with enormous bulges. This was fortuitous for Terror, which survived 3 torpedoes striking the hull forwards and her sister Erebus, which survived a direct hit from a remotely-controlled explosive motor boat that ripped off 50 feet (15.25 m) of her bulge.

Later designs of bulges incorporated various combinations of air and water filled compartments and packing of wood and sealed tubes. As bulges increased a ship's beam, they caused a reduction in speed, which is a function of the length to beam ratio. Therefore, various combinations of narrow and internal bulges appeared throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s. The bulge had disappeared from construction in the 1930s, being replaced by internal arrangements of compartments with a similar function."
My understanding regarding the Kamikaze hit b in April 1945 was that it had little or no effect on the ship....are you saying she was knocked out at that time???? if so its news to me...

You also mention the Long Lance torpedo. I never ever said that the Illustrious class were safe against these weapons. A Long Lance is a destroyer launched, 24 inch weapon with a practical range of 15000 yards, a warhead size approaching 1500 lbs, and a speed in excess of 40 knots. What I said was that she was designed to withstand torpedoes of up to 18 inch capacity, which typically had a warhead of 350 lbs, and a range of about 2000 yards. there were no air launched Japanese Long Lance torpedoes that I know of. All of a sudden we have jumped from the sublime to the ridiculous

I never even claimed that the Illustrious were proofed against 21 inch torpedoes. Whilst on this subject, I also never made any claims about the protection of the rudder, the driveshafts, or the miniing effects of magnetic exploders. My claim is simply that they were designed to withstand against a contact hit on the torpedo protection belts. If the hit occurred where it was expected (and likely) to hit, the Illustrious would have little difficulty in defeating an 18 inch torpedo with a contact exploder.

I also never said that putting more aircraft was not a good idea, in fact was at pains to say that the illustrious was able to increase her air groups to respectable number as at the end of the war (it was actually a max operating total of 57 to use the vernacular of the other guy, in my vernacular, the operational maximum was 52). What I did take to task was the actual numbers carried into battle by the Yorktowns, and I see that once again we are touting numbers of around 91. Before we get into this myth once again....please tell me exactly which battles these ships carried into battle 91 (and I anticipate 91+ )aircraft into battle. The answer, in fact is less than 80. They had max operating capacity of just over 80, apparently, and an Operational maximum of about 75 (in my book) maybe 80 (according to others), but not 91...so lets keep the numbers to what they actually should be, and not what we would like them to be. The Operational maximum for the Illustrious was 42-52, to the Yorktowns 71-83 . But what the RN needed was survivability over numbers....and it got that with the illustrious. You are at pains to tell me the vulnerbility of the Illustrious class generally, and then make up spurious arguments about Long Lance torpedoes in the 18 inch category. In terms of its general strength and durability, I rest on the war record of the class as a whole....not one loss despite the most ferocious attacks made against them.....in terms of torpedo protection, unproven, no claims about protection against Long Lance, but in design terms has a theoretical protection up to 18 inch torpedoes.

Your claims about much worse ASW protection???? how did you arrive at that conclusion. My understanding is that training for aircrews in asw training was never formalized for the squadrons on the USN fleet carriers (at least not until very late in the war), and that asw weaponary on the fleet carriers was pretty basic. The efforts of the British fleet carriers were also pretty ordinary at the beginning of the war but by 1941 had been lifted to repectable levels. Crews had been trained on how to search for u-Boats, the strike aircraft were carrying ASV radar able to detect a surfaced or partially surfaced U-Boat, and weapons had been developed to allow some airborne attacks to be made. This is a genuine question...what information do you have on confirmed or likley kills of U-Boats and submarines by US Yorktown class carriers. I know of none....they certainly dont appear on any of the class's battle honours....but perhaps you some additional information that I have not seen.

 

[parsifal]

I have not read the results of the official enquiry so cannot be precise, if you have and have a link to it I would more than welome it. I understood that the inquiry put a lot of the blame onto the Captain only lowering its level of blame on the basis that he wanted to save the crew.
It is true I believe that after the ship had been abandoned due to the level of flooding and loss of power the crew went back on board the ship, restarted one of the boilers and regained some power. There must be a suspicion that the crew were ordered off the ship before they needed to have been and that the flooding had not been the cause at that time. After all if it was underwater when they left, its more than unlikely that the flooding had reduced so that they could restart the boiler rooms again between 30 - 60 minutes later when they reboarded the ship. Differing sources give differing times.

I am not saying that the design of the Ark Royal was without fault, but it would be wrong to concentrate on that aspect. All parts need to be considered.

Beofore I reply, I need to post a correction. The official admiralty board of enquiry attributed her loss partly to the shortcomings in damage control measures taken (Barnett, page 373, "Engage the Enmey more closely"). However barnet also mentions another technical report that went into the technical shortcomings of the ship. You can apply for a copy of that report through your national archives.....the title to request is

DM 234/508, BR 2055 Technical Report Of Loss and Damage to HMS ARK ROYAL (1942)

This assessment places a much greater emphasis on the technical shortcomings of the ship.

Hope this clarifies things a bit

 

[Glider]

Beofore I reply, I need to post a correction. The official admiralty board of enquiry attributed her loss partly to the shortcomings in damage control measures taken (Barnett, page 373, "Engage the Enmey more closely"). However barnet also mentions another technical report that went into the technical shortcomings of the ship. You can apply for a copy of that report through your national archives.....the title to request is

DM 234/508, BR 2055 Technical Report Of Loss and Damage to HMS ARK ROYAL (1942)

This assessment places a much greater emphasis on the technical shortcomings of the ship.

Hope this clarifies things a bit

Thanks for the link, I was there today looking at other items but will order it next time I go

 

[parsifal]

Thanks for the link, I was there today looking at other items but will order it next time I go

No worries, hope it is intersting and helps.


Just a quick note. With regard to the Ark Royal, her underwater protection systems were similar to the Illustrious, though less extensive. In particular the transverse bulkheads were not as thick, and were not passed up into the hull as high as they were on the Illustrious class.

It is worth noting, incidentally, that the Ark Royal was hit by a 21 inch torpedo carrying a 661 lb warhead. The underwater defenses of the ship failed against this warhead, because the warhead exceeded the design parameters of the underwater protection system. The poor DC efforts combined with the inherent weaknesses in the design did the rest.

If the Illustrious had been hit by a 21 inch torpedo, it would have penetrated her underwater protection as well. If the crew were caught napping as the Ark Royals had, the result is likley to have been the same (although the redesigned funnel lines may have given them more time in which to react).

Italian torpedo bombers such as the S-79 carried up to 4x 18 inch torps or 1 or 2 21 inch torps. inevitably they chose to arm with the larger weapon, because I believe they knew that the 18 inch was not good at penetrating properly prepared underwater defences (they needed a lucky hit to be efective) . To be considered "proper" I believe you needed a mixture of armour plate and other measures to contain the extent of blast and contain flooding. It was much harder to protect against a bigger warhead, and even harder still to protect against a propely functioning magnetic exploder. But for that matter, plunging fire was much more damgerous than flat trajectory fire, and larger bombs much more dangerous than smaller ones....but thats another story I guess.

 

[parsifal]

A further note about Japanese aerial torpedoes. There were quite a number available, however in 1941 there were two main types, the Type 91(1931) Model 1 and the Type 91 (1931) model 2. The two types differed in two areas, warhead size and overall weight. The model 2 was used by Kates at ranges below about 180 NM, and the Model 1 for ranges above that. Both types were used in the attacks against the Prince Of Wales and Repulse, whilst it was the Model 2 that was used by the 40 torpedo carrying Kates at Pearl. I am uncertain what types were being used at Midway, but I suspect Model 1s given the ranges of the strikes.....

The warhead size and overall weight of these types are 331/1728 lbs for the Model 1 and 452/1929 lbs for the model 2

Repulse had anti-torpedo protection far less extensive than that used in the Illustrious. Her last major reconstruction was in 1923 where among other things she had early type bulges fitted. The She had some transverse bulkheads in the hull, but nowhere near as extensive as those that existed in the Illustrious

PoW was a thoroughly modern warship, with underwater protection superior to that of the Illustrious - around the citadel....around the screws and the rudders she suffered from the same problems, namely a vulnerable spot that if hit was likley to cause severe problems.

Prince Of Wales was hit by at least 4 x Type 91 Mod 2 torps of which two hit the shafts and or their housings. one hit and broke off the "A" Bracket to the port outer shaft. The second torpedo hit the outer shaft housing on the starborad side. What caused the loss of the ship was the continued rotation under power of the bent shafts, which caused massive and catastrophic flooding of the engine spaces to occur. The remaining hits caused no damage to the torpedo protection system. There are unconfimred reports of other hits to the underwater belt, perhaps as many as four additional, so in a sense it may have taken up to about 8 torpedo hits to sink this ship.

Japanese aerial torps are admittedly surpisingly heavy for their size, thereby making them that much more dangerous, however they are not Long Lance, and their success in sinking ships is not guranteed.

 

[syscom3]

OK, Parsifal has proven that the Illustrious had the better protection of the three carriers. But all he proved was the Illustrious had increased protection from damage, but NOT IMMUNITY FROM. And then part of that argument goes back to the original question, on whether the Illustrious sacrificed too much AC capacity to provide that protection.

Leonard proved beyond a doubt that the Yorktown class could carry 90 AC, even if air groups were going to battle with less than a full compliment.

Too me, the small air group for the Illustrious would cause serious operational issues in the Pacific where three of these ships would be needed to provide the same striking power of two Yorktown carriers. You can also say that one Illustrious carrier was simply too small to be usefull even for a single ship raiding mission.

Ultimately, the carriers were there to provide striking power, and anything that detracts from that is undermining the rationale for its existence, unless its only for escort duties and not offensive operations. In that case, the Illustrious should be compared to the Independence class carriers.

Finally, the Yorktown had far better endurance and logistical support for its air group. That meant it was going to stay at sea longer and do what it was supposed to do, and not be in dock.

 

[Amsel]

I note that your position changed from Post 76 to Post 78. Post 76 was basically that the Illustrious was a failed design in that it could not project its force. Post 78 abandons that position and says that it was better in the constricted waters around Europe and had difficulty in the Pacific. You then throw into the mix some comments about the inability of armouring schemes to stop torpedoes.

Well, before I respond, please clarify to me what your actual and final position is on this.....are you stil saying that the illustrious class are a failure because thay cannot project force, or are you simply saying that they were better suited to operations in Europe.

The difference forme is critical. I totally agree with one position, and totally disagree with the other. I would like you to clarify what exactly is your position on this.

My position hasn't changed. The Illustrious was a mistake and was not repeated. It is not even in the same class as the Yorktown class. I have stated all the reasons why I think this. The Yorktown class CV-6 USS Enterprise was a huge success for the USN. Like I have stated before; it is about two different doctorines. Many agree the doctorine of the RN when they laid down the Illustrious was flawed, recognized, and not repeated. We could go on and on about this but it comes down to armor or more aircraft, range, speed, deck size, elevator size, and maintanance capability.

 

[vikingBerserker]

This might have been said before and I apoligize for the repeat, but the reason why the "Indomitable" (which was supposed to be the 4th ship of the Illustrious Class) was changed to accomidate more aircraft and less armour was due to the short comings of the Illustrious Class.

 

[parsifal]

The Illustrious class was three ships, that were developed into a a fourth half sister, the Indomitable with the same armoured flight deck (but eith less side armour....wartime experience had shown that the principal reasoning to justify the side armour of the hangar deck - the supposed threat from surface attack was just not going to ever eventuate, so weight could be saved by reducing the side armouring. ), in exchange for an increased air capacity. Still the same basic design, and the same closed hangar system

Following the Indomitable came the two Impacable class carriers, that squeezed two full hangars into the same basic hull. Oh and yes it retained the same armoured box principal and to quote Conways, was "a further development of the Illustrious class" These two ships expanded the air air capacity to over 80, but retained the the same principals of armoured protection (on a slightly reduced scale, again to reduce the side armouring mostly which had been found to be unnecessary from wartime experience).

After that the hull design was changed, but the same basic philiospophy encompassing the armoured deck and closed hangar was retained in the next two (and final) classes designed for the RN. Only one of these classes was actually completed to a different postwar design, but within the context of the war, both of them once again retained the armoured box principal, the closed hangar system and oh yes, the superior underwater protection. One was of course the Eagle Class, the other was the cancelled Malta class. To be completely fair, the Malta class were eventually altered to incorporaporate an American style open hangar system, because it was quicker and less expensive to build the ships that way, not because it offered a superior method of construction.

That was the end of the British heavy carrier construction, and whilst it was not feasible to build an armoured carrier on anything smaller, the ubiquitous post war Light Fleet carriers carriers, which proved so popular with all the foreign navies except the USN, also were largely based on the experiences of the Illustrious class. though they could not be armoured, they did retain the same type of underwater protection, retained the same closed hangar systems, but did introduce the unit machinery system.

So it is not true that the Illustrious class were not repeated. they were in fact the basis of every class that followed them (not including of course the Invincible class, or the new cariers under construction).

 

[parsifal]

OK, Parsifal has proven that the Illustrious had the better protection of the three carriers. But all he proved was the Illustrious had increased protection from damage, but NOT IMMUNITY FROM. And then part of that argument goes back to the original question, on whether the Illustrious sacrificed too much AC capacity to provide that protection.

Leonard proved beyond a doubt that the Yorktown class could carry 90 AC, even if air groups were going to battle with less than a full compliment.

Too me, the small air group for the Illustrious would cause serious operational issues in the Pacific where three of these ships would be needed to provide the same striking power of two Yorktown carriers. You can also say that one Illustrious carrier was simply too small to be usefull even for a single ship raiding mission.

Ultimately, the carriers were there to provide striking power, and anything that detracts from that is undermining the rationale for its existence, unless its only for escort duties and not offensive operations. In that case, the Illustrious should be compared to the Independence class carriers.

Finally, the Yorktown had far better endurance and logistical support for its air group. That meant it was going to stay at sea longer and do what it was supposed to do, and not be in dock.

That about sums it up...for once we are pretty much in agreement....but there is just the little issue of the european thetre....were the Yorktown as suited to the operating environment there as well

 

[renrich]

Since Germany and Italy had rather insignificant navies and no aircraft carriers, why doe it need to be proved that the Yorktown class was suited to the operating environment in the ETO?

 

[parsifal]

Between them the two axis powers commissioned 15 Battleships, Battlecruisers and armoured ships. They commissioned 10 heavy cruisers 21 Light cruisers, and approximately 150 destroyers. They did not commission any carriers, but they did field specially trained antishipping units. The Luftwaffe in 1942 was about three times the size of the Japanese air arms, and deployed about 1200 aircraft to the southern front in the meditteraanean.

In the north, more than 50% of materiel sent to Russia in the critical years of 1942-3 went via the northern route.

In the south the the progress of DAK was directly linked to the ability of the Allies to keep just one small island supplied and the airbases thereon stocked with aircrraft. In the event of a Soviet Collapse on the eastern front the allies at short notice needed to be able to mount an emergency invasion somewhere on the continent, to try and draw pressure off the Russians. And finally, of course, the allies had to protect the convoys operating in the North Atlantic and the Carribean. All of this needed carriers , fleet carriers to support the actions at sea....without carriers none of what was achieved could have been achieved

I would say that there are some pretty good reasons to want to maintain control of the oceans in the western hemisphere in amongst all of that.....I would further say that I agree with the joint chiefs when they essentially identified the pacific as a secondary front, and the battles in and around Europe as the critical one to decide the war. The naval battles were the essential precursors to any other battle you care to name in Europe and North America. If the battles of the seas had been lost, even lost by reason of non-participation, the whole war was going to be lost. the same cannot be said for the battles in the Pacific. You think about it...which theatre was more important, and which theatre was less dependant on seapower for its outcome

 

[syscom3]

That about sums it up...for once we are pretty much in agreement....but there is just the little issue of the european thetre....were the Yorktown as suited to the operating environment there as well

The war in the ETO was not going to be effected by fleet carriers since that theater (MTO included) was a continental war. The escort carriers in the ASW and anti-bomber roles is what was vitally important.

The PTO on the other hand, the fleet carrier was integral in the successfull prosecution of the war. Since the Illustrious was a fleet carrier, we have to compare it to similar types. And in this regard, it was second fiddle in an all around capacity.

 

[renrich]

Sys, I concur. The Allies could maintain control of the seas in the ETO without carriers. If they had not had carriers in the Pacific, they might have been speaking Japanese in Australia today. The Allies did not need carriers for air support in landings on defended beaches in the ETO either. Most of the major ships belonging to the Axis in the ETO were sunk by naval gunfire or torpedoes not from aircraft. Taranto would be the exception. An interesting point. " On November 26, 1944, a Navv conference in San Francisco finalizes the decision to put a 73 fighter-per-carrier complement on fleet aircraft carriers." They pretty well could not have done that without the large capacity for AC of US carriers.

 

[parsifal]

Unbelievable. So you think that the control of the seas around europe can be achieved with a few CVEs, and rowboats. I am staggered to read that.

I dont know where to start, but just to take one option....lets look at Malta as an issue. Ther are two possible scenrios that can arise from your comments....either it was not nercessary to retain it as a viable forward base, or, you believe it can be maintained with a minimum of trouble, and not require the intervention of fleet carriers.

Lets just have a quick look at the implications of either opinion.

If Malta is not kept supplied, it ceases to function as a forward airbase, and in fact either surrenders, or literally starves to death. With Malta not available as a base, the supplies and troops pour into North Africa, and Egypt falls, After that it is not possible to hold the Middle East, and Iran and Iraq fall, which isolates Turkey and forces her into the Axis camp. With the southern front secure, and turkey quite possibly now either a member of the axis, or at minimum allowing rights of passage to the axis forces, the whole of the caucasus is now at risk. If I were in charge of the Nazis, I would pour troops into that potential front with the idea of captuing the caucasus oilfields. that in turn is going to bring Russia to its knees allowing the German in 1943 (approximately) to turn its attentions to the remainder of the western alliance. They are now in an unassailable position, and the allies have effectively lost the war.....all because the american commander in charge of this hypothetical scenario dosent have the sense to relaize the importance of Malta.

Lets be more charitable, and assume that after all you do see the importance of Malta, but are unwiling to pour the carrier strength into hoilding it. you say you will try and undertake this task with escort carriers, but ther is just one small problem with this approach...escort carriers were not built or developed in any numbers until the latter part of 1942-3, and in any event were needed to win the battle of the atlantic until early 1944. So in the critical period of 1940-42, there will be no air cover for the relief convoys trying to reach the island.

The Italian fleet will be much stionger and far more confident than it was, because it has not suffered the defeats at Taranto, Matapan, or even the total domination of the central basin that the one or two carriers gave the allies (until the arrival of the germans in 1941). The Italians are able to mount effective attacks because their air force, is not being hacked out of the sky by defending allied fighters. If and when the Germans do arrive they are going to absolutely massacre the unprotected warships and merchant shipping trying to reach the island.....the allies meanwhile are being forced to divert major amounts of warships to containing the German battle squadron at brest, which now include s an undamaged Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. They dont have any carriers to attack these ships, and they cannot sink them with their own BBs (Bismarck is effectively an unsinkable Battleship in 1941 IMO), .....so ...do i need to go further

A war without carriers in Europe is a war lost. Trying to say you will control its seas without carriers, or with carriers that you dont have access to until the latter part of 1943 is about the stupidest thing I have ever heard. You guys should know better.

And remember, these are just two scenarios. There are many others that I have not even bothered yet to explore for you.

 

[renrich]

I think that saying the war in the ETO would have been lost without Allied aircraft carriers except for ASW uses is, undoubtedly an overstatement. I would not go so far as to label it stupid, however.