USS Yorktown (CV-5) v. HMS Illustrious v. Soryu?

[fastmongrel]

How about this, Illustrious was under repair at Norfolk Navy Yard for eleven months after her adventures in the Mediterranean. Eleven months. And is there a guess on how long the average USN CV spent in the yard after being hit by a bomb(s) or Kamikaze(s)? Looks like about 52 days on average, slightly less than 2 months and that includes almost a year for USS Franklin.

I am not sure that is a fair comparison all Royal Navy ships that were repaired in US yards seem to have taken a long time. After all the dockyard was working on an unfamiliar ship with completely different equipment. Even things like thread sizes, pipe fittings and electrical fittings would have been different plus I bet a lot of that 11 months was waiting for parts to come across the Atlantic.

 

[Juha]

One short notice more on the repair time of Illustrious. It was a foreign warship in repairs in peace-time USA, USN CVs were repaired in war-time USA. In war-time the repairs of important ships were made much faster than in peace time, an extreme example is the repairs/patching up of Yorktown after the Battle of Coral Sea

Juha

 

[parsifal]

The repair time issue is a mixture of all these factors I would venture to say.....the bombs being dropped on the british carriers were about twice the size of those being dropped on the USN Carriers, which were big enough to penetrate the armoured box....the armoured box acted like an amplifier once the bombs had penetrated, but it is also true that the open hangars of the US carriers were inherently easier to fix and repairable.

If the tables had been turned, and it was British Carriers being torpedoed, and USN Carriers being bombed by really big bombs, I am willing to bet that the Brit carriers would still have faired better i withstanding the damage. Their underwater protection systems were simply more extensive than their US counterparts, and 5 or 6 1000 ilb Bombs on a Yorktown class (perhaps more likley the Wasp) would have reduced them to sinking condition, in my opinion, primarily because their defences were not designed to stand up to that size of ordinance....The British carriers underwater protection, whilst fairly conventional, was still more extensive and in my opinion abale to withstand damage better, than the US underwater protection.

The US carriers were designed to a displacement lower than the Illustrious class, but they carried a greater larger air component. I do not believe that in terms of naval design generally, that the US was more advanced in underwater protection (and certainly not in the above the waterline protection. So it should be no surprise or denigration of the US type to claim the Brit Carrier was better protected. Thats what the British carriers were renowned for, and it was that reputation, I believe, that led to their ability to offload thir carriers after the war to the smaller navies of the world. I believe the post war verdict of the smaler navies was to use US aircraft on British carriers, because that was seen as the best value for money at the time

 

[renrich]

I suspect that they bought them a lot cheaper also because the British, right after the war ended were short of money and could not afford to operate them. The British carriers that I see that were sold to foreign navies after WW2 were almost all Colossus class, around 13000 tons, 25 knots with 48 AC. Probably bought because they were cheap to operate and met the needs of the small navies. I doubt if the US had anything similar to sell.

 

[parsifal]

In the case of Australia, two carriers were purchased, the Terrible and the Majestic. They were renamed Sydney and Melbourne.

Sydney was purchased unmodified for 2.75 million pounds, for the equivalent of 40 million dollars (in 2007 dollars). Melbourne was extensively modified to incorporate the latest aircraft handling and safety features including angled deck and mirror landing system. Melbourne as modified was not a cheap purchase....she cost the equivalent of 120 million Dollars (in 2007 terms) exclusive of aircraft and some spares.

There is not much comparison between the Majestic class and the armoured Illustrious class. The Majestic class were unarmoured, and built to mercantile standards, and only incorporated a speed of 26 knots (which later years was a theoretical rather than actual speed). They were termed "trade protection" carriers, and had been designed as a result of Admiralty investigations in the war as to how to reduce the cost of getting carriers to sea.

Within the limits of their design and displacement they represented a highly survivable unit. The ships wre unarmoured, but the macheinery spaces were placed en echelon, and the internal partitioning designed to allow counterflooding that could allow up to two torpedo hits and not sink the ships. this makes them very survivable for their size (remember, the yorktowns only needed about 2-4 torpedo hits to be reduced to sinking condition). They included a number of internal fire curtains and of course C02 drenchers in the hangars. The Hangar itself was the standard admiralty closed box system, again as a fire retardant measure.

When I served on her, I do recall seeing a document (classified at the time....but I dont think we are getting any problem now, she was scrapped thirty years ago) that estmated the ship could absorb up to two torps and about 3-4000 lbs of conventional bombs before being reduced to a sinking condition. It is not fair to compare that to the wartime experiences, because safety features were vastly improved in both the USN and the RN systems in the latter part of the war, and in the post war period (though not enough, as the Falklands experiences showed in 1982). Nevertheless, this shows that despite their small size and lack of armour, their general design was quite good, and able to withstand considerable punishment (however, that same report, incidentally conceded their vulnerability to plunging cruise missiles such as the exocet or Harpoon, which may have sunk them with just a single hit.....these things were greatly feared at the time).

I have heard, but concede that I cannot confirm that at the end of the war Australia was offered its choice of US carriers as well, including an unmodified Essex class and either one or two Independance class carriers. I dont know if they were offered free or at a cost, but they were rejected on the basis of the manning costs and the costs of modernizing them. The advantages offered by the Melbourne was that she was purchased incompolete, thereby allowing the opportunity to retrofit the more modern concepts which could not have been done with a completed US Hull.

Nevertheless the Americans did sell a Light carrier to the Spanish (the Dedalo). I dont know th cost of this purchase, but the Dedalo did not operate fixed wig aircraft as such (she did operate AV8s after the the wooden deck was sheathed with a steel heat shield).

Have not been able to locate the cost of the Indian Carrier Vikrant. The Brazilians purchased their Colossus class in 1956 for the equivalent of about 60 million dollars (in 2007 dollars), but the ship required a lot of money spent on her (the amount I have been unable to determine) to allow her to operate S-2s and Skyhawks. I have not been able to track down the costs of the british carriers supplied to other nations.

There were a number of reasons why the Colossus were adopted by the RAN, and I suspect by the other small navies (based on that Australian experience). Firstly, they were relatively cheap as you say, but certainly not bargain basement. Secondly, some were purchased incomplete, allowing modifications to be built into them during construction. They were relatively low in terms of manning costs. But lastly, they represented a very sound design in terms of survivability, which I believe was at least a partial legacy to their forebears

 

[Hunter368]

After reading about the quality of the Japanese carriers, and the supremacy of the US designs; there can be only one conclusion.

The Yorktown Class was the best.

I could not agree more.

 

[R Leonard]

In regards to this point, would you not agree that the greatest single danger to a carrier was the risk of fire.

I entered this thread because of some obvious, to me anyway, errors in describing air group complements for Yorktown class carriers. I still cannot for the life of me see how one can present available aircraft on the eve of some event (and frankly, some of what you posed as such was not even an accurate presentation of what was available) and decide that is a "maximum operating strength". That plain and simply is not so. If you want to say XYZ carrier had an available strength of ABC, that's fine and we can debate those numbers, but for what you've presented as available to somehow morph into "maximum operating strength" is demonstrably incorrect.

I, frankly, don't really give a hoot about the great armored flight deck versus wood flight deck argument. Most of the more vociferous proponents of one side or the other conveniently leave out the parts that would tend to reduce their argument and I find that to be somewhat disappointing. I see the advantages and the disadvantages to either design. They all go back to operating doctrine, which is driven, in part, by the operating environment and expectations. The RN presumed their carriers would be operating within range of major land based air formations and armored their carriers accordingly and based their air defensive response from there. USN doctrine from the 1930's (and really always aimed towards a war with Japan, not against a continental Europe adversary, whether they admitted it or not) was to avoid facing off against major land based air and concentrate on naval adversaries, be they carriers or not, and restrict land strikes to those places with limited air based defenses. Illustrious's adventures in the Med are an example. I have my doubts of a contemporary US carrier being able to absorbing the same beating. It was not until late 1943 that the USN was comfortable bringing carriers within range of major enemy land based air facilities, a function of numbers, equipment, and a noted decline in enemy capabilities. As such, the armored flight deck was not a major consideration in US carrier design and the armored deck was the main deck, not the flight deck. The USN doctrine, against both land and sea based air, was to depend on CAP and maneuverability, avoid the hits rather than absorb them. The Battle of the Philippine Sea is the classic fleet defense example. Plain and simple, that's in a nut shell. Different paths to doctrine lead to different designs.

And while torpedoes can cause fires, I think bombs are far more likley to cause a fire. Moreover, if the ship is provided with adequate torpedo protection a torpedo is going to let in a relatively small amount of water. This would have been the case for the Ark Royal, if not for her inherent design flaw that failed her in the end. A Japanese air launched torpedo only has 331 lbs of warhead I might add, whereas a 1000lb bomb actually1100 lbs if german) has explosive charge in excess of 650 lbs)

Torpedoes in sufficient quantities or in the right places sink ships. Fire on any ship, carrier or no, will ruin your day, and if you let your damage control get away from you, and especially if it is inadequate in the first place (Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, and Mikuma all come to mind), sure bombs can sink ships. Torpedoes, on the other hand, are much more efficient (such as Lexington CV-2, Yorktown, Wasp, Hornet, Shokaku, Yamato, Musashi Shinano) although unlike Taiho, the "just one probably won't do the trick" category include Saratoga X 2, Lexington CV-16, Intrepid, Pennsylvania.

Talking about losses is missing the main object of a carrier strike.

My reference to losses, operational and combat goes to the heart of the "maximum operating strength" question. Your drawing, apparently from Brown's reporting, of a conclusion on maximum operating strength based on available capacity, that is what was available on the eve of an action, leads to an error in reality as to what would be the real maximum operating strength. Sure, as you reported, CVG-10 aboard Enterprise at Saipan fielded 69 aircraft, but 21 of them were space robbing SBD-5's, and the 69 did not even come close to Enterprise's "maximum operating strength," it only represented what Enterprise had aboard, available, at the time. By the end of the July 1944, CVG-10 had rotated back to NAS Alameda and CVG-20 was about to go aboard Enterprise with 37 F6F, 35 SB2C, and 19 TBM-1C, a total of 91. It cannot be said that Enterprises "maximum operating strength" then is 69 when one month later she takes aboard and operates an air group that is 32% larger. My earlier post shows these differences which are directly related to aircraft types.

Moreover, I think you need to consider that in the main the US carriers were being hit with 250kg bombs, being the main armament of the Val. The British Carriers were being mostly hit by 1100 lbs capacity, which I can assure you are far more powerful pieces of ordinance.

Gee, 1100 lbs is more than 550 lbs. I never would have guessed. Pretty hefty tomes of laws to be carting around. On the other hand, as long as we're playing ordnance apples and oranges, what do you suppose has a greater damage effect, a 550 lb GP, such as the Japanese Type 99/25/1 on a wood flight deck/open hangar deck or an 1100 lb GP, such as the German SC 500/III on an armored flight deck/closed hangar deck? Do we have any explosives experts who can make those calculations or will we be reduced to, really, uninformed opinion? Note, I said "we," if it's just "me" then feel free to post the calculations. And even with someone making the calculations for us, I'd like to see their work, too.

Your assessment is akin to saying an 8" shell is equival;ent to a 16" shell in terms of its damage capabilities.

I do not believe I made any such statement that could even be construed as such.

Torpedoes tend to work on the hull integrity and the propulsion systems, whilst bombs work on the flight deck and and superstructure. Bombs can do a lot of damage if they penetrate the armoured box (sometimes referred to as the citadel). As far as I know this did not happen to any US carrier, but I think this was because the US defences were designed to withstand a 500lb impact, but not a 1000 lb bomb.

No hot new information here, but I'd be interested in your source for the 500 lb impact design. Would not surprise me, though; Yorktown class design work started around 1930 . . . design work that was framed by US operational expectations and doctrine (see above). Since I don't know, was the reverse true for Illustrious? Was that class' armored deck portion designed to withstand a 1000 lb bomb hit? Just GP's? What about SAP's and AP's? Inquiring minds.

What was the purpose of the year Illustrious spent in the yard after war? Was that modernization or repair of accumulated war damage that "could wait?" Both? I don't know, I'm asking.

Your reference to the long repair times for the Illustrious is indeed a major flaw in the armoured deck concept....once the bombs pentrated the armoured deck the amount of damage went up exponentially. It was a bit like putting a stick of dynamite inside a sardine tin.....not pretty.

Having seen the effects of explosions in confined spaces, I can imagine.

My figures for operational aircraft were based on ajust a quick look at David Browns "Carrier Operations of wwii".

I looked at Brown once as a potential purchase, but was not sufficiently convinced to take the plunge, mostly because I tend to avoid the sweeping histories (too many opportunities for mistakes), preferring the more concentrated efforts. Perhaps you have some disinterested third party review you could give us.

For the whole of 1940, they received the grand total of just 16 pilots

Now that is an interesting number. Geez, there were more than that in my father's class a Pensacola (rec'd his wings in Nov 40). The USN winged, combined, some 708 USN/USMC/USCG naval aviators or USN/USMC/USCG naval aviation pilots in 1940; after that the number jumps to multiple thousands, then by orders of magnitude; the peak being 1944 with 21,067.

. . . which is no way to run a war, surely you would agree.

Yup, perhaps the last vestiges on RAF control?

Anyway, dont let me keep you from your more important things to do like your family and the like...

It's the weekend, don't worry, I won't, someone probably already has their plan for my time . . . rumor has it I moving the piano . . . oh joy.

Regards,

Rich

 

[vikingBerserker]

IIRC, the Britsh considered the Illustrious class as almost being too amoured, esp the sides. That was the reason why the newer British carriers were different.

 

[R Leonard]

Okay, are you suggesting the ship could undertake independant action of any kind after the second strike by the kates hit her????

After the hits scored by Hiryu's D3A's which brought her to a halt, Yorktown DC snuffed out most of the fires and made emergency repairs to the flight deck. Engineering brought power back on line, enough to generate about 23 knots, enough to launch six fighters which accounted for a goodly number the incoming torpedo planes, but not quite enough, all before she was struck by the two torpedoes which brought her to a halt. Absent the torpedo hits Yorktown could have resumed full operations despite the bomb hits.

 

[parsifal]

After the hits scored by Hiryu's D3A's which brought her to a halt, Yorktown DC snuffed out most of the fires and made emergency repairs to the flight deck. Engineering brought power back on line, enough to generate about 23 knots, enough to launch six fighters which accounted for a goodly number the incoming torpedo planes, but not quite enough, all before she was struck by the two torpedoes which brought her to a halt. Absent the torpedo hits Yorktown could have resumed full operations despite the bomb hits.

The question asked was whether after the hits by the Kates she was still operational. Simple question should get a simple answer. i suspect you dont want to answer this question, so you avoid it by describing the damage caused by the Vals, with only the shortest of oblique referrals to the damage caused by the torpedo strikes

So, I am interested to hear your rebuttal on whether thw Yorktown was operational after the second strike

 

[Glider]

IIRC, the Britsh considered the Illustrious class as almost being too amoured, esp the sides. That was the reason why the newer British carriers were different.

A very accurate summary

 

[syscom3]

The question asked was whether after the hits by the Kates she was still operational. Simple question should get a simple answer. i suspect you dont want to answer this question, so you avoid it by describing the damage caused by the Vals, with only the shortest of oblique referrals to the damage caused by the torpedo strikes

So, I am interested to hear your rebuttal on whether thw Yorktown was operational after the second strike

Like he said, the Yorktown was operational after the bomb hits. The fact it launched fighters is proof.

It was the torpedo hits that caused the listing and loss of headway. That's when its fate was sealed. And even then, the carrier was under tow when it was hit by the final (sub launched) torpedo which doomed it.

 

[parsifal]

"Maximum Operating" and "Operational Maximum" are referring to two completely different issues. You are aware of that I am sure.....

With regard to your statement about the US concentrating on a possible war with Japan, I thought the US had contingency plans for all manner of attacks....the so-called rainbow war plans.

The scenario that eventuated was about the worst possible that could arise....a simultaneous war on two fronts.


Torpedoes in sufficient quantities or in the right places sink ships. Fire on any ship, carrier or no, will ruin your day, and if you let your damage control get away from you, and especially if it is inadequate in the first place (Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, Hiryu, and Mikuma all come to mind), sure bombs can sink ships. Torpedoes, on the other hand, are much more efficient (such as Lexington CV-2, Yorktown, Wasp, Hornet, Shokaku, Yamato, Musashi Shinano) although unlike Taiho, the "just one probably won't do the trick" category include Saratoga X 2, Lexington CV-16, Intrepid, Pennsylvania.

err, can I ask if you have any training or experience in DC? Torpedoes will affect hull integrity, and the cumulative damage may well lead to fire, but as a general rule of thumb they will not lead to a spontaneous combustion, unless they penetrate the underweater defences too badly, or hit a vital, like a fuel line or a magazine.

Bombs are much more likley to cause fire in an immediate sense, you neither acknowlwedged or questioned that statement, so for now I will assume you are not disputiong it

You say that it was the torpedoes that led to the loss of Yorktown, Lexington and Hornet, but didnt all three ships also suffer catastrophic fires that made the damage control exercise impossible. So what, in reality led to their loss....the holes in the side (as you contend), or the fires that prevented the ships damage and flooding being stabilized?


The "real" operating strength is not the "maximum operating strength", unless that is also the the same as the "Operational Strength". There is a difference, and I know you know what that is. For the record, the Operational Maximum is the number of aircraft the ship can bring to battle, whilst the Maximum operating strength is the number of aircraft that can practically be operated normall from the carrier.

We have a disgreement, I can see...is the maximum that can operationally be carried into battle more relevant than the numbers that were actually carried into battle. I happen to think the latter is more important. Incidentally, the numbers I gave you concerning the Illustrious are, to the best of my knowledge the numbers she carried into battle at those times...so the numbers I gave are comparing apples to apples

On the other hand, as long as we're playing ordnance apples and oranges, what do you suppose has a greater damage effect, a 550 lb GP, such as the Japanese Type 99/25/1 on a wood flight deck/open hangar deck or an 1100 lb GP, such as the German SC 500/III on an armored flight deck/closed hangar deck? Do we have any explosives experts who can make those calculations or will we be reduced to, really, uninformed opinion? Note, I said "we," if it's just "me" then feel free to post the calculations. And even with someone making the calculations for us, I'd like to see their work, too.

So I see you have selected a piece of Japanese ordinance (the type 99/25/1) that was a rocket accelarated bomb with a side fuze that was not adopted until 1944. Thats reall representative of Japanese ordinance for most of the war. A rocket assisted bomb able to penetrate 150mm of hardened armour plate. I know you think me comparing bombs and torpedoes is somehow unfair, somehow not comparing "apples to apples", but at least I dont try and cheat in the debate by introducing ordinance that was not used until the very end of the war.

The facts are these....British carriers were generally at risk from torpedoes (sub and air launched) and big bombs. The Americans in the Pacific were at risk from torpedoes (air and somewhat less so from Subs) and smaller bombs of the 250 kg. History shows that the Illustrious was never tested against topredoes, but by the same token the Yorktowns were not tested against the the "big" bombs

The more representative Japanese 250 kg bomb was the Type 2, number 50 Modell 1 SAP . The former had a theoretical armour penetration of 80 mm when dropped at 10000 feet, but in reality was dropped at much lower altitudes, and tended, typically to penetrate about 40-60 mm of deck armour (very roughly).

Compare that to the typical German 1100 lb bomb (but please note the Germans also routinely had access from early in the war to a 1400 lb bomb that could also be deleivered by a Ju87)..... Both these types were available from very early in the war, so I think can be considered representative of german ordinance. The smaller bomb in its AP form could penetrate about 80mm of armour, whilst the larger bomb could penetrate about 140mm at what i would call "normal" or "typical" release altitudes of about 5000 feet.

The problem with using AP is that it restricts the size of the bursting charge and therefore needs to hit a vital to do lethal damage. This is why, except when attacking battleships, most attacks were with SAP. This meant that armour penetrations were less, generally, but damage from the blast effects was greater....much greater. Generally, it can be assumed that against carriers SAP (someimes even GP)

My estimation is that typically, the 250kg SAP bombs being dropped at "normal altitudes" by the Japanese could penetrate about 50mm of armour, whilst the 1100 SAP bombs could penetrate about 80mm, and the bigger 1400 lb version about 140mm.

To get some idea of the relative effects on each of their respective targets, one has to look briefly at the armouring scheme of the respective targets....in the case of the Japanese thats the Yorktowns, whilst in the case of the Germans thats the Ilustrious.

The Yorktowns had an armoured deck, below the Hangar (I believe) of 1.5 inches, or about 38 mm. The internal bulkheads were protected to almost 4 inches, though I dont know how extensive this was.

This means that a good proportion of the 250kg bombs dropped on a Yorktown are not going to penetrate the armoured "deck" and those that do are more likely to be contained by the bulkhead protection. In other words, it is reasonable to summarise by saying that the Yorktowns were designed to withstand hits from bombs up to 250 kg in size.

Now what would happen if the Yorktowns had been subjected to bombing by aircraft with 500 and 650kg bombs. Their armour protections systems are going to fail, no question. With bombs capable, on average of penetrating 80-120mm, and only 35mm in protection, the Yorktowns defences have simply no chance of withstanding such weight of bombs. The result, the bombs will penetrate to the vitals of the ship, and the ship will sink (thereby challenging your notion that only torpedoes can sink ships).

Now in terms of horizontal protection, I am not as sure of the characteristics, but my conways talks about an "STS" protection (not sure, but I think that is a reference to side armouring). The extent of armouring is very minimal, and the thickness is 0.75 inches. If those numbers are correct, they will offer no side impact protection from any torpedo of any size. The result is that the torpedo will penetrate very quickly to the vitals, and it wont take many to cause lethal damage. This conforms to the known facts....it only takes about two or there small torpdoes to sink a Yorktown class carrier

Comparing this now to the Illustrious protective scheme. She was protected immediately below the flight deck by 75 mm, and a further armoured deck below the hangar (Not sure of its thickness, but I think it was about 30-50 mm). Against bombs of 250kg, it could easily repel most hits, with little or no damage. A 500 kg bomb has about the same probability as a 250kg bomb has of penetrating the yorktown, but then the vitals below that are further protected. Historically this is what happened. of the 6 bombs that hit her (totalling 6000 lbs of exposive, only 2 bombs, or 1500 lbs of explosive , penetrated to the hangar deck, and none penetrated through to the vitals as such. It can be stated that the Ilustrious was designed to withstand hitsd from bombs of up to 500 kg in size.

What would happen if the Illustrious was torpedoes instead of bombed. Well, that too can be pretty well estimated I am afraid...its not the voodoo you believe it to be.

Illustrious had sandwich type underwater protection with 40mm bulkheads, extended a point 5 metres above the waterline. this was important, because it meant that it would need to ship a great deal of water before the protective bulkheads would be overcome. The bulkheads themselves, coupled with the modern sandwich style protection system, meant that the the underwater protection was good to warheads of up to 750 kg capacity. That means that an 18 inch torpedo of the type used to dispatch the US carriers, would have little or no effect on the carriers hull integrity. Of course things could, and often did go wrong, as the bismarcks experience clearly demonstrates.

Obviously the generalization about protection are just that...a lucky hit, or a hit that is dropped higher than usual, will upset this summary.of these bomb of 3 in

 

[Amsel]

It seems that all the USN CVs in 1942 were lost to torpedos. And I don't think the Illustrious would have survived what the Hornet went through either, look at the Ark Royal. The main reason why the Illustrious survived its ordeal was the proximity to Malta. Imagine it being in the oceans instead. The mauling of the Illustrious in October of 41' showed that the ABH failed in most aspects, and the Illustrious suffered from severe fires.

One of the issues you brought up earlier in the thread was the "greatness" of the design of the Illustrious or other RN carriers so other countries bought them after the war. They probably did not take into consideration that the Illustrious was unfit for future use due to its small elevators and most of all the small ABH which could not accomodate the later generation aircraft. The hanger cieling was too low and the elevators could not lift non-wing folding aircraft.

1942 was the most important year for the allies in the Pacific. Due to the speed of the IJN carriers the USN needed a large contingent of aircraft to be able to dash within range of the IJN fleet , send a strike with escort and also CAP over the friendlys. Also in the Guadacanal campaign aircraft were needed for ASW as well as scouting striking, CAP, and escorts. The small contingent of aircraft, maintanance capability and the fuel carried by the Illustrious doesn't bode well for her. I think that she was suited well for the Med but not for such a formidable opponant as the IJN was in 1942 in the Pacific. If the USN used the Illustrious class at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal, I really can't see her surviving let alone winning the battles.

It all comes down to defensive vs. offensive operation doctorine. Could the smaller number of aircraft win the massive battles, protect the fleets, prep and give airsupport to invasion forces, and defend against the massive kamikaze onslaught? Is it better to protect the carrier only slightly better but have a much smaller range, sortie capability, maintanance capability? You can't use the ABH and expect to be able to have the same characteristics that gave the USN its successes in the PTO. It's all a trade off. Armor for everything else.

 

[parsifal]

It seems that all the USN CVs in 1942 were lost to torpedos. And I don't think the Illustrious would have survived what the Hornet went through either, look at the Ark Royal. The main reason why the Illustrious survived its ordeal was the proximity to Malta. Imagine it being in the oceans instead. The mauling of the Illustrious in October of 41' showed that the ABH failed in most aspects, and the Illustrious suffered from severe fires.


What Mauling did the Illustrious suffer in October 1941. My understanding is that she was in the US at that time under repair. Perhaps you were referring to another ship, or another date, but you will need to clarify before I can respond.

Actually, the Illustrious would be likley to shrug off with little or no damage to her operational efficiency all except the sub launched 21 in torpedo delivered by the I-168, if it had been her rather than Yorktown that had suffered the damage at Midway. Her underwater protection systems were designed to withstand detonations from warheads of up to 750 lbs, and since the 18 inch torps that hit the Yorktown (and all the other carriers lost in 1942, except Wasp) had warheads of only 331 lbs, the Illustrious should have been able to withstand those hits fairly easily. Of course, like anything in life, nothing is certain.

Moreover, the Illustrious differed from the Ark Royal, in that the funnel uptakes were not routed under the hangar deck, and the transverse bulkheads reached higher up into the hull. This meant that she would not suffer the same catastrophic fires as the Ark Royal, and could also withstand a greater level of heel and flooding. Chances are, she could have survived the attacks that disabled the Yorktown with little or no impact.

With regard to Malta providing a great deal of assistance, well there was some help and shelter provided, but not nearly as much as you might expect. She could not be docked, and instead had to rely on divers to patch her hull so as to make her partially seaworthy. Whilst it would have been risky for her to go to sea in that condition, she probably coud have. She remained effectively in combat for the 13 days she was in the grand harbour, suffering a further three heavy bomb hits during that ordeal. No other carrier before or since has absorbed as much punishment as the Illustrous in January 1941.

The severe fires were indeed real enough, but at no stage did they spread outside the hangar. The heavy bombs dropped on her had ben sufficient to penetrate the 1st armoured deck below the flight deck, but not the second, below the hangar. If it had been the yorktown instead, the bombs would have passed clean through the armoured deck (of the yorktown) and into her vitals. My opinion is that she may have lasted seconds, not days, because there is every chance that an uncontrollabe fire or explosion would have occurred in her machinery spaces or her magazines....likley that she would have blown up and sunk in the same way as the Hood in other words....

One of the issues you brought up earlier in the thread was the "greatness" of the design of the Illustrious or other RN carriers so other countries bought them after the war. They probably did not take into consideration that the Illustrious was unfit for future use due to its small elevators and most of all the small ABH which could not accomodate the later generation aircraft. The hanger cieling was too low and the elevators could not lift non-wing folding aircraft.


Illustrious remained in service postwar, but her wartime service was never fully rectified and she remained a training carrier in the postwar era. her sister ship Victorious was fully refitted, however, and provided frontline service she was fully refitted and served quite successfully as a front line carrier until 1968. I would point out that the wartime Essex class carriers also required extensive modifcations to render them suitable for frontline operations so i fail to see the distinction here.


1942 was the most important year for the allies in the Pacific. Due to the speed of the IJN carriers the USN needed a large contingent of aircraft to be able to dash within range of the IJN fleet , send a strike with escort and also CAP over the friendlys. Also in the Guadacanal campaign aircraft were needed for ASW as well as scouting striking, CAP, and escorts. The small contingent of aircraft, maintanance capability and the fuel carried by the Illustrious doesn't bode well for her. I think that she was suited well for the Med but not for such a formidable opponant as the IJN was in 1942 in the Pacific. If the USN used the Illustrious class at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal, I really can't see her surviving let alone winning the battles.

I agree with most of what you say here....the British carriers did not have the legs to operate well in the Pacific....but you seem to imply that the Germans (and to a lesser extent their Italian allies) seem in some way to lack the ferocity of the Japanese. Whilst the Japanese were indeed ferocious, and I might say fanatical, the Germans were technically more proficient, and their sheer weight of ordinance made them very dangerous. In exactly the same way as you criticise the British carriers, one could level exactly the same criticism of US carriers if they had operated on aprolonged basis in the confined waters of the North Atlantic or the Med.

And there should be one other postscript added into this. Of the the two allied powers, only the British could effectively deliver night strikes against moving targets before 1943, and the main burden for carrier operations in areas north of the Arctic Circle remained firmly the responsibility of the RN. If you look for any major US carrier operations such as the Arctic convoys, you will not find any US carriers present. I believe that is because they sucked at rough weather operations

It all comes down to defensive vs. offensive operational doctorine. Could the smaller number of aircraft win the massive battles, protect the fleets, prep and give airsupport to invasion forces, and defend against the massive kamikaze onslaught? Is it better to protect the carrier only slightly better but have a much smaller range, sortie capability, maintanance capability? You can't use the ABH and expect to be able to have the same characteristics that gave the USN its successes in the PTO. It's all a trade off. Armor for everything else.
Err, the British did things with their carriers that the US did not as well, plus, I really am at a loss as to how this is at all relevant to the issue of Illustrious vs Yorktown. The US fast carriers were Essex class, werent they, and wasnt the British production base just a fraction of that commanded by the US??? In short, I fail to see the relevance of this line of argument.

 

[Amsel]

Err, the Kreigsmarine were not even 1/4 as ferocious as the IJN. What became the biggest threat to ships in WWII, and made the battleship obselete? I'll answer for you; airpower! What you are failing to admit, and what has historically made the Illustrious a failed design was its force projection. If the Yamato, and Tirpitz could be sunk by airpower then what of the puny armor of the Illustrious. You fail to grasp the idea that the USN carriers were designed to be force projectors and not warships. The doctorine of the ABH which restricted the range, deck length, hanger space, speed, and elevators for what? A little more armor. There is a huge difference betweeen the strike capability of the Yorktown class over the Illustrious. Airpower was what it was all about.

 

[parsifal]

Err, the Kreigsmarine were not even 1/4 as ferocious as the IJN. What became the biggest threat to ships in WWII, and made the battleship obselete? I'll answer for you; airpower! What you are failing to admit, and what has historically made the Illustrious a failed design was its force projection. If the Yamato, and Tirpitz could be sunk by airpower then what of the puny armor of the Illustrious. You fail to grasp the idea that the USN carriers were designed to be force projectors and not warships. The doctorine of the ABH which restricted the range, deck length, hanger space, speed, and elevators for what? A little more armor. There is a huge difference betweeen the strike capability of the Yorktown class over the Illustrious. Airpower was what it was all about.

You have not factored into this equation of yours the effects of the Luftwaffe, or the U-Boats. The U-Boats alone sank over 80% of all allied shipping and came closest of all axis forces to actually defeating the Allied navies.

So your initial answer that airpower alone rendered battleships obsolete is in itself inherently and fundamentally mistaken. Airpower was a very important factor in changing the nature of warfare, it was not the only factor, n some would argue not even the most important factor. More than anything, Battleships were designed and built to fight the conventional surface battle....the decisive surface action, Jutland style battles if you will, but the nature of warfare had changed so much that such battle concepts were largely obsolete. Battleships meeting battleships became a relatively rare occurrence, and with that the very reasoning for having batleships in the first place was no longer there....

Even in the context of the Pacific war, battleships and their poorer cousins, cruiseres and destroyers, nevetheless played a critical part in the outcome of the war. The battles in the Pacific were fought in part with surface ships, ground forces, aircraft , and most importantly, with submarines. so this notion that carriers, and air power were singularly responsible for the obsolesence of battleships (and by extension, the outcome of the war) is just patently mistaken. Airpower, and carriers played their parts, but they are just part of the whole picture, a complex combination of supporting factors that led to their demise.

The problem with battleships was not so much their obsolesence, as their inflexibility. They could not protect against submarines, were vulnerable to airpower (as you say) were so expensive that nobody dared risk them in open battle. In most instances their many and varied roles could be accomplished far more cheaply and efficiently by lesser systems, like submarines and the like.

Failure of the Illustrious class as a force prohector???? are you kidding??? have you even bothered to read about the accomplishments of this ship on even the most rudimentary levels. Are you aware of the accomplishments of these ships?? ever heard of battles like taranto the loss of the Bismarck, the near total domination of the meditteranean in 1940-42, the landings in Sicily, Salerno and southern France, the invasions of Madagascar, the escort carrier operations in the north Atlantic (oh and by the way, this was done by RN CVEs, the USN carriers were concentrated in the south and central Atlantic, the convoys to Russia wre an RN responsibility. If that is not a case of force projection I'll be a monkey uncle...its just that it wasnt done with 38% of the worlds industrial potential to back it up that makes it look puny in comparsion to the great drives across the central pacific.

However there is a fundamental difference between the conditions the British carriers were expected to fight under, and those that the USN expected to fight. The USN was into the crossing of vast stretches of open ocean, like the pacific (but it could also have been across the Atlantic as the various rainbow plans demonstrate), and therefore designed its carriers, as you say with a maximised number of aircraft in mind. For the prewar carriers, like the Yorktown this meant that sacrifices had to be made, and you guessed it, the sacrifices were in the levels of protection they had worked into their designs.

In the case of the Illustrious class, the idea was still force projection ( I am sorry to be rude about this, but fair d*nkum, you need to get out more, force projection was drummed into me at Naval college until I ate drank and slept the stuff, its actually quite humourous to me that you would even suggest that) but more attention had to be paid to the protection issues because the ships would be operating within the range of large numbers of enemy land based planes, and the fighter defences available to the RN at the time of design were very weak. But even that aside, the RN carriers were simply designed to a higher standard of protection than their USN counterparts. Put crudely, they were designed to withstand bombs of up to 1000lbs, and torpedoes of up to 18 in calibre. The Yorktowns essentially were designed to withstand bombs of up to 500 lbs only, with limited protection against torpedoes.

Now the loss of the battleships that you mention demonstrate that protection systems are not fullproof, but what they fail to take into account are all the times that protection systems do work. I can assure you that for every time they dont work, there are other times that they do. And the examples you quote...the loss of the Tirpitz and the Yamato are somewhat strange as choices of the vulnerability of Battleships. Yamato needed the attentions of over 500 aircraft to be sunk, whilst tirpitz was not finally sunk until attacked by heavy bombers carrying special ordinance of over 12000 lb weight (the so-called "tallboy" bombs) Bismarck withstood the torpedo attacks made against her that hit her belt (it was a n exceptionally lucky hit on the rudders that disabled her) the Italians adopted a failed system of underwater protection, whilst the US losses at Pearl were with ships lacking proper torpedo and deck protection. Compared to all these systems (except the Bismarck and Yamato) the Illustrius was a properly designed defensive system, far in advance of any of them. It was not just an accident of fate that the only modern British Carrier lost in the war was the Ark Royal, and she was lost due to a design fault. Propely designed ships, like the Illustrious dont sink easily. You are just sadly mistaken to describe them as "lightly protected"....I suggest before you try saying that again you read up about the RN operations off Crete Malta, and Japan to determine just how tough these armoured carriers really were. If you did, you wouldnt say such inanely dumb things

 

[Amsel]

You have not factored into this equation of yours the effects of the Luftwaffe, or the U-Boats. The U-Boats alone sank over 80% of all allied shipping and came closest of all axis forces to actually defeating the Allied navies.
I actually did take into consideration the u-boats and LW, and still believe that if the Illustrious class was used at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal; the battles would have been lost which would give the IJN a strong hold of the Pacific. I again reiterate that the Illustrious was better suited for the Med then the massive naval campaign in the Pacific. You are mistakenly, just as the RN was in 1936 putting more into armor then sinking enemy fleets. Trading force projection for armor. Not to be rude but I don't think you will admit to 91 aircraft being better then 40-60 aircraft. But you admit that the RN reluctantly went to the permanent deck park of the USN doctorine. Why? Because the poor design of the Illustrious in the offensive role. The ABH really cut down on the capabilities to engage the aggressive IJN. How was the Kreigsmarine a threat to anyone besides the u-boats? They were essentially always on the defensive due to their lack of carriers.

So your initial answer that airpower alone rendered battleships obsolete is in itself inherently and fundamentally mistaken. Airpower was a very important factor in changing the nature of warfare, it was not the only factor, n some would argue not even the most important factor. More than anything, Battleships were designed and built to fight the conventional surface battle....the decisive surface action, Jutland style battles if you will, but the nature of warfare had changed so much that such battle concepts were largely obsolete. Battleships meeting battleships became a relatively rare occurrence, and with that the very reasoning for having batleships in the first place was no longer there....
The large surface actions were oselete due to airpower and aircraft carriers. If there was no carriers or aircraft then the BB's would still rule the seas.


Even in the context of the Pacific war, battleships and their poorer cousins, cruiseres and destroyers, nevetheless played a critical part in the outcome of the war. The battles in the Pacific were fought in part with surface ships, ground forces, aircraft , and most importantly, with submarines. so this notion that carriers, and air power were singularly responsible for the obsolesence of battleships (and by extension, the outcome of the war) is just patently mistaken. Airpower, and carriers played their parts, but they are just part of the whole picture, a complex combination of supporting factors that led to their demise.
I don't disagree totally, but airpower was the major deterrent to ships. Why was Kurita trying so desperately to seperate the carriers from the rest of the fleet in Leyte?


The problem with battleships was not so much their obsolesence, as their inflexibility. They could not protect against submarines, were vulnerable to airpower (as you say) were so expensive that nobody dared risk them in open battle. In most instances their many and varied roles could be accomplished far more cheaply and efficiently by lesser systems, like submarines and the like.

Failure of the Illustrious class as a force prohector???? are you kidding??? have you even bothered to read about the accomplishments of this ship on even the most rudimentary levels. Are you aware of the accomplishments of these ships?? ever heard of battles like taranto the loss of the Bismarck, the near total domination of the meditteranean in 1940-42, the landings in Sicily, Salerno and southern France, the invasions of Madagascar, the escort carrier operations in the north Atlantic (oh and by the way, this was done by RN CVEs, the USN carriers were concentrated in the south and central Atlantic, the convoys to Russia wre an RN responsibility. If that is not a case of force projection I'll be a monkey uncle...its just that it wasnt done with 38% of the worlds industrial potential to back it up that makes it look puny in comparsion to the great drives across the central pacific.
Again I reiterate that the Illustrious was more suited to the Med where it could be complemented by the closeness to land and its smaller air groups could be aaugmented by land based air groups such as the invasion of Sicily. I do not disparage the record of the Illustrious, it did good for its flaws. Defensively, and in a passive way its armor only helped it slightly better then the fast carriers of the USN. The below waterline capabilities of the Illustrious were not as good as you say they are. The below hit the Illustrious took in April of 45' showed that.


However there is a fundamental difference between the conditions the British carriers were expected to fight under, and those that the USN expected to fight. The USN was into the crossing of vast stretches of open ocean, like the pacific (but it could also have been across the Atlantic as the various rainbow plans demonstrate), and therefore designed its carriers, as you say with a maximised number of aircraft in mind. For the prewar carriers, like the Yorktown this meant that sacrifices had to be made, and you guessed it, the sacrifices were in the levels of protection they had worked into their designs.

In the case of the Illustrious class, the idea was still force projection ( I am sorry to be rude about this, but fair d*nkum, you need to get out more, force projection was drummed into me at Naval college until I ate drank and slept the stuff, its actually quite humourous to me that you would even suggest that) but more attention had to be paid to the protection issues because the ships would be operating within the range of large numbers of enemy land based planes, and the fighter defences available to the RN at the time of design were very weak. But even that aside, the RN carriers were simply designed to a higher standard of protection than their USN counterparts. Put crudely, they were designed to withstand bombs of up to 1000lbs, and torpedoes of up to 18 in calibre. The Yorktowns essentially were designed to withstand bombs of up to 500 lbs only, with limited protection against torpedoes.
Again , not to be rude, but you are the one who needs to study the RN doctorine of the 1930's to see what I am talking about. And why the RN limited the capabilities of the Illustrious when she was laid down.


Now the loss of the battleships that you mention demonstrate that protection systems are not fullproof, but what they fail to take into account are all the times that protection systems do work. I can assure you that for every time they dont work, there are other times that they do. And the examples you quote...the loss of the Tirpitz and the Yamato are somewhat strange as choices of the vulnerability of Battleships. Yamato needed the attentions of over 500 aircraft to be sunk, whilst tirpitz was not finally sunk until attacked by heavy bombers carrying special ordinance of over 12000 lb weight (the so-called "tallboy" bombs) Bismarck withstood the torpedo attacks made against her that hit her belt (it was a n exceptionally lucky hit on the rudders that disabled her) the Italians adopted a failed system of underwater protection, whilst the US losses at Pearl were with ships lacking proper torpedo and deck protection. Compared to all these systems (except the Bismarck and Yamato) the Illustrius was a properly designed defensive system, far in advance of any of them. It was not just an accident of fate that the only modern British Carrier lost in the war was the Ark Royal, and she was lost due to a design fault. Propely designed ships, like the Illustrious dont sink easily. You are just sadly mistaken to describe them as "lightly protected"....I suggest before you try saying that again you read up about the RN operations off Crete Malta, and Japan to determine just how tough these armoured carriers really were. If you did, you wouldnt say such inanely dumb things

You keep putting too much into the armor of the Illustrious, when it has been proven that the armor only barely helped it and in one instance actually showed the structural flaw besides the armor. The Ark Royal was not lost due to a design fault, but to a torpedo which has been proven time again that ships could only be theoretically protected by its armor below the waterline to a torpedo hit. It is a good thing that the Illustrious was never hit by a torpedo, especially a Japanese torpedo. If a kamikaze hit below the waterline could put her out of service then imagine a Long Lance hit. I brought up those battleships because of their armored capability. The armor of the Illustrious could not even compare to that of the Yamato and its counterparts. Thus i am saying that the trade off of armored hangers for speed, range, strike capability, maintanence capabilities proves precisely what the advantage the Illustrious had. Slightly better passive protection then the Yorktown class, and much worse strike, ASW, escort, and CAP capabilities.

I would take the capabilities of the Yorktown class over the Illustrious design for the same reasons the USN did. You might study the USN doctorine vs. the RN doctorine in carriers to realize that the RN had to adopt the USN doctorine eventually. That tells me that the USN design was much better then the Illustrious design.

 

[Glider]

You keep putting too much into the armor of the Illustrious, when it has been proven that the armor only barely helped it and in one instance actually showed the structural flaw besides the armor. The Ark Royal was not lost due to a design fault, but to a torpedo which has been proven time again that ships could only be theoretically protected by its armor below the waterline to a torpedo hit.

An observation about the loss of the Ark Royal. A number of years ago I had a conversation with a Priest who was a TAG on the Ark Royal when she was lost and he was adament that the reason the ship was lost was down to the Captain. Yes there was a design fault but the flooding could and should have been contained.

In essence the torpedo struck and immediately most of the crew were told to abandon ship, the No 1 wanted to keep the crew on board and help save the ship. It was some hours after the torpedo hit that the water reached the boiler rooms and later before power was lost. Effective damage control didn't start until nearly an hour after the ship was hit, in his eyes an unforgivable delay. His summary was the the Ark was a happy shiip and achieved a number of successes but that this was down to the No1 not the Captain

I have looked up a number of sites and they seem to back up what I was told but I would like one day to get hold of the official investigation.

With this in mind I would temper any negative comments on the design of the Ark. It wasn't perfect but no ship was perfect

 

[Amsel]

I didn't make a negative comment about the Ark Royal but a nuetral comment. The Ark was a much better carrier then the Illustrious.