Assuming we get that far, I will get into the hour by hour ground combat records for Second El Alamein.
Those reports would be of interest, why were they not used before the making the claims about the Priests or even knowing how many were present? I do not know what others conclude, for me it is a warning to treat all your claims as verify before accepting.
I already posted, upthread, the precise dates when the unit of which Bobby Gibbes was commander, 3 RAAF, received it's P-40Fs, and this includes serial numbers of the aircraft. Go back and look, and then if you like check these serial numbers because there is an audit trail so to speak. After November 1942 3 RAAF was flying primarily Kittyhawk II / P-40F, which they continued to use into 1944.
To "the rest of the squadron stayed with mark I" I failed to add "until re-equipped…", since I only had in mind the kill claim in October. Then comes I gave where to find the full details, the 3 squadron PDF is about 1.9Gb for the time period in question.
By early 1942 the Hurricane I and II, Tomahawk IIB and Kittyhawk I and Ia were taking unacceptable losses.
The upgrades in fighter performance were obviously needed. However you claim bombing caused 3 to 5 times the casualties to the Luftwaffe, leaving 15 to 25% for in air including AA losses, if this is correct then there is no great need for the Spitfire or better KIttyhawks, just the increased strength (either numbers or more sorties per aircraft or both) so enough fighters were available to punch the bombers through to the airfields, as the Luftwaffe losses in the air were a minority. To take this all the way the army becomes decisive in the air war, your tank on their runway is the ultimate air superiority, better than bombing. Bombing this effective would also see the shift that the Spitfire V had over France in 1942/43, in trouble in 1942 as it was the main target, doing better in 1943 as the bombers were the target.
Air 20/1929, Middle East operational flying hours , 11,950 in January 1942, 8,659 in February, 10,896 March, 11,384 in April, 12,680 in May, 19,209 in June, July report missing, 24,966 in August, 23,234 in September, 23,221 in October, 21,661 in November and 16,006 in a hard to read December report. No mention of B-17. Things to note are Wellingtons were around 4 to 4,500 hours January to May and over 6,000 hours in June, or a third or more of the effort. The report gives the number of airmen available but not the number of sorties to determine loss rates. June 1942 average for the month, 325 Hurricane, 162 Kittyhawk, 96 Spitfire and 64 Tomahawk pilots available, total 647 pilots, 9,427 hours. In August 420 Hurricane, 167 Kittyhawk, 494 (!??) Spitfire and 29 Tomahawk, total 1,110 pilots, 8,470 hours. Weekly casualty reports are in AIR 20/1881.
The "Lawyer" aspect comes in when you pour through a post trying to find some detail to pounce on and then turning the whole discussion into a referendum on that. My point didn't hinge on Kittyhawk III in July.
Actually I am not, rather going through and noting where your claims do not match the material I have, fewer mismatches, fewer comments.
To me it really doesn't matter who gets the credit for the fighter tactics and CAS / forward observer reforms.
Who did it matters in this sort of forum where the details can be explored. Not just the Desert Air Force did it, or one man did it shorthand generic history. The trouble for me is you assign credit for such things incorrectly then build on that. To exaggerate slightly take out the usual patrol activity and the desert war had "hours" of combat June 1940 to June 1942, little time to learn about combat. Throw in the growth pains as 8th Army expanded and the turnover of British generals and it is easy to see how mistakes could continue at that level. To create the doctrine required both arms, at Gazala it was clear there was still a gap between them. Things like using the twin engine bombers as battlefield strike were understandable given the lack of fighter bombers, but it meant hours of delays to get the bombers plus escort to a target.
The supply issues meant it was expensive to run large scale exercises even near Cairo because of the wear and tear, the tank and vehicle mileage limits. Britain had lots of supplies and underemployed forces who therefore needed exercises plus had the commanders who had been on the receiving end in France. The Lysander was around as an artillery observer pre war with a doctrine, and the use of fighter reconnaissance to make such work more survivable was underway in Britain in 1940/41, good use for the early P-40 shipped there, later the P-51. The references I have indicate the system the allies used in WWII was developed and tested in Britain then exported to North Africa, in June 1942 half the army had it, in July all did. The desert commanders already had a system based on the pre war ideas but proved and improved the one from Britain. Things like forward air controllers were a 1943 improvement, logically following on from the forward artillery observers idea. While it all seems logical now despite the reports units in Britain did not pick up on the changes done in the Mediterranean and had to learn after D-Day. Then with even more air resources they could increase the amount of support and decrease waiting times.
The RAF strength return for front line units on 1 July 1942 simply says Kittyhawk, establishment 178, strength 103, 68 serviceable, the 1 September return, establishment 112, strength 101 I, 11 II, 4 III., 1 October establishment 112, strength 57 I, 19 II, 59 III after receiving 1 I, 47 II and 67 III during the month, writing off 16 I, 2 II and 7 III. It will be interesting to see how many Hurricane I were being lost, there seems to be some still in the TAC/R units, but whether those units were doing operations is unknown.
My understanding is that the 'tentacle' system was more about spotting and relaying positions of enemy troops to ground forces. The forward observer system for calling in air strikes came later.
My point is I gave a date for the FCO use, since your "later" was earlier than the date I had.
Mediterranean Air War, page 401-403, lists the following US and heavy and medium bomber types in Theater for Oct 27 1942 (so i.e. before Torch and during 2nd Al Alamein)
(under "Air HQ, Egypt"):
US 1st Bombardment Group (Provisional)
9th Sqn B-17E
Halverson Sqn B-24D
Thanks for that, my quick check of the 9th Air Force figures for the desert had all heavy bomber figures under B-24, which vaguely did not seem right. Time to look at more specific references, Rust's The 9th Air Force in World War II. The B-17E unit that did a sort of world tour, the 9th squadron of the 7th Bomb Group, arrived from India on 28 June, they had 7 B-17, though on 19 July strength is given as 9, with 3 serviceable. And that is the entire mention of the unit. The USAAF combat squadrons has it in the Middle East from 2 July to 4 October, the returning to India. It also had some LB-30 and re-equipped with B-24 in 1942. The abbreviated histories of USAAF groups does not mention the Middle East deployment. If the squadron history is correct it was gone by 27 October, not sure about how many B-17 it had when departing. No losses mentioned in the B-17 list,
https://384thbombgroup.com/_content/downloads/FORTLOG.pdf
The two USAAF squadrons were being serviced by 134 squadron RAF, nominally a single seat fighter unit, they are both reported present on 20 October by the RAF.
What I actually meant (again) is that these aircraft types alone were insufficient and could not have carried the day.
So with only Hurricanes and Blenheims the Air Force cannot carry the day and so the Air force is not "decisive"? In turn leading to the loss of 1st Alamein? You change your language and we can only go on what is written.
I'm sorry but you are all over the map again here and are making factual errors, I'll try to break it down point by point in a subsequent post.
The all over the map includes axis supply issues, problems and effects of air attacks.
Allow me to explain this. Since you are challenging everything I post in this discussion, and sometimes pretending I said things I didn't, it is a convenient short cut to refer to your own numbers to make my point. 50% losses of supplies are due to interdiction across the Med, according to your own numbers.
If I was challenging everything there would be a line by line reply. And I do not pretend. Your 50% figure applies to what period? I gave key monthly figures, to expand on that in the period June 1940 to December 1942 losses at sea hit 50% or more twice, November 1941 and December 1942. So where does your 50% figure come from? Or can it be interpreted as 50% of supplies that did not make it to the front were lost at sea, the other on land? Does any land total include the supplies the supply system needed? Metric tons.
| Cargo | All Cargo | All Cargo | dry cargo | Fuel | % all | Note |
| Month | sent | arrived | arrived | arrived | cargo lost | Note |
May-42 | 93188 | 86439 | 67858 | 18581 | 7.24 | |
Jun-42 | 41519 | 32327 | 26759 | 5568 | 22.14 | 1192 tons fuel lost. |
Jul-42 | 97794 | 91491 | 67590 | 23901 | 6.45 | |
Aug-42 | 77134 | 51655 | 29152 | 22503 | 33.03 | 41% loss of fuel. |
Sep-42 | 96903 | 77526 | 46465 | 31061 | 20.00 | |
Oct-42 | 83695 | 46698 | 34390 | 12308 | 44.20 | |
So here at least we have defined one of the points of contention clearly: Were the two battles of El Alamein close, or something of a foregone conclusion?
Few battles are forgone conclusions, first Alamein required the allied command to remain disrupted for the axis to win, that did not happen, fresh troops arrived and in any case the axis forces lacked the supplies to go much further. As for second Alamein the axis win if the allies call off the attack but by this time the allies were well informed about the state of axis forces, they could keep going. A whole lot of things have to break for the axis in a situation where they have lost intelligence and essentially, if Ehler is correct need to land 4 times the fuel the army needs to supply it with fuel, 3 for supply system, 1 for army, that is not sustainable. The US supply histories covering the Red Ball and similar make it clear how much supply the supply system needed in that situation. There were a series of US truck convoy supply routes, Red Ball is just the best known.
On 10th September 1944 the Red Ball route is effectively doubled from St Lo to Soissons for the 1st Army and Sommesous for the 3rd Army. The southern route round trip is now 590 miles, the northern route even longer. On 20th September the road between Courville and Alencon, being used by the Red Ball Express, is in such a bad shape that further maintenance is impractical, an alternative route is chosen. The Red Ball express northern termination is moved to Hirson. The northern route round trip is now 696 miles. Tyre consumption was so bad all the trailers had to be taken out of service to keep the trucks going at the cost of supply lift.
Ok here is another point of contention: Did the Germans interdict Allied supply chains with any air strikes in North Africa? Do you mean for a specific time period?
You were the one who made the claim, you need to provide the evidence.
Repeat,
Does this mean the barrages in WWII were similarly ineffective, and is that except for SP 105mm guns? Given how good you rated them above? It had to be airstrikes?
Another opinion about being close battles, so Supercharge was the last roll of the dice at Second Alamein? Rommel and his under 30 operational Panzers was really close as of 3 July to shifting a dug in infantry division with more than divisional artillery in support? Or bypassing it with adequate supplies and force to press on? To run into fresh troops further back. Von Mellenthin, being a staff member at DAK HQ is completely mistaken on 4 July?
You would have to clarify a bit what you are actually asking for here.
The way advancing causes loss of combat power, in particular tanks, and the amount of supplies needed in the supply system, Rommel needed 8th Army to remain as confused as it was at Mersa Matruth, that did not happen, he definitely did not need Auchinleck making routine use of massed artillery, by the looks of things the biggest barrages yet done in the desert.
Am I correct in understanding that you are making the argument that the DAF was basically useless or irrelevant to the outcome of these two battles? Because I think that would be an outlier position.
I have already stated my views on the DAF, it was not decisive. Now sit down and figure out how you managed to get from not decisive to where you did.
In spite of this being an aviation forum and y'all being aviation buffs, clearly there are many people here who think that aviation played relatively little role in ground warfare.
I disagree 100%. I believe the Stuka specifically was actually pivotal, crucial to the success in Poland and especially France. It wasn't 'just' or even 'mostly' propaganda, if anything I believe it is a bit understated.
Actually what people are doing is pointing out you are overstating the case. Consider Tobruk in 1941, the Germans had months, air supremacy and Stukas, so they should have been able to systematically eliminate the AA guns, the artillery, the concrete bunkers then support the crushing attack into the much weakened defence as per your Malta plan. Rommel asked for and received a siege train. Poland was going to lose, it was heavily outnumbered, France had a very slow command system. The combined arms attacks made things easier for the Germans, as noted before the idea the Luftwaffe was decisive meant it tried the Battle of Britain, including one raid, target destroyed beliefs.
The bombs, rockets and artillery shells were not powerful enough, so a near miss was usually a miss if the troops were in even light field works.
A good example of airpower in support is the forcing of the Meuse, initially aided by the allied command refusing to believe the attack was coming, on troops who had not been properly trained by April 1940 standards. As the artillery could not deploy the crossing was supported by 900 bomber and 180 Stuka sorties for Guderian and 360 bomber and 90 Stuka for Rheinhardt along with 88mm guns and those of the troops, the plan was for 8 hours of attacks from 0800, they began at 1000. Other Luftwaffe forces were doing interdiction. The air attacks did little material damage, they undermined the morale of the defenders, they also hit a couple of German units. The German troops attacked at 1500. This was a clear target for the airmen, with a well defined bomb line, a series of planned attacks, not really making use of the liaison system, that came later.
World War I showed attacking front line positions was costly for the air force and struggled to inflict losses on the troops, if it was done in good co-ordination with an attack it helped overall, but was swapping higher air force casualties for lower ground force ones. Even in WWI if the enemy was forced to move air power could inflict high casualties, like the artillery really, catch the enemy in the open. Once they stopped the value of an air strike, like an artillery bombardment, rapidly faded as an aid to attackers, unless you had massed heavy bombers. It was hard enough for the army to do artillery and infantry attacks, aircraft were harder to time correctly.
The RAF/British Army Close Support organization was changing as experience was gained. CAS depends on the communication system and knowledge of where friendly and enemy troops are. Diagrams from Vic Flinthams 'Close Call' Volume I (first and last diagram) and AP 3235 'Air Support' (middle two) show this over a period of time:
Nice diagrams, if I read things correctly in 1940 division HQ was aware but then had to ask permission of higher air headquarters, interesting if the formations in the field were really in direct communication with Air Force HQ, but then again the force was 2 divisions and the RAF available was similarly sized. In September 1941 brigades are now listening and can talk to the aircraft, but authority to order aircraft is at Corps level in the army, no mention of the hand off to the air force. In November Corps has to hand off to another HQ which is only linked to it, not the aircraft reporting system.
Alamein there is none or only one link between the aircraft and the authority to allocate strikes. Another diagram expands this, which shows the brigade/division/corps links. Everyone is informed at the same time, everyone can have a say if they feel it is required. Other corps HQ can also listen in at least.
Hi
Ehler's book ('The Mediterranean Air War'), pages 236-241, has this reference the lead up to 2nd battle of El Alamein:
Thanks for that. What is reference 66? That is a rear services fuel consumption higher than I thought it would be.