What if America built De Havilland Mosquitoes instead of the B-17 Flying Fortress? (1 Viewer)

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The Mosquito idea uses a lot of the retrospectroscope.

As conceived and the first 10 bombers off the production line the plane carried four 250lb bombs, the same bomb load as the Fairey Battle and the Blenheim.

Every "what if" thread relies on retrosepctroscope. And yet unlike a Battle or a Blenheim, Mosquitoes could survive repeated missions and hit their targets fairly reliably.

It was well into 1942 when they got four 500lb bombs into a Mosquito

Which to me is plenty, so long as they hit what they are aimed at.


I think you are exaggerating the scenario in which it would have changed. It would have been a phase in of one thing and phase out of another. The Americans and British manufactured a lot of planes that they either did not end up using or used for something different than originally intended. Production of heavy bombers in 1942 was not so far along that it couldn't change course.


Some raids had high casualties but they adjusted a variety of things. It was certainly clear in 1943 that the Mosquito had enormous merit as a bomber and even in 1942 it was doing better than all the other types in many respects.
Improved Merlins, 100/130 fuel allowed the Mosquito to improve it's performance and a 1944 Mosquito could do a lot of things a 1942 Mosquito could not do. But by late 1943/early 1944 it was way, way too late to switch bombing tactics/strategy.
Really? What do you think they would have done if they had continued taking Schweinfurt scale losses.

Mosquitoes sucked at carrying incendiaries and the 4000lb cookie doesn't go operational until 1944.

I don't see incendiaries as particularly desirable. If your bomb aiming is accurate.

In the actual strategic bombing campaign the Germans were able to seed the paths taken by the heavy bombers with heavy AA guns. With faster wider ranging aircraft that don't have to stick together in massive formations to survive, there was a lot more ground to cover with whatever types of countermeasures you tried.

I do suspect the Germans would have made faster fighters, but that just would have gotten us into the escort-vs-interceptor battle which we do see as desirable as it helps eliminate the Luftwaffe.
 
In this analogy I'd call the Mosquito the lever action rifle and the big heavies the old blunderbus.

Bad analogy.

A Civil war muzzle loading rifle (neither side used much in the way of muskets or blunderbusses) was effective out to 300yds or beyond. In mass, company or battalion volley they were effective at well over 500yds and forced new artillery tactics, and new artillery pieces. Smooth bore cannon were within range of infantry with shoulder arms instead of out of range.

Civil war lever action rifles used basically pistol power ammunition. Sort of the sub machine gun of their day. Effectiveness was around 200yds and under. A lot of fire power close up but trying to cross 3-400yds of open field was not going to go well against muzzle loading rifles in cover/concealment.

It was the rifled muzzle loader (from the Crimean war on) that forced major changes in battlefield tactics. Not the lever action rifle.
 






The only serious technical error in this document is suggesting it is ideal for the pacific war, due to the glues used, this was untrue. Even the Mosquito was not good at everything, everwhere.
 
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See post 476 - I think SR's points closes the door on that!

SR tries to shut down every "What if" argument the exact same way, citing the production figures of the actual war. We already know what happened, that doesn't actually mean they couldn't have done anything different. There was nothing locked in about using the heavy bombers, that is just the way it shook out.
 

Totally disagree, and you are stepping into very comfortable ground for me here, though we will veer off into non aircraft land.

The lever action rifle enabled revolutionary changes in cavalry warfare, among other things, and various units in the Civil War did take full advantage of this new technology. Muzzle loading weapons required massed volleys to be effective, but that was rapidly changing.

The actual effective range for most of the muzzle loading weapons used in the civil war, whether rifled or not (not all were) was often <50 meters.
 

I'm suggesting that situation is pretty much over, unless we go to war with Nicaragua or something
 
Production of heavy bombers in 1942 was not so far along that it couldn't change course.
You're very wrong there - if we were lucky you were looking at at least 18 months between vetting the design, issuing a contract, building tooling, manufacturing long lead time items, flight testing, training and finally delivery. Aircraft production (especially during WW2) wasn't a light switch (especially on the Allied side).
 
The US was in talks to build R-1830s and R-1820s under license in plants managed by automotive companies (not actual automotive plants) in the fall of 1940. This was part of Roosevelts 50,000 plane air force.

What I dislike about many what if's is the idea that it takes only a short period of time to change production of large plants from one type of engine or airframe to another. It could take many months. A lot of factories took close to year from the first production aircraft to reach the 500th, after which they were cranking out several hundred a month. change airframes and you are back to a few dozen planes a month while tooling and expertise is built back up.
 

I'm well aware of that, but where there is a will (and an opportunity is recognized) there is often a way. Look how quickly they got the Merlin engined Mustang into production and ramped up.
 
I'm well aware of that, but where there is a will (and an opportunity is recognized) there is often a way. Look how quickly they got the Merlin engined Mustang into production and ramped up.
It's one thing to produce a single engine fighter, it's another thing to introduce a twin engine bomber and change the face of your bomber force.
 

I know. Whenever we have these discussions it turns into a referrendum on "What ifs" in general. Some people argue that we couldn't have done anything differently basically because we didn't do anything differently. Others see perhaps more opportunity to change course than there really was. We can't be certain either way. But I think you are a little too quick to slam the door on some of these, and this one in particular. The truth lies somewhere in the middle and I think there is merit in thinking through some of these scenarios, with the caveat that it is difficult to turn an aircraft carrier.
 
It's one thing to produce a single engine fighter, it's another thing to introduce a twin engine bomber and change the face of your bomber force.

Or how about... to switch everything over to jets as everyone did fairly rapidly after the war...
 
But there are some on this forum who have actually worked around some of these aircraft or have been in the business long enough to know where some of these "what ifs" are totally impractical if not impossible given what is known about the equipment of the era and how they were produced.
 
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The discussion about defensive armament in the context of the Mosquito is somewhat irrelevant. Other than an Me262, or a very lucky already airboure single engine fighter,
True unless you're trying to use a Mosquito at high altitude with an optical bombsight where you would be throwing away the Mosquito's best asset - it's speed.
 
True unless you're trying to use a Mosquito at high altitude with an optical bombsight where you would be throwing away the Mosquito's best asset - it's speed.
Sorry that line is now deleted as it was posted in error replying to a totally different comment, I didnt notice that the single line of text remained - the error is mine.
 
Very few units got Henry rifles. Spencers were more common but Spencers were slower firing (working the lever did not cock the hammer)

The US on both sides must have been using a lot of defective muzzle loading rifles. British figured the Muzzle loading rifles were effective at 10 times that distance in Crimea.

The problem may be in what was considered "effective" range. Even volley fire by smooth bores was ineffective at about 100yds. However

rear sight of 1853 Enfield. Laid flat was the 100yd position, the first hump/bump is 200 yds the next is 300yds and the 4th was 400yds. Then the sight was raised to vertical and the sliding portion was set to the appropriate mark.

Effective range might be a range at which even single digit percentage of hits was obtained on a "formation target" lie a screen 6 feet high and 20 ft wide (head of a marching column.)
British were publishing manuals showing trajectories and danger spaces from about 1856 on.

Rifled muzzle loaders made Cavalry charges on open ground a lot more costly, it also made bayonet charges on foot a lot more costly but it took quite a while for some officers (even generals) to figure that out.
 
Well, by late 1941/early 1942 you had a virtual aircraft carrier in US bomber production. It took over a year to build the first 500 B-24s. It took about 3 months to build the next 500.

In 1942 the US built just under 16,000 R-1820s, around 22,600 R-1830s, just under 15,000 Allisons, about 11,800 R-2800s and 7,250 V-1650s.
Over all production of aircraft engines would roughly double in 1943.

Yes you can change production. But in "many what ifs" people don't want to pay the cost.
 
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