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The Mosquito idea uses a lot of the retrospectroscope.
As conceived and the first 10 bombers off the production line the plane carried four 250lb bombs, the same bomb load as the Fairey Battle and the Blenheim.
It was well into 1942 when they got four 500lb bombs into a Mosquito
at which point the Americans had 2-3 plants building B-17s and either 5 plants building B-24s or a smaller number actually producing B-24s with the extra plants being built. Buick, Chevrolet, Studebaker and others were either starting to put out engines or were finishing up construction on plants that would build radial engines by the tens of thousands.
Cancelling all of this to build even a metal Mosquito would have delayed the US bombing offensive by over a year.
Only two squadrons used Mosquitoes bombers in daylight missions in 1942 and until May of 1943. After that daylight raids were conducted by the fighter bomber version with two 500lb bombs inside and, depending on mission, two 500lbs under the wings.
Mosquito losses of the these first two squadrons were high. The two daylight bomber Mosquito Squadrons were switched to night pathfinders joining a 3rd Mosquito squadron.
Really? What do you think they would have done if they had continued taking Schweinfurt scale losses.Improved Merlins, 100/130 fuel allowed the Mosquito to improve it's performance and a 1944 Mosquito could do a lot of things a 1942 Mosquito could not do. But by late 1943/early 1944 it was way, way too late to switch bombing tactics/strategy.
Mosquitoes sucked at carrying incendiaries and the 4000lb cookie doesn't go operational until 1944.
In this analogy I'd call the Mosquito the lever action rifle and the big heavies the old blunderbus.
The Mosquito idea uses a lot of the retrospectroscope.
As conceived and the first 10 bombers off the production line the plane carried four 250lb bombs, the same bomb load as the Fairey Battle and the Blenheim.
It was well into 1942 when they got four 500lb bombs into a Mosquito at which point the Americans had 2-3 plants building B-17s and either 5 plants building B-24s or a smaller number actually producing B-24s with the extra plants being built. Buick, Chevrolet, Studebaker and others were either starting to put out engines or were finishing up construction on plants that would build radial engines by the tens of thousands.
Cancelling all of this to build even a metal Mosquito would have delayed the US bombing offensive by over a year.
Only two squadrons used Mosquitoes bombers in daylight missions in 1942 and until May of 1943. After that daylight raids were conducted by the fighter bomber version with two 500lb bombs inside and, depending on mission, two 500lbs under the wings.
Mosquito losses of the these first two squadrons were high. The two daylight bomber Mosquito Squadrons were switched to night pathfinders joining a 3rd Mosquito squadron.
Improved Merlins, 100/130 fuel allowed the Mosquito to improve it's performance and a 1944 Mosquito could do a lot of things a 1942 Mosquito could not do. But by late 1943/early 1944 it was way, way too late to switch bombing tactics/strategy.
Success of a daylight Mosquito campaign also depends on the Germans doing exactly what they did as far as their own aircraft development.
That is NOT dropping the compression ratio in their engines and using higher boost for more power and coming up with a successor to the Bf 109 or streamlining/stretching the 109 just a bit.
It also depends on the Germans NOT switching AA gun production to fewer 88mm and up guns to more 37-55mm AA guns (or even more 20mm guns)
Mosquitoes sucked at carrying incendiaries and the 4000lb cookie doesn't go operational until 1944.
See post 476 - I think SR's points closes the door on that!
Bad analogy.
A Civil war muzzle loading rifle (neither side used much in the way of muskets or blunderbusses) was effective out to 300yds or beyond. In mass, company or battalion volley they were effective at well over 500yds and forced new artillery tactics, and new artillery pieces. Smooth bore cannon were within range of infantry with shoulder arms instead of out of range.
Civil war lever action rifles used basically pistol power ammunition. Sort of the sub machine gun of their day. Effectiveness was around 200yds and under. A lot of fire power close up but trying to cross 3-400yds of open field was not going to go well against muzzle loading rifles in cover/concealment.
It was the rifled muzzle loader (from the Crimean war on) that forced major changes in battlefield tactics. Not the lever action rifle.
Actually not true - if you have a situation where you have to obliviate a large area and have total control of the airspace, then I can see a use of a heavy bomber(s) operating at higher altitudes. Also consider as the string of bombs leave the bomb bays of these aircraft, they can be guided to a precise target with pinpoint accuracy, something not available during WW2.
You're very wrong there - if we were lucky you were looking at at least 18 months between vetting the design, issuing a contract, building tooling, manufacturing long lead time items, flight testing, training and finally delivery. Aircraft production (especially during WW2) wasn't a light switch (especially on the Allied side).Production of heavy bombers in 1942 was not so far along that it couldn't change course.
Well what I described was done in Afghanistan with success.I'm suggesting that situation is pretty much over, unless we go to war with Nicaragua or something
You're very wrong there - if we were lucky you were looking at at least 18 months (if you're lucky) between vetting the design, issuing a contract, building tooling, manufacturing long lead time items, flight testing, training and finally delivery. Aircraft production (especially during WW2) wasn't a light switch (especially on the Allied side).
It's one thing to produce a single engine fighter, it's another thing to introduce a twin engine bomber and change the face of your bomber force.I'm well aware of that, but where there is a will (and an opportunity is recognized) there is often a way. Look how quickly they got the Merlin engined Mustang into production and ramped up.
The US was in talks to build R-1830s and R-1820s under license in plants managed by automotive companies (not actual automotive plants) in the fall of 1940. This was part of Roosevelts 50,000 plane air force.
What I dislike about many what if's is the idea that it takes only a short period of time to change production of large plants from one type of engine or airframe to another. It could take many months. A lot of factories took close to year from the first production aircraft to reach the 500th, after which they were cranking out several hundred a month. change airframes and you are back to a few dozen planes a month while tooling and expertise is built back up.
It's one thing to produce a single engine fighter, it's another thing to introduce a twin engine bomber and change the face of your bomber force.
Really? Rapidly??? How long did it take for the US to become a all-jet military???Or how about... to switch everything over to jets as everyone did fairly rapidly after the war...
But there are some on this forum who have actually worked around some of these aircraft or have been in the business long enough to know where some of these "what ifs" are totally impractical if not impossible given what is known about the equipment of the era and how they were produced.I know. Whenever we have these discussions it turns into a referrendum on "What ifs" in general. Some people argue that we couldn't have done anything differently basically because we didn't do anything differently. Others see perhaps more opportunity to change course than there really was. We can't be certain either way. But I think you are a little too quick to slam the door on some of these, and this one in particular. The truth lies somewhere in the middle and I think there is merit in thinking through some of these scenarios, with the caveat that it is difficult to turn an aircraft carrier.
True unless you're trying to use a Mosquito at high altitude with an optical bombsight where you would be throwing away the Mosquito's best asset - it's speed.The discussion about defensive armament in the context of the Mosquito is somewhat irrelevant. Other than an Me262, or a very lucky already airboure single engine fighter,
Sorry that line is now deleted as it was posted in error replying to a totally different comment, I didnt notice that the single line of text remained - the error is mine.True unless you're trying to use a Mosquito at high altitude with an optical bombsight where you would be throwing away the Mosquito's best asset - it's speed.
No worries!Sorry that line is now deleted as it was posted in error replying to a totally different comment, the error is mine.
Very few units got Henry rifles. Spencers were more common but Spencers were slower firing (working the lever did not cock the hammer)Totally disagree, and you are stepping into very comfortable ground for me here, though we will veer off into non aircraft land.
The lever action rifle enabled revolutionary changes in cavalry warfare, among other things, and various units in the Civil War did take full advantage of this new technology. Muzzle loading weapons required massed volleys to be effective, but that was rapidly changing.
The actual effective range for most of the muzzle loading weapons used in the civil war, whether rifled or not (not all were) was often <50 meters.
Well, by late 1941/early 1942 you had a virtual aircraft carrier in US bomber production. It took over a year to build the first 500 B-24s. It took about 3 months to build the next 500.I know. Whenever we have these discussions it turns into a referrendum on "What ifs" in general. Some people argue that we couldn't have done anything differently basically because we didn't do anything differently. Others see perhaps more opportunity to change course than there really was. We can't be certain either way. But I think you are a little too quick to slam the door on some of these, and this one in particular. The truth lies somewhere in the middle and I think there is merit in thinking through some of these scenarios, with the caveat that it is difficult to turn an aircraft carrier.