When did German fighter pilot quality start to decline?

Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules

Still, I'd bet the average Luftwaffe fighter squadron of Jan 1945 would have better trained pilots than an IJN or IJAF fighter squadron of the same time.
Japan had been stockpiling fuel, munitions and new equipment (fighters, tanks, etc.) In strategic locations on the home islands during the last year's of the war.
Along with that, were experienced pilots (Army & Navy) along with veteran Army units.
The vast majority of Kamikaze pilots that were attacking Okinawa and other targets from southern Japan in '45, were young volunteers that had little more than enough training to get their aircraft in the air and keep it level.
 
Reading about the Nakajima Ki-115 development had some interesting tidbits. Apparently the first non-suspended, disposable gear made taxing so difficult (especially on unimproved airstrips) --- that veteran and test pilots would bounce off the runaway, out of control. Not what was needed for green "one-way" pilots.
 
Reading about the Nakajima Ki-115 development had some interesting tidbits. Apparently the first non-suspended, disposable gear made taxing so difficult (especially on unimproved airstrips) --- that veteran and test pilots would bounce off the runaway, out of control. Not what was needed for green "one-way" pilots.
You'd think they'd put some springs on the wheels in the initial versions. Even WW1 biplanes had suspension. It's not there for the comfort of the one way chap inside.
 
You'd think they'd put some springs on the wheels in the initial versions. Even WW1 biplanes had suspension. It's not there for the comfort of the one way chap inside.

Eventually had to put a suspension onto the landing gear. Just to keep test pilots from being killed, while testing prototypes. I don't think Japan made any production Ki-115 planes.
 
Even WW1 biplanes had suspension. It's not there for the comfort of the one way chap inside.
Very few WW1 aircraft had sprung suspension.
They typically had an axle supported by struts.
Their tires were the "spring".
I don't think Japan made any production Ki-115 planes.
A little over 100 made, none saw combat.
 
I think we might be selling the Luftwaffe short a bit. In U.S. squadrons, the squadron leaders who were aces always ran some training sorties for rookies and passed on knowledge of combat. Do we think the Luftwaffe did less? I grant the Luftwaffe might not have had the luxury to send the great aces about training other squadrons, but surely the best pilot in the squadron would train with the rookies. I'll grant that as fuel got short, training got shorter, too, but the Germans were never stupid about operations.

I'm thinking that the average German pilot in late 1944 was not as good as the average Allied pilot, but the difference might not be anywhere near as great as I read above. Once the 1,000-plane raids stared, though, the average German pilot skill declined due to lack of pilot replacements in any quantity and little time even for squadron leader training. I'm thinking it got to a state where the difference was noticeable around Jan 1945.

If you look at table 166 of the Statistical Digest of World War II, we shot down approximately the same number of airplanes each month except for April, October, and November. Then, in January 1945, we dropped to 473, 488, and 895 in Mar. Then came April when we destroyed 4,257 of them in the ETO! The Luftwaffe basically failed as a fighting force in April 1945, and they lost fewer airplanes in the 3 months prior than any month in the past 3 years mainly because many fewer sorties were flown due to shortages.

Looks to me like the Luftwaffe simply started flying less around January 1945 and basically stopped altogether sometime in April 1945. After 4,257 ETO kills in April, we destroyed a whopping 28 in May ... well ... up until May 8, anyway.
 
Last edited:
If you look at table 166 of the Statistical Digest of World War II, we shot down approximately the same number of airplanes each month except for April, October, and November. Then, in January 1945, we dropped to 473, 488, and 895 in Mar. Then came April when we destroyed 4,257 of them in the ETO! The Luftwaffe basically failed as a fighting force in April 1945, and they lost fewer airplanes in the 3 months prior than any month in the past 3 years mainly because many fewer sorties were flown due to shortages.

Looks to me like the Luftwaffe simply started flying less around January 1945 and basically stopped altogether sometime in April 1945. After 4,257 ETO kills in April, we destroyed a whopping 28 in May ... well ... up until May 8, anyway.

Hi Greg,

In January 1945 the Luftwaffe shifted its attention almost entirely to the Eastern Front, after the Vistula-Oder offensive began on 12 January 1945. For example, in February 1945 there were just short of 30,000 sorties by Luftwaffe fighters and ground-attack aircraft, and 25,000 of those were on the Eastern Front. I'd argue that the Luftwaffe was still going strong as a fighting force up to April 1945, just not against the Western Allies. I started drafting a blog post about this very topic earlier this year, and will try and get around to finishing it soon.

Also, are you sure about the April 1945 figure? Judging by Olynyk's claims list, there were only around 720 aerial victory claims by Western Europe-based USAAF units and around 100 by Southern Europe-based USAAF units.

Cheers,
Andrew A.
 
Basically, I was speaking about the Western front. The figures come from the Statistical Digest of World War II, as stated above. I didn't make them up. I am as sure about them as I am about the Statistical Digest ... it is compopsed of the numbers the U.S.A.A.F. statistical team agreed on right after the war, collating the data they had at the time, in formats they were familiar with.

Is it 100% accurate? Not likely, but it is as good as we're going to get.

I generally agree they shifted a lot to the Russian Front because the Russians were coming and were generally burning and killing as they came.

When I say the Luftwaffe failed as a fighting force in April 1945, I mean on the Western Front, against Great Britain and the U.S.A. since that is what the Statistical Digest covers - the war in the ETO and other Allied Fronts ... but specifically NOT the Russian Front. On the Russian Front, the people there fought until they died, whether or not there was any ammunition and whether or not they were in the Army. If you were a civilian, you likely got treated as a combatant anyway, so you might as well fight. It was rather brutal. I have never read a good account of the aerial fighting towards the end of the war on the Eastern Front, but the Soviet Air Force was flying missions until the day the war ended and probably later. If there WAS an effective Luftwaffe in early May 1945, it was on the Russian Front, not on the aerial approaches from the U.K.
 
Basically, I was speaking about the Western front. The figures come from the Statistical Digest of World War II, as stated above. I didn't make them up. I am as sure about them as I am about the Statistical Digest ... it is compopsed of the numbers the U.S.A.A.F. statistical team agreed on right after the war, collating the data they had at the time, in formats they were familiar with.

Is it 100% accurate? Not likely, but it is as good as we're going to get.

Hi Greg,

No worries, I wasn't suggesting you made the figures up, and am aware that the Statistical Digest of World War II is a reliable source. I just checked it, and the 4,257 figure is for aircraft destroyed in the air and on the ground: the ground claims totalled 3,703, and the aerial claims totalled 554.

I have never read a good account of the aerial fighting towards the end of the war on the Eastern Front, but the Soviet Air Force was flying missions until the day the war ended and probably later.

I'm working on a book about this very subject at the moment: In the Works - Air War Publications, and it has been really interesting how hard-fought it was on the Eastern Front up until the final days.

Cheers,
Andrew A.
 
Unlike other theatres, ground kills in the ETO are all attributed to fighters, none to bombers per table 167 of the Digest; but then there is the USAF Historical Study no. 70 Tac. ops. of 8th AAF 6.6.44 to 8.5.45 which grants more ground kills to bombers than to fighters during 1944!
 

Attachments

  • EA claims 1944.pdf
    221.6 KB · Views: 55
This might help, USAAF study I got from microfilm

1606820083770.png


1606820136513.png


1606820165248.png
 
From Alfred Price's book, "Dogfights."

"By the end of April (1944) Gen Adolph Galland, the Luftwaffe's Inspector of Fighters, was moved to report to his superiors:"

Between Jan and April 1944 our day fighter arm lost more than 1,000 pilots. They included our best Staffel, Gruppe, and Geschwader commanders .... The time has come when our force is within sight of collapse.

I have also heard that it was the invasion of Sicily that really showed that the Luftwaffe was being bled out. My next door neighbor flew B-25's in the Med and said he could only think of two missions in which there were enemy fighters anywhere near them.
 
Amazing how the numbers increased exponentially on the West. But, stayed around the same on the East. Despite all the new Soviet fighter types.

Nice graph!
 
In January 1945 the Luftwaffe shifted its attention almost entirely to the Eastern Front, after the Vistula-Oder offensive began on 12 January 1945. For example, in February 1945 there were just short of 30,000 sorties by Luftwaffe fighters and ground-attack aircraft, and 25,000 of those were on the Eastern Front. I'd argue that the Luftwaffe was still going strong as a fighting force up to April 1945, just not against the Western Allies. I started drafting a blog post about this very topic earlier this year, and will try and get around to finishing it soon.

Hello Andrew,

Jochen Prien wrote in Jagdgeschwader 53, Vol. 3 (Schiffer Publishing Ltd., Atglen, PA, 1998), pp. 1029, 1063

"A few days later two noteworthy orders were issued by the Reichsmarschall in connection with the ongoing widespread weakening of the fighter arm within the Reich; the first, which appeared on 25 January 1945, said:

Military situation and development in the east demand the calling away and transfer of previously subordinate fighter and close-support units. Stepped-up offensive action must also be expected in the west. We therefore have to meet our Anglo-American opponents in the air with fewer units than before, and consequently we must focus our efforts on providing the army with the air support it needs to continue its difficult defensive struggle to protect the homeland. I know that every brave and right-thinking airman of the Geschwader and Gruppen under my command feels exactly the same way and will do everything in his power to inflict damage on the enemy at every opportunity through ruthless aggressiveness. The hour is more than serious, you can only use complete men who are determined to give their utmost. Everything is at stake. Hail to victory and to the Führer!"

"The following is taken from an order issued by the Luftwaffe command on 5 February 1945:

"...Because of increased defensive consumption in the east new operational directives have been issued for Luftwaffe operations in the west. The results, as they pertain to the units subordinated to the corps headquarters:
(a)Strictest limiting of fighter operations to really promising situations."


Have you come across these orders/directives during your research?
 
I read that between Jan 1944 and Jan 1945 the Luftwaffe lost something like 20,000 aircraft that were in the process of being delivered from the factories to the operational units.
 
I read that between Jan 1944 and Jan 1945 the Luftwaffe lost something like 20,000 aircraft that were in the process of being delivered from the factories to the operational units.

An additional point is that (at least according to american USSBS investigators) - Speer invented 8000 fighters which didnt exist.

This was done by "recategorizing" all repaired or refitted aircraft as "new". This made his production figures look very good, but
meant that 8000 "new" fighters actually never existed as brand new additional planes.
 
An additional point is that (at least according to american USSBS investigators) - Speer invented 8000 fighters which didnt exist.

This was done by "recategorizing" all repaired or refitted aircraft as "new". This made his production figures look very good, but
meant that 8000 "new" fighters actually never existed as brand new additional planes.
Ah that Speer, always was crafty as a box of foxes.
 

Users who are viewing this thread

Back