MIflyer
1st Lieutenant
I understand that the 30,000 produced number sometimes cited for the BF-109 includes remanufactured aircraft.
When did German fighter pilot quality start to decline?
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I understand that the 30,000 produced number sometimes cited for the BF-109 includes remanufactured aircraft.
Andrew Arthy
Airman 1st Class
Hi Mike,
There are a whole lot of quotes like those in the Luftwaffe records around late-January and early February 1945, such as the attached.
Desperate times called for desperate measures! I just checked Don Caldwell's The Luftwaffe Over Germany and Day Fighters in Defence of the Reich, but surprisingly he doesn't say much about the eastward transfer of so many Jagdgruppen. However, Christer Bergström talks about it a little in his Bagration to Berlin book.
Caldwell is mainly focused on the Reichsluftverteidigung and thus the units involved in the Defence of the Reich. He does mention in the intro to chapter 9 of Day Fighters that 'Twenty fighter Gruppen were withdrawn from the west and sent east to counter the Soviet juggernaut'. He goes on to mention that these included Jg 1, Jg 3 and Jg 11, the most senior of the home defence Geschwader.
Mike Williams
Senior Airman
- 572
- Oct 19, 2006
Thanks Andrew! My focus has been more on the West front and the impact that these orders regarding shifting of units, fuel etc. east had on operations of 2nd TAF, 8th and 9th AF units. I don't recall coming across any relevant primary source references but I do know of these secondary sources that speak to this:
Messerschmitt BF 109 im Einsantz bei Stab und I./Jagdeschwader 27, Jochen Prien, Peter Rodeike, Gerhard Stemmer, page 485
Nachdem am 12.Januar 1945 im Osten der sowjetische Grossenangriff auf das reich begonnen hatte und die Rote Armee in den folgenden Tagen die deutsche Abwehrfront an vielen Stellen durchbrechen und weit nach Westen vordringen konnte, erfoolgte eine grundlegende Schwerpunktverlagerrung des deutchen Luftwaffeneinsatzes nach Osten un wurde die grösste Umgruppierung eingeleitet, die die Luftwaffe seit Beginn des Überfalls auf die Sowjetunion dreieinhalb Jahre zuvor durchgeführt hatte. Der Abwehreinsatz über dem Westen und die Reichverteidigung wurden auf ein Mindestmass zurückgeschraubt, um möglichst zahlreiche fliegende Verbände und Flakeinheiten für den Osten frei-zubekommen. Im Bereich Luftwaffenkommandos west verblieben danach die JG 2, 26, 27 und der grösste Teil des JG 53 während für die Reichverteidigung danach nur noch die JG 300 und 301 sowie die meisten NJ-Verbände zur Verfügung standen; die Einsatzbereitschaft dieser Einheiten wurde noch dadurch geschwächt, dass die Osten eingesetzten Verbände bei der Vertleiung der weiterhin ässerst knappen Treibstoffvorräte bevorzugt bedacht wurden. Zugleich mussten die Gruppen einen erheblichen Teil des Bodenpersonals - dabei vor allem die jüngeren Jahrgänge - an Fallschirmjäge-reinheiten sowie an Verbände des Heeres und der Waffen-SS abgeben, für die Ersatz weibkichesPersonal zu den Verbänden kam, das in vielen Bereichen, vor allem in den technischen, erst angelernt werden musste.
(translation - After the large Soviet attack on the Reich began in the east on January 12, 1945 and the Red Army was able to break through the German defensive front in many places and advance far to the west, a fundamental shift in the focus of German air force operations to the east took place Largest regrouping initiated by the Air Force since the attack on the Soviet Union began three and a half years earlier. The defense operation over the west and the defense of the empire were reduced to a minimum in order to get as many airborne units and flak units as possible free for the east. In the area of the Luftwaffenkommandos West, JG 2, 26, 27 and most of JG 53 remained, while JG 300 and 301 and most of the NJ units were then available for the defense of the Reich; the operational readiness of these units was further weakened by the fact that the units deployed in the east were given preferential consideration in distributing the still extremely scarce fuel supplies. At the same time, the groups had to hand over a considerable part of the ground personnel - especially the younger generation - to parachute units as well as to units of the Army and the Waffen-SS, for which replacement female personnel came to the units, in many areas, especially in the technical one had to be learned first.)
Jochen Prien & G. Stemmer, Jagdgeschwader 3 "Udet" in World War II, Vol 1., (Schiffer Publishing Ltd., Atglen, PA, 2002), p.378-379.
A Wehrmacht Operations Staff memo dated 19/1/1945 stated that "a high degree of forces are to be concentrated for the great decisive battle in the eastern theater at the conscious acceptance of the associated serious risk in the western theater". For the air defense that meant that the flak would bear the main of subsequent defensive operations in the west, while the bulk of the flying units were to be deployed in the east to support the army. To this end the units deployed in the east were to receive priority in the allocation of the last remaining reserves of fuel. The memo went on to say: "The available fuel is to be allocated accordingly".
John Weal, Jagdgeschwader 27 'Africa', (Osprey Publishing Limited, Oxford, 2003), p. 117.
"As one of the few Jagdgeschwader remaining on the western front (the majority having been rushed eastwards in a vain attempt to repel the Red tide), JG 27's activities were curtailed by a new OKL directive severely restricting fighter operations in the west. This permitted missions to be flown "only in those situations promising a real chance of success". Also many of the Geschwader's ground personnel were now being transferred to infantry duties."
Werner Girbig, Six Months to Oblivion, The Defeat of the Luftwaffe Fighter Force Over the Western Front, (Schiffer Publishing Ltd., West Chester, PA, 1991
After the transfer of large number of fighter units to the Eastern Front in mid-January, only four day fighter Geschwader remained available to the Home Defense Forces and Luftflotte Headquarters West. And all four were well below strength. The Allied bombers in their hordes droned their way across Germany every day. The raids continued with unabated weight. Augsburg, Hamburg, Magdeburg, Paderborn, Bielefeld, Mannheim, Heilbronn, Duisburg, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Kassel, Hamm, Münster - these were just the main bomber targets for the second half of the month.
The German air defenses in the I Jagdkorps' area had by now become virtually meaningless. Losses amounted to almost 30% of sorties flown, while kills did not even amount to 0.2% of the Allies aircraft committed."
Hans Ring and Werner Girbig, Jagdgeschwader 27, (Motorbuch Verlag, Stuggart, 1994), pp. 307-311
Im Laufe des Monats muß das Geschwader fast das gesamte Personal der jüngeren Jahrgänge abgeben. Sie werden allen möglichen Verbänden des Heeres, der SS und der Luftwaffenfelddivisionen eingliedert.In diese Zeit hinein erreicht das Geschwader ein Befehl, dem heute und an dieser Stelle einen Kommentar hinzufügen wohl überflüssig is.
Aufgrund erhöhten Abwehrverbrauchs im Osten sind durch das OKL neue Answeisungen für den Luftwaffeneneinsatz im Westen befohlen worden: "Schärfste Einschränkung des Jageinsatzes auf nur wirklich erfolgversprechende Lagen..."
Aber wann bieten jetzt noch einmal solche erfolgversprechenden Lagen? Und so wird gemäß der neuen Anweisung fast nicht mehr geflogen.Sechs Wochen lang wartet das Geschwader am Boden, nur hin und wieder einmal ein Einsatz.
(translation - During the month the squadron has to hand over almost all of its younger generation personnel. They are incorporated into all possible units of the Army, the SS and the Luftwaffe field divisions. During this time, the squadron received an order to which it is probably superfluous to add a comment today.
Due to increased defense consumption in the east, the OKL issued new instructions for the air force deployment in the west: "The strictest restriction of the hunting deployment to only really promising situations ..."
But when will such promising locations be offered again? And so, according to the new instructions, there is almost no flight anymore. The squadron waits on the ground for six weeks, only an occasional mission.)
Cheers, Mike
for the data available on luftarchive.de the neubau production of 109 is 30,573 from 1st september '39 to 31st march '45
drgondog
Major
Many rational thoughts were provided above regarding the decline in pilot skills.
IMO the most important were:
1942-early 1943
The stripping of instructor pilots across Germany to move them (mostly) to the East to support operations against the USSR.
The balance between aviation fuel and diesel fuel was always in favor of Diesel through 1943
The inadequacy of fuel supplies from Synthetic operations crippled ground and air operations
The failure of German high command to recognize the threat posed by 8th AF on German industry resulted in not increasing fighter pilot capacity and first measures were to re-educate bomber and transport pilots to fill the gap in fighter pilot delivery.
Blitz Week in July, Tidal Wave and Schweinfurt/Regensburg in August 1943 - the Schweinfurt in October- both alarmed (Hamburg/Ploesti and Schweinfurt potential disasters for Germany if follow up had been possible) and comforted because of the huge losses inflicted on USAAF Strategic bombing inventory of aircraft and trained crews - along with knowledge that Fall/Winter daylight ops would lose potency with Continent bad weather. That said, LW High Command were also hoping that the huge losses they were inflicting on both day and night operations would place political pressures on US to abandon daylight operations and retreat to retrain for night ops - giving Germany more time to refresh and re-arm in the west,
1944-mid 1944
The arrival of P-38 in late Fall 1943 was a shock to the use of T/E day and night fighter deployment beyond range of P-47C/D, in layered defense, and the introduction of the P-51B was a complete shock as that fighter was as good or better at bomber altitudes over all of Germany, that attrition of Day Fighter pilot and aircraft inventory forced re-deployment from Ost and Sud of 30+ Staffeln to Defense of the Reich over the next several months - to no avail. It was in this cycle that the average LW fighter pilot skills were distinctly less than RAF/US counterparts - and for the first time, thee were no safe havens free from day fighter bomber and fighter pressure. Recall, that the re-inforcement from Ost and Sud, brought many combat experienced pilots into LuftFlotte Reich and 3 - and these were basically thrust into the meatgrinder from both 8th and 15th AF operations.
By March/April Galland and Schmid were confronted with the reality that a.) the training program could not catch up to the losses, b.) that neither the improved Bf 109G and FW 190A's could attain even local air superiority, and c.) the Me 262 while potent could not reach operational numbers fast enough to stem the tide.
One factor (primarily ETO) related to lack of instrument flying training and skills - greatly limiting tactical and training operations in defense in winter/spring 1944. It was a factor of some importance but hard to quantify.
IMO the most important were:
1942-early 1943
The stripping of instructor pilots across Germany to move them (mostly) to the East to support operations against the USSR.
The balance between aviation fuel and diesel fuel was always in favor of Diesel through 1943
The inadequacy of fuel supplies from Synthetic operations crippled ground and air operations
The failure of German high command to recognize the threat posed by 8th AF on German industry resulted in not increasing fighter pilot capacity and first measures were to re-educate bomber and transport pilots to fill the gap in fighter pilot delivery.
Blitz Week in July, Tidal Wave and Schweinfurt/Regensburg in August 1943 - the Schweinfurt in October- both alarmed (Hamburg/Ploesti and Schweinfurt potential disasters for Germany if follow up had been possible) and comforted because of the huge losses inflicted on USAAF Strategic bombing inventory of aircraft and trained crews - along with knowledge that Fall/Winter daylight ops would lose potency with Continent bad weather. That said, LW High Command were also hoping that the huge losses they were inflicting on both day and night operations would place political pressures on US to abandon daylight operations and retreat to retrain for night ops - giving Germany more time to refresh and re-arm in the west,
1944-mid 1944
The arrival of P-38 in late Fall 1943 was a shock to the use of T/E day and night fighter deployment beyond range of P-47C/D, in layered defense, and the introduction of the P-51B was a complete shock as that fighter was as good or better at bomber altitudes over all of Germany, that attrition of Day Fighter pilot and aircraft inventory forced re-deployment from Ost and Sud of 30+ Staffeln to Defense of the Reich over the next several months - to no avail. It was in this cycle that the average LW fighter pilot skills were distinctly less than RAF/US counterparts - and for the first time, thee were no safe havens free from day fighter bomber and fighter pressure. Recall, that the re-inforcement from Ost and Sud, brought many combat experienced pilots into LuftFlotte Reich and 3 - and these were basically thrust into the meatgrinder from both 8th and 15th AF operations.
By March/April Galland and Schmid were confronted with the reality that a.) the training program could not catch up to the losses, b.) that neither the improved Bf 109G and FW 190A's could attain even local air superiority, and c.) the Me 262 while potent could not reach operational numbers fast enough to stem the tide.
One factor (primarily ETO) related to lack of instrument flying training and skills - greatly limiting tactical and training operations in defense in winter/spring 1944. It was a factor of some importance but hard to quantify.
MIflyer
1st Lieutenant
And despite the absolute numerous advantage of VVS in 1944-1945... It probably could be explained if we know more details about the Soviet training program and about pilots quality evaluations in that period. I have never seen a research of this subject (and I read Russian).
Here's a two-part article that summarizes a lot of the points made above, plus provides some additional details.
Part 1 sets up the structure of pilot training, as it was originally designed to work:
Pilot Training of the Luftwaffe
Part 2 covers 1942-45, which is more the answer to the original question:
Pilot Training mid- and late-war
Part 1 sets up the structure of pilot training, as it was originally designed to work:
Pilot Training of the Luftwaffe
Part 2 covers 1942-45, which is more the answer to the original question:
Pilot Training mid- and late-war
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Due to fuel shortage, training is reduced so you can meet your goal for number of pilots graduated. Sounds like the German high command were MBA grads; meet the metrics for this quarter and don't worry about the consequences. But the MBA's can move to another company after they run one into the ground; the Germans couldn't hope for anything better than moving to Argentina..
Escuadrilla Azul
Tech Sergeant
- 1,851
- Feb 27, 2020
As stated in "Strategy for Defeat. The Luftwaffe
1933-1945" by WILLIAMSON MURRAY, only 8 of Germany's 107 aces to score more than 100 victories joined their squadrons after mid-1942, quoted from Ernest Obermaier, Die Ritterkreuzträger der Luftwaffe, Vol. I (Mainz, 1970), p. 21.
Just curious if it breaks out where those 8 were predominantly based.
Cheers,
Biff
Escuadrilla Azul
Tech Sergeant
- 1,851
- Feb 27, 2020
Hi, in "Strategy" it didn´t. I guess it does in Obermaier, but I don´t have anyway to check it. Perhaps someone in the forum got it and can answer the question. My guess is that at least 7 of the 8 were from the Eastern Front.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
Top aces like Barkhorn were more active on the Eastern Front.
Barkhorn (assigned JG2 in 1940) served mostly with JG52.
Rall (assigned JG52 in 1939) served with JG52.
Kittel (assigned JG54 in 1941) served with JG54.
Nowotny (assigned JG54 in 1941) served mostly with JG54.
Batz (assigned 2./JGr Ost in 1942) served mostly with JG52.
So these top 5 Experten listed, acheived their scores on the Eastern front and it's interesting to also note that they were all in service with the Luftwaffe before 1942, including Batz, who joined the Luftwaffe in 1935 and was a flight instructor before transferring to a combat unit.
Barkhorn (assigned JG2 in 1940) served mostly with JG52.
Rall (assigned JG52 in 1939) served with JG52.
Kittel (assigned JG54 in 1941) served with JG54.
Nowotny (assigned JG54 in 1941) served mostly with JG54.
Batz (assigned 2./JGr Ost in 1942) served mostly with JG52.
So these top 5 Experten listed, acheived their scores on the Eastern front and it's interesting to also note that they were all in service with the Luftwaffe before 1942, including Batz, who joined the Luftwaffe in 1935 and was a flight instructor before transferring to a combat unit.
swampyankee
Chief Master Sergeant
- 4,028
- Jun 25, 2013
How does one evaluate pilot quality? At one extreme, when the Luftwaffe and Germany was on the grand strategic offensives of the early war, its pilots were operating against relatively ill-prepared air forces: France, Poland, the USSR, and the RAF and largely dictating the time and place of engagements. During the Battle of Britain, the RAF was still operating in a defensive posture, but was beginning to benefit from increases in both aircraft quantity and quality, but was still struggling with getting adequately trained pilots. By 1943, the Luftwaffe was on the strategic defensive and, equally importantly, was facing air forces that were no longer ill-prepared. In other words, the relative quality of Luftwaffe pilots was decreasing, regardless of any changes in its training practices. Certainly before the D-Day invasion, the Luftwaffe was also facing air forces which were, in many ways, technologically and numerically superior and, increasingly, operationally superior, and the Luftwaffe was forced more and more into a purely defensive posture against the Western Allies and was facing an air force which was effectively exploiting the Luftwaffe's weaknesses on the Eastern Front.
There is no need to postulate that Luftwaffe pilot quality decreased in some absolute sense, although it certainly did in a relative sense, at least until mid-1944. Of course, once Germany had no safe airfields at which to train pilots, pilot quality was going to decrease in an absolute sense, but by the time that happened, the strategic air campaign had already been won by the Allies. In the East, the Heer was losing on the ground, and the Luftwaffe was increasingly unable to provide the sort of tactical air support that was the hallmark of Blitzkrieg, although it hadn't yet lost there, but it was also unable to go on the offensive.
Of course, the Luftwaffe's policy of keeping successful pilots in combat would also reduce those same pilots' potential for improving the combat effectiveness of pilots before they get sent to front line units and likely reduced the effectiveness of the median pilot, as those Experten would not have a formal system in which to impart their skills and knowledge.
There is no need to postulate that Luftwaffe pilot quality decreased in some absolute sense, although it certainly did in a relative sense, at least until mid-1944. Of course, once Germany had no safe airfields at which to train pilots, pilot quality was going to decrease in an absolute sense, but by the time that happened, the strategic air campaign had already been won by the Allies. In the East, the Heer was losing on the ground, and the Luftwaffe was increasingly unable to provide the sort of tactical air support that was the hallmark of Blitzkrieg, although it hadn't yet lost there, but it was also unable to go on the offensive.
Of course, the Luftwaffe's policy of keeping successful pilots in combat would also reduce those same pilots' potential for improving the combat effectiveness of pilots before they get sent to front line units and likely reduced the effectiveness of the median pilot, as those Experten would not have a formal system in which to impart their skills and knowledge.
Luftwaffe Aircraft Losses By Theatre September 1943 - October 1944
don-caldwell.we.bs/jg26/thtrlosses.htm (don-caldwell.we.bs)
don-caldwell.we.bs/jg26/thtrlosses.htm (don-caldwell.we.bs)
fastmongrel
1st Sergeant
I was surprised how many aircraft were lost in the Italian Balkan theatre. I always had the impression that the region was relatively quiet in terms of air combat.
Escuadrilla Azul
Tech Sergeant
- 1,851
- Feb 27, 2020
In "Day Fighters in Defense of the Reich" Don Caldwell said that 12 Luftwaffe pilots were credited with 100+ victories over Western Allies.
GrauGeist
Generalfeldmarschall zur Luftschiff Abteilung
There were some that did not go to the Eastern front, but of the top ten "Experten", only Bärr had had a higher victory tally of western aircraft, though he did have about 95 or so eastern front victories.
