Hi Mike,
There are a whole lot of quotes like those in the
Luftwaffe records around late-January and early February 1945, such as the attached.
View attachment 603479
Desperate times called for desperate measures! I just checked Don Caldwell's
The Luftwaffe Over Germany and
Day Fighters in Defence of the Reich, but surprisingly he doesn't say much about the eastward transfer of so many
Jagdgruppen. However, Christer Bergström talks about it a little in his
Bagration to Berlin book.
Thanks Andrew! My focus has been more on the West front and the impact that these orders regarding shifting of units, fuel etc. east had on operations of 2nd TAF, 8th and 9th AF units. I don't recall coming across any relevant primary source references but I do know of these secondary sources that speak to this:
Messerschmitt BF 109 im Einsantz bei Stab und I./Jagdeschwader 27, Jochen Prien, Peter Rodeike, Gerhard Stemmer, page 485
Nachdem am 12.Januar 1945 im Osten der sowjetische Grossenangriff auf das reich begonnen hatte und die Rote Armee in den folgenden Tagen die deutsche Abwehrfront an vielen Stellen durchbrechen und weit nach Westen vordringen konnte, erfoolgte eine grundlegende Schwerpunktverlagerrung des deutchen Luftwaffeneinsatzes nach Osten un wurde die grösste Umgruppierung eingeleitet, die die Luftwaffe seit Beginn des Überfalls auf die Sowjetunion dreieinhalb Jahre zuvor durchgeführt hatte. Der Abwehreinsatz über dem Westen und die Reichverteidigung wurden auf ein Mindestmass zurückgeschraubt, um möglichst zahlreiche fliegende Verbände und Flakeinheiten für den Osten frei-zubekommen. Im Bereich Luftwaffenkommandos west verblieben danach die JG 2, 26, 27 und der grösste Teil des JG 53 während für die Reichverteidigung danach nur noch die JG 300 und 301 sowie die meisten NJ-Verbände zur Verfügung standen; die Einsatzbereitschaft dieser Einheiten wurde noch dadurch geschwächt, dass die Osten eingesetzten Verbände bei der Vertleiung der weiterhin ässerst knappen Treibstoffvorräte bevorzugt bedacht wurden. Zugleich mussten die Gruppen einen erheblichen Teil des Bodenpersonals - dabei vor allem die jüngeren Jahrgänge - an Fallschirmjäge-reinheiten sowie an Verbände des Heeres und der Waffen-SS abgeben, für die Ersatz weibkichesPersonal zu den Verbänden kam, das in vielen Bereichen, vor allem in den technischen, erst angelernt werden musste.
(translation - After the large Soviet attack on the Reich began in the east on January 12, 1945 and the Red Army was able to break through the German defensive front in many places and advance far to the west, a fundamental shift in the focus of German air force operations to the east took place Largest regrouping initiated by the Air Force since the attack on the Soviet Union began three and a half years earlier. The defense operation over the west and the defense of the empire were reduced to a minimum in order to get as many airborne units and flak units as possible free for the east. In the area of the Luftwaffenkommandos West, JG 2, 26, 27 and most of JG 53 remained, while JG 300 and 301 and most of the NJ units were then available for the defense of the Reich; the operational readiness of these units was further weakened by the fact that the units deployed in the east were given preferential consideration in distributing the still extremely scarce fuel supplies. At the same time, the groups had to hand over a considerable part of the ground personnel - especially the younger generation - to parachute units as well as to units of the Army and the Waffen-SS, for which replacement female personnel came to the units, in many areas, especially in the technical one had to be learned first.)
Jochen Prien & G. Stemmer, Jagdgeschwader 3 "Udet" in World War II, Vol 1., (Schiffer Publishing Ltd., Atglen, PA, 2002), p.378-379.
A Wehrmacht Operations Staff memo dated 19/1/1945 stated that "a high degree of forces are to be concentrated for the great decisive battle in the eastern theater at the conscious acceptance of the associated serious risk in the western theater". For the air defense that meant that the flak would bear the main of subsequent defensive operations in the west, while the bulk of the flying units were to be deployed in the east to support the army. To this end the units deployed in the east were to receive priority in the allocation of the last remaining reserves of fuel. The memo went on to say: "The available fuel is to be allocated accordingly".
John Weal, Jagdgeschwader 27 'Africa', (Osprey Publishing Limited, Oxford, 2003), p. 117.
"As one of the few Jagdgeschwader remaining on the western front (the majority having been rushed eastwards in a vain attempt to repel the Red tide), JG 27's activities were curtailed by a new OKL directive severely restricting fighter operations in the west. This permitted missions to be flown "only in those situations promising a real chance of success". Also many of the Geschwader's ground personnel were now being transferred to infantry duties."
Werner Girbig, Six Months to Oblivion, The Defeat of the Luftwaffe Fighter Force Over the Western Front, (Schiffer Publishing Ltd., West Chester, PA, 1991
After the transfer of large number of fighter units to the Eastern Front in mid-January, only four day fighter Geschwader remained available to the Home Defense Forces and Luftflotte Headquarters West. And all four were well below strength. The Allied bombers in their hordes droned their way across Germany every day. The raids continued with unabated weight. Augsburg, Hamburg, Magdeburg, Paderborn, Bielefeld, Mannheim, Heilbronn, Duisburg, Düsseldorf, Cologne, Kassel, Hamm, Münster - these were just the main bomber targets for the second half of the month.
The German air defenses in the I Jagdkorps' area had by now become virtually meaningless. Losses amounted to almost 30% of sorties flown, while kills did not even amount to 0.2% of the Allies aircraft committed."
Hans Ring and Werner Girbig, Jagdgeschwader 27, (Motorbuch Verlag, Stuggart, 1994), pp. 307-311
Im Laufe des Monats muß das Geschwader fast das gesamte Personal der jüngeren Jahrgänge abgeben. Sie werden allen möglichen Verbänden des Heeres, der SS und der Luftwaffenfelddivisionen eingliedert.In diese Zeit hinein erreicht das Geschwader ein Befehl, dem heute und an dieser Stelle einen Kommentar hinzufügen wohl überflüssig is.
Aufgrund erhöhten Abwehrverbrauchs im Osten sind durch das OKL neue Answeisungen für den Luftwaffeneneinsatz im Westen befohlen worden: "Schärfste Einschränkung des Jageinsatzes auf nur wirklich erfolgversprechende Lagen..."
Aber wann bieten jetzt noch einmal solche erfolgversprechenden Lagen? Und so wird gemäß der neuen Anweisung fast nicht mehr geflogen.Sechs Wochen lang wartet das Geschwader am Boden, nur hin und wieder einmal ein Einsatz.
(translation - During the month the squadron has to hand over almost all of its younger generation personnel. They are incorporated into all possible units of the Army, the SS and the Luftwaffe field divisions. During this time, the squadron received an order to which it is probably superfluous to add a comment today.
Due to increased defense consumption in the east, the OKL issued new instructions for the air force deployment in the west: "The strictest restriction of the hunting deployment to only really promising situations ..."
But when will such promising locations be offered again? And so, according to the new instructions, there is almost no flight anymore. The squadron waits on the ground for six weeks, only an occasional mission.)
Cheers, Mike