Why American aces had lower scores than anybody else

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As to the original thread question, US aces had lower scores in aerial victories because the US was in the war later. By the time the aircrews were trained and deployed it was even later.
Also, when they did arrive, there was a multitude of them. By 1944, most flying was done by the US. There were fewer Axis aircraft to engage the US fliers. Attrition and the preponderance of Allied aircraft meant less to "go around."
The RAF, RAAF, RNZAF, FAA, PAF, Soviet, French, et al. had a three year jump. They were holding the line while we were dancing to Artie Shaw. And when the US arrived, they had to compete against seasoned pilots for a dwindling resource. IMHO.
 
Add to the number of reasons, is that US fighter pilots flew 'tours' of specified number of either missions or hours before returning to States for leave and frequent re-assignment, often in Training Command to enrich new pilots with their experiences.

The number of aces in high teens or 20s that went home and never came back include Thornell (352nd), Gentile (4th) for example. Two very talented hunters that perhaps would have exceeded McGuire/Bong, Johnson and Gabreski - or Johnny Johnson RAF and perhaps matched the top Soviet aces with a second tour.
 

You keep looking at specific months and ignore the clearly obvious overall trend.

Consider the graph below. It uses the data from Army Air Forces Statistical Digest — World War II.

The combined total of combat sorties in the ETO and MTO are shown in blue on the left axis, with the figures coming from Table 118. The combined total of losses to enemy fighters in the ETO and MTO are shown in red on the right axis, with the figures coming Table 159 and 160, respectively.



Notice how as the number of combat sorties rose, Luftwaffe fighters inflicted losses commensurate with that increase. Even with the sustained rise in combat sorties from October 1943 onward, losses to Luftwaffe fighters kept pace. The parallel between combat sorties and losses to enemy fighters up through April 1944 is clearly visible.

But look what happens after April 1944. Losses to Luftwaffe fighters don't just flat-line, they drop. Sharply. Losses to enemy fighters diverge dramatically from combat sorties. The ability of Luftwaffe fighters to shoot down U.S. aircraft declined markedly. Had the effectiveness seen previously continued, then in May 1944 the U.S. would have lost closer to 900 aircraft instead of the 499 which were actually shot down, and in June 1944 it would have lost in the area of 1,000 aircraft to enemy fighters instead of the 445 actually lost.

April 1944 was clearly the high-water mark of Luftwaffe fighter effectiveness. Afterward, its fortunes declined, with a clear downward trend for the remainder of the war.

While it never lost the ability to inflict losses on U.S. aircraft, the effectiveness at which Luftwaffe fighters could inflict such losses clearly fell.
 
dedalos said:
The American daylight bomber offensive was absolutely impossible for any other nation.
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Bomber Command's offensive rivalled that of the USAAF offensive in terms of tonnage of bombs dropped:

1943 = 176,352 tons by Bomber Command; 50,179 tons by 8th and 15th Air Forces combined
1944 = 571,057 tons by Bomber Command; 617,520 tons by 8th and 15th Air Forces combined
1945 = 198,835 tons by Bomber Command; 278,216 tons by 8th and 15th Air Forces combined

That's a total of 946,244 tons of bombs dropped by Bomber Command from 1943-45, and 945,915 tons dropped by the 8th and 15th Air Forces combined during the same period.

There is the idea that all Bomber Command did was incendiary raids on urban areas, but this is not true (the peak year for incendiary bomb usage both in terms of tons dropped and percentage of total tons dropped was 1943). The campaign against the Ruhr from March through July 1943 had a significant effect on German war production, causing it to stagnate for some nine months afterwards.

dedalos said:
And all the other allied countries fought with American weapon systems, or systems that were constructed using American raw materials. They were eating American food. And were standing on American shoes
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The big contribution you missed was oil. As strange as it may seem to people today, during WWII the United States was the single largest producer of crude oil in the world, accounting for over 60% of global output.

dedalos said:
Merlin was the best aero engine of the war , and it was an English design, so what? They had to ask America to help with their production!
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I'd say the Pratt & Whitney R-2800 was just as good as the Merlin. I'd rate the two as being equally important to the Allied aerial effort.



buffnut453 said:
In all likelihood, Russia would still have defeated Nazi Germany.
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I'd agree, but it probably would have taken an additional two years, depending on how much we estimate the degree of contribution made by Lend-Lease and the bomber offensive.
 
While the US was by far the biggest producer of oil and oil products during WWII that is not the same as having it all available for military operations, pre war the oil was being used by mostly civilians and as a result the US and the places it was exporting to had built oil based economies requiring a certain minimum supply, and the economy had major expansion during the war, including oil production. So in 1940 US oil consumption was 1,400,000 barrels per day, with 1% of that by the military, in 1945 consumption was 1,800,000 barrels per day of which 29% was military, in other words total non military consumption had declined by about 106,000 barrels per day, under 8%. US production in 1940, 3,697,000 barrels of crude per day, in 1945 4,695,000 barrels per day. In 1940 the US was exporting 316,606 barrels per day, 44.4% of which was crude, in 1945 472,839 barrels per day, 20.5% as crude.

Lend Lease had little to do with the survival into 1942 of the non US forces, most Lend Lease statistics use the date of departure from North America, not adding the weeks to months it then took to reach the front line, making its early impact seem larger. In its favour there is the finished product effect, steel instead of coal and iron ore, flour instead of grain and so on. The USSR really appreciated the radio in every tank and aircraft, enabling better tactics. One possible sub segment of lend lease that could be classified as vital is the chemicals shipped to the USSR, as the USSR explosives industry capacity was heavily hit by the invasion.

From late 1942 onwards Lend Lease usually helped make each allied attack more effective. Against this the loss of merchant shipping in the Americas created shortages of shipping and invasion shipping that constrained allied operations into 1945.

The allied decision was made to mobilise North America more along production and financial aid first, military power second.

The recapture by the Red Army in the winter of 1941/42 of the Mosbas coal fields around Moscow was also important.
 
If that's how YOU want to look at it, go ahead. Enjoy. I have the Statistical Digest, too. It makes nice charts, huh?
 
GregP said:
If that's how YOU want to look at it, go ahead. Enjoy. I have the Statistical Digest, too. It makes nice charts, huh?
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You earlier made the statement that "Allied losses were higher in Sep 44 than at any point in 43." This statement is true. However, your conclusion based on that true statement, that "The Luftwaffe didn't decline substantially in 1944 in the ETO" does not take into account that Luftwaffe success continued to grow rapidly until April of 1944, but then began to decline rapidly from that April high point. Saying that the Luftwaffe's performance in 1944 did not decline would be like saying that the stock market, if it had a similar graph, did not decline in 1944. Anybody who bought stocks in April of 1944 would disagree with that statement. Somebody could just as easily say that the Luftwaffe did not decline between 1943 and 1945, since it did better in March of 1945 than in March of 1943.
Why not just acknowledge that 33k's graph does indeed show a serious Luftwaffe decline in 1944 after peaking in April?
 
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In all this surely you must consider what the allies were actually doing in 1944, Operation Argument, support for D-Day, D-Day itself. Operation Bagration, breakout from Normandy etc etc etc.
 

The Luftwaffe WAS declining in ability, but not until after mid-1944. Very definitely not from 1941 as has been offered earlier.

Though the Luftwaffe was declining, actual losses weren't necessarily declining. It doesn't matter that the sorties increased, the fact is the losses were serious and reasonably high, with a few exceptions in a couple of months. When the Luftwaffe decided to take issue with some mission, they could. The Luftwaffe was still offering losses up until mid-April 1945, after which they collapsed almost totally.

In general, they started out as a formidable force but didn't make good their losses, at least in experienced pilots. That is a recipe for eventual major problems, and they wound up with those problems. Any military force that doesn't see training as essential for continued superior results on operations is doomed to lose its effectiveness at some point. People who don't train replacements well just aren't very effective after awhile. With WWII-type wartime attrition, it became evident semi-rapidly, but the expert cadre was still effective ... just dwindling in number.
 
pbehn said:
In all this surely you must consider what the allies were actually doing in 1944, Operation Argument, support for D-Day, D-Day itself. Operation Bagration, breakout from Normandy etc etc etc.
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Right. In particular, if I recall my history correctly, Eisenhower made it a point to break the back of the Luftwaffe and secure complete air superiority by the time D-Day arrived. The graph that 33k shared is pretty convincing evidence that the Allies succeeded in this.
 
GregP said:
The Luftwaffe WAS declining in ability, but not until after mid-1944. Very definitely not from 1941 as has been offered earlier.
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That was not the point I was addressing, whether or not it had come up earlier. I was speaking only to the assertion that "The Luftwaffe didn't decline substantially in 1944 in the ETO." Clearly it did, so why not just acknowledge the point? If you want to add a "However. . ." feel free to do so, but the way you worded it made it almost seem like you were brushing off 33k's information as though he were merely expressing an opinion. Maybe that's not what you meant to say, but that's the way it seemed to me. If you would like to clarify, I would welcome it.
 
The earlier discussion stated categorically that the Luftwaffe was declining from 1941 and implied heavily that it was never a serious threat.

In fact, the Luftwaffe WAS a credible, serious threat and, had it been utilized correctly, even WITH the lack of training consideration, it could have been a major factor and might have won the war. The main reason Germany DIDN'T win the war was the fact the Hitler attacked the Soviet Union. If not for that, they STILL might have won or at least forced a peace on their terms.

I simply do not believe the Luftwaffe was poorly run on operations. They were poorly run in the highest offices. The rank and file were good officers, Nazi or not, and were capable of delivering when it counted. They were betrayed by their own leader who refused to listen to his commanders when they gave advice. That was a GOOD thing since it undermined the German war effort considerably. The procurement and development arms were also somewhat inept. They DID manage to produce a fair number or airplanes. They just had no idea what to develop, so they wasted a LOT of effort trying to develop everything all at once instead of concentrating on a few good aircraft that could be used to good effect. It seems that even being a competent designer and company couldn't get past political infighting. That is a failure in leadership since there was no "congress" or other political body that needed to approve things. The Nazis could do that without all the extraneous fanfare ... and simply didn't.

The main failure started with Hitler and his immediate deputies. Hitler and Goering together could somehow manage to fail to boil water over a fire. But, they'd surely LOOK like they were doing it well.
 
I would disagree that Eisenhower was the prime mover for 8th AF/9th AF. Arnold was getting serious input, particularly from General Lawrence Kuter, the Allied intelligence was reporting significant strength buildup of LW opposing Daylight operations from South and West in late 1943 citing the activity as a threat to the Invasion.

On December 27, 1943 Arnold issued a message to 8th and 9th AF "This is my personal message to you - this is a Must - is to destroy the enmy air force wherever you find them, in the air, on the ground, in the factories." furtther, "The prime mission of all US fighters in the UK, until further noticewill be to support and escort heavy bombers enaged in Pointblank.

At the next level, Spaatz reported a single didgit salute from Air Chief Leigh-Mallory, in command of 2 TAF which had loose control of 9th AF. Arnold flew to London for a meeting with Portal and received unconditional support, sitting Leigh-Mallory down. Portal also released delivered P-51B/Mustang IIIs reeived to date to 9th AF 354th FG, then remainder to 357th which was arriving.

At the nd of January, 1944 Doolittle further amplified the message to 'seek and destroy in the air and on the ground', further emphasizing the point by issuing memo that gound destruction would also count towards Ace status..

Both Galland and Schmid reported to US interrogators post VE Day, that that moment in time was as close as they could pinpoint 'the beginning of the end'.

Eisenhower only imposed his authority as SHAEF in the instance of he official end of the Combined Bomber Offensive, April 1, 1944. He exercised command prerogatives when he supported Crossbow and the Transportation campaign - at which time 9th FC was increasingly pulled from 8th AF escort duties - and Spaatz was only availed about 20 days for probably the most effective bombing campaign - namely against Geman Energy industry... ad not resuming until June 12th.
 
I'd like to offer something for consideration on the Luftwaffe strength topic:

Equipment was not a limiting consideration for the Luftwaffe until roughly the last six months of the war. The primary limit on strength was manpower, particularly trained pilots.

In 1942, losses of single-engine pilots averaged 5.75% of strenght per month.
For the first half of 1943, it was 10.2% per month.
For the second half of 1943 it was 13.8% per month.
For the first five months of 1944, it was 19.8% per month.

There were always more machines available than men to fly them.

Quoting Murray in Strategy for Defeat (pp303-312) - bolding mine:

"The loss of aircraft was only one indicator among many as to what was happening to the Luftwaffe. The attrition of pilots and skilled aircrews was perhaps the most important factor in the destruction of the Luftwaffe as an effective fighting force. The rise in the attrition rate for pilots resulted in a steady reduction in the skills and experience of those flying German aircraft. While the losses among the fighter pilots may have been somewhat heavier than for other categories, they undoubtedly reflected what was happening throughout the force structure. The increasing attrition of pilots forced the Germans to curtail training programs to fill empty combat cockpits. As a result, new pilots with less skill than their predecessors were lost at a faster rate.

....

In the period through the late summer of 1942, German pilots were receiving at least as many training hours as their opponents in the RAF. By 1943, that statistic had begun a gradual shift against the Germans until the last half of the year when Luftwaffe pilots were receiving barely one-half of the training hours given to enemy pilots. In terms of flying training in operational aircraft, the disparity had become even more pronounced: one-third of the RAF total and one-fifth of the American total. But those Luftwaffe pilots who had survived the attrition of the first air battles of the war had little difficulty defeating new Allied pilots no matter how many training hours the latter had flown. In fact, the ratio of kills-to-sorties climbed as those Luftwaffe pilots who survived built up experience. However, few German pilots survived the attrition of the first war years, and thus the Luftwaffe became, in fact, two distinct forces: the few great aces--the Hartmans, Galands, and Waldmans--and the great mass of pilots who faced great difficulty in landing their aircraft, much less surviving combat. Only 8 of Germany's 107 aces to score more than 100 victories joined their squadrons after mid-1942."
 
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Would you please offer references for this, particularly the Leigh Mallory salute and also Portal's release of the Mustangs?

Thanks.

jim
 
Hi
Leigh-Mallory was the Air Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) from 15th November, 1943 (previously he had commanded Fighter Command) not just 2 TAF. So he was a senior Allied commander with both British and US air organisations under his command and had a USAAF deputy commander.

Mike
 
JDCAVE said:
Would you please offer references for this, particularly the Leigh Mallory salute and also Portal's release of the Mustangs?

Thanks.

jim
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The single digit salute comment was hyerbole. That said, Leigh-Mallory would not budge until ordered by Portal to stand down

Look to Carl A Spaatz and the Air War in Europe, To Command The Sky, Forged in Fire, to name a a few - IIRC Boylon's USAF Study 136 is also a good reference.

The underlying issue was the nomination of Leigh-Mallory to command the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, including 2TAF and Brereton's Ninth AF. Apparently he assumed two major concepts as fact. 1.) That as AEF Air Force commander, he would have total control of ALL US/UK air assets (including Bomber Command and USSTAFE) to prepare for the invasion, and b.) that destruction of the LW could not be achieved before the Invasion. Further he did not believe that the the LW could be defeated before Overlord.

I made the comment about the P-51B in my last book, because it formed the basis for the argument that Spaatz proposed as crucial to Pointblank. In fact Spaatz wanted to conrol of all US fighter assets in UK inluding the now arriving P-47D and P-38J Fighter Groups during the Strategic Bombing Campaign. The issue became a major issue in the burgoining organizational battles Eisenhower was confronted with as the newly appointed SHEAF.

Spaatz did Not have a problem answering to Tedder, but was adamant that he would ask to be replaced if ordered to release command of 8th and 15th AF combat operations to Leigh-Mallory. Everyone except Roosevelt were at one time or another brought in for this turf war.
 
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