Why American aces had lower scores than anybody else

[GrauGeist]

The sharp reduction in Luftwaffe performance in 1945 was also due to not having enough pilots, fuel, oil and rubber for their aircraft. Which resulted in fewer fighters getting aloft to challenge Allied elements.

Also, the percentages (if one compares ALL years, not cherrypick late war stats) shows there was a clear and unmistakable upswing in Luftwaffe aerial victories through 1944.

 

[GregP]

My numbers were table number calculated in Excel, too. So, we're using the same numbers, except you're using the losses in the ETO only. The Luftwaffe actually flew in the ETO and the MTO, so I'm using the sorties versus Germany. Sorties versus Germany in Jan 1944 were 44,175 per table 118. The Germans actually DID fight in the Med and they fought us, so I count them, too. You may count however you want.

First, I get told to not look at losses, but rather losses to enemy planes. I did and it doesn't track your claim.

Then not to look at losses, but to losses per sortie. I did and it doesn't track your claim.

Now I'm supposed to just look at the ETO because that particular bunch of numbers supports your contention?

The Luftwaffe fought the Allies and not just in Europe. I'm looking at the Allies versus Germany, not just the ETO. But that's just me. I want to look at the strategic situation, not the tactical one. But, hey, look at it any way you like. That's what makes looking at the numbers fun.

I bet I can find a mission where we had no losses and another one where the Germans had no losses. But I'm not saying we flew a lot of missions without losses or victories even though I can find a slice of numbers that support that claim.

Cheers.

 

[33k in the air]

Also, the percentages (if one compares ALL years, not cherrypick late war stats) shows there was a clear and unmistakable upswing in Luftwaffe aerial victories through 1944.

The first four months of 1944, yes. After April, however, losses to Luftwaffe fighters fall visibly. April of 1944 was the peak of the war for U.S. ETO losses to Luftwaffe fighters, with 516. In May losses to enemy fighter dropped to 397, in June it fell to 284, in July, it's down to 150. It would surpass 150 only three times in the remaining nine full months of the war (August, September, and December of 1944, with 163, 241, and 211, respectively).

In the first five months (January through May) of 1944 the total ETO losses attributed to German fighters was 1,587; over the next ten months (June 1944 through March 1945) the losses to enemy fighters was 1,636. Twice the time period to attain a slightly higher total.

Below is the entire August 1942 through April 1945 period. Total sorties from Table 118, total losses to enemy fighters from Table 159. Sortie loss percentage calculated in Excel.

            Total  Losses
Month     Sorties  to E/A   Pct.
----------------------------------
Aug 1942      324     8    2.47%
Sep 1942      423     2    0.47%
Oct 1942      534     9    1.69%
Nov 1942      629    13    2.07%
Dec 1942      543    17    3.13%
--------------------------------
Jan 1943      767    21    2.74%
Feb 1943      976    22    2.25%
Mar 1943    1,564    19    1.21%
Apr 1943      989    33    3.34%
May 1943    3,915    58    1.48%
Jun 1943    4,104    86    2.10%
Jul 1943    5,531    94    1.70%
Aug 1943    5,826   100    1.72%
Sep 1943    9,294    60    0.65%
Oct 1943    7,463   152    2.04%
Nov 1943    9,624   109    1.13%
Dec 1943   13,876   123    0.89%
--------------------------------
Jan 1944   15,183   197    1.30%
Feb 1944   24,425   243    0.99%
Mar 1944   31,950   234    0.73%
Apr 1944   43,434   516    1.19%
May 1944   67,979   397    0.58%
Jun 1944   96,096   284    0.30%
Jul 1944   74,878   150    0.20%
Aug 1944   77,976   163    0.21%
Sep 1944   57,384   241    0.42%
Oct 1944   52,596   135    0.26%
Nov 1944   52,299   131    0.25%
Dec 1944   61,089   211    0.35%
--------------------------------
Jan 1945   47,577   121    0.25%
Feb 1945   68,365    56    0.08%
Mar 1945  111,472   144    0.13%
Apr 1945   79,402   119    0.15%

I don't understand the focus on annual totals when monthly totals are available and which illustrate the trends far better.

 

[GregP]

Turn that argument around and we understand each other. If the Luftwaffe was getting worse by the month, then it surely SHOULD be getting worse by the year. But the loss numbers per combat sorties don;t support that.

I could do the numbers per month, too, just as easily, but they reflect the year, so I used years. The sum of the parts adds up to the whole and the numbers track.

Let's just agree to disagree here. Whichever way it really is, the end result won't change.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

And I'll drill the point home further that post hoc ergo propter hoc -- while ignoring other factors -- will necessarily skew any conclusion you wish to derive. The swing in airpower in 1944 happened for several different reasons: fuel supplies, which affected LW training; 8th AF fighter doctrine which became more aggressive; the longer-ranged P-51s giving the LW less freischutz and less safe bases; and so on.

 

[33k in the air]

My numbers were table number calculated in Excel, too. So, we're using the same numbers, except you're using the losses in the ETO only.

You originally started with ETO numbers as I recall, so I limited figures to that theatre. If you want to include the MTO, fine, but it doesn't change the results.

The MTO specifically saw losses to enemy fighters in the first five months of 1944 (Jan. through May) of 636; over the next eleven months (June 1944 through April 1945), total losses to enemy fighters was 559. Over twice the time period for less than the same amount of losses. That's pretty much the same as seen in the ETO.

For the ETO and MTO combined, the peak for losses to enemy fighters is April 1944 with 669. In May this falls to 499, then falls again to 445 in June, and drops to 291 in July. It rises slightly to 296 in August, and never goes that high again for the rest of the war. For the first five months of 1944 (Jan. through May) the total losses to enemy fighters is 2,223; over the next ten months (June 1944 through March 1945), total losses to enemy fighters was 2,188. That's twice the time period to achieve a slightly lower amount.

Below are the results for the ETO and MTO. I will describe exactly which Tables and columns I am referencing to preclude any confusion. The first page number listed is the page number in the report, while the second is the page number in the PDF.

The ETO and MTO combat sorties flown are from Table 118 (p.220/p.237), "Theaters vs Germany" section, "ETO" and "MTO" columns. The ETO losses to enemy aircraft are from Table 159 (p.255/p.276), "All Types" section, "Enemy Aircraft" column. The MTO losses to enemy aircraft are from Table 160 (p.256/p277), "All Types" section, "Enemy Aircraft" column. Note that "All Types" is the combined losses of heavy bombers, medium & light bombers, and fighters.

The percentage sortie loss figures are calculated in Excel, along with the ETO+MTO combined total of sorties and losses.

                     ETO                       MTO                   Total    
           ---------------------     --------------------    ---------------------
Month      Sorties   E/A    Pct.     Sorties   E/A   Pct.    Sorties   E/A   Pct.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jun 1942         -     -       -         70     5   7.14%         70     5   7.14%
Jul 1942         -     -       -        166     3   1.81%        166     3   1.81%
Aug 1942       324     8   2.47%        255     6   2.35%        579    14   2.42%
Sep 1942       423     2   0.47%        576     6   1.04%        999     8   0.80%
Oct 1942       534     9   1.69%      1,519     6   0.39%      2,053    15   0.73%
Nov 1942       629    13   2.07%      2,544    11   0.43%      3,173    24   0.76%
Dec 1942       543    17   3.13%      2,166    32   1.48%      2,709    49   1.81%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan 1943       767    21   2.74%      4,330   100   2.31%      5,097   121   2.37%
Feb 1943       976    22   2.25%      3,362    60   1.78%      4,338    82   1.89%
Mar 1943     1,564    19   1.21%      6,478    65   1.00%      8,042    84   1.04%
Apr 1943       989    33   3.34%     12,963   144   1.11%     13,952   177   1.27%
May 1943     3,915    58   1.48%     12,724   119   0.94%     16,639   177   1.06%
Jun 1943     4,104    86   2.10%     13,248    84   0.63%     17,352   170   0.98%
Jul 1943     5,531    94   1.70%     24,370   177   0.73%     29,901   271   0.91%
Aug 1943     5,826   100   1.72%     21,532   181   0.84%     27,358   281   1.03%
Sep 1943     9,294    60   0.65%     20,659   103   0.50%     29,953   163   0.54%
Oct 1943     7,463   152   2.04%     14,124    86   0.61%     21,587   238   1.10%
Nov 1943     9,624   109   1.13%     15,856    52   0.33%     25,480   161   0.63%
Dec 1943    13,876   123   0.89%     19,948    93   0.47%     33,824   216   0.64%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan 1944    15,183   197   1.30%     28,992   118   0.41%     44,175   315   0.71%
Feb 1944    24,425   243   0.99%     20,568   175   0.85%     44,993   418   0.93%
Mar 1944    31,950   234   0.73%     24,798    88   0.35%     56,748   322   0.57%
Apr 1944    43,434   516   1.19%     30,645   153   0.50%     74,079   669   0.90%
May 1944    67,979   397   0.58%     42,539   102   0.24%    110,518   499   0.45%
Jun 1944    96,096   284   0.30%     33,947   161   0.47%    130,043   445   0.34%
Jul 1944    74,878   150   0.20%     33,987   141   0.41%    108,865   291   0.27%
Aug 1944    77,976   163   0.21%     37,968   133   0.35%    115,944   296   0.26%
Sep 1944    57,384   241   0.42%     26,359    33   0.13%     83,743   274   0.33%
Oct 1944    52,596   135   0.26%     22,607     6   0.03%     75,203   141   0.19%
Nov 1944    52,299   131   0.25%     26,055    23   0.09%     78,354   154   0.20%
Dec 1944    61,089   211   0.35%     28,347    28   0.10%     89,436   239   0.27%
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Jan 1945    47,577   121   0.25%     16,914     2   0.01%     64,491   123   0.19%
Feb 1945    68,365    56   0.08%     31,348     4   0.01%     99,713    60   0.06%
Mar 1945   111,472   144   0.13%     35,408    21   0.06%    146,880   165   0.11%
Apr 1945    79,402   119   0.15%     41,495     7   0.02%    120,897   126   0.10%

First, I get told to not look at losses, but rather losses to enemy planes.

Of course. If you are analyzing the Luftwaffe's fighter effectiveness then you need to separate out losses to fighters from losses to flak and other causes.

I did and it doesn't track your claim.

You only posted the final results and not the numbers you used to get those results, so I have no idea which columns of data you were using. This is why I am including the raw totals since then it can be crosschecked against the Statistical Digest, if for no other reason to ensure I transcribed the numbers correctly.

Then not to look at losses, but to losses per sortie.

I never suggested any such thing. That was done on your own initiative (or in response to someone else).

 

[33k in the air]

Turn that argument around and we understand each other. If the Luftwaffe was getting worse by the month, then it surely SHOULD be getting worse by the year.

A year is far too much of a coarse data point. Also, when should a year-based analysis start? By the calendar? Or any twelve-month stretch?

But the loss numbers per combat sorties don;t support that.

I think you've calculated those incorrectly, or are using too coarse of a time frame. Losses to enemy aircraft divided by combat sorties flown gives the percentage of sorties lost to enemy fighters, and can be calculated on a monthly basis.

 

[33k in the air]

And I'll drill the point home further that post hoc ergo propter hoc -- while ignoring other factors -- will necessarily skew any conclusion you wish to derive. The swing in airpower in 1944 happened for several different reasons: fuel supplies, which affected LW training; 8th AF fighter doctrine which became more aggressive; the longer-ranged P-51s giving the LW less freischutz and less safe bases; and so on.

Yes, it was a combination of factors — another is the large increase in USAAF strength as the year went on. But that the Luftwaffe's ability to use its fighters to shoot down U.S. aircraft clearly fell as 1944 progressed is amply demonstrated by losses to enemy fighters diminishing.

 

[GregP]

And I'll drill the point home further that post hoc ergo propter hoc -- while ignoring other factors -- will necessarily skew any conclusion you wish to derive. The swing in airpower in 1944 happened for several different reasons: fuel supplies, which affected LW training; 8th AF fighter doctrine which became more aggressive; the longer-ranged P-51s giving the LW less freischutz and less safe bases; and so on.

And I'll drill the point home further that post hoc ergo propter hoc -- while ignoring other factors -- will necessarily skew any conclusion you wish to derive. The swing in airpower in 1944 happened for several different reasons: fuel supplies, which affected LW training; 8th AF fighter doctrine which became more aggressive; the longer-ranged P-51s giving the LW less freischutz and less safe bases; and so on.

Ignoring the numbers also skews conclusions.

Yes, the Luftwaffe in the ETO alone gets a bit worse, but the Luftwaffe as a fighting unit held performance right up to the end when taken as a whole.

I get a little put out with the ETO discussions since southern France and all of Italy is actually in Europe but gets put in with the MTO, which was a vital part of the European war. Also, the Russian Front was a Luftwaffe operating area, too, sometimes more than half of the entire Luftwaffe. So, while I occasionally look at just a theater, I'm usually more interested in the big picture. The Luftwaffe shows up quite well in the big picture, but they still don't manage to win the war.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

The Luftwaffe was the fighter force plus most of the flak, quoting overall losses is not a good way to show the changes in the threat environment. The Luftwaffe fighter threat grew to a peak then declined, the flak threat remained about constant. A point about loss rates to flak, but also to an extent to fighter and definitely to other causes, is the percentage of USAAF effort on poor or bad weather days, starting at zero with a monthly peak of 87.15%, overall 50.49% of attacking heavy bombers reporting they bombed visually. Also the raids to the less well defended occupied countries. The other point is the USAAF fighters were not heavily flak exposed until strafing and fighter bomber operations became common and then it was mostly light flak, not the heavy flak the bombers faced. The number of guns per flak battery was eventually raised but ammunition shortages came into prominence in the final year of the war.

Flak batteries assigned to Luftflotte 3,
29 January 1943 189 heavy, 271 light
15 June 1943 206 heavy, 292 light
26 November 1943 224 heavy, 331 light.
23 May 1944 349 heavy, 407 light.

As for the Reich flak defences,
13 January 1943 659 heavy and 558 light/medium
15 June 1943 1,089 and 738
8 January 1944 1,402 and 721
8 March 1944 1,431 and 581.

Before the RAF introduced window Bomber Command was recording that around 6 to 9% of returning aircraft on night missions had flak damage, March to July 1943. This dropped to 2.85% in August and averaged 2.3% for all of 1944 and 1.4% for 1945. Window remained effective against the fire control radars for the remainder of the war. The average for aircraft returning damaged by flak on night raids February to December 1942 was 6.5%, for all of 1943 5.8%.

The USAAF carried window and active jammers but by day the gunners could correct their aim by eye. Some batteries even had the ability to track the H2X radars of USAAF pathfinders and use this for ranging, electronic warfare is a 2 way street. The flak service needed to replace an average of 380 88mm guns a month in 1944, thanks to wear or destruction. Even in 1942 it was 148 guns a month. Increasing accuracy is firstly a function of the fire control systems, including the trained personnel, something the Germans struggled to provide. Then go for barrel wear and ammunition quality.

USAAF Statistical Digest. Operations section. Tables 119 and 159. Effective sorties \\ losses to Flak \\ % loss to AA. No reported flak losses until April 1943

Month

All

HB

M&LB

Ftr

\\

All

HB

M&LB

Ftr

\\

All

HB

M&LB

Ftr

\\

HB Vis %

HB dam %

Apr-43​

859​

349​

510​

\\

1​

1​

\\

0.12​

0.29​

n/a

0.00​

\\

100​

23.3​

May-43​

3,603​

1,471​

23​

2,109​

\\

21​

13​

8​

\\

0.58​

0.88​

34.78​

0.00​

\\

100​

30.8​

Jun-43​

3,147​

1,268​

1,879​

\\

12​

12​

\\

0.38​

0.95​

n/a

0.00​

\\

100​

32.7​

Jul-43​

4,292​

1,743​

416​

2,133​

\\

30​

29​

1​

\\

0.70​

1.66​

0.24​

0.00​

\\

100​

43.9​

Aug-43​

4,771​

1,850​

904​

2,017​

\\

20​

20​

\\

0.42​

1.08​

0.00​

0.00​

\\

100​

42.2​

Sep-43​

7,252​

2,457​

1,808​

2,987​

\\

27​

25​

2​

\\

0.37​

1.02​

0.11​

0.00​

\\

89.46​

29.2​

Oct-43​

5,526​

2,117​

521​

2,888​

\\

38​

38​

\\

0.69​

1.79​

0.00​

0.00​

\\

76.62​

41.7​

Nov-43​

6,884​

2,581​

867​

3,436​

\\

33​

25​

7​

1​

\\

0.48​

0.97​

0.81​

0.03​

\\

40.61​

22.2​

Dec-43​

11,032​

4,937​

994​

5,101​

\\

70​

65​

5​

\\

0.63​

1.32​

0.50​

0.00​

\\

45.43​

22.7​

Jan-44​

12,541​

5,027​

1,050​

6,464​

\\

35​

27​

2​

6​

\\

0.28​

0.54​

0.19​

0.09​

\\

42.75​

20.5​

Feb-44​

19,588​

7,512​

2,373​

9,703​

\\

108​

81​

14​

13​

\\

0.55​

1.08​

0.59​

0.13​

\\

59.37​

25.4​

Mar-44​

26,411​

8,773​

3,025​

14,613​

\\

167​

112​

9​

46​

\\

0.63​

1.28​

0.30​

0.31​

\\

48.25​

27.1​

Apr-44​

34,493​

9,945​

5,332​

19,216​

\\

190​

105​

25​

60​

\\

0.55​

1.06​

0.47​

0.31​

\\

81.68​

31.4​

May-44​

55,358​

13,975​

8,523​

32,860​

\\

248​

122​

28​

98​

\\

0.45​

0.87​

0.33​

0.30​

\\

69.5​

22.8​

Jun-44​

82,369​

22,713​

8,908​

50,748​

\\

400​

162​

12​

226​

\\

0.49​

0.71​

0.13​

0.45​

\\

60.21​

17.6​

Jul-44​

64,626​

18,864​

5,839​

39,923​

\\

377​

201​

23​

153​

\\

0.58​

1.07​

0.39​

0.38​

\\

55.92​

18.2​

Aug-44​

67,961​

18,964​

6,588​

42,409​

\\

607​

238​

75​

294​

\\

0.89​

1.26​

1.14​

0.69​

\\

89.55​

20.8​

Sep-44​

49,393​

15,617​

3,379​

30,397​

\\

422​

207​

25​

190​

\\

0.85​

1.33​

0.74​

0.63​

\\

36.58​

24.6​

Oct-44​

45,990​

17,058​

1,800​

27,132​

\\

334​

112​

24​

198​

\\

0.73​

0.66​

1.33​

0.73​

\\

22.94​

20.0​

Nov-44​

46,360​

15,245​

3,244​

27,871​

\\

328​

146​

18​

164​

\\

0.71​

0.96​

0.55​

0.59​

\\

12.85​

22.5​

Dec-44​

54,547​

16,424​

4,881​

33,242​

\\

285​

74​

48​

163​

\\

0.52​

0.45​

0.98​

0.49​

\\

35.56​

12.7​

Jan-45​

42,309​

14,750​

2,998​

24,561​

\\

412​

222​

28​

162​

\\

0.97​

1.51​

0.93​

0.66​

\\

32.76​

19.5​

Feb-45​

62,350​

19,933​

7,902​

34,515​

\\

433​

157​

68​

208​

\\

0.69​

0.79​

0.86​

0.60​

\\

24.42​

15.8​

Mar-45​

104,795​

28,804​

15,792​

60,199​

\\

460​

164​

52​

244​

\\

0.44​

0.57​

0.33​

0.41​

\\

42.46​

17.4​

Apr-45​

72,842​

18,180​

9,209​

45,453​

\\

302​

77​

18​

207​

\\

0.41​

0.42​

0.20​

0.46​

\\

77.76​

9.5​

May-45​

4,978​

2,254​

167​

2,557​

\\

20​

4​

16​

\\

0.40​

0.18​

0.00​

0.63​

\\

1943​

47,366​

18,773​

5,533​

23,060​

\\

252​

228​

23​

1​

\\

0.53​

1.21​

0.42​

0.00​

\\

72.37​

1944​

559,637​

170,117​

54,942​

334,578​

\\

3,501​

1,587​

303​

1,611​

\\

0.63​

0.93​

0.55​

0.48​

\\

51.37​

21.1​

1945​

287,274​

83,921​

36,068​

167,285​

\\

1,627​

624​

166​

837​

\\

0.57​

0.74​

0.46​

0.50​

\\

43.01​

15.6​

Total

894,277​

272,811​

96,543​

524,923​

\\

5,380​

2,439​

492​

2,449​

\\

0.60​

0.89​

0.51​

0.47​

\\

50.49​

HB Vis % is the percentage of heavy bombers credited with attacking that reported using visual sighting to drop their bombs, from the Richard Davis figures.

HB Dam % is from the Statistical Summary of 8th Air Force Operations dated 10 June 1945, the percentage of heavy bombers damaged Category A, AC, B and E of credit, not effective, sorties. For the war totals 43,610 A, 13,893 AC, 593 B and 1,557 E, 20.4% of credit sorties. The main summary page has 293,599 credit and 266,565 effective heavy bomber sorties, so up the percentages in this column by around 10% to give an approximation to using effective sorties.

For the statistically minded, a rough guide to weather effects on flak accuracy. Take the 1945 figures as baseline, for 1943 it means 1.64 times the heavy bomber loss rate on 1.68 times the percentage of visual bombing sorties, in 1944 1.26 and 1.19, overall 1.2 and 1.17

The 8th Air Force statistical report has Heavy Bomber Losses on combat missions as 5,696 total, of which 4,139 were MIA, 1,557 category E. The MIA being broken down into 1,318 losses to enemy aircraft, 1,304 to flak or flak plus enemy aircraft, 180 accidents, 1,337 other or unknown. First flak related losses in November 1942. The Statistical Digest has 5,548 losses on combat missions, 2,452 to enemy aircraft, 2,439 to flak and 657 to other causes, first flak related loss in April 1943.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Ignoring the numbers also skews conclusions.

It's a good thing I never suggested anyone should do that!

 

[dedalos]

It was incredible the industrial capacity of the america. Reading the given statistics above, its clear that Lw despite the badly outperformed main types of fighters, and the overall lower order of battle aircraft numbers, and its broken communications, and the training problems, did cause important casualties to the american air force. Casualties that ,most propably, no other nation than america could sustain. Or even all the others alleid countries put together. Not only in materials but aircrew as well. Each heavy bomber loss it was 10 men loss!
In my opinion ww2 was won by america. Period.

 

[GregP]

OK, I ran the table again and they are shown below. I used Table 118 (Combat Sorties Flown by Theater) for sorties and Table 158 (Airplane Losses on Combat Missions) for losses. Because you were talking about losses in the ETO, I used the Total, ETO, and MTO columns from Theaters versus Germany.

I note that the ETO numbers behave somewhat as you said, but do NOT support the Luftwaffe failing apart from 1941 onward. I tend to discount the early war months since the losses were small and a few numbers can really affect the rates per sortie, so I discount early months when there were fewer than 15 losses. For 1942, that leaves Nov and Dec 1942.

The losses per combat sortie show a decline in the ETO numbers by year, though not precipitously. 1942: .0263; 1943: .0223; 1944: .0129; Jan 1945: .0136. Things decline from Jan 1945 and the Luftwaffe collapsed in April 1945. Losses went up in 1944, but not loss per combat sortie.

In the MTO, we have: Nov-Dec 1942: .0132; 1943: .0126; 1944: .0108; and 1945: .0112. The MTO loss rate per combat sortie held up very well through Jan 1945.

Using the Total column, I would start in Nov 1942. So, Nov-Dec 1942: .0164; 1943: .0149; 1944: .0117; Jan 1945: .0129. Yes, the numbers decline, but not by much and certainly not precipitously. They even slightly increase in Jan 1945. But they DO generally slightly decline. Certainly not a cannon fodder decline, but a decline nonetheless.

See the table below. The average at the right is for the total column. You can plot the drop off in Feb 1945 for both theaters. You can REALLY see the collapse of the Luftwaffe in Table 166, Enemy Aircraft Destroyed. Look at April 1945. We went from 895 destroyed on Mar 1945 to 4,367 destroyed in April 1945! That's over a 400% increase!

 

[33k in the air]

OK, I ran the table again and they are shown below. I used Table 118 (Combat Sorties Flown by Theater) for sorties and Table 158 (Airplane Losses on Combat Missions) for losses. Because you were talking about losses in the ETO, I used the Total, ETO, and MTO columns from Theaters versus Germany.

Table 158 does not break out losses by cause. It shows losses from ALL causes. If you want to examine Luftwaffe fighter effectiveness, then losses to enemy fighters needs to be used. The cause of losses is broken out in Tables 159 and 160.

I note that the ETO numbers behave somewhat as you said, but do NOT support the Luftwaffe failing apart from 1941 onward.

Well, certainly not in 1941.

Using the Total column, I would start in Nov 1942. So, Nov-Dec 1942: .0164; 1943: .0149; 1944: .0117; Jan 1945: .0129. Yes, the numbers decline, but not by much and certainly not precipitously. They even slightly increase in Jan 1945. But they DO generally slightly decline. Certainly not a cannon fodder decline, but a decline nonetheless.

Again, you have used losses from ALL causes, not losses attributed to enemy fighters. As losses to enemy fighters declined, losses to flak increased.

 

[33k in the air]

Tables of numbers do not show the trend as well as a graph, so here is a graph of combined U.S. losses to enemy fighters for the ETO and MTO.

The decline in the ability of Luftwaffe fighters to shoot down U.S. aircraft as 1944 progressed is clearly illustrated.

 

[GregP]

Note late 1944 through Mar 1945 look as good or better than 1943, yet the Luftwaffe was supposed to be decimated by 1945.

Again, the data doesn't support the contention the Luftwaffe was decimated, at all. Of course, the big efforts of early 1944 show up since those were Operation "Argument," or the start of "Big Week" in Feb 1944. About then, the P-51 showed up as the major daylight escort and provided the Luftwaffe with a nasty surprise for a few months. They recovered and managed to do reasonably well except for Feb 1945 and after March 1945. They collapsed as a fighting force in April 1945, right when the Ta 152 was making it's debut as a small group of production prototypes.

The data are fairly clear. What are you trying to show that I did not say already ... in plain English? That is, I'm wondering why you are persisting in showing me the same data I have been looking at. Recall the flak crews were also in the Luftwaffe, so their effect collects with the Luftwaffe's efforts, too, and generally follows the same trend of maintaining effectiveness up until near the end.

It's pretty obvious the MTO drops off, corresponding with the big 1944 push to escort daylight bombers. The Luftwaffe recalled many MTO assets at that time. The MTO flak crews picked up the slack. Makes sense. When the motherland is threatened, everything else gets absorbed to defend the homeland, and they do the best they can until the situation resolves one way or the other.

In the Allied camp, the CBI operated that way and was always the last priority for war materiel.

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Recall the flak crews were also in the Luftwaffe, so their effect collects with the Luftwaffe's efforts, too, and generally follows the same trend of maintaining effectiveness up until near the end.

His graph is about USAAF losses to fighters alone. Lumping flak kills into that is not clarifying anything for the discussion. He's already separated that out, so far as I can read it.

 

[GregP]

And the chart above shows exactly what I have been saying all along. The Luftwaffe, moreso in the ETO as it turns out, didn't "decline" much until April 1945 with the exception of Feb 1945. The fighters DID decline in the MTO, but it's not a big surprise considering Apr-May-Jun 1944. I think I said it clearly that the decline wasn't really all that apparent, and was told they fell off from 1941 forward ... they really didn't much, except for when we threw 1,000-plane raids escorted by 700 fighters at them in the ETO and the draw-down in the MTO starts to show effect. Anybody would have a drop-off in performance under that assault, and it shows in in Apr-May-Jun 1944 when Merlin-engine P-51s started showing up in numbers. That's not something you counter immediately, and they didn't.

It took a few months to respond to the new threat, just like it took a few months for the British to respond to the appearance of the Fw 190 in Aug 1941 or so. Those number a low relative to 1944,so they really don't show up above much, but the Fw 190 was a challenge for the Spitfire V, and the Mk IX had to be developed to counter it. It didn't happen immediately, either.

 

[33k in the air]

Note late 1944 through Mar 1945 look as good or better than 1943, yet the Luftwaffe was supposed to be decimated by 1945.

In 1943 the Luftwaffe still had considerable fighter strength on other fronts. In 1944 most of its fighters had been pulled back to defend Germany. 1944 also saw a significant increase in German aircraft production.

Again, the data doesn't support the contention the Luftwaffe was decimated, at all.

Who here has said 'decimated'? The point is that the ability of Luftwaffe fighters to shoot down U.S. aircraft peaked by mid-1944 and declined substantially thereafter. That is undeniable. Imagine if it hadn't and the losses seen in April 1944 had continued at about that level for the rest of the year. What would your response be then?

The data are fairly clear. What are you trying to show that I did not say already ... in plain English?

See reply above. You seem to be responding to an argument I have not made.

His graph is about USAAF losses to fighters alone. Lumping flak kills into that is not clarifying anything for the discussion. He's already separated that out, so far as I can read it.

Correct. Losses are to enemy fighters only. Aircraft lost to flak or other causes are not included.

And the chart above shows exactly what I have been saying all along. The Luftwaffe, moreso in the ETO as it turns out, didn't "decline" much until April 1945 with the exception of Feb 1945.

You have a strange definition of decline.

Again, imagine if the losses seen in April 1944 had continued for another six months or so

Why didn't the Luftwaffe's fighter tally reach that height again? Why did the Luftwaffe fighter victories drop sharply after April? What prevented it from repeating the level of success it achieved in April? Is the drop following that peak not of significant importance to the Allied aerial efforts? How can that clear drop in ability to shoot down U.S. aircraft not be seen as a decline of its fighting effectiveness?

 

[GregP]

The Luftwaffe pulled strength back in 1942 and 1943. They scaled back about 15% in 42 from 41 and about 14% in 43 from 42. Then they increased strength by about 15% in 1944, and again scaled back by about 24% in 1945.

The numbers for the years (about mid-year) are 2274, 1894, 1598, 1847, and 1404 respectively. That isn't exactly a major draw-down from the Russian Front until 1945.

The Luftwaffe didn't decline substantially in 1944 in the ETO. Check the chart above. Allied losses were higher in Sep 44 than at any point in 43. Same in Dec 44. They declined for Jan-Feb 45 and took a decent jump in Mar 45 back upward until they collapsed in April 45 ... that isn't exactly "decimated," by any means, until April 45.

We've been discussing it for two pages of posts. SOMEBODY wants to continue discussing it; maybe not you. I am reluctant from here on in unless we stay with the data from the war.

Seems to me YOU have a strange definition of decline. I know they were getting desperate when the Mustangs and 1,000-plane raids started showing up, but their performance in the ETO looks pretty decent considering. It falls off in the MTO where the flak crews started getting better as the units went back to Germany to fight.

Yes, it declined in the MTO. We all know the Luftwaffe training system wasn't up to the task, but the guys who were actually flying did a decent job considering their inept leadership at the highest levels.