Why American aces had lower scores than anybody else

[GrauGeist]

I know. Trying to get M Macandy to the books. One can be an ace but lighting up an airfield defended with aaa is perhaps far more dangerous as you most certainly know. I think it is a different skill all together. That AAA shot at everything coming close. Even own airplanes.

Agreed.
Many Luftwaffe airfields had "killing zones" of AA situated so that if you approached outside of the designated pattern, you had little chance of survival and if you did approach in the designated pattern but were not recognized/approved, you got shot up, too.

And their AA was layered (in different calibers) which meant that at tree-top or 10,000 feet, they were going to work you over.

 

[pbehn]

Its a common myth the RAF were throwing 'green' and 'barely trained' pilots into the fight because they were 'desperate'… nope, they were indeed green, but they'd all been to an OCU, and they were fed into the fight because they were next ones up. The 'how many hours have you got on a Spitfire', 'Six Sir' is often quoted as 'proof' the pilots were untrained, but its a misleading question, 'Six Sir' because most of his OCU hours were on a Hurricane - unsurprisingly, the RAFs premier fighter was a bit thin on the ground in OCU's.

They only had 1,200 pilots with 100 plus hours training if you include Dowding Park and Leigh Mallory in the count. At the declaration of war there were around 120 Spitfires in service, at the fall of France there were around 500 Spitfires and Hurricanes in service circa 250 of each. To have 1,200 pilots trained on type at the height of the BoB is a mathematical impossibility and your figure of 100+ hours means nothing, a pilot needed 200 hours on average to be "in the game". Bearing in mind they were locally outnumbered by pilots that had on average more hours on type and their job was to get past the fighters and attack the bombers.

 

[pbehn]

Agreed.
Many Luftwaffe airfields had "killing zones" of AA situated so that if you approached outside of the designated pattern, you had little chance of survival and if you did approach in the designated pattern but were not recognized/approved, you got shot up, too.

And their AA was layered (in different calibers) which meant that at tree-top or 10,000 feet, they were going to work you over.

It was a statistical lottery. Some units and squadrons worked on attacking airfield, working over the AA defences systematically, but that is only against what was known by intel or could be seen from the air. There is nothing that prevents the private from the cookhouse grabbing a rifle and having a lucky shot. If you are in range to shoot up an airfield there are possibly a lot of men with a rifle close bye and its a long way back from Germany,

 

[Macandy]

Quite obviously not true. The LW gained in strength through to the invasion of Norway not only in numbers but in types like the Bf 109E. and Ju88. The RAF was playing catch up.

Numbers of airframes means nothing if your core of highly experienced pilots is being attritted and not replaced.
An RAF pilot shot down in 1940 was replaced by one as well trained, one shot down in 1943 was replaced by one better trained.

The Luftwaffe entered WWII with a large cadre of highly skilled pilots who'd had the luxury of a peacetime training programme and learned their trade in the Spanish Civil War - but a real war saw them being steadily lost and replaced with less well trained pilots.

The RAF was gaining both in numbers of aircraft and combat experienced pilots from 1939.

By 1943 the Luftwaffe was two air forces - a small and diminishing cadre of highly trained pre war pilots, and a large Air Force of poorly trained cannon fodder.

 

[Macandy]

Read more.

Even the main highly defended airfields - the USAAF had a simply answer by late 1944.
They simply flew a few hundred medium bombers over them and turned them into moonscapes.
There's a reason so many Experten saw out their war operating out of farmers fields and stretches of road.

 

[pbehn]

Numbers of airframes means nothing if your core of highly experienced pilots is being attritted and not replaced.
An RAF pilot shot down in 1940 was replaced by one as well trained, one shot down in 1943 was replaced by one better trained.

The Luftwaffe entered WWII with a large cadre of highly skilled pilots who'd had the luxury of a peacetime training programme and learned their trade in the Spanish Civil War - but a real war saw them being steadily lost and replaced with less well trained pilots.

The RAF was gaining both in numbers of aircraft and combat experienced pilots from 1939.

By 1943 the Luftwaffe was two air forces - a small and diminishing cadre of highly trained pre war pilots, and a large Air Force of poorly trained cannon fodder.

What attrition was there between the fall of Poland and the invasion of Norway? When France fell, how many Bf 109Es had the LW with trained pilots in service compared to the RAF's Hurricanes and Spitfires? Some RAF pilots shot down in 1940 had trained in peacetime, and served in France and the Battle of Britain, how on were they replaced with a pilot with the same level of training and experience you have said yourself some had only 50-100 hrs on type?

 

[Snautzer01]

about airfield flak

 

[drgondog]

Even the main highly defended airfields - the USAAF had a simply answer by late 1944.
They simply flew a few hundred medium bombers over them and turned them into moonscapes.
There's a reason so many Experten saw out their war operating out of farmers fields and stretches of road.




View attachment 664681

Actually no. LF Reich for Defense of Germany increasingly concentrated forces out of range of medium bombers. Only LF 3 with JG 26 and JG 2 remained in medium bomber range There were exceptions, particularly during the invasion when many JG3 and JG 11 fighters reinforced LW forces in West.

Your characterization of Jager staffing post 1941 is too simplified.

Multiple replacements for the air battles against 8th AF were drawn from a.) experienced squadrons from East and West, b.) Transfer and training from bomber/transport pools, and c.) transfer from t/e day and night fighter to FW 190A8s in summer 1944.

Occasionally heavy bomber strikes against primary airframe mfg centers like Augsburg and Oberpfaffenhofen also destroyed many finished aircraft not yet flown out for assignment.

 

[33k in the air]

Even the main highly defended airfields - the USAAF had a simply answer by late 1944.
They simply flew a few hundred medium bombers over them and turned them into moonscapes.
There's a reason so many Experten saw out their war operating out of farmers fields and stretches of road.




View attachment 664681

Be careful about bomb damage assessment; don't fall into the trap the Allies often did. While the damage in that photo looks impressive, with those bomb craters everywhere, how much actual damage was done to the important facilities? The view from ground level could be considerably different. The only definitive damage in that photo are the craters in the runways. And repairing such runway damage would be a known practice. (The question would be if the resources and manpower were available to conduct those repairs in a timely manner.)

 

[GrauGeist]

Even the main highly defended airfields - the USAAF had a simply answer by late 1944.
They simply flew a few hundred medium bombers over them and turned them into moonscapes.
There's a reason so many Experten saw out their war operating out of farmers fields and stretches of road.




View attachment 664681

This photo is of Volkel airfield in Holland.

This was not the result of "a few hundred medium bombers" of the USAAF.
This is the work of Bomber Command 460 Sqd. Lancasters.

 

[Milosh]

Too many craters for just one RAF bomber squadron.

 

[GrauGeist]

Too many craters for just one RAF bomber squadron.

It was a series of bombing missions between August and September 1944.

Going by memory, I beleive they stated 900 craters counted for the target area (which was larger than seen pictured).

 

[dedalos]

I read all the time that german aces scored the majority of kills against easy opponents and in favorable conditions
1) did ever after the balkans campaign , the jagdwaffe fought with any quantity advantage at any front? On the contrary , they were badly outnumbered on every front
2) did ever enjoyed aircraft performance parity against the western alleis after mid 1942? On the contrary both bf109g and fw190a were badly outperformed
3) did they had ,even on the eastern front, performance advantage after late 1942? If we believe the soviets performance claims no. According to them la5fn, la7, yak3,yak9, p39,soviet spits, were flying rings around the german fighters. In this very forum , there are numerous members that support that even the p40 was fully equal to the german fighters
4) what chances had the german pilots to rest? Very few. When barkhorn was shot down and badly wounded in may 1944 he was flying the 6th mission of the day and was so tired he could not look at his 6 oclock
5) did they had help from intelligence about the enemy equipment? No. On the other hand the anloamerican pilots were warned about the fw190d before the normandy landings!
6) did they had good ground guidance? No.
7)did they enjoy lengthy training . No
8) were even given enough time to recover from their wounds ? No.
9) did they had time to train in new theater of operations when they were transfered ? Usually no. Many aces were lost that way. Being a low level eastern front dogfighter was a reciepe for quick death on channel front. But some times the opposite happened too. Siegfried scnell of jg 2 after 90 kills on channel front was lost almost immediately in russia adding just 6 soviet kills
Considering the above factors i would say that it was the american and the the british pilots who scored the easiest victories . On they other hand they hand fewer targets available

 

[dedalos]

Someone said that only 8 centurions aces entered combat after mid 1942. I will immediately add lipfert. And i believe there are more
But thats not the point. Heinz ewald, with 84 kills in 1944-45 is not a great pilot? Willi rescke with 27 against the american armadas is not a great ace? The top scorer in a Dora, from iv/jg26, had less than 30 total kills, all late in the war .in my opinion indication of an incredibly skilled fighter pilot.
The trick for the new pilots was to survivve their first 10 missions. But it was difficult. Most could not fully control their air raft

 

[33k in the air]

This photo is of Volkel airfield in Holland.

This was not the result of "a few hundred medium bombers" of the USAAF.
This is the work of Bomber Command 460 Sqd. Lancasters.

I thought the photo looked familiar. It appears in The Crucible of War 1939–1945 — The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, Volume III, on page 509 (although vertically inverted from the forum post). The caption reads, "Vokel airfield after an attack by No 6 Group on 3 September 1944. Bomber Command made a number of successful raids against Luftwaffe bases in France and the Low Countries in August and September 1944."

 

[glennasher]

A couple of MG's isn't going to stop a Squadron of P-51's massacring the training aircraft they jump in the skies surrounding the field doing circuits unless the fighters for some perverse reason ignore the panicking trainers and insist on flying up and down the small grass strip.
And many 2nd and 3rd line elementary airfields were just that - a grass strip, a hut and some trainer and civil instructors - Maybe a home guard dude with an old MG-08, not some huge Luftwaffe fortified air base with multiple layers of flak. The elementary fields were very soft targets and considered very fair game.

ETA: Just looked up your source… sure enough,
Arbeitsplatz (training fields) grass fields, no infrastructure, no defences

Gabreski, among others, might disagree........................ Yes, I know it was a prop strike, but isn't AAA the reason he was flying so low?

 

[nuuumannn]

Too many craters for just one RAF bomber squadron.

Ah, but not too many for an RAAF squadron

Just messing with you, Milosh, I get your point. 460 was an Aussie unit, though.

 

[Milosh]

Ah, but not too many for an RAAF squadron

Just messing with you, Milosh, I get your point. 460 was an Aussie unit, though.

Back at you nuuumannn.

It appears it was RCAF bombers that made the Volkel mess. See post above by 33k in the air.

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Unlike an RAF or USAAF pilot under training who had no worries about being attacked, being shot down was a constant fear for Luftwaffe trainees.

The 9th Air Force summary notes 1 Ar96, 1 Fw44 and 1 Fw56, plus 12 unknown types claimed as shot down, the 8th Air Force summary puts any trainer claims into the 146 other and unknown category. The curtailment of Luftwaffe training by allied long range fighters was mostly the threat, not the reality of losses in the air, then comes the losses from strafing, and such operations really date from mid 1944. Also plenty of training airfields existed for take off and landing practice, not meant to house aircraft overnight or do repairs.

At the height of the Battle of Britain, the RAF had over 1,200 pilots with 100+ hours combat flying under their belts driving desks and in OCU's passing on lessons.

Its a common myth the RAF were throwing 'green' and 'barely trained' pilots into the fight because they were 'desperate'… nope, they were indeed green, but they'd all been to an OCU, and they were fed into the fight because they were next ones up.

To maintain front line Fighter Command strength in 1940 the RAF cut OTU courses in half, as well as moving pilots from Bomber Command and the RN, plus integrated the pilots from other countries at war with Germany, this actually enabled official pilot strength to increase but overall quality dropped, the A, B and C squadrons designations, with C effectively training units shows the pilot problems well, the Luftwaffe went through the same thing but worse, as Williamson Murray notes, operational Bf109 pilots on 1 May 1940 were 1,010, on 1 September 735. As the Luftwaffe did not exist for over a decade post WWI the early WWII losses deprived it of experienced "middle management" in a way the allied air forces were better able to avoid.

The Luftwaffe did rotate aircrew to an extent plus things like extended leave in resorts to give the men a break.

From Sept 3 1939, the Luftwaffe was a constantly degrading force.

In 1939/40 the Luftwaffe grew in terms of quality and quantity, things like the Ju88 and Bf110 (replacing the Bf109D in Zestorer units), in 1941 there was the Bf109F, Do217 and Fw190. The return of Luftwaffe personnel captured by the French helped retain quality as well. On 2 September 1939 the Luftwaffe Quartermaster reported 3,609 combat aircraft on strength, that grew to 4,867 on 4 May 1940, losses in France and withdrawal of units to re-equip dropped strength back to 4,129 by end June and it was 4,104 on 2 November. On 14 June 1941 strength was 4,887, with almost 200 more reconnaissance, 200 more fighters, but 300 fewer bombers than May 1940. On 3 January 1942 strength was 4,157, continuing a regular theme of build up to the summer campaign then reductions in strength until winter.

The Luftwaffe built up to May 1940, then rebuilt in the first half of 1941, with generally better aircraft but an overall drop in aircrew experience. Williamson Murray reports 3,950 Luftwaffe aircraft lost May to December 1940, 5,300 in 1941.

The Luftwaffe overcame its trainer numbers issue by using captured aircraft, expanding training locations to places like southern France for the better weather.

In 1941/42 the Luftwaffe was able to break in new aircrew in the lower threat environment of the east and generally had the ability to engage only when things looked good in the west and south, but it was forced to fight in the east. Though things like the Baedeker raids cost a higher percentage of instructor and trainee crews. In late 1942 and early 1943 the airlifts pulled most of the instrument and more advanced flying training crews out of the schools, many did not return, that and the need for more aircrew curtailed things like instrument flying training for day fighter pilots. Then of course from late 1942 the Luftwaffe was forced to regularly fight on all fronts, and to cope meant cutting training times and mass producing aircraft already in production to maintain numbers, add the need to upgrade firepower to deal with the IL-2 and allied 4 engined bombers, which hurt performance.

The RAF was in a similar position as the Luftwaffe was in at the end of the war. Tactics, radar, the tenacity of those who did fight during the BoB, Hitler's stupidity and a little bit of luck untimely won the BoB

Again your opinion with no facts - and no one (not even the RAF) was ready for "the long war" in September 1939 -

In 1940 the RAF was receiving more pilots and aircraft than its opponent. The Luftwaffe raids on London did do what the Luftwaffe wanted, force major combats, drawing in large numbers of defending fighters creating the large air battles the Luftwaffe needed to win well before the weather ruled out an invasion, but the defenders won, unlike similar 8th Air Force operations in 1944 (Berlin in March 1944 anyone?)

The Empire Air Training Scheme was a sign the RAF was preparing for a long war, its pre war production programs had provision for large numbers of reserves, again a sign of preparation for a long war. Certainly not ready for a long war but planning for it.

They only had 1,200 pilots with 100 plus hours training if you include Dowding Park and Leigh Mallory in the count. At the declaration of war there were around 120 Spitfires in service, at the fall of France there were around 500 Spitfires and Hurricanes in service circa 250 of each.

Agreed on the 1,200 pilots idea.

As of 1 September 1939 the RAF had 25 regular and 14 reserve fighter squadrons in Britain. On mobilisation in September 1939 numbers 19, 41, 54, 65, 66, 72, 74, 602, 609, 610 and 611 squadrons had Spitfires, 603 Gladiators and Spitfires, but as not all the reserve squadrons were officially operational that translated to 100 serviceable Spitfires in operational units. During October 1939 another 18 fighter squadrons were formed.

On 22 June 1940 there were officially 19 operational Spitfire and 17 operational Hurricane squadrons, thanks to the losses in France, with 243 serviceable Spitfires and 213 serviceable Hurricanes, plus the 7 Blenheim and 2 Defiant squadrons, so 45 out of 61 fighter squadrons in existence (including 1 RCAF) were operational, by 10 July there were 27 Hurricane squadrons operational, by 1 October it was 33.

According to the USAAF statistical digest the losses of USAAF fighters to flak in the European theatre went above those lost to enemy aircraft in June 1944 and stayed there, same as the heavy bombers. For destroyed on the ground claims they exceeded destroyed in the air in April 1944, February and April 1945. 7,422 claims for destroyed in the air, 6,796 on the ground of which 3,703 were in April 1945. Note the 8th Air Force fighters also claimed 4,600 locomotives destroyed amongst other ground targets, it was more than airfields that exposed the fighters to flak.

The 8th Air force dropped 85,134 short tons of bombs on airfields, the 9th 11,971 short tons, Bomber Command 18,284 short tons (the latter figure from Richard Davis and is from 1942 on) and I do not have the tonnage for 2nd (and 1st) Tactical Air Forces but it was the heavy bombers dropping most of the bombs on airfields.

Ignoring the Oboe Mosquito raids Bomber Command hit Volkel airfield on 15 August and 3 September 1944, 737.9 and 560 short tons of bombs, the first raid dropped 39 target indicators and 1,672 1,000 and 500 pound bombs and was by 1 and 8 groups, the second 48 target indicators and 1,383 1,000 and 500 pound bombs and was by 6 and 8 groups.

 

[pbehn]

Agreed on the 1,200 pilots idea.

It isnt an idea it is a fact, Park obviously had a pilots license, he also had his own Hurricane, but if he was acting as a fighter pilot it was last ditch stuff conceding that you had lost or would do shortly. There are always lots of people with such a qualification, like Park, also training instructors, airfield commanders, and those who have worked up in the organisation. There are also people like Douglas Bader, but with different injuries that mean they couldnt fly in combat or even think about it. And then there are those like Al Deere, who returned from France fit but tired and was posted to a training squadron, he collided with a student (probably vice versa), writing off two aircraft and was injured on landing, temporarily out of commission, he of course still had a pilots license.