Unlike an RAF or USAAF pilot under training who had no worries about being attacked, being shot down was a constant fear for Luftwaffe trainees.
The 9th Air Force summary notes 1 Ar96, 1 Fw44 and 1 Fw56, plus 12 unknown types claimed as shot down, the 8th Air Force summary puts any trainer claims into the 146 other and unknown category. The curtailment of Luftwaffe training by allied long range fighters was mostly the threat, not the reality of losses in the air, then comes the losses from strafing, and such operations really date from mid 1944. Also plenty of training airfields existed for take off and landing practice, not meant to house aircraft overnight or do repairs.
At the height of the Battle of Britain, the RAF had over 1,200 pilots with 100+ hours combat flying under their belts driving desks and in OCU's passing on lessons.
Its a common myth the RAF were throwing 'green' and 'barely trained' pilots into the fight because they were 'desperate'… nope, they were indeed green, but they'd all been to an OCU, and they were fed into the fight because they were next ones up.
To maintain front line Fighter Command strength in 1940 the RAF cut OTU courses in half, as well as moving pilots from Bomber Command and the RN, plus integrated the pilots from other countries at war with Germany, this actually enabled official pilot strength to increase but overall quality dropped, the A, B and C squadrons designations, with C effectively training units shows the pilot problems well, the Luftwaffe went through the same thing but worse, as Williamson Murray notes, operational Bf109 pilots on 1 May 1940 were 1,010, on 1 September 735. As the Luftwaffe did not exist for over a decade post WWI the early WWII losses deprived it of experienced "middle management" in a way the allied air forces were better able to avoid.
The Luftwaffe did rotate aircrew to an extent plus things like extended leave in resorts to give the men a break.
From Sept 3 1939, the Luftwaffe was a constantly degrading force.
In 1939/40 the Luftwaffe grew in terms of quality and quantity, things like the Ju88 and Bf110 (replacing the Bf109D in Zestorer units), in 1941 there was the Bf109F, Do217 and Fw190. The return of Luftwaffe personnel captured by the French helped retain quality as well. On 2 September 1939 the Luftwaffe Quartermaster reported 3,609 combat aircraft on strength, that grew to 4,867 on 4 May 1940, losses in France and withdrawal of units to re-equip dropped strength back to 4,129 by end June and it was 4,104 on 2 November. On 14 June 1941 strength was 4,887, with almost 200 more reconnaissance, 200 more fighters, but 300 fewer bombers than May 1940. On 3 January 1942 strength was 4,157, continuing a regular theme of build up to the summer campaign then reductions in strength until winter.
The Luftwaffe built up to May 1940, then rebuilt in the first half of 1941, with generally better aircraft but an overall drop in aircrew experience. Williamson Murray reports 3,950 Luftwaffe aircraft lost May to December 1940, 5,300 in 1941.
The Luftwaffe overcame its trainer numbers issue by using captured aircraft, expanding training locations to places like southern France for the better weather.
In 1941/42 the Luftwaffe was able to break in new aircrew in the lower threat environment of the east and generally had the ability to engage only when things looked good in the west and south, but it was forced to fight in the east. Though things like the Baedeker raids cost a higher percentage of instructor and trainee crews. In late 1942 and early 1943 the airlifts pulled most of the instrument and more advanced flying training crews out of the schools, many did not return, that and the need for more aircrew curtailed things like instrument flying training for day fighter pilots. Then of course from late 1942 the Luftwaffe was forced to regularly fight on all fronts, and to cope meant cutting training times and mass producing aircraft already in production to maintain numbers, add the need to upgrade firepower to deal with the IL-2 and allied 4 engined bombers, which hurt performance.
The RAF was in a similar position as the Luftwaffe was in at the end of the war. Tactics, radar, the tenacity of those who did fight during the BoB, Hitler's stupidity and a little bit of luck untimely won the BoB
Again your opinion with no facts - and no one (not even the RAF) was ready for "the long war" in September 1939 -
In 1940 the RAF was receiving more pilots and aircraft than its opponent. The Luftwaffe raids on London did do what the Luftwaffe wanted, force major combats, drawing in large numbers of defending fighters creating the large air battles the Luftwaffe needed to win well before the weather ruled out an invasion, but the defenders won, unlike similar 8th Air Force operations in 1944 (Berlin in March 1944 anyone?)
The Empire Air Training Scheme was a sign the RAF was preparing for a long war, its pre war production programs had provision for large numbers of reserves, again a sign of preparation for a long war. Certainly not ready for a long war but planning for it.
They only had 1,200 pilots with 100 plus hours training if you include Dowding Park and Leigh Mallory in the count. At the declaration of war there were around 120 Spitfires in service, at the fall of France there were around 500 Spitfires and Hurricanes in service circa 250 of each.
Agreed on the 1,200 pilots idea.
As of 1 September 1939 the RAF had 25 regular and 14 reserve fighter squadrons in Britain. On mobilisation in September 1939 numbers 19, 41, 54, 65, 66, 72, 74, 602, 609, 610 and 611 squadrons had Spitfires, 603 Gladiators and Spitfires, but as not all the reserve squadrons were officially operational that translated to 100 serviceable Spitfires in operational units. During October 1939 another 18 fighter squadrons were formed.
On 22 June 1940 there were officially 19 operational Spitfire and 17 operational Hurricane squadrons, thanks to the losses in France, with 243 serviceable Spitfires and 213 serviceable Hurricanes, plus the 7 Blenheim and 2 Defiant squadrons, so 45 out of 61 fighter squadrons in existence (including 1 RCAF) were operational, by 10 July there were 27 Hurricane squadrons operational, by 1 October it was 33.
According to the USAAF statistical digest the losses of USAAF fighters to flak in the European theatre went above those lost to enemy aircraft in June 1944 and stayed there, same as the heavy bombers. For destroyed on the ground claims they exceeded destroyed in the air in April 1944, February and April 1945. 7,422 claims for destroyed in the air, 6,796 on the ground of which 3,703 were in April 1945. Note the 8th Air Force fighters also claimed 4,600 locomotives destroyed amongst other ground targets, it was more than airfields that exposed the fighters to flak.
The 8th Air force dropped 85,134 short tons of bombs on airfields, the 9th 11,971 short tons, Bomber Command 18,284 short tons (the latter figure from Richard Davis and is from 1942 on) and I do not have the tonnage for 2nd (and 1st) Tactical Air Forces but it was the heavy bombers dropping most of the bombs on airfields.
Ignoring the Oboe Mosquito raids Bomber Command hit Volkel airfield on 15 August and 3 September 1944, 737.9 and 560 short tons of bombs, the first raid dropped 39 target indicators and 1,672 1,000 and 500 pound bombs and was by 1 and 8 groups, the second 48 target indicators and 1,383 1,000 and 500 pound bombs and was by 6 and 8 groups.
