Why American aces had lower scores than anybody else (2 Viewers)

[Macandy]

Someone said that only 8 centurions aces entered combat after mid 1942. I will immediately add lipfert. And i believe there are more
But thats not the point. Heinz ewald, with 84 kills in 1944-45 is not a great pilot? Willi rescke with 27 against the american armadas is not a great ace? The top scorer in a Dora, from iv/jg26, had less than 30 total kills, all late in the war .in my opinion indication of an incredibly skilled fighter pilot.
The trick for the new pilots was to survivve their first 10 missions. But it was difficult. Most could not fully control their air raft

Most RAF/USAAF fighter pilots survived their first 10 missions as they already had an excellent grounding in the tactics needed to keep them alive.
Your Luftwaffe replacement pilot? Not so much

 

[Macandy]

They only had 1,200 pilots with 100 plus hours training if you include Dowding Park and Leigh Mallory in the count. At the declaration of war there were around 120 Spitfires in service, at the fall of France there were around 500 Spitfires and Hurricanes in service circa 250 of each. To have 1,200 pilots trained on type at the height of the BoB is a mathematical impossibility and your figure of 100+ hours means nothing, a pilot needed 200 hours on average to be "in the game". Bearing in mind they were locally outnumbered by pilots that had on average more hours on type and their job was to get past the fighters and attack the bombers.

You might want to take that up with the RAF which was of the opinion that 100 hours front line flying was enough, tiredness and complacency kicked in after that.

How is 1,200 pilots with more than 100 hours operational flying 'impossible'? The Hurricane for example had equipped 18 RAF Sqns on Sept 3 1939.
And of course, an RAF Sqn wasn't just 12 pilots as the Luftwaffe had assumed when drawing up its conviction it had shot down the RAF in 1940.
An RAF Sqn had typically 20 pilots for its 16 aircraft - a fact the Germans missed as they didn't have spares in their Staffeln. Shoot down 4 RAF fighters, the Squadron still was at full personnel strength and the fighters were usually replaced overnight.
This was why the Luftwaffe didn't win. They used their own metric and applied it to an Air Force with the ability to take attrition loss last the Sqn level. They compared apples to oranges - RAF Sqns were stronger both in number of pilots and aircraft than a Luftwaffe one.

Acquiring 1,200 pilots with 100 hours isn't a hard ask, its 100 pilots a month - and with nearly 60 Hurricane and Spitfire Squadrons committed to the BoB, that only required 1.5 pilots a month to gain 100 hours in their log.

 

[Macandy]

It isnt an idea it is a fact, Park obviously had a pilots license, he also had his own Hurricane, but if he was acting as a fighter pilot it was last ditch stuff conceding that you had lost or would do shortly. There are always lots of people with such a qualification, like Park, also training instructors, airfield commanders, and those who have worked up in the organisation. There are also people like Douglas Bader, but with different injuries that mean they couldnt fly in combat or even think about it. And then there are those like Al Deere, who returned from France fit but tired and was posted to a training squadron, he collided with a student (probably vice versa), writing off two aircraft and was injured on landing, temporarily out of commission, he of course still had a pilots license.

'Park had a 'pilots licence'?

Park was a very experienced combat pilot (WWI) who was highly regarded for his tactical and strategic skills.
He wasn't someone old duffer stooging around in 1940, he was only in his 40's and a very capable fighter pilot.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Acquiring 1,200 pilots with 100 hours isn't a hard ask, its 100 pilots a month - and with nearly 60 Hurricane and Spitfire Squadrons committed to the BoB, that only required 1.5 pilots a month to gain 100 hours in their log.

And if you're lucky out of those 1,200 pilots with 100 hours you're only going to have a small percentage that are really proficient in flying. And out of those 1,200, how many did you start with that were "washed out'? How many of those 1200 survived the war?

Even by WW2 standards, throwing pilots with 100 hours into combat is risky and desperate, luckily it was somewhat pulled off but I'm sure many of those 100 hour pilots eventually became cannon fodder or met their demise flying into a granite cloud.

 

[pbehn]

'Park had a 'pilots licence'?

Park was a very experienced combat pilot (WWI) who was highly regarded for his tactical and strategic skills.
He wasn't someone old duffer stooging around in 1940, he was only in his 40's and a very capable fighter pilot.

He was 48 and a former WW1 pilot with 5 victories 13 out of control the military cross and bar, but in 1940 he was in army terms a general, you dont use a general in the infantry.

 

[pbehn]

You might want to take that up with the RAF which was of the opinion that 100 hours front line flying was enough, tiredness and complacency kicked in after that.

How is 1,200 pilots with more than 100 hours operational flying 'impossible'? The Hurricane for example had equipped 18 RAF Sqns on Sept 3 1939.
And of course, an RAF Sqn wasn't just 12 pilots as the Luftwaffe had assumed when drawing up its conviction it had shot down the RAF in 1940.
An RAF Sqn had typically 20 pilots for its 16 aircraft - a fact the Germans missed as they didn't have spares in their Staffeln. Shoot down 4 RAF fighters, the Squadron still was at full personnel strength and the fighters were usually replaced overnight.
This was why the Luftwaffe didn't win. They used their own metric and applied it to an Air Force with the ability to take attrition loss last the Sqn level. They compared apples to oranges - RAF Sqns were stronger both in number of pilots and aircraft than a Luftwaffe one.

Acquiring 1,200 pilots with 100 hours isn't a hard ask, its 100 pilots a month - and with nearly 60 Hurricane and Spitfire Squadrons committed to the BoB, that only required 1.5 pilots a month to gain 100 hours in their log.

Are you discussing training before combat or fatigue in combat. I think you have forgotten losses in France 453 according to one source, 378 on the destroyed on the ground or abandoned . and you completely underestimate how hard it is to train pilots, especially in UK during autumn winter and spring with snow ice wind and rain with cloud down to ground level at times. It is also intensive on instructors, they were single engined planes so the instructor needs to fly too. A Merlin can be in need of overhaul after 250 hrs of hard use while a Spitfire shows signs of metal fatigue in places (wheel wells) after 150 hrs. Not all pilots who start training pass, not all even survived. There are members of the warbird community post here, maybe they can advise how much effort it takes to keep 12 Merlin engined planes flying twice a day, in the air, and how many extra you need to guarantee you can do that every day.

 

[Barrett]

Way late to this one, but Nishizawa and all Japanese victory figures are extremely speculative owing to the natural result of over claiming and poor record keeping. The late-great Henry Sakaida reckoned Sakai's "64" at between 11 and 20-something because other pilots were of course involved in nearly all the same combats.

 

[GregP]

Numbers of airframes means nothing if your core of highly experienced pilots is being attritted and not replaced.
An RAF pilot shot down in 1940 was replaced by one as well trained, one shot down in 1943 was replaced by one better trained.

The Luftwaffe entered WWII with a large cadre of highly skilled pilots who'd had the luxury of a peacetime training programme and learned their trade in the Spanish Civil War - but a real war saw them being steadily lost and replaced with less well trained pilots.

The RAF was gaining both in numbers of aircraft and combat experienced pilots from 1939.

By 1943 the Luftwaffe was two air forces - a small and diminishing cadre of highly trained pre war pilots, and a large Air Force of poorly trained cannon fodder.

So the Luftwaffe has a small, declining bunch of good pilots and a large bunch of cannon fodder pilots?

Let's fact check that for the USAAF only.

Let's see:

1) ETO Losses:
1942 - 55 - that's 2.1% o9f the losses.
1943 - 1,261 - that's 16.8% of the losses.
1944 - 7,749 - that's 57.9% of the losses.
1945 - 3,631 - that's 23.2% of the losses in only the first 4 months of 1945. I discounted May when we only had 60 losses. If you account for the other 8 month at the same rate, you'd have 10,893 losses for 1945. Not too shabby for cannon fodder, if I DO say so.

So, in real life, with their forces "declining" since 1941, the Luftwaffe managed to give the USAAF only 2.1% of it's eventual war losses in 1942 using their remaining experts. The loss numbers went up every year until 1944 when they gave us 57.9% of our losses with their "cannon fodder" pilots mostly running the show by then?

Something seems a bit flawed about your logic. Maybe your premise is incorrect?

In reality, the monthly losses didn't start to taper off until April 1945 and they dropped away within a month after that to 60 and then to zero. They fought up until the end quite well, Macandy. Really. That includes their supposedly obsolete Bf 109, which was shooting down our planes until the last day of the war.

 

[Greg Boeser]

Now do losses per sortie in each year.
The USAAF flew a very small percentage of their sorties in1942.

 

[GregP]

Yup, I know that we didnt fly too much in 1942. But saying the Germans weren't very good in 1944 isn't exactly accurate, given the losses incurred.

 

[33k in the air]

1) ETO Losses:
1942 - 55 - that's 2.1% o9f the losses.
1943 - 1,261 - that's 16.8% of the losses.
1944 - 7,749 - that's 57.9% of the losses.
1945 - 3,631 - that's 23.2% of the losses in only the first 4 months of 1945. I discounted May when we only had 60 losses. If you account for the other 8 month at the same rate, you'd have 10,893 losses for 1945. Not too shabby for cannon fodder, if I DO say so.

That's not really a meaningful way of looking at the losses because force sizes were much larger in the latter years than the earlier years. For example, the number of heavy bombers available for operations by the 8th AF doubled from 1,082 in early March to 2,243 just three months later. You can see the same sort of ramp up in percentage of bomb tonnage dropped when looked at the way you are:

1942: 2,727 tons (0.4%)
1943: 47,340 tons (6.7%)
1944: 445,603 tons (63.4%)
1945: 207,257 tons (29.5%)

So, in real life, with their forces "declining" since 1941, the Luftwaffe managed to give the USAAF only 2.1% of it's eventual war losses in 1942 using their remaining experts. The loss numbers went up every year until 1944 when they gave us 57.9% of our losses with their "cannon fodder" pilots mostly running the show by then?

Something seems a bit flawed about your logic. Maybe your premise is incorrect?

Quoting from Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933–1945 by Williamson Murray (p.242-243):

If Eighth could bear an attrition rate that was close to 20 percent (299 bombers written off) for February, the Germans certainly could not suffer the losses it required to inflict that punishment. In February, Luftwaffe fighter and pilot losses became unmanageable. The tactics that had worked when there was time to attack unescorted bomber formations were no longer effective. American fighters were nearly always present and eager to attack their opponent. As a result, there was little chance to use twin-engine day and night fighters without heavy losses . . .​

​

For the Luftwaffe's single-engine force, "Big Week" ushered in a period during which sustained combat devastated its units over the long haul. "Big Week" was only the start of a process that lasted through April and was not the apogee but rather a beginning. Bf 109 and Fw 190 losses were the heaviest thus far in the war for pilots as well as aircraft. The Luftwaffe wrote off over 33 percent of its single-engine fighters and lost 17.9 percent of its fighter pilots during February . . .​

​

The attrition of German fighter pilots and aircraft reached a new high point in March. Luftwaffe units wrote off 56.4 percent of single-engine fighters available on March 1, while crew losses reached nearly 22 percent of pilots present on February 29. Nevertheless, the Germans did impose severe attrition on Eighth's bombers, Eighth wrote off 349 bombers in March. Not until May did a significant decrease in bomber attrition begin, reflecting the continued arrival of new crews and aircraft as well as the final collapse of the Luftwaffe's fighter force (see Table XLIX).​

In reality, the monthly losses didn't start to taper off until April 1945 and they dropped away within a month after that to 60 and then to zero. They fought up until the end quite well, Macandy. Really. That includes their supposedly obsolete Bf 109, which was shooting down our planes until the last day of the war.

You are only counting the losses attributed to enemy fighters, yes?

 

[Geoffrey Sinclair]

Numbers of airframes means nothing if your core of highly experienced pilots is being attritted and not replaced.
An RAF pilot shot down in 1940 was replaced by one as well trained, one shot down in 1943 was replaced by one better trained.

The Luftwaffe entered WWII with a large cadre of highly skilled pilots who'd had the luxury of a peacetime training programme and learned their trade in the Spanish Civil War - but a real war saw them being steadily lost and replaced with less well trained pilots.

The RAF was gaining both in numbers of aircraft and combat experienced pilots from 1939.

By 1943 the Luftwaffe was two air forces - a small and diminishing cadre of highly trained pre war pilots, and a large Air Force of poorly trained cannon fodder.

An RAF and Luftwaffe (and everyone else) aircrew lost early in the war was replaced by a less well trained person. One reason the RAF had problems being effective in 1941 was the cutting of training early in the war to obtain numbers. The same applied to everyone else. One factor in the air war in Europe was winter quarters forcing a period of quieter operations. Something the 8th Air Force did not let happen in 1943/44.

By end 1942 RAF and USAAF pilots were being given more training hours, the Luftwaffe was relying on the lower loss rates in the east as a form of operational training. By end 1943 the western allies were giving twice the training hours as the Luftwaffe, by mid 1944 total Luftwaffe hours were comparable to allied training on operational types, around a third the total western allied training hours.

The big drop in Luftwaffe day fighter pilot quality occurred in the first 5 months of 1944. As of 31 December 2,395 pilots in units, 1,461 operational, 2,262 casualties January to May 1944.

Since we are talking Luftwaffe fighter effectiveness, USAAF Statistical Digest Table 119, 159 ETO effective sorties \\ losses to enemy aircraft \\ percentage losses

Month

Total

HB

M&LB

Ftr

\\

Total

HB

M&LB

Ftr

\\

Total

HB

M&LB

Ftr

Jul-43​

4,292​

1,743​

416​

2,133​

\\

94​

79​

1​

14​

\\

2.19​

4.53​

0.24​

0.66​

Aug-43​

4,771​

1,850​

904​

2,017​

\\

100​

87​

6​

7​

\\

2.10​

4.70​

0.66​

0.35​

Sep-43​

7,252​

2,457​

1,808​

2,987​

\\

60​

46​

4​

10​

\\

0.83​

1.87​

0.22​

0.33​

Oct-43​

5,526​

2,117​

521​

2,888​

\\

152​

139​

0​

13​

\\

2.75​

6.57​

0.00​

0.45​

total

21,841​

8,167​

3,649​

10,025​

\\

406​

351​

11​

44​

\\

1.86​

4.30​

0.30​

0.44​

Jan-44​

12,541​

5,027​

1,050​

6,464​

\\

197​

139​

1​

57​

\\

1.57​

2.77​

0.10​

0.88​

Feb-44​

19,588​

7,512​

2,373​

9,703​

\\

243​

170​

4​

69​

\\

1.24​

2.26​

0.17​

0.71​

Mar-44​

26,411​

8,773​

3,025​

14,613​

\\

234​

178​

2​

54​

\\

0.89​

2.03​

0.07​

0.37​

Apr-44​

34,493​

9,945​

5,332​

19,216​

\\

516​

314​

1​

201​

\\

1.50​

3.16​

0.02​

1.05​

total

93,033​

31,257​

11,780​

49,996​

\\

1,190​

801​

8​

381​

\\

1.28​

2.56​

0.07​

0.76​

Jan-45​

42,309​

14,750​

2,998​

24,561​

\\

121​

49​

0​

72​

\\

0.29​

0.33​

0.00​

0.29​

Feb-45​

62,350​

19,933​

7,902​

34,515​

\\

56​

14​

4​

38​

\\

0.09​

0.07​

0.05​

0.11​

Mar-45​

104,795​

28,804​

15,792​

60,199​

\\

144​

63​

5​

76​

\\

0.14​

0.22​

0.03​

0.13​

Apr-45​

72,842​

18,180​

9,209​

45,453​

\\

119​

72​

11​

36​

\\

0.16​

0.40​

0.12​

0.08​

total

282,296​

81,667​

35,901​

164,728​

\\

440​

198​

20​

222​

\\

0.16​

0.24​

0.06​

0.13​

The data from the main 4 months of 1943, when most bombing raids were unescorted and then the first 4 months of 1944 and 1945. The Luftwaffe fighter force became much less effective in percentage terms but inflicted about the same number of USAAF losses numerically in the four month periods in 1943 and 1945 while losing far more fighters in 1945 both numerically and as a percentage of sorties. The Jagdwaffe fought to the end.

Werner Gerbig Six Months to Oblivion is quite old now, it covers the air fighting from the Luftwaffe day fighters point of view from November 1944 onwards.

 

[GregP]

Yet we lost approximately the same number of airplanes in the ETO every month from Sep 44 thru Apr 45 except for Mar 45 when we lost more. The effect of the Luftwaffe didn't change, almost at all, until May 45, and VE day is 98 May 45.

 

[33k in the air]

Yet we lost approximately the same number of airplanes in the ETO every month from Sep 44 thru Apr 45 except for Mar 45 when we lost more. The effect of the Luftwaffe didn't change, almost at all, until May 45, and VE day is 98 May 45.

Army Air Forces Statistical Digest World War II
Table 159 — Airplane Losses on Combat Operations in European Theater of Operations, by Type of Airplane and by Cause of Loss: Aug 1942 to May 1945
(p.255 of the report; p.276 of the PDF)

Only Jan. 1944 through April 1945 are presented for brevity's sake. The first figure is the number of heavy bomber aircraft lost to enemy fighters; the second is the number lost to flak; the third figure is the number lost to other causes; the figure after the equal sign is the total.

139 + 027 + 37 = 203 — Jan. 1944
170 + 081 + 20 = 271 — Feb. 1944
178 + 112 + 55 = 345 — Mar. 1944
314 + 105 + 01 = 420 — Apr. 1944
211 + 122 + 43 = 376 —May 1945
112 + 162 + 46 = 320 — June 1944
080 + 201 + 71 = 352 — July 1944
061 + 238 + 32 = 331 — Aug. 1944
137 + 207 + 30 = 374 — Sept. 1944
036 + 112 + 29 = 177 — Oct. 1944
050 + 146 + 13 = 209 — Nov. 1944
028 + 074 + 17 = 119 — Dec. 1944
049 + 222 + 43 = 314 — Jan. 1945
014 + 157 + 25 = 196 — Feb. 1945
063 + 164 + 39 = 266 — Mar. 1945
072 + 077 + 41 = 190 — Apr. 1945
001 + 004 + 02 = 007 — May 1945

These figures demonstrate your overall statement is not accurate (I would not classify 119 or 177 as being approximately the same as 374 or 314).

Additionally, the number of heavy bombers lost to enemy fighters drops significantly after April 1944. (Indeed, April of 1944 was the highest monthly loss to enemy fighters in the ETO of the entire war.) If we divide the years into thirds, from Jan.–Apr. 1944 there were 801 heavy bombers lost to enemy fighters; from May–Aug. 1944 the number dropped to 464; from Sept.–Dec. 1944 the number dropped to 251; and from Jan.–Apr. 1945 the number decreased again down to 198.

Clearly, the ability of the Luftwaffe to shoot down U.S. bombers peaked in April of 1944 and fell off markedly after that.

Flak losses, on the other hand, went up. From Jan.–Apr. 1944 there were 325 heavy bombers lost to flak; from May–Aug. 1944 the number rose to 723; from Sept.–Dec. 1944 the number dropped to 539; and from Jan.–Apr. 1945 the number increased to 620.

 

[GregP]

That's funny. My numbers come from the Statistical Digest Table 158: Losses by Theater, Theaters Versus Germany Total.

The Luftwaffe's accomplishments versus the U.S.A. .

 

[Thumpalumpacus]

Additionally, the number of heavy bombers lost to enemy fighters drops significantly after April 1944. (Indeed, April of 1944 was the highest monthly loss to enemy fighters in the ETO of the entire war.) If we divide the years into thirds, from Jan.–Apr. 1944 there were 801 heavy bombers lost to enemy fighters; from May–Aug. 1944 the number dropped to 464; from Sept.–Dec. 1944 the number dropped to 251; and from Jan.–Apr. 1945 the number decreased again down to 198.

Is this because LW pilot quality fell, Americans finally has effective long-range escorts, 8th AF doctrine governing escorts changed to allow them more freedom, or a combination of these factors (as well as others I've missed)?

 

[drgondog]

Is this because LW pilot quality fell, Americans finally has effective long-range escorts, 8th AF doctrine governing escorts changed to allow them more freedom, or a combination of these factors (as well as others I've missed)?

All of those, but perhaps the most important (IMO)was the emasculation of natural LW leader aggresion to 'attack' via stupid instructions from Goering to 'attack only the bombers, conserve forces by avoiding the fighters'. US fighter pilots were 'less molested' as they entered combat operations as a result suffered less attrition in 1943 than may have been expected.

Again, IMO, the wholesale destruction of the LW in late winter 1943/1944 through D-Day was certainly enhanced by the rapid integration of the P-51B into combat ops - but moreso because of the 'gentle blooding of 8th & 9th AF fighter pilots which rapidly expanded skilled and experienced fighter force block which took the Attack initiative when engaging the LW.

When Doolittle unleashed the VIII FC (as well as 354th FG of IX FC) to 'attack LW in air and on the ground' - the attitude wasn't 'ok, but be careful' but 'Finally you got your head out and let us be what we were born to be - killers, not shepards'.

Both Galland and Schmid were uniform that their post-war assesment that the true 'beginning of the end' for LW Day Fighter defense was on or about the end of January, 1944 when the LW fighter leaders experienced and reported US fighters not breaking combat to return to the bombers, but pursuing relentlessly to the deck when LW broke off attacks. Incentive of Ace status for equal credit air or ground further compounded the issues as fighter which ordinarily would be with bomber force at 25K were on the deck shooting up forming LW forces, returning LW forces and simply shooting up everything in sight - airields, rail, barge, radar sites, etc.

 

[33k in the air]

That's funny. My numbers come from the Statistical Digest Table 158: Losses by Theater, Theaters Versus Germany Total.

As losses to German fighters decreased, losses to flak increased.

The total losses in Table 158 and 159 agree, but the latter breaks out the losses by type of aircraft and type of loss. Below are the total losses (heavy bombers, medium & light bombers, fighters) in the ETO from Jan. 1944 through April 1945 broken out by cause. The percentages were calculated in Excel and added to the results.

Month    Total    E/A  Flak   Other    E/A    Flak   Other
----------------------------------------------------------
Jan 1944   277    197    35    45    71.1%   12.6%   16.2%
Feb 1944   393    243   108    42    61.8%   27.5%   10.7%
Mar 1944   551    234   167   150    42.5%   30.3%   27.2%
Apr 1944   732    516   190    26    70.5%   26.0%    3.6%
May 1944   761    397   248   116    52.2%   32.6%   15.2%
Jun 1944   904    284   400   220    31.4%   44.2%   24.3%
Jul 1944   712    150   377   185    21.1%   52.9%   26.0%
Aug 1944   968    163   607   198    16.8%   62.7%   20.5%
Sep 1944   758    241   422    95    31.8%   55.7%   12.5%
Oct 1944   552    135   334    83    24.5%   60.5%   15.0%
Nov 1944   538    131   328    79    24.3%   61.0%   14.7%
Dec 1944   603    211   285   107    35.0%   47.3%   17.7%
Jan 1945   646    121   412   113    18.7%   63.8%   17.5%
Feb 1945   580     56   433    91     9.7%   74.7%   15.7%
Mar 1945   774    144   460   170    18.6%   59.4%   22.0%
Apr 1945   579    119   302   158    20.6%   52.2%   27.3%

 

[GregP]

Since you want to discuss, OK, let's discuss. Table 159 is airplane losses on combat missions. Table 118 is combat sorties flown. The first columns cover the theaters versus Germany (ETO and MTO).

I'm going to look at airplane losses per combat sortie.

The average losses per combat sortie for Aug-Dec 1942 is .00282.
The average losses per combat sortie for Jan-Dec 1943 is .00318.
The average losses per combat sortie for Jan-Dec 1944 is .00602.
The average losses per combat sortie for Jan-Apr 1945 is .00473.

Looks to me as if the losses per sorties increased 50% in 1943 over 1942, 100% over 1943 in 1944, and tapered off slightly in the first few months of 1945, where the losses were still double what they were in 1942 when the Germans supposedly had more experts. I discount May 1945 since the Luftwaffe collapsed asa fighting force in April 1945.

The losses per combat sortie data do not support the Luftwaffe getting significantly weaker and, in fact, indicate they got stronger as time went on with their strongest year being 1944, when they are popularly believed to be "less skilled." U.S. losses per combat sorties were 1/3 higher in the first four months of 1945 than they were in 1943.

The Luftwaffe as a force doesn't seem to be nearly as depleted as you guys want to believe from the data in the Statistical Digest. Go ahead, check the math. It's correct using the data in the Digest.

I'm not really trying to argue as much as I'm not seeing the truth in saying the Luftwaffe as a force got less effective as time went on. The data just don't support that contention until May 1945. Of course, that's using all losses, including losses to flak.

If you look at just losses to enemy fighter aircraft per combat sortie, you get a slightly different story.

The average losses per combat sortie to enemy fighters for Aug-Dec 1942 is .00257.
The average losses per combat sortie to enemy fighters for Jan-Dec 1943 is .00237.
The average losses per combat sortie to enemy fighters for Jan-Dec 1944 is .00242.
The average losses per combat sortie to enemy fighters for Jan-Apr 1945 is .00080.

So, the Luftwaffe fighters look almost exactly evenly strong for 1942, 1943, and 1944, and then taper off in 1945, as we might expect they would given the attrition in experts. But the effect of expert attrition doesn't begin to show until 1945 in losses per sortie to fighters. Again, these data are directly from the Statistical Digest tables.

 

[33k in the air]

I'm going to look at airplane losses per combat sortie.

The average losses per combat sortie for Aug-Dec 1942 is .00282.
The average losses per combat sortie for Jan-Dec 1943 is .00318.
The average losses per combat sortie for Jan-Dec 1944 is .00602.
The average losses per combat sortie for Jan-Apr 1945 is .00473.

Looks to me as if the losses per sorties increased 50% in 1943 over 1942, 100% over 1943 in 1944, and tapered off slightly in the first few months of 1945, where the losses were still double what they were in 1942 when the Germans supposedly had more experts. I discount May 1945 since the Luftwaffe collapsed asa fighting force in April 1945.

ETO combat sorties flown from Table 118; ETO total losses (heavy bombers, medium & light bombers, fighters) attributed enemy aircraft from Table 159; monthly sortie loss percentage calculated in Excel.

             Total  Losses
Month      Sorties  to E/A    Pct.
----------------------------------
Jan 1944    15,183    197    1.30%
Feb 1944    24,425    243    0.99%
Mar 1944    31,950    234    0.73%
Apr 1944    43,434    516    1.19%
May 1944    67,979    397    0.58%
Jun 1944    96,096    284    0.30%
Jul 1944    74,878    150    0.20%
Aug 1944    77,976    163    0.21%
Sep 1944    57,384    241    0.42%
Oct 1944    52,596    135    0.26%
Nov 1944    52,299    131    0.25%
Dec 1944    61,089    211    0.35%
Jan 1945    47,577    121    0.25%
Feb 1945    68,365     56    0.08%
Mar 1945   111,472    144    0.13%
Apr 1945    79,402    119    0.15%

There is a clear and unmistakable reduction in the percentage of sorties lost to German fighters.