Why American aces had lower scores than anybody else

[FLYBOYJ]

To be fair, the Soviet Union would charge you with destroying a car if you walked out in front of it!

That's your opinion (and probably correct) but irrelevant to this discussion

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Yes, I am saying the were absolutely that stupid. Right to the bitter end, they were standing up squadrons of their wunderwaffe crewed by'experten' who they fondly imagined would sweep the clouds of allied aircraft from the skies.


Mein Fuhrer! Today our staffeln of experten shot down 12 American Bombers!
Mein Fuhrer! Today the Americans came back mob handed and bombed our expetens airfield with 400 bombers!

The great majority Luftwaffe pilots knew late in the war they were doomed, they only continued to fight as they felt they had to defend their homeland rather than follow Nazi propaganda.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Scoring rates are reliant on the veracity of claims equally as much as the actual score. It would also be an individual thing, not something you can apply as a trait specifically to Allied or German aces.

Werner Shroer is credited with 114 victories in 197 missions; even if he were only 50% accurate that would still be a very good rate. However, it puzzles me, as it seems he served the entire war or most of it, and yet he only flew 197?

There was also a German pilot whose name escapes me, that was credited with 71 victories in 70 missions on the Eastern Front. It would be interesting to see how his claims stacked up against Soviet loss records.

Günther Scheel

 

[Macandy]

That's your opinion (and probably correct) but irrelevant to this discussion

Its actually rather relevant.
The Russians charged all POW's who had fought on Russian territory as criminals - the Supreme Soviet had made it a anti State crime to illegally enter Russia - so all POW's got 10 years in a Gulag rather than a POW camp..
Charging Hartmann as a 'criminal' wasn't because he was singled out for special consideration. It was SOP.

 

[Macandy]

The great majority Luftwaffe pilots knew late in the war they were doomed, they only continued to fight as they felt they had to defend their homeland rather than follow Nazi propaganda.

I was specifically referring to the insane cult of the Experten that lasted to the end.
They would have been far better served by sending their best pilots to OCU's and giving the Lutfwaffes cannon fodder some basic learned in combat skills.
A USAAF pilot had 10 weeks in an OCU learning lessons that would save his life before setting foot overseas - a Luftwaffe greenhorn had to try and pick this up in the Squadron - most didn't.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Its actually rather relevant.
The Russians charged all POW's who had fought on Russian territory as criminals - the Supreme Soviet had made it a anti State crime to illegally enter Russia - so all POW's got 10 years in a Gulag rather than a POW camp..
Charging Hartmann as a 'criminal' wasn't because he was singled out for special consideration. It was SOP.

Actually some got less (not defending their actions). Hartmann was among the last to be released because he refused to cooperate and sign any confessions. He was put on trial twice (the second time represented himself) and was convicted both times.

I was specifically referring to the insane cult of the Experten that lasted to the end.

Can you name a few of these "Experten" that you consider insane?

They would have been far better served by sending their best pilots to OCU's and giving the Lutfwaffes cannon fodder some basic learned in combat skills.
A USAAF pilot had 10 weeks in an OCU learning lessons that would save his life before setting foot overseas - a Luftwaffe greenhorn had to try and pick this up in the Squadron - most didn't.

They didn't have that luxury, especially the last 6 months of the war.

 

[Clayton Magnet]

I was specifically referring to the insane cult of the Experten that lasted to the end.
They would have been far better served by sending their best pilots to OCU's and giving the Lutfwaffes cannon fodder some basic learned in combat skills.
A USAAF pilot had 10 weeks in an OCU learning lessons that would save his life before setting foot overseas - a Luftwaffe greenhorn had to try and pick this up in the Squadron - most didn't.

I suspect, and this is purely my opinion, that the Luftwaffe would have followed the same general principle on training new pilots, as the allies did, IF they had the same luxury of distance and space that the western allies had. But they quickly found themselves embroiled in a multi-front war, surrounded on basically all sides. They couldn't just send their new recruits away to a distant land, to be trained by combat veterans, like the RAF and USAAC/F did.

Canada was called the "Aerodrome of Democracy" due to the BCATP, and the multitude of brand new training airfields dotting the country. (I did my glider training at an ex BCATP airfield in the 90's)

 

[Clayton Magnet]

Unless you're trying to convict him of crimes, in which case you're going to fluff up the numbers.

If they tried to fluff up the numbers, then they fell short by a few. But I suppose they only would have been concerned with Soviet losses, so perhaps that's where the 345 number comes from.

 

[Jagdflieger]

I suspect, and this is purely my opinion, that the Luftwaffe would have followed the same general principle on training new pilots, as the allies did, IF they had the same luxury of distance and space that the western allies had. But they quickly found themselves embroiled in a multi-front war, surrounded on basically all sides. They couldn't just send their new recruits away to a distant land, to be trained by combat veterans, like the RAF and USAAC/F did.

Canada was called the "Aerodrome of Democracy" due to the BCATP, and the multitude of brand new training airfields dotting the country. (I did my glider training at an ex BCATP airfield in the 90's)

The whole pilot training misery - especially for fighter-pilots, had it's causes already during the per-war period.
The only fully operational Jagdfliegerschule 2 (fighter-pilot school) was at Schleissheim from 1935 - 1936. From 1937 - 1938 (almost 2 years) fighter-pilot training only took place
at the respective Fighterwings were the pilots had been assigned to. Some received a very intense and good training other's average to none.
Due to Hitler using the Luftwaffe to intimidate the Western powers all flight-personal incl. their aircraft's from the schools (not just the fighter-pilot school) were constantly used to
fill up the existing wings and to form new wings and squadrons.

So due to the Rhineland occupation, reunite Austria, the Sudeten-crisis and occupation of the rest - Czech-republic, meaning 1935 - 1939 fighter-pilot training existed more on paper
then reality. During the Denmark and Norway occupation all except 1 fighter-school training squadron remaining at Schleissheim were send to Denmark and Norway together with the entire school-wing from Jagdfliegerschule 1 Werneuchen - with one remaining squadron being used as the core for a new fighter-wing.

Essential fighter-pilot training took only place from August 1941 - to October 1942, after that even the advanced pilot-training schools looked down or reduced training hours by more
then 50%. Hartmann was actually amongst the last fully trained vintage of Luftwaffe fighter-pilots. Due to the heavy losses since the BoB even suitable flight-training personal was rare. E.g. the Luftkriegsschule 2 in Berlin-Gatow Aufsicht Saal B, in which Hartmann received his basic flight training was under supervision by my uncle a He -111 pilot. Lucky for Hartmann as he states in his book - he was fortunate to had gotten an experienced fighter-plane-pilot as instructor.

As such I personally was always astonished that the Luftwaffe fighter-wings were even able to put up some kind of resistance from 1944 onward at all.

Regards
Jagdflieger

 

[dedalos]

Luftwaffe did send experienced pilots back to flight schools to rest and teach the new pilots. And after some time returned to front line units.Often , while in the training units, these veterans were asked to lead the new pilots against american bombers that were in their area. Results were not good
However the main problem, was the lack of fuel . Simply there was no enough fuel for training.
The flight leaders of the front line units were trying to complete the training of the new pilots even during operational patrols
Lipfert arrived at 6/jg52 in autumn 1942. At his first sorties he had a hard time just to follow his flight leader. Imagine now the situation of the new pilots in 1944
I would like also to say that everybody overclaimed more or less, but they also claimed unconfirmed victories that today we know that did occur . For example lipfert did shot down catacuzino s wingman in late 44 although he claimed it as unconfirmed

 

[Jagdflieger]

Luftwaffe did send experienced pilots back to flight schools to rest and teach the new pilots. And after some time returned to front line units.Often , while in the training units, these veterans were asked to lead the new pilots against american bombers that were in their area. Results were not good

Interesting, so what would you define to be an experienced pilot? I might be wrong but I am not aware of a single Luftwaffe Ace to be deployed to a Flight-school. Even for fighterpilots with e.g. 30-50 kills I am not aware of one having served as an instructor at a fighter or C school. just because one might have been in charge of a training school doesn't implement that he would have had even the time to personally instruct new bees or advanced pilots.
No sidepunch intended, if you have some data I would appreciate that very much.

However the main problem, was the lack of fuel . Simply there was no enough fuel for training.

What data would you have to support this statement? or what period are you referring to?

The flight leaders of the front line units were trying to complete the training of the new pilots even during operational patrols

Sorry but that is a myth - e.g. from 1943 onward there was no time and opportunity for an experienced pilot to complete a new bee pilots training. Besides attaching a new bee on his first missions to a more or better experienced Rottenfuehrer (2) or Schwarmfuehrer (4) - once they were being jumped upon by enemy planes they couldn't care even if they wanted to about those new bees, not to mention whilst being on a mission to intercept attack bombers. this is exactly as to why the Luftwaffe suffered horrendous losses amongst its new bees.

I have come across many accounts by veterans stating that on their (new bees) first takeoff for a mission 10-20% already crashed, got killed or badly wounded. These new bees did not
even posses the lowest required standard towards flying.

Hartmann was an outstanding exception in this issue - mainly due to his ability to spot/identify an "easy" target and allowing his wingman to watch his maneuver or even letting the new bee make his first try. Hartmann himself if not for sheer luck would have been KIA already on his first flight.

Lipfert arrived at 6/jg52 in autumn 1942. At his first sorties he had a hard time just to follow his flight leader. Imagine now the situation of the new pilots in 1944
I would like also to say that everybody overclaimed more or less, but they also claimed unconfirmed victories that today we know that did occur . For example lipfert did shot down catacuzino s wingman in late 44 although he claimed it as unconfirmed

Agree

Regards
Jagdflieger

 

[dedalos]

Interesting, so what would you define to be an experienced pilot? I might be wrong but I am not aware of a single Luftwaffe Ace to be deployed to a Flight-school. Even for fighterpilots with e.g. 30-50 kills I am not aware of one having served as an instructor at a fighter or C school. just because one might have been in charge of a training school doesn't implement that he would have had even the time to personally instruct new bees or advanced pilots.
No sidepunch intended, if you have some data I would appreciate that very much.
M
What data would you have to support this statement? or what period are you referring to?

My friend you are wrong, many experienced pilots served 2-3 months in advanced training units. writing from memory i report
nowotny after jg54 and before kommando nowotny commanded jagdgruppe ost in france
herman graf after jg 52 and before Jr50 also that unit
lipfert was transfered for 2 months in 1943 to train romanians
krrupinski in early 1943
gunther schack in spring 1943
rudolf trenkel in summer 43
i stop here because the list is huge. not all experienced pilots returned to advanced training units but many many did for 2-3 months periods. by the term experienced could be pilots with 20 plus kills and a certain time frame of front line service.
on channel front even just 10 kills was sign of very experienced pilot

Sorry but that is a myth - e.g. from 1943 onward there was no time and opportunity for an experienced pilot to complete a new bee pilots training. Besides attaching a new bee on his first missions to a more or better experienced Rottenfuehrer (2) or Schwarmfuehrer (4) - once they were being jumped upon by enemy planes they couldn't care even if they wanted to about those new bees, not to mention whilst being on a mission to intercept attack bombers. this is exactly as to why the Luftwaffe suffered horrendous losses amongst its new bees.

lipfert reports that in1943 even the entire gruppe (II/jg52) did some practice together, and many pilots describe how they tried to help the new pilots in their first missions. And i dont mean just combat tactics but aircraft handling as well

I have come across many accounts by veterans stating that on their (new bees) first takeoff for a mission 10-20% already crashed, got killed or badly wounded. These new bees did not
even posses the lowest required standard towards flying.

Hartmann was an outstanding exception in this issue - mainly due to his ability to spot/identify an "easy" target and allowing his wingman to watch his maneuver or even letting the new bee make his first try. Hartmann himself if not for sheer luck would have been KIA already on his first flight.

Agree

Regards
Jagdflieger

as for the fuel , the training flying hours were already reduced by 1942
actually, on the eastern front, even from the early 1943 , the main limiting factor of the number of sorties flown was the fuel situation. Often the pilots were given free days due lack of fuel, or flew 1 mission. In 1941/42 was no uncommon for a fighter pilot to fly 5-8 missions per day

 

[Andrew Arthy]

Hi,

It was very common for experienced Luftwaffe pilots to be withdrawn from the front to serve as instructors with training units, even into 1945. Here are some examples from Jagdgeschwader 54 and the periods they served as instructors:

- Hugo Broch, November 1943-June 1944
- Karl-Heinz Cordes, February 1944-summer 1944
- Heribert Koller, November 1944-February 1945
- Otto Kittel, November 1943-February 1944
- Hans-Joachim Kroschinski, April 1944-September 1944

Despite lack of fuel and Allied air superiority, Luftwaffe fighter pilot training was still decent in late-1944. Looking at some German fighter pilot logbooks, I calculated that in 1942 and 1943, a German fighter pilot would undertake 750-900 flights before arriving at a frontline unit (650-700 basic training flights, 100-200 advanced training). In the autumn of 1944 they were undertaking 350-450 flights before arriving at a frontline unit (300 basic, 50-150 advanced), so the situation was not horrendous. Obviously the training standards decreased as the war went on, but they were still receiving adequate training, and as noted above, they were training with experienced pilots as instructors and mentors. It was only after January 1945 that the training situation broke down completely.

Cheers,
Andrew A.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Hi,

It was very common for experienced Luftwaffe pilots to be withdrawn from the front to serve as instructors with training units, even into 1945. Here are some examples from Jagdgeschwader 54 and the periods they served as instructors:

- Hugo Broch, November 1943-June 1944
- Karl-Heinz Cordes, February 1944-summer 1944
- Heribert Koller, November 1944-February 1945
- Otto Kittel, November 1943-February 1944
- Hans-Joachim Kroschinski, April 1944-September 1944

Despite lack of fuel and Allied air superiority, Luftwaffe fighter pilot training was still decent in late-1944. Looking at some German fighter pilot logbooks, I calculated that in 1942 and 1943, a German fighter pilot would undertake 750-900 flights before arriving at a frontline unit (650-700 basic training flights, 100-200 advanced training). In the autumn of 1944 they were undertaking 350-450 flights before arriving at a frontline unit (300 basic, 50-150 advanced), so the situation was not horrendous. Obviously the training standards decreased as the war went on, but they were still receiving adequate training, and as noted above, they were training with experienced pilots as instructors and mentors. It was only after January 1945 that the training situation broke down completely.

Cheers,
Andrew A.

Hi Andrew -

I always appreciate the information you post, you're a wealth of knowledge. About these "flights." Is there any indication how they equate to specifics - hours in the air, instrument training, gunnery, formation flying. Case in point. I knew people who flew with former east bloc pilots, they flew MiG-21s. Although they had many "flights" (sorties, take off and landings) they did not have a lot of actual flight hours, (about 700 - 1000 hours) and that's where "the rubber meets the road." According to some of the US trained pilots I knew who flew with them (we were flying L39s) these pilots basically knew how to fly the aircraft but were not that skilled in instrument and formation flying. I'm wondering if these Luftwaffe trainees operated in the same proficiency as their opposing counterparts.

Now with all this said, are you sure these flights are not actually "hours"?

Thanks!

FBJ

 

[Andrew Arthy]

Hi Andrew -

I always appreciate the information you post, you're a wealth of knowledge. About these "flights." Is there any indication how they equate to specifics - hours in the air, instrument training, gunnery, formation flying. Case in point. I knew people who flew with former east bloc pilots, they flew MiG-21s. Although they had many "flights" (sorties, take off and landings) they did not have a lot of actual flight hours, (about 700 - 1000 hours) and that's where "the rubber meets the road." According to some of the US trained pilots I knew who flew with them (we were flying L39s) these pilots basically knew how to fly the aircraft but were not that skilled in instrument and formation flying. I'm wondering if these Luftwaffe trainees operated in the same proficiency as their opposing counterparts.

Now with all this said, are you sure these flights are not actually "hours"?

Thanks!

FBJ

Hi,

The figures I gave are the number of flights undertaken. I do have plans to produce more accurate figures, with a breakdown of hours, types of flights, etc., but that is something for the future. The logbooks all give the types of flights, so it would be possible to do more analysis. I just have to crunch the numbers, and that's not something I will have time for in the near future.

That said, here is a quick analysis of one of the late-war fighter pilots, who joined his operational unit in November 1944:

- 2 hours before first solo
- 132 flights on basic training types (a total of 40 hours to this point)
- 293 flights before first flight in an advanced fighter (a total of 124 hours to this point). His first advanced fighter was actually the Fiat G.50, and later the Bf 109 and FW 190
- 386 flights before commencing combat flying (a total of 169 hours to this point)

I'm certainly not arguing that this was the ideal training regime, but late-war Luftwaffe fighter pilots were not just cannon fodder with a couple of hours training.

Cheers,
Andrew A.

 

[FLYBOYJ]

Hi,

The figures I gave are the number of flights undertaken. I do have plans to produce more accurate figures, with a breakdown of hours, types of flights, etc., but that is something for the future. The logbooks all give the types of flights, so it would be possible to do more analysis. I just have to crunch the numbers, and that's not something I will have time for in the near future.

That said, here is a quick analysis of one of the late-war fighter pilots, who joined his operational unit in November 1944:

- 2 hours before first solo
- 132 flights on basic training types (a total of 40 hours to this point)
- 293 flights before first flight in an advanced fighter (a total of 124 hours to this point). His first advanced fighter was actually the Fiat G.50, and later the Bf 109 and FW 190
- 386 flights before commencing combat flying (a total of 169 hours to this point)

I'm certainly not arguing that this was the ideal training regime, but late-war Luftwaffe fighter pilots were not just cannon fodder with a couple of hours training.

Cheers,
Andrew A.

Excellent - thank you!

Now the "flights" matched with hours make a lot more sense (at least to me)

~335 hours - that's a lot better than I assumed. I'd be interested in your further posts on this to see if this was the average up to January, 1945.

Many Thanks!

FBJ

 

[33k in the air]

Despite lack of fuel and Allied air superiority, Luftwaffe fighter pilot training was still decent in late-1944. Looking at some German fighter pilot logbooks, I calculated that in 1942 and 1943, a German fighter pilot would undertake 750-900 flights before arriving at a frontline unit (650-700 basic training flights, 100-200 advanced training). In the autumn of 1944 they were undertaking 350-450 flights before arriving at a frontline unit (300 basic, 50-150 advanced), so the situation was not horrendous. Obviously the training standards decreased as the war went on, but they were still receiving adequate training, and as noted above, they were training with experienced pilots as instructors and mentors. It was only after January 1945 that the training situation broke down completely.

According to Williamson Murray's Luftwaffe: Strategy for Defeat 1933–1945, the flying hours in training programs for the RAF, USAAF, and Luftwaffe for stated time periods:

You can read the text of Murray's book online at Hyperwar.

 

[GrauGeist]

Even the Japanese sent their top pilots to a stint as instructors.

 

[Jagdflieger]

Despite lack of fuel and Allied air superiority, Luftwaffe fighter pilot training was still decent in late-1944. Looking at some German fighter pilot logbooks, I calculated that in 1942 and 1943, a German fighter pilot would undertake 750-900 flights before arriving at a frontline unit (650-700 basic training flights, 100-200 advanced training). In the autumn of 1944 they were undertaking 350-450 flights before arriving at a frontline unit (300 basic, 50-150 advanced), so the situation was not horrendous. Obviously the training standards decreased as the war went on, but they were still receiving adequate training, and as noted above, they were training with experienced pilots as instructors and mentors. It was only after January 1945 that the training situation broke down completely.

Cheers,
Andrew A.

Instinctively from memory I would reply NO WAY - but let me check some of my stats and I will come back to you on that issue.
I am also referring to flying hours in front line aircraft's - not just those Arado or He trainers or common-team flying hours in a passenger aircraft.

I am actually very interested in that "training" matter - far more then which plane was best or who shot how many.

As for e.g. Otto Kittel, or others mentioned, he never served at a flight-school or any unit in reference to school (A,B,C or advanced flying school) Some field-units had their own single training squadron based away from the active units e.g. JG 51 or JG 52, etc. etc.
E.g. 3./EJGr.Ost till mid Feb. 1944 at Jean d'Angely/France and then at Liegnitz/Poland. That is were Kittel was training his own units flyers before being posted to the combat units of JG 54. Also Kittel did serve with 2. Ausbildungsstaffel JG 54 at Jean d'Angely he was from what I know not transferred to Liegnitz. As such his training stint for his own JG. 54 pilot reserve was less then 5 weeks.

As to the shortage of fuel myth - it did only occur in general from August. 44 onward. Source: - BA-MA ZA 3/36
The other time that additional requested fuel by the training-schools was more or less rejected was in the time Feb 1942 - Sept 1942 due to the Wehrmachts counteroffensive
in Russia. Source: , S. 16f., in: BA-MA ZA 3/28

Versorgung des Ausbildungswesens 1944 mit Treibstoff in Tausend Tonnen-Einheiten: Fuel in 1000t/unit
Jan. -Feb. -Mär. -Apr. -Mai -Jun. -Jul. -Aug. -Sep. -Okt. -Nov. -Dez.
3,3 - 3,7 --4,1 ---5,1 ---5,1 ---5,2 --2,9 -1,5 --1,2 --0,7 --0,5 --0,5

The actual reason was the non-availability of training/school aircraft's - see stats

Percentage of Training aircraft's to total aircraft production
Anteil von Schulflugzeugen an der Gesamtproduktion 1937-1944
Jahr: 1937 - 1938 - 1939 - 1940 - 1941 - 1942 - 1943 - 1944
In % 24,4 %-24.7% - 23,4% - 15,3% - 7,5% - 7,5% - 8,1% - 7,7%

As such from 1941 to 1944 only about 7,7% of the total aircraft production was diverted towards training aircraft's compared to 22% from 1937 -40 = 2/3 less
Even if there would have been a shortage in fuel in general (not due to logistic issues) those 7.7% could have flown the same hours as the 22% before.

But e.g. in 1942 - 5299 pilots and crew-members had been trained, the output in 1943 was 12164 = more then double but on the same % of aircraft's as in 1942.
Source: Anlage 3, in: BA-MA RL 4/59

Even Galland had reported to Milch in Summer 1943 that an increase in fighter-production would be meaningless if the % for training planes isn't on par.
The general for flight-training (Chef AW) had reported in October 1943 that the demand for training aircraft's needs to be double of the numbers of those in the existing field-units
in order to fill the existing gaps.
At monthly average in 1943 around 150 field-equivalent fighters were at the disposal for pilot training of which 50% were termed to be worn out, source: BA-MA RL 4/59.
In January 1944 the total recorded sum of twin steered fighter-aircraft's was 8. source: BA-MA ZA 3/785

This clearly shows in what miserable state, pilot-training was already in 1943.

Actual training-hours in regards to C school: 60-80h. Source: BA-MA MFB 4/56379
Actual training-hours in regards to front-line fighters in 1943: 12-15h. Source: BA-MA RL 2II/181
Actual training-hours in regards to front-line fighters in 1945: 06-10h: Source: BA-MA MFB 4/5639


BTW, are you familiar with the doctorate dissertation by Ernst Stilla in regards to the Training issues of the Luftwaffe?

Regards
Jagdfieger

 

[glennasher]

Even the Japanese sent their top pilots to a stint as instructors.

I wonder if some of that time might have been recovering from wounds received in battle or aircraft mishaps? Not disputing what you said in any way, but maybe after recovering, they were sent to an OTU in order to get their feet wet again?