WW2 USN Strategic Bombing Capability (1 Viewer)

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This thread got started as an offshoot of the Best bomber thread and the contention that the B-29 was not needed and a waste of money.
The U.S. Navy's strategic bombing capability in 1941 (the start of the B-29 program) was pretty much nil and it's likelihood of achieving anything of significance in 1942 or 43 was also nil. It was only with the massive ship building programs and massive production of carrier planes that allowed for any sort of "strategic" bombing capability of land masses in 1944 and 1945. It was also helped by improved aircraft and engines over what was contemplated in 1941.
How much the U.S. could count on fuel shortages and the Japanese not coming up with a better pilot replacement program ( and favourable results in early battles) in 1941/42 to enable the U.S. to switch from a B-29 based offensive to a carrier based offensive is certainly speculative.
Think cancel B-29 in spring of 1942 and then have Midway turn into disaster for the Americans. When does the U.S. carrier offensive against the Japanese home Islands start then?
Or Japanese develop a better/more effective submarine force?
As for using big twins on carriers, you have to balance the better capability of the large twin against the capability of the single engine aircraft. Like the Avenger being able to fold to a 19ft width. Being able to house/operate more single engine aircraft may make up for their lower capability.
 
Awesome logic and plan on the desk, Steve.
I frankly admire :)

It is a terrible logic when we are talking about the deaths or potential deaths of hundreds of thousands of our fellow human beings. There never was and never will be a 'good' war.

Awful though the results of the two bombs were, I honestly believe that another 9 months or a year of conflict and the eventual invasions of the Japanese Islands would have been much worse for both sides.
It's cold comfort to the casualties of the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, but their sacrifice prevented something even worse.

Steve
 
It's funny, Steve.
Did I talk about Hiroshima and Nagasaki ?
I only wonder why you always pretend to forget Russians' great contribution to end the war.
If it was because you hate them, looks not fair in history.
At all.
 
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The Russian contribution to ending the war in the Far East?
Surely that was more of a threat than a reality. The final proposal put to the Japanese government at Potsdam (26th July) made NO reference to the Emperor, contrary to the wishes of many in the US administration (Corden Hull said that it "smacked of appeasement") and there was NO direct threat of Soviet involvement. All the Allies were at least under the impression that there would be a Soviet attack on Japan sometime within two or three weeks of 8th August. The Japanese response, ignoring the declaration, was ill advised, taken as rejection, and certainly precipitated the use of the bombs.
The argument that imminent Soviet involvement precipitated the Japanese surrender rather than the dropping of the bombs doesn't hold water for me.
The Emperor specifically mentioned that the "new and cruel" bomb employed by the Allies was the "reason why we have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the joint declaration of the powers."

If you mean the contribution of the Soviet Union to ending the war in Europe, I don't think anyone has attempted to minimise that.

Cheers

Steve
 
True, but that occurred even with the use of nuclear weapons
The point is a great portion of the Japanese leadership WAS NOT going to surrender, even if it came from the emperor, that's why the argument about the Japanese seeking surrender terms and the use of nukes were not necessary. Those bombs changed the minds of many, but not all.
 
"....The Japanese response, ignoring the declaration, was ill advised ..."
Delusional is the word that comes to mind ... Japanese diplomats were seriously pursuing the idea of having the Russians negotiate the "peace" with the Americans, British, et al on their behalf. As if that was every going to happen given the historical background between the 2 countries. This sentiment was floated by some in the Japanese administration despite a fear and abhorrence of communism by Japanese conservatives.
 
"....The Japanese response, ignoring the declaration, was ill advised ..."
Delusional is the word that comes to mind ... .

That was one of the words that came to my mind too, but I was trying to use the most moderate language possible whilst making the point about simply ignoring the declaration :)

Cheers

Steve
 
Sensei Shinpachi-San, please share your insight into the great contribution of the Soviets toward ending the war. Like most Americans, I was led to believe that, despite their huge sacrifices and contribution to defeating Hitler, the Russians jumped into the Pacific war in its last week solely for territorial gain and influence at the bargaining table. Admittedly, this is a somewhat parochial interpretation of events. Would you share your perspective, Sir? Arigato goziamasu Shinpachi-San.
 
Sorry, Steve, I have understood that you know very few about what happened and talked in the Imperial Council held on August 9, 1945.
After 20 minutes Hirohito was informed of Soviet's invasion into Manchuria, he made up his mind to accept the joint declaration.
No ones there objected it as the invasion was totally unexpected incident like a sudden death sentence for them.
 
Why the surprise? Hadn't the Red Army and the Kwantung Army been taking potshots at each other across the Amur since 1938?
 
But was it effective? I've always heard there was a "quasi-war" going on there most of the time. Not so?

This was our shame but Japan was trusting Soviet Union and asking it mediation for the peace talk with the Allies in July.
Japan was looking forward to answer from Soviet side in August.
 
I don't buy this version of history. The attack in Manchuria occurred after the first bomb and the same day as the second. I also don't believe that this came as a total surprise to the Japanese (nor does Glantz). It must also have been obvious to the Japanese, following the Soviet notification that they would not renew the neutrality pact after April '46, and the prognostication and delay over the approaches in Moscow seeking Soviet mediation that this was not likely. The Japanese governments might have sometimes been delusional, but not stupid.
Cordell Hull had been assured by Stalin, in Moscow, in October 1943, that the Soviet Union would eventually join the war against Japan. promoting Soviet involvement was a corner stone of US policy until a change of heart in mid 1945. Having spent two years urging Soviet involvement the Americans could hardly urge Soviet neutrality at this late stage! The official position of the War Department still held that "Russian entry will have a profound military effect in that almost certainly it will materially shorten the war and thus save American lives," but many in the administration were far from keen to see Soviet involvement when the war was effectively won and even Truman is recorded saying that "he intended thereafter to be firm in his dealings with the Russians." He wasn't !
Cheers
Steve
 
That would be your own favor but please imagine, Steve.
If such massive bombings by the B-29s, including A-bombs, had ended the Pacific War so early as in August 1945, with or without Soviet Union, as your country probably intended, why could not your country win in Korea and Vietnam ? Could not you win in such smaller coutries without A-bombs ? I don't think so. You could have been bombing empty military/factory buildings in my impression.
 
That would be your own favor but please imagine, Steve.
If such massive bombings by the B-29s, including A-bombs, had ended the Pacific War so early as in August 1945, with or without Soviet Union, as your country probably intended, why could not your country win in Korea and Vietnam ? Could not you win in such smaller coutries without A-bombs ? I don't think so. You could have been bombing empty military/factory buildings in my impression.

That's an easy answer, Shinpachi, WWII was an all-out war, a "national crusade", if you will, against a hated enemy of limited and dwindling resources, with no concern for collateral damage or thought of winning hearts and minds. "Starve'em and butcher'em if you have to!"
Korea and Viet Nam were attempts to preserve a political entity with limited resource expenditure, limited national commitment, and little understanding of the facts on the ground.
 

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