WW2 USN Strategic Bombing Capability

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Hard to say without more research. It is around 600 miles from the North coast of Hokkaido to Tokyo and around 1180 miles from the North coast of Hokkaido to the south (or southwest ) coast of the southern Island. So basically most of Japan was out of range of the B-29 even if it operated from the western most Aleutian Island. Trying to establish a major air base on a Russian Kuril Island (or Russian mainland?) not only faced opposition from Uncle Joe but the logistics would have been as bad or worse than using the more southern Pacific Islands.

From wiki so.......
"The chain has around 100 volcanoes, some 40 of which are active, and many hot springs andfumaroles. There is frequent seismic activity..."
"The climate on the islands is generally severe, with long, cold, stormy winters and short and notoriously foggy summers. The average annual precipitation is 30–40 inches (760–1,020 mm), most of which falls as snow."

Granted armies and AIr forces have operated in conditions as bad if not worse by why choose this option if there are others?

From an operational standpoint, I think B-29s on Attu would have been a disaster. Heavy weights, high landing speeds, short slippery runways with obstacles at the ends and no precision instrument approach system. Venturas and Harpoons are far more nimble airplanes than B-29s, which is hugely important if you have to fly a non-precision instrument approach in the fog into a short runway in mountainous terrain. Been there, done that. Piece of cake in a 1900 or a 99 or a King Air. Whole different animal in a Herc, a P-3, or any of the four engine piston pounders. It's all about weight, speed, turning radius, and climb gradient on the departure or the missed approach.
 
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From an operational standpoint, I think B-29s on Attu would have been a disaster. Heavy weights, high landing speeds, short slippery runways with obstacles at the ends and no precision instrument approach system. Venturas and Harpoons are far more nimble airplanes than B-29s, which is hugely important if you have to fly a non-precision instrument approach in the fog into a short runway in mountainous terrain. Been there, done that. Piece of cake in a 1900 or a 99 or a King Air. Whole different animal in a Herc, a P-3, or any of the four engine piston pounders. It's all about weight, speed, turning radius, and climb gradient on the departure or the missed approach.

Imagine you and 49 other B-29s have just arrived over a foggy Attu and are circling over the marker beacon, but are VMC above the clouds after a max-range raid on Tokyo. Due to stronger-than-forecast headwinds, you're all a little skosh on fuel, you can't make Dutch Harbor and Kiska is WOXOF. The wind is howling down the runway wrong way for a straight-in approach from the beacon, so each plane in turn has to execute a circle-to-land maneuver. Oh, and BTW, Tail End Charlie (first to land cause he's lowest on fuel) reports clouds six thousand feet deep, moderate icing in clouds all the way down, and severe turbulence and wind shear during the circle to land. Oh, and the the Precision Approach Radar they promised us can't seem to pass calibration tests due to terrain reflections.
 
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The other consideration that needs to be looked at, if B-29s were operating from the Aleutians, is the geography.

If the target is Tokyo, IJN Kure or any other strategic location, the time between inbound detection and time over target is greatly expanded, allowing the Japanese to mount a strong defense.

The historical approach from China made for a minimal detection time as did a direct approach from the southern islands. In the case of China operations, the Japanese were alerted, but did not know the path of the B-29s until they approached the home island after crossing the East China Sea.

In the case of missions from the southern islands, the B-29s would be right on top of the home islands with much less warning.

So in short, after a long and difficult flight from the Aleutians, the bomber force would then encounter a long and protracted defense, hit their target and have to run the gauntlet on the return leg.

In all honesty, if such an attempt were made, it would not have gone well and make the Kassel mission look like a Sunday picnic.
 
Hi XBe02Drvr,

I concur with your analysis of operating from the Aleutians except for the C-130. They are maneuverable and can stop on a dime with reversing props. I bet most in here have seen one do a combat landing at an airshow, shorter than a Beech 1900 usually. They even operate with skis in snow, as you no doubt know.

The P-3s can't fly as slowly as a C-130 can, but are close: 100 kts for a C-130 and 112 kts for a P-3. Both use almost the same powerplant and are of similar weights with the C-130 being a but heavier at gross but having better high-lift devices. The P-3 needs 4,240 feet for a normal takeoff, more if heavy. The C-130 needs 3,586 feet to take off at 155,000 pounds but only 1,400 feet at 80,000 pounds, so it virtually leaps into the air when compared with the P-3.

Here's an assault landing:
 
"..... Yes, but to organize all the logistic chain, from a tiny island to another, without a Navy, I think that could have been for the Red Army an impossible task......
...... Not to point the fact that Red Army vast majority of tanks, artillery, ammo etc. in August 1945 was six or seven thousand km far from Vladivostok, with the Siberia in between."

Here are the numbers for the three fronts, Elmas:

Soviet forces under the Far East Command[1] Wikipedia

Totals (in bold)
Transbaikal Front
1st Far East Front
2nd FarEast Front
Men 1,577,725 (654,040 586,589 337,096)
Artillery pieces 27,086 (9,668 11,430 5,988)
Multiple rocket launchers 1,171 (583 516 72)
Tanks and self-propelled guns 5,556[c] (2, 416 1,860 1,280)
Aircraft 3,721 (1,324 1,137 1,260)

The resources for the operational were assembled in Siberia; Europe was only stripped of medical and engineering resources.

As for amphibious operations, this ...
"On August 18, several Soviet amphibious landings had been conducted ahead of the land advance: three in northern Korea, one in Sakhalin, and one in the Kuril Islands. This meant that, in Korea at least, there were already Soviet soldiers waiting for the troops coming overland. In Sakhalin and the Kurils, it meant a sudden establishment of Soviet sovereignty.

If Stalin had intended wider amphibious operations, Elmas, he would have assembled them by August 8, 1945.
 
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Yah,

Bitchin' Betty has several lines, "Pull-Up!," "Bank Angle," "Stall, stall," etc.

The copilot has one sentence for most of the flight: "Continue ..."

In all seriousness, an airshow routine isn't exactly normal flying and neither is an assault takeoff or landing. But is DOES get your attention, especially if you are non-flying flight crew.
 
Interesting stuff, GregP. You clearly know your Lockheeds. Tell me, are those speeds you quoted for Herc and Orion Vref speeds you would fly on a circle to land approach in turbulence, or max effort straight and level slow flight demonstration. I've spent some time as passenger and/or unofficial "observer" in P-3s, and from the jump seat I never saw less than 155 KIAS on the approach. And those were always straight-ins. And seldom did they fly anything but heavy.
The defining performance factor for operating a heavy aircraft in the vicious weather, limited navaids, and precipitous terrain of the Aleutians has got to be its ability to do a slow, tight circle to land safely in fog and turbulence.
For those of you who aren't instrument pilots, here's how it works. If the available navaids force you to approach the runway with the wind at your tail, you have to get your airplane turned around so you can land into the wind without losing sight of the runway. If the surface visibility is poor, this is a real challenge, requiring steep banks and tight turns. The faster you're flying, the wider the radius of your turns and the better the visibility you need under the overcast and through the fog in order to make it work. If at any point you lose sight of the runway, an immediate max climb missed approach is mandatory to extract yourself from the hills. I'm betting even the ballsiest Herc drivers wouldn't attempt that at 100 KIAS in turbulence, under a low overcast, down between the hills. If a Herc can sustain slow flight at 100, Vstall is probably about 95 give or take. That would make Vref (typically 1.3 times Vstall) about in the 125 knot range. Circling at that speed would require a minimum of 1 1/2 mile vis. Thoe light turboprops I flew could do it in under a mile.
 
They aren't Vref at all. The speeds quoted are the stall speeds for an aircraft loaded to normal max on a standard day.

Actual Vref, as you well know, is calculated by a flight engineer or the avionics for the current weight and atmospheric conditions, and can vary considerably. I wouldn't be surprised if a relatively lightweight C-130 stalled at under 90 knots, but I don't really know as I have never flown one.

All I can say for sure is they can get off and land in a short space.

Cheers.
 
It's really nice having a Boundary Layer Control blown wing with 70+% span in direct prop wash and 4800 ponies times 4, who can all dig in their heels in reverse, even if the runway is slippery. And the instant thrust available from those constant speed Allisons, even from idle power, sure is nice, too. Zero spool up time. Imagine an old time B-29 driver experiencing a Herc for the first time.
 
This way

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or this way?

M400081.jpg



"..... Yes, but to organize all the logistic chain, from a tiny island to another, without a Navy, I think that could have been for the Red Army an impossible task......
...... Not to point the fact that Red Army vast majority of tanks, artillery, ammo etc. in August 1945 was six or seven thousand km far from Vladivostok, with the Siberia in between."

Here are the numbers for the three fronts, Elmas:

Soviet forces under the Far East Command[1] Wikipedia

Totals (in bold)
Transbaikal Front
1st Far East Front
2nd FarEast Front
Men 1,577,725 (654,040 586,589 337,096)
Artillery pieces 27,086 (9,668 11,430 5,988)
Multiple rocket launchers 1,171 (583 516 72)
Tanks and self-propelled guns 5,556[c] (2, 416 1,860 1,280)
Aircraft 3,721 (1,324 1,137 1,260)

The resources for the operational were assembled in Siberia; Europe was only stripped of medical and engineering resources.

As for amphibious operations, this ...
"On August 18, several Soviet amphibious landings had been conducted ahead of the land advance: three in northern Korea, one in Sakhalin, and one in the Kuril Islands. This meant that, in Korea at least, there were already Soviet soldiers waiting for the troops coming overland. In Sakhalin and the Kurils, it meant a sudden establishment of Soviet sovereignty.

If Stalin had intended wider amphibious operations, Elmas, he would have assembled them by August 8, 1945.

How many LST,'s, how many LSS's, how many LSD's, how many carriers, how many cruisers, how many destroyers etc, etc, etc.?
 
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".... How many LST,'s, how many LSS's, how many LSD's, how many carriers, how many cruisers, how many destroyers etc, etc, etc.?"

Operating down the coast from Vladivostok the Soviets were not faced with the same challenges as the USN was when island-hopping. And what the Soviets did, they did well.

There's more than one way to launch amphibious landings and in the end all that matters is that they succeed ... :) and they did.
 
I'm not talking of invading a tiny Kuril island, I'm talking of invading Japan mainland: I don't think that the Red Army would have been greeted with sake toasts.
If to invade an Island was a such a piece of cake, I can't understand how IJN, after Pearl Harbor, did not succed not only to invade Midway, but the whole Hawahiian archipelago.

Et de hoc satis
old Romans used to say.
 
That's easy to understand: IJN couldn't achieve AND MAINTAIN local air superiority at Midway or Pearl, or later at Guadalcanal. Without that, any island invasion (or other invasion for that matter) is impossible. If the Lex, the Sara, and the Enterprise had been in port on December 7, (and if Kido Butai had been commanded by an aviator admiral rather than a battleship admiral), it would have been a different story. We'd all be speaking Japanese now.
 
If Russians had been a little wiser enough to forget their classical heroism for a few weeks, they could have reached the eastern area of Hokkaido and reserved the entire area of the Hokkaido Island by September 2 in time for the Missouri ceremony. Our fact was simple because Japanese garrison of the Kuril Islands was ordered to obey the coming occupation forces, whichever they were Americans or Russians, by Imperial GHQ in advance as the war was substantially over on August 15. In fact, our garrison was ready to hand all munitions after August 16. However, Soviet troops bravely began armed invasion with the aid of bombardment by warships in the midnight of August 18. With no idea who they were, our garrison fought back based on the right of self-defense until it was ordered to stop fighting by Tokyo on August 21. Russians had wasted 4 days at the north end island of Kuril from the beginning. They only had to say "We are here to disarm you".
 
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