WW2 USN Strategic Bombing Capability (1 Viewer)

[GrauGeist]

That's easy to understand: IJN couldn't achieve AND MAINTAIN local air superiority at Midway or Pearl, or later at Guadalcanal. Without that, any island invasion (or other invasion for that matter) is impossible. If the Lex, the Sara, and the Enterprise had been in port on December 7, (and if Kido Butai had been commanded by an aviator admiral rather than a battleship admiral), it would have been a different story. We'd all be speaking Japanese now.

By war's end, the USN had 28 carriers (CV) and 71 escort carriers (CVE) - a huge jump from 8 carriers (CV) at the start of the war. So as the USN started to put their carriers into service, the Japanese started to lose their air superiority. This is not including the USAAF aircraft being transported into the theater, by the way.

In order for all of us to be "speaking Japanese", Japan would have had to take out the United State's industrial capacity. The majority of shipyards were on the east coast, with smaller shipyards along the west coast. This was simply too much for Japan to accomplish, while maintaining their hold in Asia and the southwest Pacific.

So in the unlikely event they captured the Hawaiian islands (uncluding Midway, Wake, etc.), they have really accomplished nothing, but hyper-extending their supply chain and placed a draw on their total strength.

If they actually bypassed the Hawaiian group and conducted a concerted strike against key west coast targets AND the Panama canal, then perhaps there would have been a chance. And incredibly slim chance, yes, but far more effective than capturing Hawaii.

It should be noted that Australia was supplied by the U.S. via the west coast and Panama canal, also...so not only would a strike at the west coast and canal hamper the U.S. war effort, it would have an impact on Australia's war effort, too.

 

[michaelmaltby]

Putting Russian actions, August 9 - 15, 1945 in perspective

 

[stona]

I can't see any valid comparison between these landings and the sort of operations necessary to launch an invasion of the main Japanese Home Islands, as planned by the Americans. We are looking at orders of magnitude in the different requirements for men and materiel.
Land 1,000 men on Kyushu and see how far that gets you
Cheers
Steve

 

[michaelmaltby]

I agree ... but my point is that by all the evidence available, Stalin had no intention of invading the Home Islands .... he was an opportunist seeking "low hanging fruit".

But the operations by the Russians [edit: xxwere well executedxx] achieved their objectives , which is also my point

[edit for more accurate wording]

 

[stona]

I agree with your basic premise, but I wouldn't call the landings well executed. I've seen the so called Battle of Shumsu/Shimusu (no idea which is correct) described as a Russian shambles and just about anything that could go wrong did. A larger operation, or better defended one, would have been a debacle.
The only landing craft the Russians had were a few US supplied LCIs, how many of those would have been available for larger operations, the Americans needed everyone they had, and then some, for their own invasion plans.
Cheers
Steve

 

[XBe02Drvr]

If the Japanese had let Yamamoto run the war according to his vision without constant restraint from senior "battleship admirals" and the Army (Tojo), I'm convinced his understanding of industrial capacity and the crucial importance of logistics would have led to the choking off of Hawaii and then Australia. He also understood the strategic importance of aircraft and submarines in a resource war in the Pacific. If Kido Butai had succeeded in destroying the American carriers at Pearl, and if it had been commanded by a bold, aggressive, aviator admiral, it could have stuck around Oahu a while longer and taken out the important oversights the first raid missed. Fueling and repair facilities, the submarine base, and long range patrol aircraft (besides the carriers of course) were what sustained the American war effort for the first few months of the war. Yamamoto understood this. A couple more waves of attacks could have eliminated these and left Hawaii essentially defenseless and difficult to supply. IJN doctrine wasted their extensive submarine fleet in a fruitless search for capital ships to sink, rather than the scouting and supply-line strangling which could have been their true value. Yamamoto understood this, but was powerless to change it. GG correctly points out that the majority of American shipbuilding and ordnance manufacturing was East Coast based. Aircraft manufacture, on the other hand (at least of the critical types) was concentrated In California and Washington. I know Bell, Chance Vought, Curtiss, Grumman, Martin, and Republic were East, but Boeing, Consolidated, Douglas, Lockheed, North American, and Northrop were all within easy air raid (or even battleship gun) range of the Pacific. With (as GG suggests) toe holds in Panama and the resource-rich American west coast a lot of the Japanese supply line dilemma would be eliminated, and (as the US later did) bypassed garrisons could be ignored and allowed to starve. With no safe haven Naval bases on the entire west coast, and Hawaii, the Philippines, and Australia gone, we would have been stymied in the Pacific and fighting a defensive war on the mainland. In December 41 and January 42 we would have been too shocked, demoralised, and disorganized to prevent the Japanese from making rapid territorial gains in the west and turning some of our own industrial might against us. They could have withdrawn most of the Kwantung Army from China and shipped them to California. Without foreign military aid neither Chiang nor Mao was any threat to Japan. The US would have had to concentrate its resources at home, leaving Britain and Russia vulnerable. If the Japanese forays into the Indian Ocean had been conducted with a conquest mentality rather than just raiding, India would have fallen, if treated properly, that huge suppressed population would have enthusiastically joined the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and kicked the "white oppressors" out of Asia entirely. So there you have it; Japan sitting securely on top of a major chunk of the world's resources, with no significant opponents in position to threaten its resources, its logistics, or its industry.

 

[gjs238]

If the Japanese had let Yamamoto run the war according to his vision without constant restraint from senior "battleship admirals" and the Army (Tojo), I'm convinced his understanding of industrial capacity and the crucial importance of logistics would have led to the choking off of Hawaii and then Australia. He also understood the strategic importance of aircraft and submarines in a resource war in the Pacific. If Kido Butai had succeeded in destroying the American carriers at Pearl, and if it had been commanded by a bold, aggressive, aviator admiral, it could have stuck around Oahu a while longer and taken out the important oversights the first raid missed. Fueling and repair facilities, the submarine base, and long range patrol aircraft (besides the carriers of course) were what sustained the American war effort for the first few months of the war. Yamamoto understood this. A couple more waves of attacks could have eliminated these and left Hawaii essentially defenseless and difficult to supply. IJN doctrine wasted their extensive submarine fleet in a fruitless search for capital ships to sink, rather than the scouting and supply-line strangling which could have been their true value. Yamamoto understood this, but was powerless to change it. GG correctly points out that the majority of American shipbuilding and ordnance manufacturing was East Coast based. Aircraft manufacture, on the other hand (at least of the critical types) was concentrated In California and Washington. I know Bell, Chance Vought, Curtiss, Grumman, Martin, and Republic were East, but Boeing, Consolidated, Douglas, Lockheed, North American, and Northrop were all within easy air raid (or even battleship gun) range of the Pacific. With (as GG suggests) toe holds in Panama and the resource-rich American west coast a lot of the Japanese supply line dilemma would be eliminated, and (as the US later did) bypassed garrisons could be ignored and allowed to starve. With no safe haven Naval bases on the entire west coast, and Hawaii, the Philippines, and Australia gone, we would have been stymied in the Pacific and fighting a defensive war on the mainland. In December 41 and January 42 we would have been too shocked, demoralised, and disorganized to prevent the Japanese from making rapid territorial gains in the west and turning some of our own industrial might against us. They could have withdrawn most of the Kwantung Army from China and shipped them to California. Without foreign military aid neither Chiang nor Mao was any threat to Japan. The US would have had to concentrate its resources at home, leaving Britain and Russia vulnerable. If the Japanese forays into the Indian Ocean had been conducted with a conquest mentality rather than just raiding, India would have fallen, if treated properly, that huge suppressed population would have enthusiastically joined the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and kicked the "white oppressors" out of Asia entirely. So there you have it; Japan sitting securely on top of a major chunk of the world's resources, with no significant opponents in position to threaten its resources, its logistics, or its industry.

 

[gjs238]

I agree ... but my point is that by all the evidence available, Stalin had no intention of invading the Home Islands .... he was an opportunist seeking "low hanging fruit".

But the operations by the Russians were well executed, which is also my point

RE: low hanging fruit
Then I wonder why Stalin didn't retain Manchukuo, rather than hand it over to the Chinese in '46.

On the other hand, from Wikipedia Manchukuo - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Although the territories came under the jurisdiction of the Nationalist government before the Chinese Civil War came to its conclusion in 1949, the brief Soviet occupation helped transform the region into a power base for the Chinese Communist troops led by Mao Zedong where the People's Liberation Army could resupply itself with Japanese equipment and gain strategic advantage against the Nationalist government headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

 

[Shortround6]

If the Japanese had let Yamamoto run the war according to his vision without constant restraint from senior "battleship admirals" and the Army (Tojo), I'm convinced his understanding of industrial capacity and the crucial importance of logistics would have led to the choking off of Hawaii and then Australia. He also understood the strategic importance of aircraft and submarines in a resource war in the Pacific. If Kido Butai had succeeded in destroying the American carriers at Pearl, and if it had been commanded by a bold, aggressive, aviator admiral, it could have stuck around Oahu a while longer and taken out the important oversights the first raid missed. Fueling and repair facilities, the submarine base, and long range patrol aircraft (besides the carriers of course) were what sustained the American war effort for the first few months of the war. Yamamoto understood this. A couple more waves of attacks could have eliminated these and left Hawaii essentially defenseless and difficult to supply. IJN doctrine wasted their extensive submarine fleet in a fruitless search for capital ships to sink, rather than the scouting and supply-line strangling which could have been their true value. Yamamoto understood this, but was powerless to change it. GG correctly points out that the majority of American shipbuilding and ordnance manufacturing was East Coast based. Aircraft manufacture, on the other hand (at least of the critical types) was concentrated In California and Washington. I know Bell, Chance Vought, Curtiss, Grumman, Martin, and Republic were East, but Boeing, Consolidated, Douglas, Lockheed, North American, and Northrop were all within easy air raid (or even battleship gun) range of the Pacific. With (as GG suggests) toe holds in Panama and the resource-rich American west coast a lot of the Japanese supply line dilemma would be eliminated, and (as the US later did) bypassed garrisons could be ignored and allowed to starve. With no safe haven Naval bases on the entire west coast, and Hawaii, the Philippines, and Australia gone, we would have been stymied in the Pacific and fighting a defensive war on the mainland. In December 41 and January 42 we would have been too shocked, demoralised, and disorganized to prevent the Japanese from making rapid territorial gains in the west and turning some of our own industrial might against us. They could have withdrawn most of the Kwantung Army from China and shipped them to California. Without foreign military aid neither Chiang nor Mao was any threat to Japan. The US would have had to concentrate its resources at home, leaving Britain and Russia vulnerable. If the Japanese forays into the Indian Ocean had been conducted with a conquest mentality rather than just raiding, India would have fallen, if treated properly, that huge suppressed population would have enthusiastically joined the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and kicked the "white oppressors" out of Asia entirely. So there you have it; Japan sitting securely on top of a major chunk of the world's resources, with no significant opponents in position to threaten its resources, its logistics, or its industry.

The Japanese had nowhere near the amount of shipping (or oil) to undertake such an adventure. The oil is one reason they did attack when they did. They were under an oil embargo and were using up more oil every day than they were getting from whatever supplies/sources they did have. The Dutch East Indies was the big prize/goal of the Japanese 1941/early 42 attacks/campaign.
Seize the oil fields there or grind to halt. Without the oil fields the Japanese navy and "invasion fleets" would be powered by sails and oars.

 

[GrauGeist]

RE: low hanging fruit
Then I wonder why Stalin didn't retain Manchukuo, rather than hand it over to the Chinese in '46.

You got your answer right here:

On the other hand, from Wikipedia Manchukuo - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Although the territories came under the jurisdiction of the Nationalist government before the Chinese Civil War came to its conclusion in 1949, the brief Soviet occupation helped transform the region into a power base for the Chinese Communist troops led by Mao Zedong where the People's Liberation Army could resupply itself with Japanese equipment and gain strategic advantage against the Nationalist government headed by Chiang Kai-shek.

Manchuko may have been a contested region, but if it went to arbitration, the Soviet Union would most likely have to give it back, running the risk of hard feelings.

What Stalin ended up doing was far more in his favor both in terms of securing his border and strengthening a communist ally.

 

[michaelmaltby]

This wasn't a walk-in-the park .... judging by the remains:

Russia finds remains of 35 Japanese, Soviet soldiers on Shumshu Island | The Japan Times

 

[Shinpachi]

This wasn't a walk-in-the park .... judging by the remains:
Russia finds remains of 35 Japanese, Soviet soldiers on Shumshu Island | The Japan Times

In my impression, the remains ratio of 26 : 9 would be close to the actual casualty ratio between Soviet and Japan.
The Japanese garrison held many IJA veterans who fought Nomonhan while Soviet troops was organized by many peasants.
Our survivors from Siberia testified later that they smashed Russians.

Nice find MM

 

[GrauGeist]

If the Japanese had let Yamamoto run the war according to his vision without constant restraint from senior "battleship admirals" and the Army (Tojo), I'm convinced his understanding of industrial capacity and the crucial importance of logistics would have led to the choking off of Hawaii and then Australia. He also understood the strategic importance of aircraft and submarines in a resource war in the Pacific.

Yamamoto was also against dragging the U.S. into a war. He warned against it and when told to do draw up plans to strike a hard blow against the U.S., he said the attack may be a success, but it will only be a matter of time before the U.S. strikes back. However, the war cabinet was pretty sure of themselves and ignored Yamamoto, feeling confident that they would be able to lure the USN into one great victorious showdown.

If Kido Butai had succeeded in destroying the American carriers at Pearl, and if it had been commanded by a bold, aggressive, aviator admiral, it could have stuck around Oahu a while longer and taken out the important oversights the first raid missed. Fueling and repair facilities, the submarine base, and long range patrol aircraft (besides the carriers of course) were what sustained the American war effort for the first few months of the war. Yamamoto understood this. A couple more waves of attacks could have eliminated these and left Hawaii essentially defenseless and difficult to supply. IJN doctrine wasted their extensive submarine fleet in a fruitless search for capital ships to sink, rather than the scouting and supply-line strangling which could have been their true value. Yamamoto understood this, but was powerless to change it.

There were three attack waves planned. the first wave went remarkably well, the second seemed to falter.
One of the reasons for the second wave's diminished success, was that the U.S. defenses were far stronger than they had anticipated.

Add to that, the few USAAC aircraft that had managed to get airborn were unexpected and while not sweeping the skies of the invaders, did cause them great concern.

So the furious response from the defenders coupled with the fact that the carriers and their support ships were out to sea with no known location, the third wave was withdrawn.

GG correctly points out that the majority of American shipbuilding and ordnance manufacturing was East Coast based. Aircraft manufacture, on the other hand (at least of the critical types) was concentrated In California and Washington. I know Bell, Chance Vought, Curtiss, Grumman, Martin, and Republic were East, but Boeing, Consolidated, Douglas, Lockheed, North American, and Northrop were all within easy air raid (or even battleship gun) range of the Pacific. With (as GG suggests) toe holds in Panama and the resource-rich American west coast a lot of the Japanese supply line dilemma would be eliminated, and (as the US later did) bypassed garrisons could be ignored and allowed to starve. With no safe haven Naval bases on the entire west coast, and Hawaii, the Philippines, and Australia gone, we would have been stymied in the Pacific and fighting a defensive war on the mainland. In December 41 and January 42 we would have been too shocked, demoralised, and disorganized to prevent the Japanese from making rapid territorial gains in the west and turning some of our own industrial might against us. They could have withdrawn most of the Kwantung Army from China and shipped them to California. Without foreign military aid neither Chiang nor Mao was any threat to Japan. The US would have had to concentrate its resources at home, leaving Britain and Russia vulnerable.

To give an idea of the density of shipyards on the west coast, here is a list of prewar sites:
California - Alameda, Long Beach, Los Angeles, San Fransisco, San Pedro, Sausalito, Wilmington.
Oregon - Astoria, Goble, Marshfield, Portland, Rainier.
Washington - Anacortes, Bellingham, Everette, Hoquiam, Longview, Port Angeles, Port Blakely, Seattle, South Bend, Suguamish, Winslow.
As far as aircraft companies listed, on the west coast, there were also Hughes, Avco/Vultee, Ryan and Interstate.

To complicate matters a little more, consider the US Navy, US Marine, US Coast Guard and USAAC installations spread all the way from Alaska to the Mexican border. And let's toss in the RCN and RCAF assets in the British Columbia area, too.

To effect a successful assault, it would take a great deal of planning and quietly shifting a vast amount of assets without alerting the U.S.

If the Japanese weren't successful in eliminating the US Pacific fleet in that concentrated area, they would most certainly have their hands full trying to take and hold the north american west coast.

I'm not saying it couldn't be done, but I remain highly skeptical of it's success in light of Imperial Japan's historical strategic blunders.

If the Japanese forays into the Indian Ocean had been conducted with a conquest mentality rather than just raiding, India would have fallen, if treated properly, that huge suppressed population would have enthusiastically joined the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" and kicked the "white oppressors" out of Asia entirely. So there you have it; Japan sitting securely on top of a major chunk of the world's resources, with no significant opponents in position to threaten its resources, its logistics, or its industry.

This was Germany's major Faux Pas, too. When Germany rolled into the Ukraine and Russian proper, the civilians lined the streets, showering the German troops with flowers, hailing them as liberators. Red army soldiers defected to the Germans in droves, ready to take up arms against Uncle Joe and the Communists.

*HAD* Hitler seized on this opportunity and played on the sentiments of the people and played the "great savior" instead of crushing them with his hatred, the taking of the Soviet Union would had been very well within his grasp.

 

[stona]

In my impression, the remains ratio of 26 : 9 would be close to the actual casualty ratio between Soviet and Japan.
The Japanese garrison held many IJA veterans who fought Nomonhan while Soviet troops was organized by many peasants.
Our survivors from Siberia testified later that they smashed Russians.
Nice find MM

It seems that the Japanese garrison mounted a stubborn defence, but the Soviets made, to use a good old English expression, 'a right dog's dinner' of the landing(s).
Words like disorganised and uncoordinated spring to mind! The Russians simply did not have the experience to allow them to develop the expertise of other Allies, notably the Americans, in amphibious operations.
Cheers
Steve

 

[Shinpachi]

After the Battle of Shumshu was over, Russian Commander General Gnechko told Japanese Garrison Commander Tsutsumi that he was not thinking of peaceful occupation at all because he needed a glorious war record.
That was his job. Not ours at all either.

 

[XBe02Drvr]

Grau Geist says: "Yamamoto was against the war....."
That was absolutely true, but when ordered to plan the opening raid, like a "good soldier", he complied, but pressed for a far more aggressive war plan than the High Command was comfortable with. He didn't buy the traditional IJN doctrine of maneuvering for "one decisive battle" between massed surface fleets. But like the "good soldier" he was, he "toed the company line" right up to his death.

 

[gjs238]

Grau Geist says: "Yamamoto was against the war....."
That was absolutely true, but when ordered to plan the opening raid, like a "good soldier", he complied, but pressed for a far more aggressive war plan than the High Command was comfortable with. He didn't buy the traditional IJN doctrine of maneuvering for "one decisive battle" between massed surface fleets. But like the "good soldier" he was, he "toed the company line" right up to his death.

In another thread it might sound like you were referring to Rommel.

 

[Shortround6]

Even if the Japanese possessed a sizable number of ships capable of making the voyage the logistics are very against it. The voyage is many times longer than from the south island to the Philippines or Malaya so you need many more times the amount of rations for the troops and crew. You need to either carry water or install bigger desalination plants. Refueling the transports (and escorts) needs to be taken into account. The Japanese certainly cannot afford for the transports to make a one way trip and beach themselves on the California coast. Planning on capturing US fuel depots is a desperate gamble.
The US west coast is just under 1300 miles long (not counting islands and inlets/bays) and very few major cities would be within mutual support distance of attacking Japanese forces. Which invites destruction in detail. Without port facilities the attackers are doomed and the chances of taking major ports by direct assault are slim. At least taking them in working condition. Landing away from the ports cities and trying to march overland may not work very well either. The Americans having a much better telephone and transportation network than the Asian nations did. Sneaking through the countryside and popping up in unexpected areas isn't going to work as well. The Americans can feed in reinforcements by multiple transcontinental rail lines. The Japanese, assuming they can find fuel, have to send the ships back to Japan, reload and the sail back to the US. Replacement/reinforcements are weeks if not a couple of months away.
US also had coastal defenses, not up to later standards but better than anything Japan had. San Francisco having the first four 16 in guns to be emplaced in the US. Guns from the cancelled battleships/battlecruisers of the 1920s. The mountings were covered with concrete roofs many feet thick. Other older guns were in other batteries and at least some AA guns were provided pre Pearl Harbor, more were added later.

 

[gjs238]

It would seem that implementing Hokushin-ron would have been a more practical course.
However, the Soviets did give them a shellacking at Khalkhin Gol in '39.

 

[Shortround6]

I do have a question about "Hokushin-ron" as all I know is from Wiki:

"General Kenkichi Ueda was a strong believer in the Hokushin-ron policy, believing that Japan's main enemy was communism and that Japan's destiny lay in conquest of the natural resources of the sparely populated north Asian mainland."

Bolding by me. What were the "known" natural resources in the area/s in question?

The southern option had known sources of oil, rubber, tin and perhaps other materials?