WWII submarines...which was the better one?

[Lucky13]

Any ideas why Sweden only is on naval guns and not on the other lists? I've always thought that we built our own torpedoes, missiles etc...

 

[renrich]

Am presently reading "Hitler's U- Boat War" "The Hunted 1942-1945" by Clay Blair, 1998. Page 314. " Hailed by some historians and engineers as another great technical achievement, the snort was not that by a long shot. Rather it was a miserable, temporary device that German U-Boat crews hated absolutely. They resisted it's installation on their boats and used it not continuously, as often depicted, but only very sparingly ( ordinarily about four hours a day) to charge batteries, owing to the high fuel oil consumption experienced when running submerged on diesels." Blair quotes Herman Werner in "Iron Coffins" when the ball float jammed shut, creating a vaccum in the boat. " The men gasped for air, their eyes bulging. The chief lowered the boat, bringing the snort head below the surface in an effort to loosen the float." Eventually, "the float cleared with a snap and air was sucked into the boat with a long sigh. The sudden change in pressure burst many an ear drum. Some of the men covered their faces in pain and sagged to the deck plates. Others swallowed violently to equalize the pressure." Blair, " Owing to crew complaints and technical bottle necks, the Germans fitted the snort much more slowly than usually described." This book is exhaustively researched, very detailed and written by an expert on submarine warfare. It explodes a lot of myths about WW2 and the Battle of the Atlantic.

 

[Soren]

There were different types of schnorchels used, the early ones created some problems namely the vacuum effect, but bursting eardrums is never mentioned - sometimes the engine just simply cut out. These problems were eliminated with the later schnorchels, the system being completely automated.

Also the engine crew would have had to be completely unaffected by this vacuum effect for them allowing it to continue long enough so that eardrums would burst, something which sounds very unrealistic.

 

[renrich]

Some more interesting facts about the u-boat war in the Atlantic. 859 u-boats set off on war patrols, 648 were lost, 75%. Of these 429 had no survivors. 215 u-boats, 33%, were lost on their first patrol. From September 1942 to May, 1945, the Allies sailed 953 convoys east and west on the North Atlantic and Middle Atlantic runs. These convoys comprised 43,426 merchant ships. Of these, 272 were sunk by u-boats. 99.4% of all Allied merchant ships sailing in North Atlantic convoys in this period reached their destination intact. The snorkel U-Boats and the Type XXI boats were failures and never had any chance of changing the course of the war. As with the types VII and IX the facilities and amenities (habitibility) of the type XXI provided for the comfort and feeding of the crew did not even meet the minimum standards of the US Navy. Owing to the interconnections of washing and drinking water, the sanitation was deemed to be "inadequate" and "unsafe." Until the latter months of 1942, Allied AC sank very few u-boats unassisted by surface ships. With the perfection of centimetric-wavelength radar the 4 engine long range bombers such as B24s, B17s and Halifax, land based AC vaulted to top rank as U-Boat killers. They sank unassisted 204 u-Boats and 30 more in cooperation with surface ships, nearly 33% of all German losses. Sounds like the airborne radar worked pretty well.

 

[renrich]

Just quoting from the memoirs of Herman Werner on the snorkel problems. There were a number of other evolutions the crew went through to try and unjam the ball which consumed a good deal of time. Perhaps it would be good if "Iron Coffins" was reviewed.

 

[Soren]

As with the types VII and IX the facilities and amenities (habitibility) of the type XXI provided for the comfort and feeding of the crew did not even meet the minimum standards of the US Navy.

Don't know where you have that from but it is complete and utter bollocks. The Type XXI set a whole new standard as far as crew habitability goes.

 

[Soren]

Some more interesting facts about the u-boat war in the Atlantic. 859 u-boats set off on war patrols, 648 were lost, 75%. Of these 429 had no survivors. 215 u-boats, 33%, were lost on their first patrol. From September 1942 to May, 1945, the Allies sailed 953 convoys east and west on the North Atlantic and Middle Atlantic runs. These convoys comprised 43,426 merchant ships. Of these, 272 were sunk by u-boats. 99.4% of all Allied merchant ships sailing in North Atlantic convoys in this period reached their destination intact. The snorkel U-Boats and the Type XXI boats were failures and never had any chance of changing the course of the war. As with the types VII and IX the facilities and amenities (habitibility) of the type XXI provided for the comfort and feeding of the crew did not even meet the minimum standards of the US Navy. Owing to the interconnections of washing and drinking water, the sanitation was deemed to be "inadequate" and "unsafe." Until the latter months of 1942, Allied AC sank very few u-boats unassisted by surface ships. With the perfection of centimetric-wavelength radar the 4 engine long range bombers such as B24s, B17s and Halifax, land based AC vaulted to top rank as U-Boat killers. They sank unassisted 204 u-Boats and 30 more in cooperation with surface ships, nearly 33% of all German losses. Sounds like the airborne radar worked pretty well.

Hehe, those are definitely not facts. Many times the bombers destroyers THOUGHT they had destroyed a U-boat, but many times the hadn't even come close. The German U-boats used all manner of tricks to convince the Allies that they were sunk so they could escape in safety, and it worked very well.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Do you have statistics on how many times this happened?

 

[Soren]

Nope, not at all.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Then how do we know it happened many times?

Dont take me wrong. I am not saying it did not. I just want proof so that I can know.

 

[renrich]

Gentlemen, these figures I have quoted are from all sources, USN, British Admiralty, Kreigsmarine, etc and have been correlated and reconciled. This book is extremely well documented and footnoted with all references noted and with many appendixes. Every war patrol with all the particulars is listed including the Captain's name and DOB. Soren, if this data doesn't fit your data or preconceived notions perhaps you could find this book and see for yourself if it is credible. Human interest story. Three boats assigned to patrol in Brazilian waters all commanded by Ritterkreuz holders, among them Friedrich Guggenberger in IXC U-513. After sinking several ships, U513 is attacked on the surface by a PBM piloted by Roy S Whitcomb who drops 4 depth charges, two destroying the boat. Whitcomb seeing Germans in the water drops two rafts and life jackets and notifies tender Barnegat. When she reached scene about dusk she can only find Guggenberger and six EM. After extensive interrogation, Guggenberger, who is the skipper who sank Ark Royal, is incarcerated at a POW camp, Papago Wells, on an Indian reservation in Arizona. Imagine that was interesting for him.

 

[Glider]

Soren
Renichs facts for the loss rates are about correct. Different sources give different exact figures but I have no reson to doubt they are as close as you are going to get. I haven't checked them with UBoat.net, but I would be suprised if they differed by much. There certainly close to the numbers I have.

Re the book Iron Coffins, I have suggested this book to you a couple of times and still suggest that its a good read by someone who was there and whose views should be given serious consideration. There is no doubt that the second version of the the schnorkel was better than the first but its sobering to realise that his Boat, U953 had the later version, not the first.

As for living conditions the type XXI did have good conditions that were roughly the same as the US Fleet boats, but the type VII in particular, like the British boats, were way behind in habitability.

 

[renrich]

As a matter of fact, the claims that the German skippers reported were usually around 30% to 50% high. I would think that would be no surprise given the conditions the U-Boats were operating under. I am sure that the claims by US submariners were always too high also. Having said that, the Allies knew how many ships were lost and when and where they were lost. The Germans knew when a boat did not come back and also when contact was lost with the boat and kept careful records on that. The Allies knew when an escort attacked a contact and how many depth charges and other weapons were used and where it happened. The same for aircraft. A careful survey and correlation of all these records would allow a good researcher to pin down all but a hand full of merchant ship sinkings and u-boat losses as to who, what, where, when and by what means. Needless to say, all this correlation of data has been done post war. If one wants to argue with the conclusions of all these German, British and American researchers and statisticians, well, I suppose nothing is provable.

 

[Soren]

A hugely deciding factor for why the Germans lost the battle of the Atlantic was the capture of one its Enigma crypting machines, the Allied cracking of the codes pretty much meant they knew where the U-boats were and were going to be - a HUGE advantage.

It is quite clear that in the short periods where the Enigma wasn't cracked the U-boats were dealing out huge blows to the Allied merchant fleets.

 

[AL Schlageter]

What times would that be Soren?

1939:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Sep39 48/178,621
Oct39 33/156,156
Nov39 27/72,721
Dec39 39/101,823
Tot39 147 (36.75/month)/509,321 (127,330.25/month)

British merchant ship construction capacity from 1939-1941 did not exceed 1.2 million GRT per year.
US merchant ship construction in 1939 was 0.242 million GRT.

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Aug39 19/2
Sep39 3/0
Oct39 13/3
Nov39 10/1/1
Dec39 5/1/1
Tot39 50/7/2 (an average of 10 patrols per month and 14% lost)

Thus for 1939, an average of 2.94 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 21 ships sunk (note that throughout these averages will be slightly inflated since they do not include the minor contribution of the Italian submarine fleet.)

1940:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan40 53/163,029
Feb40 50/182,369
Mar40 26/69,826
Apr40 6/30,927
May40 14/61,635
Jun40 66/375,069
Jul40 41/301,975
Aug40 56/288,180
Sep40 60/288,180
Oct40 66/363,267
Nov40 36/181,695
Dec40 46/256,310
Tot40 520 (43.33/month)/2,462,867 (205,238.91/month)
US merchant ship construction for 1940 was about 0.5 million GRT.

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan40 8/2
Feb40 10/3
Mar40 10/2
Apr40 19/3
May40 8/0/2
Jun40 18/3/1
Jul40 4/0
Aug40 16/2/1
Sep40 12/0
Oct40 13/2
Nov40 14/1
Dec40 6/0
Tot40 138/18/3 (an average of 11.5 patrols per month and 13% lost)

Thus for 1940, an average of 3.77 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 28.89 ships sunk.

1941:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan41 23/129,711
Feb41 47/254,118
Mar41 41/236,549
Apr41 41/239,719
May41 63/362,268
Jun41 66/325,817
Jul41 26/112,624
Aug41 27/85,603
Sep41 57/212,237
Oct41 28/170,786
Nov41 15/76,056
Dec41 23/93,226
Tot41 457 (38.08/month)/2,298,714 (191,559.5/month)
US merchant ship construction 1941 0.804 million GRT

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan41 10/0
Feb41 18/3/2
Mar41 15/3/3
Apr41 14/2/2
May41 21/0/2
Jun41 22/2/3
Jul41 24/1/9
Aug41 42/5/9
Sep41 38/0/2
Oct41 37/0/6
Nov 41 27/5/5
Dec41 49/4/6
Tot 41 287/25/49 (an average of 23.9 patrols sailing per month and 8.7% lost)

Thus for 1941, an average of 1.59 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 18.28 ships sunk.

1942:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan42 56/310,224
Feb42 72/429,255
Mar42 93/507,514
Apr42 81/418,161
May42 129/616,835
Jun42 136/636,926
Jul42 96/467,051
Aug42 117/587,245
Sep42 96/461,794
Oct42 89/583,690
Nov42 126/802,160
Dec42 64/337,618
Tot42 1,155 (96.25/month)/6,158,473 (513,206.08/month)
British and Canadian merchant ship construction 1942 1.8 million GRT
US merchant ship construction 1942 5.433 million GRT

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan42 50/2/5
Feb42 29/3/2
Mar42 32/2
Apr42 37/2/2
May42 23/3
Jun42 39/9/5
Jul42 45/7/3
Aug42 58/10/4
Sep42 52/8/8
Oct42 62/6/10
Nov42 54/8/6
Dec42 59/8/7
Tot42 540/68/57 (an average of 45 patrols sailing per month and 12.6% lost)

Thus for 1942, an average of 2.14 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 16.99 ships sunk.

1943:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Jan43 44/307,196
Feb43 67/362,081
Mar43 110/633,731
Apr43 50/287,137
May43 46/237,182
Jun43 17/76,090
Jul43 46/237,777
Aug43 20/92,443
Sep43 16/98,852
Oct43 20/91,295
Nov43 9/30,726
Dec43 8/55,794
Tot43 452 (37.67/month)/2,510,304 (209,192/month)
US merchant ship construction 1943 13.081 million GRT

Number of U-Boat patrols (combat patrols only, does not include tanker/resupply missions)/losses/aborts prior to contact in principle theaters (North Atlantic, South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, and the Americas)
Jan43 61/13/11
Feb43 72/8/9
Mar43 59/16/10
Apr43 95/35/18
May43 55/23/9
Jun43 46/23/9
Jul43 39/27/7 (49 total patrols of all types)
Aug43 33/12/6
Sep43 32/11/10
Oct43 62/23/9
Nov43 36/9/4
Dec43 31/10/2
Tot43 621/210/104 (an average of 51.75 patrols sailing per month and 33.8% lost)

Thus for 1943, an average of 0.73 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 2.15 ships sunk.

So, overall, the most successful year for the U-Boats was 1940, before the expansion of the force allowed for an increase of more than about a dozen patrols sailing per month, and well prior to the entry of the US and its shipbuilding capacity into the war. Worse, the performance of the U-Boat force in 1941 and 1942 never exceeded its performance in the first months of the war. And, after 1943 the U-Boat campaign became ever less relevent to the outcome of the war.

Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Tot44 125/663,308
Tot45 63/284,476

US merchant ship construction for 1944 was 12.257 million GRT
US merchant ship construction for 1945 (through 1 May) was 3.548 million GRT

U-Boat Fleet to 1Sep42
On 19Aug39 there were 57 U-Boats in commission, 20 sea-going U-Boats and 18 'ducks' were fully ready to put to sea
Total number U-Boats deployed to 1Sep42 275
Total number lost 94
Total number retired 10
Total number available 171

U-Boat Fleet 1Sep42 to 1May45
Total number deployed 1Sep42 to 1May45 531
Total number lost 1Sep42 to 1May45 568

British controlled merchant shipping over 1,600 GRT (number/in thousands of gross tons)
3Sep39 2,999/17,784
30Sep40 3,75721,373
30Sep41 3,608/20,552
31Dec41 3,616/20,693

Thus, despite the 'success' of the U-Boat force in 1940 (relative to its performance in 1941 and 1942) it had no appreciable effect in reducing the size of the British merchant fleet.

Numbers of ships arriving and losses in North Atlantic convoys inbound to Britain (ships arriving/losses)
1939 700/5 (7.1%)
1940 5,434/133 ((2.5%)
1941 5,923/153 (2.6%)
1942 4,798/80 (1.7%)
1943 5,667/87 (1.5%)
1944 7,410/8 (0.1%)

The operational U-Boat force from 1943-1945 never approached a "steady 400-500 boat." Rather, during 1942 the peak strength of boats assigned to combat flotillas (including those under repair for combat-damage and breakdowns, but excluding those assigned to school flotillas, experimental projects, or otherwise retired from combat) was 202, during November. The low in 1942 was 89 in January. The average monthly strength during 1942 was 143.83. The strength of the force peaked in May 1943 at 237. It had declined to a low of 159 by November. Average monthly strength during 1943 was 197.58. The peak strength during 1944 was 168 in February, the low was 146 in November. Average monthly strength in 1944 was 157.83. The peak strength in 1945 was April with 165, the low was May with 134, prior to the surrender.

At that, these were much better than 1939 (average of 19.5 monthly), 1940 (average of 18.75 monthly) and 1941 (average of 47.5 monthly). OTOH, the 'bang for their buck' was probably highest in 1940, which was also arguably the U-Boats most 'successful' year in terms of ships sunk per patrol and U-Boats lost per ship sunk

 

[Soren]

Where is that info from AL ?

According to my sources atleast 63 Allied ships were sunk in 1945, not just 8.

 

[Glider]

A hugely deciding factor for why the Germans lost the battle of the Atlantic was the capture of one its Enigma crypting machines, the Allied cracking of the codes pretty much meant they knew where the U-boats were and were going to be - a HUGE advantage.

It is quite clear that in the short periods where the Enigma wasn't cracked the U-boats were dealing out huge blows to the Allied merchant fleets.

Not quite right Soren. Of course the capture of the Enigma was a huge advantage but even when the allies didn't have an example, and / or when the Germans added a fourth rotor to the machine so we couldn't break it for a while, the Allies were quite good as avoiding German wolf packs.
It was by no means a case of without the Enigma the Allies had severe losses and with it they didn't. Radar and Huff Duff played their share, plus estimates on the U Boat intentions based on information gleaned from plots on where there radio transmissions were made from.

Its often forgotten that the Germans also had a fair bit of success in this area breaking the code used for the convoy routings for large parts of the war. A significant plus to the Germans.

In so many areas of conflict, there was an ebb and flow of the advantage but as I said once the Allies had the machine and the settings for three months they did retain the advantage.

 

[AL Schlageter]

Where is that info from AL ?

According to my sources at least 63 Allied ships were sunk in 1945, not just 8.

That agrees with:

Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines (#ships, GRT)
Tot44 - 125/663,308
Tot45 - 63/284,476

I can't find where it says 8. Where abouts does it say 8?

Found on some forum while doing a net search.

 

[renrich]

Al. My source states that for 1945, the Allies sailed a total of transatlantic CONVOYS between the Americas and Britain and between the Americas and Gibralter and the reverse: 202 convoys, 8514 ships, 7 losses. Losses were from convoys or stragglers from convoys. During this same period the U-Boat losses were 172. I think the discrepancy between the 7 or 8 figure and the 63 number is the 63 is for all over the world and includes ships not in CONVOY. Of course the 172 U-Boats lost is for all over the world but does NOT include boats surrendered or scuttled.. German submariners lost during 1945 is 7740 men with 280 cptured.

 

[Freebird]

Of the fighting parties in WWII, which had the better submarine force. Which of those from USN, Kriegsmarine, RN, IJN, RM and so on was the better weapon system as say today?QUOTE]

Do you mean "better" as in most effective? Or had the best equipment? And what year of the war? I think its safe to say that the German U-boats had the greatest impact.