WWII Submarines

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Read "Silent Victory" and tell me you wont get heartburn.

It took the surface fleet 20 months to finally be able to take on the IJN in a night action and win.

It took the sub force even longer to be able to finally have a chance of sinking a single ship while on patrol.

The results speak for themselves.
 
in the 1939 Russians had the biggest submarine fleet in the world (about 330 subs). But since the very beginning of the war most of it was trapped in the Black and Baltic sea by minefields.
 
Another good book with some excellent WW2 stories, Blind Man's Bluff. Has more to do with the espionage side of subs, but has a few great stories about WW2 raids.
 
On 23 February, 1942, four American DDs won a night surface action at Balikpapan, sinking a patrol craft and four transports. The Nautilus finished off one of the IJN carriers at Midway with a torpedo. Some of the S boats also had some successes in the early going. On the night of 11-12 October, 1942, the USN won a night action known as Battle of Cape Esperance. My uncle was in that one and gave me a first hand account. On the night of 12 November, 1942, a heavily outgunned USN force of cruisers and destroyers engaged an IJN force of BBs and DDs in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal and so damaged BB Hiei that she was helpless the next day when attacked and sunk by AC. The next night Washington sank Kirishima in a gunduel. All those victories took place well before the twenty months mentioned.
 
On 23 February, 1942, four American DDs won a night surface action at Balikpapan, sinking a patrol craft and four transports.

Undefended transports sitting at anchor and all they could do is sink 5 ships?

The Nautilus finished off one of the IJN carriers at Midway with a torpedo.

The torpedo didnt even explode, let alone put a hole in the hull.

Some of the S boats also had some successes in the early going.

Best war shot was the day after the Battle of Savo Island when one of the IJN cruisers was blown to pieces from an S-Boat using obsolete torpedo's. Other than that ..... it took hundreds of torpedo launches just to sink an occasional ship.

On the night of 11-12 October, 1942, the USN won a night action known as Battle of Cape Esperance. My uncle was in that one and gave me a first hand account.

The USN crossed the IJN "T" and only managed to sink two ships (and heavily damage a 3rd). Poor employment of the DD's was the blame for that.


Poor employment of the DD's, lack of effective use of radar, no battle doctrine or strategy nearly made the first nights battle a debacle. If anything, it was a draw tactically speaking. The next nights encounter went good, all things considered.

But then we can also mention the Battle off of Tassafaronga that was an embarrassment of the highest magnitude.
 
"20 months before the USN could take on the IJN in a night surface action and win." I just named several night surface actions where all historians would say the USN won well inside of twenty months. Perhaps your definition of win is different from most. Morison in "USN Operations WW2" stated the torpedo from Nautilus finished off one othe IJN carriers. Perhaps later and more accurate accounts than Morison's paint a different picture. It seems to me that your appraisal of the USN efforts might be overly critical. There were undoubtedly tactical mistakes made and sometimes the strategy was faulty but, on balance, during the portion of the war where the odds were even or tilted toward the IJN, the USN acquitted itself well in my view.
 
"20 months before the USN could take on the IJN in a night surface action and win." .

I think, whomever wrote that, had the general line right. The US Navy took a long time getting it together to the point where they used their advantages against the Japanese disadvantages. Pointedly, using radar directed gunnery in such a way as to negate the advantages of the long lance and enter a surface action with greater than average chance of success. It was well into 1943 before that happened.

Cap Esperence, mentioned on the preceeding page, was as much luck as tactical decisions. Right turns at the right place led to capping the T. Guadalcanal, first night, was, to use the description of one of the captians in the fight, "A bar room brawl with the lights shot out". The US force tactically collided with the Japanese force with both sides intermingled. Nobody teaches that one at their war colleges.

It was not until 1943 when the US managed a long range (12,000yds+) naval battle at night using smoke screens, radar directed gunnery and distance to win.
 
....Morison in "USN Operations WW2" stated the torpedo from Nautilus finished off one othe IJN carriers. Perhaps later and more accurate accounts than Morison's paint a different picture. ....

Japanese survivors off of the carrier emphatically state that the torpedo failed to explode.

Naval engagements that the USN was on the short end of the stick:

Savo Island ... a debacle of monumental proportions.

Cape Espearence .... on paper a narrow win, but tempered by a dismal employment of DD's and failure to capitalize on perfect tactical opportunities.

Naval Battle of Guadalcanal night #1 A mauling on the USN, due to poor planning, poor employment of DD's and the failure to capitalize on radar.

Naval Battle of Guadalcanal night #2 A clear win (finally)

Tassafaronga A debacle a monumental proportions.

Komodorski Islands A draw.

Kula Gulf A draw, although 3 cruisers and 4 DD's should have defeated the IJN force of 10 DD's.

Vela Gulf Finally a clear cut USN win.

Battle off Horaniu A draw, if it could be called that.

Battle of Vella Lavella A Loss

Battle of Empress Augusta Bay A clear cut USN victory, and they would not lose another one for the rest of the war.

I count one clear cut win after 20 months and two clear cut wins after 23 months. Not an impressive showing.

I am not counting Balikpapen as it was DD's versus merchant men, and the force only inflicted minor losses on the IJN when they had tactical surprise and gunnery supremecy, all at point blank range.

As for the sub forces ..... only one word can describe them ..."pathetic".
 
I do think the IJN task force commander was fired and perhaps Soc McMorris, who was the USN TFC was decorated although it probably should have been the Salt Lake City CO who should have gotten the honors. McMorris was in the US CL during the battle and a memoir I read of a sailor on the USS Dale, one of the US DDs, said that the USS Richmond, the CL, stayed out in front so far, since it was a running gun battle, that she was out of range of the Japanese guns for the most part. SLC fired around 800 rounds of 8 inch shell, ran out of AP stuff and the numbers 3 and 4 turrets ran out of ammo and had to be resupplied with shell from the forward magazines. Must have been difficult moving 250 pound projectiles from the forward magazines several hundred feet aft in sub freezing weather at 28 knots. Much of her electronic gear quit working because of the concussion from firing and light bulbs all over the ship were broken. Just imagine that although the majority of the firing was from the after turrets, 800 rounds amount to 80 ten gun salvos. The battle was fought for the most part at about 18000 yards. The IJN cruisers were bigger than SLC but had ten gun 8 inch batteries also.
 
The two battles of Guadacanal are admittedly regarded as a USN defeat in the first battle, and a clearcut victory in the second battle. Yet I challenge that. Both battles resulted in the loss of IJN battleships in both battles. TGhe material losses in 1st guadacanal were without a doubt heavier for the USN, but by the end of these battles, the Japanese were drawn to the conclusion that they had lost the battle for guadacanal island. though the Army took a bit longer to convince, the navy lost all heart, ad were reduced to mostly submarine transport relief efforts for the besiegers.

So, in my view ther were three victories.

Moreover the victories that went to Japan were never strategic in their effect. Even Savo island was flawed, because Mikawa lost his nerve and withdrew without having sunk the Watchtower transports. If he had, Guadacanal would have been immediately lost. At best the Marines would have been forced into a humilating withdrawal (presumably abandoning all their equipment), because there simply was not the transport available in the theatre to replace any significant losses in the assault fleet. Thanks to Admiral King and his abysmal handling of the US MS fleet assets in the Atlantic.....
 
The 1st Naval Battle of Guadalcanal (Nov 13th) has always considered to be a tactical defeat on the USN and a strategic victory in that it stopped Japanese plans.

Dont forget that the next day also saw the USS Juneau being blown to tiny pieces by a well placed torpedo.
 

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