They were, no doubt.
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Tante, sorry to wake you up to this fact but...Hitler and the Nazis were a WARMONGERING, EVIL REGIME during WWII.....
They were, no doubt.
Then lets leave it at that and get back on topic.
So the orders are "Sea lion", how would everyone use the Luftwaffe?
Gaining control of the air over SE England and the channel was a precursor to a cross channel invasion. however, in reality perhaps the very best the Germans could hope to achieve was a slight air dominance. I do not believe that the germans had the ability to achieve air superiority in the Summaer of 1940. But it might have been possible to achieve local advantages here and there for short periods of time.
what about the strains being felt on the other side. How many billets were they short? Were the Germans attacking as strongly as they had earlier (well yes, but reserves were almost gone). What were their readiness rates. I can tell you they were suffering more than our friends of the LW would have you believe. And anyway, by September it was too late to undertake an invasion wehrmacht style. It could not have been done by that time. That was shown decisvely in post war wargaming of the scenario. August was the very latest weather wise that the cros channel attempt could have been made.
And I dont think the RAF was as close to total collapse as you think. Strained yes, worried, yes, potential to lose yes, broken absolutely not. Likley to lose, no. possible to lose, partially, but not totally. Remember, the Germans had to achieve total air domination, or supremacy. Air superiority was not enough. look at Normandy. what were the air conditions that applied over Allied beachheads in 1944? What makes the Germans any less vulnerable to disruption that they can settle for a lesser air control state
what about the strains being felt on the other side. How many billets were they short? Were the Germans attacking as strongly as they had earlier (well yes, but reserves were almost gone). What were their readiness rates. I can tell you they were suffering more than our friends of the LW would have you believe.
I get the feeling we're looking at this all in hindsight and missing out on exactly what was known at the time.
Was radar important to the LW?
Did Downing know how the LW was straining?
etc, etc, etc.....
That's not what Dowding thought.
Of a meeting on 7th September in which he described his command as "going downhill" and at which sought the means to go downhill as slowly as possible he said.
"It was absolutely essential that the enemy should not become aware that he had materially damaged us.It was imperative that an undiminished front exist in the South East,because the enemy was feeling the strain very much at the same time,and nothing should be affoded them in the nature of encouragement."
His success was largely due to what has been described as an 'air reserve doctrine'. The decision to make the squadron the 'largest tactical unit that it will be practically expedient to employ' backed this up. As September 1940 commenced the Luftwaffe were still confronted by what they called "the RAF's last 50 fighters" but the reality was that the RAF was close to breaking. Of particular concern was the acute shortage of combat ready fighter pilots.As Dowding was at pains to explain to Douglas in the four weeks up to September 4th,despite replacements from the three OTUs,he had suffered a net loss of 68 pilots. Park added that on the same date nine of his (11 Group) squadrons had started with less than fifteen pilots. Douglas suggested opening another OTU until Dowding explained that this in itself would be a further drain on Fighter Command's resources.
Dowding wanted more repair and maintenance crews. He was pleased with the works organisation,despite the attacks only two airfields (Lympne and Manston) had been out of action for any significant time. He also wanted to move vulnerable sector control rooms away from airfields but this was proving a big headache. There were problems with everything from re-routing of communications to security,accomodation,transport and even the provision of hot meals.
Fighter Command was on the verge of collapse. A more concerted and better organised effort by the Luftwaffe might have pushed it over the edge. It is no accident that Park always considered 7th September when the Luftwaffe switched its attention from his sector airfields to London as the turning point of the battle. The Luftwaffe's losses on 15th Septenber (later to become Battle of Britain day) might have precipitated the official cancellation of 'Sealion' two days later but the decisive mistakes had already been made.
Cheers
Steve
If you compare the RAF on 13 August with the 7 September, they had more pilots and more serviceable aircraft.
I would keep unrelenting pressure on Fighter Command. My Bf 109s would not be limited tactically as they were historically. They would not only escort my bombers and fast bombers (the only role I would contemplate for the Bf 110 and something it was actually good at) but would also fly "freijagd" hunting and destroying the RAF in the air,on the ground,wherever it was to be found,to paraphrase a later US commander.
They did exactly that, but those fighter pilots who were assigned to close escort were complaining about it very loudly (meaning a certain cigarhead here *cough cough*). Others were performing Freie Jagd at the same time. The USAAF adopted similar tactics later.
...Attacking London (or other high value target) was in fact the correct tactical move as Fighter Command losses increased, German losses decreased. The RAF HAD to come up and fight, and no longer could play hide and seek, ignoring raids, nor it did have the ability to produce local superiority against the relatively smallish sized individual raids that the LW was relying on earlier. As much a Göring et. co. was criticized for it, massed bombers with overwhelming fighter escort worked well to suck the RAF into a Verdun-like bloodletting...
They did exactly that, but those fighter pilots who were assigned to close escort were complaining about it very loudly (meaning a certain cigarhead here *cough cough*). Others were performing Freie Jagd at the same time. The USAAF adopted similar tactics later.
Attacking London (or other high value target) was in fact the correct tactical move as Fighter Command losses increased, German losses decreased. The RAF HAD to come up and fight, and no longer could play hide and seek, ignoring raids, nor it did have the ability to produce local superiority against the relatively smallish sized individual raids that the LW was relying on earlier. As much a Göring et. co. was criticized for it, massed bombers with overwhelming fighter escort worked well to suck the RAF into a Verdun-like bloodletting.
It was again what the USAAF employed against the Luftwaffe in 1944. It did not yield results in a few weeks (the LW had little choice in that, since a very small time table was available to them until bad wather set in second half of September) but it did made an effect in a few months.
I dare say ca. 200 bomber raids (with a manageable and protectable size bomber formation) with heavy emphasiz on fast Ju 88s (which automatically minimises exposion to slow Hurricanes, i.e. 2/3s of the RAF force) with about 400 fighters - 3 or 4 entire Jagdgeschwadern - in escort in one blob during the daylight hitting high profile targets like London combined with twice as many bombers hitting the aircraft industry and ports, no more than the top 3 targets in sequence until they are utterly destroyed during the night with precision raids would yield results relatively quickly, in about two months. The other units may rest and refit in the meanwhile and hammer the RAF in turns. Do 17 units, which had limited use due to their limited load and range should be used as night harass aircraft of airfields with 50 kg bombs, making repairs impossible. Recon work must be delegated to Bf 110s units, which are extremely hard to be intercept in the time. The LW eventually figured that out during the course of the Battle, but they did not have the benefit of hindsight, but only trial and error.
It would also make radar stations and the observer corps irrelevant as it would not matter whether the RAF knew where the Luftwaffe was, it would be physically impossible to raise and concentrate enough fighters the same airspace from various airfields (given the infancy and limitations of RAF command and control as well) in the short time, nor could they, with their equally short endurance stay in the air long enough to assemble a Mega Wing in response. The end result would be that unlike in the Battle, the RAF would always face a largely superior local LW, with predictable results.
A crash programme for 109s with drop tanks would also be a must in July, even at the expense of operations. It is needed to control the space long enough, and to assembe large raids.
Even if there was no single fighter left in GB, that would never be a permanent state. Fighters can be rebuild, pilots trained. The KGs can't be everywhere, all the time.Freijagd with the increased endurance and tactical flexibility this bestows would be an entirely different affair to the 10/15 minutes that the Bf 109 had historically when it reached an arc running through the Thames at london.
If you have blinded the RAF by destroying the Chain Home stations the risk of effective bomber interceptions are much reduced. I'm suggesting that the Luftwaffe's Bf 109s go on the offensive. If they can catch the Spitfires and Hurricanes as they take off,climb or ideally on the ground,they are much more easily dealt with.
As Luftwaffe commander I propose a coordinated strategy,not the historical piece meal attacks with several concurrent objectives.
1. Destroy Britain's radar based air defence system.
2. Destroy Fighter Command.
3. Bomb the crap out of Britain and hope you can force her to negotiate rather than attempt a very risky invasion.
Cheers
Steve