Aircraft Economics the forgotten consideration

[GrauGeist]

The B17 was more valuable as a bomber hence the delegation of B24 to VLR role.

The B-17 did continue serving in the SWP in various roles (recon, SAR and such) and on several occasions, came to the rescue of Navy recon aircraft that came under attack, like the time a PBY was under attack by an H6K and sent out a distress call.
An Army B-17 thundered in to the rescue and proceeded to maul the H6K in a running battle that lasted over 30 minutes.

 

[Canaus]

Interesting discussion.
For anyone not aware the the you tube channel "Perun" is the preeminent power point presentation on defence economics. The main content is on the current Russo-Ukraine war, but each presentation has a lot historical perspective. Well worth the viewing or rather listening.

 

[pbehn]

The B17 was more valuable as a bomber hence the delegation of B24 to VLR role.

The VLR B-24s were in very high demand by all forces everywhere, there was a very unseemly "scrap" about who should get them.

 

[MIflyer]

The VLR B-24s were in very high demand by all forces everywhere, there was a very unseemly "scrap" about who should get them.

One of the odder aspects of B-24 use was that the USAAF had B-24's equipped with radar for antisub missions before anyone else. There was a "Scrap" over where Non-USAAF leaders wanted them to be deployed. Eventually the USN and RAF got their own and the USAAF unit was released. Since the crews were not trained in formation flying and high altitude bombing, they could not just be incorporated in USAAF bomber units and were assigned to carry agents and supplies to Resistance units in Europe. They were called The Carpetbaggers and I have two books on them on my shelf.

And note that an early LB-30 Liberator without turbos became Winston Churchill's personal transport for long range missions. He flew all the way to the USSR and back in that airplane.

 

[pbehn]

One of the odder aspects of B-24 use was that the USAAF had B-24's equipped with radar for antisub missions before anyone else. There was a "Scrap" over where Non-USAAF leaders wanted them to be deployed. Eventually the USN and RAF got their own and the USAAF unit was released. Since the crews were not trained in formation flying and high altitude bombing, they could not just be incorporated in USAAF bomber units and were assigned to carry agents and supplies to Resistance units in Europe. They were called The Carpetbaggers and I have two books on them on my shelf.

And note that an early LB-30 Liberator without turbos became Winston Churchill's personal transport for long range missions. He flew all the way to the USSR and back in that airplane.

There were all sorts of "turf wars" especially within UK between Bomber Command and Coastal Command and the RAF and RCAF not only about who got liberators but who got RADAR RAF Bomber command got the RADAR and promptly lost it. A whole lot of BS that wasted time closing the Atlantic gap.

 

[33k in the air]

The B-24 did have the advantage of a larger internal GP bomb load than the B-17:

B-24 = 4 x 2,000 lb GP bombs (8,000 lbs total) or 8 x 1,000 lb GP bombs (8,000 lbs total)
B-17 = 2 x 2,000 lb GP bombs (4,000 lbs total) or 6 x 1,000 lb GP bombs (6,000 lbs total)

With the use of cluster adapters the B-24 could carry 52 x 100 lb incendiaries internally while the B-17 could only carry 42 x 100 lb incendiaries internally.

 

[MIflyer]

You have to wonder what we might have done to improve efficiency. For example, for the CAM ships, how about take an older Hurricane (note that the RAF pilots in the Med were saying "They have 5,000 Hurricanes in the U.K., so they are sending them here, but no Spitfires.") and remove the MLG. Put external streamlined jettisonable MLG on the bottom of the wings and use the MLG space and weight in the wings to add fuel tanks and extra ammo. If the Hurricane is launched too far away from land to make it to a base the MLG could be removed prior to launch or dumped after launch. The extra range would possibly enable the fighter to return to a base or to loiter longer over the convoy.

Such modified Hurricanes could be mounted on tankers and cargo ships that accompany strike forces and possibly even cruisers. They could have been very useful at Coral Sea and Midway, where fighter protection for the Fleet was inadequate. as well as the Soloman Island campaigns. They might have been able to help fill the "Air Gap" in the Atlantic until VLR B-24's were available, especially if they equipped the fighters with depth charges.

 

[Escuadrilla Azul]

Much of the original cost of combat types is not airframe, as the US figures indicate, it is the armament, engine(s), communications etc. and they take a lot of the maintenance time, though an aircraft with poorly designed access panels will cost more to run, the Martin Baker MB5 is reported as a maintenance person's dream. In theory a higher performing type will be cheaper if that translates to less battle damage. Different factories tend to end up with different production costs, before all the problems of assigning the true cost of manufacture, like is depreciation of factory buildings, tools and office furniture included in the price? Head office overhead?

Date	Model	Airframe	Engines(s)	Propeller(s)	GFE	Ordnance	Communications	Total	Notes
28-Feb-43​	P-47	$ 47,796	$ 22,608	$ 5,975	$ 5,651	$ 2,527	$ 3,295	$ 87,852	Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts
31-Jul-44​	P-47	$ 61,699	$ 24,313	$ 6,922	$ 5,767	$ 3,504	$ 3,303	$ 105,508	Costs are weighted average of all Army contracts from 1939 to date
31-Aug-44​	P-47	$ 55,783	$ 23,852	$ 6,960	$ 5,357	$ 3,506	$ 2,948	$ 98,406	Costs based on uncompleted contracts
30-Nov-44​	P-47	$ 49,420	$ 22,608	$ 5,257	$ 5,210	$ 3,506	$ 3,295	$ 89,296	Costs based on uncompleted contracts
28-Feb-43​	P-51	$ 23,583	$ 17,558	$ 3,740	$ 2,649	$ 1,905	$ 2,780	$ 52,215	Merlin Versions. Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts
31-Jul-44​	P-51	$ 28,984	$ 17,328	$ 4,887	$ 2,322	$ 2,493	$ 2,830	$ 58,844	Costs are weighted average of all Army contracts from 1939 to date
31-Aug-44​	P-51	$ 27,889	$ 17,545	$ 4,391	$ 2,236	$ 2,574	$ 2,780	$ 57,415	Costs based on uncompleted contracts
30-Nov-44​	P-51	$ 25,795	$ 17,558	$ 2,555	$ 2,234	$ 2,559	$ 2,780	$ 53,481	Costs based on uncompleted contracts
28-Feb-43​	B-17	$ 111,443	$ 34,287	$ 3,400	$ 45,606	$ 4,595	$ 9,040	$ 208,371	Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts
31-Jul-44​	B-17	$ 157,484	$ 37,480	$ 11,755	$ 48,939	$ 5,999	$ 10,305	$ 271,962	Costs are weighted average of all Army contracts from 1939 to date
31-Aug-44​	B-17	$ 129,150	$ 35,521	$ 11,247	$ 47,425	$ 5,966	$ 9,040	$ 238,349	Costs based on uncompleted contracts
30-Nov-44​	B-17	$ 125,464	$ 34,875	$ 6,487	$ 46,413	$ 5,686	$ 9,040	$ 227,965	Costs based on uncompleted contracts
28-Feb-43​	B-24	$ 115,338	$ 32,659	$ 4,220	$ 49,781	$ 3,205	$ 8,474	$ 213,677	Costs based on weighted average of uncompleted contracts
31-Jul-44​	B-24	$ 169,452	$ 36,539	$ 12,899	$ 49,034	$ 4,726	$ 9,752	$ 282,402	Costs are weighted average of all Army contracts from 1939 to date
31-Aug-44​	B-24	$ 138,585	$ 33,363	$ 13,004	$ 47,956	$ 4,520	$ 8,474	$ 245,902	Costs based on uncompleted contracts
30-Nov-44​	B-24	$ 114,951	$ 34,497	$ 8,663	$ 48,288	$ 4,505	$ 8,474	$ 219,378	Costs based on uncompleted contracts

Model	1939-41	1942​	1943​	1944​	1945​
B-17	$301,221​	$258,949​	n/a	$204,370​	$187,742​
B-24	$379,162​	$304,391​	n/a	$215,516​
P-47	$113,246​	$105,594​	$104,258​	$85,578​	$83,001​
P-51	n/a	$58,698​	$58,824​	$51,572​	$50,985​

The 1941 to 1943 Lancaster and Halifax shared the same basic engines, propellers, armament and radio equipment, or about half the total cost of a finished aircraft. The Halifax III etc. used the more expensive and heavier Hercules engines, depending on versions 4 Hercules came in at around 1,000 pounds extra weight.

AVIA 15/2389 covers the sale of RAF aircraft to France in 1945/6, including serial numbers, one point is the prices quoted, in pounds, completed aircraft,

37-40,000 Lancaster I
40,000 Halifax
15,000 Mosquito VI
16,000 Mosquito 30
16,000 Mosquito PR XVI
16,300 Mosquito PR.34
10,000 Spitfire IX
9,700 Spitfire XIV
13,650 Typhoon
26,000 Wellington XIII
25,000 Wellington XIV
55-65,000 Sunderland III

Spare engine prices,

1,530 Merlin 22
1,460 Merlin 24
3,830 Hercules 100
1,480 Merlin 25
1,840 Merlin 76
1,840 Merlin 67, 72 etc.
1,900 Merlin 114
1,800 Merlin
2,300 Griffon
5,550 Sabre II
3,180 Hercules XVII
1,596 Pegasus XVIII

My but Rolls Royce were cost effective.

Early war cost estimates, 201st a/c, man hours, Lancaster 74,319, Halifax 98,246, Stirling 129,944

a) June 1941 proposed order 400 Lancaster 17,700,000 pounds, 44,250 pounds each, 250 Halifax 10,938,000 pounds, 43,752 pounds each

b) Lancaster from Armstrong Whitworth 41,400 pounds, from MetroVic 43,600 pounds, Halifax from English Electric 42,000 pounds.

c) 450 Lancaster from Avro 19,340,000 pounds, 42,978 pounds each, Metrovic 257 aircraft 11,204,000 pounds, 43,595 pounds each. 150 Halifax from Fairey 6,572,000 pounds, 43,813 pounds each

Tanks versus tanks fights happened but doctrine tended to the idea anti tank guns fought tanks, tanks did other things, then as the average anti tank gun size grew, making it harder to hide and move, the anti tank guns became more self propelled and German doctrine changes to tank as anti tank weapon, Panther, Assault guns for infantry support, US doctrine Tank Destroyers as anti tank weapon, tank as infantry support.

Real battlefields are full of all sorts of weapons A British analysis of tank losses in August 1944 indicates that on average it took 1.63 hits to knock out a Sherman, 2.55 to knock out a Panther and 4.2 hits to knock out a Tiger. If you make the big assumption all hits are the same, averaged over the various anti tank weapons both sides had, and hits are equally probable again on average then the "kill ratio" in overall combat would be

1 Panther to 2.55/1.63 or 1.6 Shermans and 1 Tiger to 4.2/1.63 or 2.6 Shermans.

Weight ratios were on the order of 1 Panther to 1.5 or 1.4 Shermans, 1 Tiger to around 1.9 Shermans. So the extra weight, basically armour, had its effect. More particularly it is probably saying the Panther would have been better served with some of the frontal armour being reallocated to the sides, making it tougher all round, like the Tiger. The Panther to Tiger ratio is 1.65 Panthers to the Tiger, the Tiger was around 1.3 times heavier than the Panther. The design of the Panther is reported to have meant it was cheaper to make than the Panzer IV.

Why the como sistem cost more in a P-47 than in a P-51? They weren't the same?

 

[NevadaK]

In response to the OP, there are many different economies that exist during the war. Cost of manufacture is one. Relevant to wartime, Cost of time to manufacture and Cost of man hours to manufacture have as great if not greater economic value than monetary cost. Then there is the utility economy such as cost to operate, cost to repair, and efficacy cost (how successful is the unit in direct use against the enemy). Then there are background economies such as cost of infrastructure to build, transport, and operate. The actual economic value/cost of say the B-24 is at the nexus of all of these economies. Were we able to model all of these value/costs, we might find that the value of the B-24 was significantly greater than say the B-17 which is anecdotally cited as the better bomber.

This approach to economic modeling of systems was at the basis of the U.S. effort in the 1980's to "spend the Soviet Union into failure". By establishing a US military capacity that was economically unobtainable by the USSR, it led to the collapse of the Soviet economy.

 

[MIflyer]

Why the como sistem cost more in a P-47 than in a P-51? They weren't the same?

By the time the P-51 came into the ETO the radio employed for fighters there, SCR-522, was in full rate production in US Factories (it was British designed) and had largely supplanted the SCR-274-N that was installed in the earlier models in that theater. You build more of a piece of equipment, then generally it costs less. P-51A's sent to the CBI theater were equipped with SCR-274-N, where it proved to be a superior choice for their missions, since it enabled them to talk to the ground troops directly.

 

[Escuadrilla Azul]

By the time the P-51 came into the ETO the radio employed for fighters there, SCR-522, was in full rate production in US Factories (it was British designed) and had largely supplanted the SCR-274-N that was installed in the earlier models in that theater. You build more of a piece of equipment, then generally it costs less. P-51A's sent to the CBI theater were equipped with SCR-274-N, where it proved to be a superior choice for their missions, since it enabled them to talk to the ground troops directly.

But for the same period (say 30/11/1944) the radio for P-47 cost some 1.000 USD more than the one for the P-51 but by your post they should be using the same one and 1.000 bucks in a 2.500-3.500 range seems a lot for different contractors.

Was the P-47 using more nav/com equipment?

 

[GrauGeist]

Is it possible that someone, somewhere failed to list the cost of the BC-1206 receiver set in the P-51's accounting?

The P-51D and P-47D both had a comparable transeiver and beacon set installed (and IFF set), so it doesn't make sense why there would be such difference in cost.

 

[MIflyer]

Is it possible that someone, somewhere failed to list the cost of the BC-1206 receiver set in the P-51's accounting?

I have four BC-1206 sets. They are small and should not have cost very much. The BC-1206 was used in P-47, P-51, P-61, P-63, and P-80A aircraft, although usually only in the USA.
But note the different dates for the P-51 versus P-47.

 

[pbehn]

But for the same period (say 30/11/1944) the radio for P-47 cost some 1.000 USD more than the one for the P-51 but by your post they should be using the same one and 1.000 bucks in a 2.500-3.500 range seems a lot for different contractors.

Was the P-47 using more nav/com equipment?

The introduction of the P-47 was delayed when they found the fitted radios didnt work as required, so they sourced British radios locally and some version of this was then built in USA. That was in March April1943, giving lots of time for haggling over signed contracts, economies of scale and bulk discounts.

 

[Shortround6]

If you look hard enough at some of the contracts there may be extra "stuff" thrown in. Like contract A has 5000 manuals and 3000 parts lists added in and contract D for the same basic item has zero manuals and parts lists included, different price for the same number units.
The US was often refiguring prices anyway. Grumman was limited to about 3% profit on the F6F and as they got better at making them the cost went down. There were government accounts in factory monitor things. One imagines that similar things were going on in other factories.

 

[MIflyer]

It is true that some P-47's, P-51's,, P-38's, and P-61's were equipped with the APS-13 tail warning radar. That was a large and complex piece of equipment for its day, operating at 400 MHZ range UHF frequencies rather than the 100-156 MHZ VHF of the SCR-522 comm radio. I can well imagine one of those sets costing $1000.

 

[gruad]

It is true that some P-47's, P-51's,, P-38's, and P-61's were equipped with the APS-13 tail warning radar. That was a large and complex piece of equipment for its day, operating at 400 MHZ range UHF frequencies rather than the 100-156 MHZ VHF of the SCR-522 comm radio. I can well imagine one of those sets costing $1000.

So the Monica set that was such a disaster for BC could be useful when the aircraft carrying it was not relying on stealth and had equal capability to it's attacker.

 

[MIflyer]

And the APS-13 was not being used in darkness by those fighters, except possibly by the P-61. I really don't know how much good it did, but having the ability to detect something behind you had some advantage, I guess. I recall seeing a comment by a USAAF fighter pilot that the APS-13 was quite effective in alerting them to possible threats.

The RAF tested putting a APS-13 looking forward in a Typhoon to better enable them to determine how far they were away from V-1's they were chasing at night. That flame made it very difficult to judge distance. Too far away and their shots would not bring the bomb down. Too close and if it blew up it would take out the fighter as well.

 

[gruad]

And the APS-13 was not being used in darkness by those fighters, except possibly by the P-61. I really don't know how much good it did, but having the ability to detect something behind you had some advantage, I guess. I recall seeing a comment by a USAAF fighter pilot that the APS-13 was quite effective in alerting them to possible threats.

The RAF tested putting a APS-13 looking forward in a Typhoon to better enable them to determine how far they were away from V-1's they were chasing at night. That flame made it very difficult to judge distance. Too far away and their shots would not bring the bomb down. Too close and if it blew up it would take out the fighter as well.

Once the RAF realized the Luftwaffe NFs were using Monica/APS 13 to home in to their heavies, they removed the sets and put them into Mosquito escorts.

The NF would get a nasty surprise as the Mossie with it's far superior performance could turn and get behind. This problem got so bad that Ju88s started to carry an extra crewman to check the rear...

 

[nuuumannn]

The Lancaster may have been better than the Halifax but switching production from Halifax to Lancaster would just mean much fewer "four engined bombers" and there were many tasks that the Halifax could do just as well as a Lancaster.

The only task the Halifax could do better than the Lancaster was provide a bad example. Yes, Halifax crews were more likely to survive crash landings and being shot down compared to Lancaster crews, but this is tempered by the fact that Halifaxes were more likely to get shot down than Lancasters. Halifaxes were also more likely to remain grounded owing to maintenance issues and were more likely to turn back after take-off on a raid because of nominally overheating engines. While the Halifax III and Lancaster III had similar maximum bomb loads and MTOWs, the Halifax took longer to get to altitude loaded, and because its engines were operating at higher RPMs, not as much of an issue with the Hercules-engined Halifaxes but overheating in the climb was an issue that affected every Halifax variant, it had greater fuel consumption, thus reducing its range/endurance, and it had a lower ceiling carrying the same warload compared to the Lancaster across the entire course of a raid.

Regarding the whole economy thing, the Halifax consumed resources and brain power throughout its career owing to the multitude of issues that afflicted the design. While it could be said that the Manchester was where the Lancaster was refined, rectifying the issues affecting the Halifax took far longer. To rectify the severe rudder overbalance for example, a solution was not found until nearly three years after the type's first flight. In the Merlin-engined Halifaxes, HP had to go cap in hand to Rolls-Royce to ask it to redesign the engine mounts and nacelles because HP insisted on designing them themselves despite Rolls' offer to do so initially, because they induced severe vibration that HP struggled to cure. Production batches were numerous and introduced numerous changes as solutions were found to the problems, which meant small production batches of each model. The Halifax was a resource sucking maintenance hog that was a success despite itself. It is worth noting that Harris often repeated that he wanted Halifax and Stirling production to end to concentrate on Lancaster production. It wasn't hard to see why.