Airwar over France with no Operation Torch, instead 1943 invasion of France

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In this case (Tunis is still not home for Allied aircraft, let alone parts of Italy), the distance involved is too big. It is 910 miles from Benghazi to Bucharest.
Short of capturing Crete and estabilshing bases there (or using Soviet air bases?), escorts are out of the question. But then, it is more than 600 miles between Crete and Bucharest, and until late 1943 (P-38J available) Allies cannot provide escort even when flying from Crete.

The F4U will not provide any better range than P-47. The P-38 'behave' do better in Mediterranean in summer, especially the P-38H vs. P-38J, than in the West European winter, but the P-38H have had 1/4 less of fuel than P-38J.
If we're trying to escort the bombers at 15-20000 ft and not at 25000 ft, both defending Flak and fighters have better chances to kill the heavies.
 


P=38s only had the range to do so from Italy, not from Egypt or the Middle East.
 
davebender said:
Dare I suggest USN F4U as escort for medium / low altitude bombing missions? It had a relatively large fuel capacity and exceptional aerial performance compared to other USA fighter aircraft during 1943.
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The USN/USMC will not part with F4U's. Period. And they had Admirals Kings support on that.
 
tomo pauk said:
( or using Soviet air bases?)
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the Russians are going to co-operate enough to make it as successful as it could be. you would have to completely change the soviet leadership and mindset to make that happen... you will end up with a repeat of the frantic missions
 
Soviets may not have any choice if summer 1942 German offensive into Caucasus is reinforced with units historically sent to Tunisia and Vichy France.

May come down to USA helping to defend Baku. Once such a commitment begins additional units get sucked in until 1943 invasion of France is no longer possible. Now you've got a very different WWII.
 

Why would the summer 1942 offensive have the DAK? They'd be in Africa.
 

stalin and the soviets showed they were willing to absorb massive losses in both territory and manpower. I think stalin would have to be replaced before there was any change in policy....no matter what the situation. he did not want any appearance that the us or any allied force rescued the soviet union...it was bad for propaganda..
 
Not all territory is of equal military value.

Caucasus was critical to Soviet war effort as it was a major route for Lend Lease assistance. Britain and Soviet Union jointly occupied Iran to secure this supply route. German Army Group A blocked the route as long as they remained in the Caucasus.
 
This is an altogether different scenario to the one initially postulated. basically stripping out the med front, ignore the crumbling loyalties of the Vichy regime and denuding the implied support to spain by the significant presence in western Europe of the german army.

Destruction of the Italian positions in North Africa without German support would be over by the end of 1941, assuming a mass transfer of forcesto be completed and ready by may 1942.

What would I do as the Allied joint Chiefs from that point. No German forces in Italy. no significant german forces in the rest of southern Europe. Significant, strategically vital interests in Rumania. Wavering major axis partners in the form of Fascist Italy and Vichy, with Spain playing games but vulnerable and now isolated.

There are more opportunities here than I can easily assimilate. they include;

1) invasions of Sicily Corsica, Crete by 8th Army.
2) Defections of Vichy North Africa and its fleet to the Allies
3) invasions of mainland Italy, probably after (1), again by 8A alone (with re-equipped French divs now fighting for the FNFL)
4) pressure on Spanish to declare neutrality (as opposed to co-belligerent)
5) pressure on the turks for access through the bosphorous. It was always the implied threat of German retaliation that held the turks back until 1945, when the threat was all but gone. If the germans voluntarily remove the threat, opportunities do present themselves to the allies.
6) If (5) eventuates, move immediately to land and use the 2.5 Allied armies to knock out the rumanians and capture the vital oilfields at Ploesti. War is over within 6 months of that happening, and there is the added bonus that most of eastern Europe is in Allied, not Soviet, hands.

This is scenario where the "soft underbelly" of Europe really is soft.....
 

"Parts of France" will not be under Allied control in 1943, parts of Allied soldiers will be under France. (as in war graves)
An Allied invasion of France in 1943 will not occur, as the British are not suicidal, and an Allied landing has virtually no chance of survival, let alone breakout.


The 8th army may well be stuck on the borders of Tunisia, short of supplies




Excellent analysis Parsifal (as usual)
 
parsifal said:
good to see you again freebird. hope you are well
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Thanks mate!
Yeah, it's been a crap year, and crazy busy, was informed that our contracts next year would get a 10% - 15% cut so told them to get stuffed.
Happy to see the year over and contracting with a new outfit going forward. 8)

This thread is now p*****g me off, I've just wasted an hour half typing a reply that's just evaporated.

Anyways, here goes again...

wiking85 said:
What would a force on force airwar over France in 1943 look like had there been no Operation Torch and therefore Tunisian/Sicily/Italy campaign, but instead the US and UK saving up forces to invade France in 1943 like in Operation Roundup?
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First off, what's the reasoning behind the US sitting idle in 1942?
The UK US are committed to opening another front of some sort in 1942, and have promised as much to Stalin.
The Allies have serious concerns about the Soviets holding out in 1942, or possibly collapsing in the south with the Axis capturing Baku and threatening Persia.
While the Allies are far, far short of being able to mount an invasion of France, the British are convinced that a landing in NW Africa would draw away considerable Axis forces from the East. (they turn out to be right )

After the cancellation of the Russia convoys Stalin is fuming, and both FDR Churchill are agreed that the US UK need to open a new front in 1942 in NW Africa.
Also, even if Torch is cancelled there's no guarantee that Roundup will be possible in 1943.

So how does FDR explain to Stalin that US ground participation won't happen until 1943 or 1944?


wiking85 said:
Let's say for the sake of argument that invasion comes in June 1943 in the area of the historical Normandy landings to draw off German forces before Kursk.
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An invasion of France won't happen in 1943 as the Allies would be in no position to manage it, and if they tried it would be a fiasco. Churchill would be a fool to overrule his Chiefs of Staff to push though an operation that would likely end up as a disaster.
In any event, it wouldn't draw anything away from Kursk as the German position on the Eastern front would already be 20 or 30 divisions stronger, and the Soviet position much weaker.
A weak landing in France in 1943 can be handled by the Axis forces already there, and after crushing the Allied landing the Germans will be able to send another 15 or 20 divisions to the Soviet front.
Essentially, while a successful landing in France will tie down German troops, a failed landing attempt would set the Allies back two years or more, and free up more German divisions to send east.

wiking85 said:
What does the air campaign look like then if the pull a Transport Plan before doing major bombing of Germany?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Plan
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No Transport plan possible as the Combined Bomber Offensive (Pointblank) is a prerequisite for these operations, and Pointblank itself is delayed or cancelled in 1943 as the supplies aircraft needed for it are eaten up by the landing attempt.

In the summer of 1943 there are no Mustangs yet, and the P-47 has only reached operation status in a couple of squadrons, so the support for a landing would be much more difficult in the shorter range Spitfires, and longer range missions to Germany are not feasible .

wiking85 said:
For the sake of argument let's say the North African Campaign basically ends with the Axis armies being run out of Africa in Spring 1943 by Monty and the 8th army, but then without an invasion of Sicily.
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.
It's far from certain that Monty can push Rommel out of Libya, as without the Torch landings the Germans are not retreating into Tunisia, and will turn and fight the British in central Libya, with the Allies now struggling at the end of a 1,400 mile supply line. Rommel should be able to halt the Allies in a stalemated position at Tobruk, Benghazi or somewhere in Libya

In any case, without the Anglo-American Torch landings splitting Axis forces, the British are not going to capture the 300,000 axis forces that they did historically.


wiking85 said:
I'm assuming Kursk then is impossible and the fighters transferred from the West for the offensive aren't, same with the SS Panzer divisions, meaning the Soviet launch their own offensive in the East after the Allied landings in Normandy.
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No.
The Luftwaffe will be stronger in the East as the Germans haven't lost massive forces in the Med.
The Eastern front will have all of the SS other divisions that they historically had in 1943, plus some 20 - 30 extra divisions that were not lost in Tunisia, Italy the Balkans.
Kursk is however indeed unlikely to occur, as the Soviets will probably not have recaptured it in early 1943.
Without Hitler's extremely unwise decision to start sending his reserves to Southern Europe in the immediate aftermath of Torch, the Germans could have sent more reserves to Army Group B which would mitigate the damage from "Uranus"
 
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freebird said:
In any event, it wouldn't draw anything away from Kursk as the German position on the Eastern front would already be 20 or 30 divisions stronger, and the Soviet position much weaker.
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What 20-30 division? There weren't that many German ones in North Africa and Sicily combined and that's including Rommel who cannot go anywhere and his divisions are worn down and will probably need German reinforcements.


Assuming that the 5th Panzer army doesn't go to North Africa to shore up Rommel's badly depleted forces and that Operation Anton may not happen, that's debateable, because the Allies will still land at the point of their choosing with overwhelming force after deception operations that historically confused and tied down German troops. So its really debateable whether the Germans of 1943 could have stopped them. In 1944 with significantly stronger forces than existed in France in 1943 they couldn't crush the landings.

How is Pointblank a prerequisite? The target area for the Transport Plan in France is able to be covered by P-38s, P-40s, Spitfire VIIIs, and P-47s. If you mean the lack of Big Week and the destruction of the Luftwaffe, drawing them into decisive air battles in France has the same effect; the goal is bringing them to battle, not where it happens; in 1943 Pointblank didn't really succeed at its goals of wrecking German industry, so wasn't really critical to any subsequent operation, other than gaining experience of unescorted raids into Germany and inflicting some losses on the ground on the Germans.

Again how do you figure? Rommel was beaten badly at El Alamein and unable to resist even at El Agheila
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_El_Agheila
Rommel needed reinforcements and that would probably mean the 5th Panzer army. That then means its not available for any other front. Plus then Tripoli is subject to interdiction by Malta, just like Tunisia was and its pretty easy then to find Axis convoys and sink them all headed to one port, just like with Tunisia.
 
What 20-30 division? There weren't that many German ones in North Africa and Sicily combined and that's including Rommel who cannot go anywhere and his divisions are worn down and will probably need German reinforcements.
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Thats a conservative estimate by Freebird. If the landings were to fail or even just contained, the Germans would be free to strip out their coastal garrisons in Western Europe. As at June 1942 there were 37 divisions deployed along the Atlantic Coast.

In addition there were increasingly substantial forces facing off on the Vichy frontier, being held in Germany and deploying in Northern Italy. Im not entirely certain of the numbers of these troops, but easily in excess of 12 divs, all being held to react to Allied initiative. If there was no Torch landings, ther was no need to withhold reserves to collapse the Vichy. If the allies attempt a cross channel landing and it fails, as it inevitably must, in 1942, then by 1943, the germans are at least 30 divs stronger in the east. This gives them enough wriggle room to do a lot of things, include a complete avoidance of Stalingrad, enough reservers to start rotating units properly, and enough units to establish a viable eastern front strategic reserve.


The choices in 1943 are a LOT more restricted than they were in 1944. The possibilities for landing sites available to the allies were really dictated by some key limitations. Some debate about this but in my opinion they included the range of their fighter forces, which in 1943 was a lot less than 1944 (Im talking the main groups and types available to the allies), the inability in 1943 to work independantly of a port, which means they had to capture a port quickly. This was no Sicily or Italy, the forces involved and the need to out-reinforce the front compared to the Germans was acknowledged as the operational objective. Could not be done in 1943 without a port.

These constraints really limited Allied options to the Pas-De-Calais region, just where the Germans expected a landing. Part of the failure of the Germans in France is that they failed to appreciate the enormous work being done 1942-4 to make the allies less dependant on port facilities. Strategic mobility was denied the allies until that problem was solved. The mulberries were the main solution, and the final form of how these would be built were not worked out until the end of August 1943. Its debatebale as to when they might have been ready, maybe March 1944, but then there was the problem of the channel crossing in winter. There really was no way to bring the cross channel attack forward much earlier than about May 1944, if the strategic choices available historically is to be assumed as available


For the Americans at least, the thinking for the need to escort its bombers, and indeed mount a heavy and sustained campaign over occupied France with its medium bombers and fighters would not have materialised without its extensive experiences in North Africa and to a lesser extent over Sicily and Italy to help it through the thinking processes required. The Americans as late as October 1943 were still wedded to the concept of the unescorted heavy bomber attacks. It was only after men such as Doolittle were moved in to replace men like Eaker, that a noticeable shift in American thinking began to manifest itself. until that occurred, the Americans were simply not going to have the know how and experience to implement what you are suggesting, and the British dont have enough medium and long ranged fighters to do the job in their place. The North African experiences were absolutely needed, not only to get the troops up to steam, but also the experience in the air leaders as well. This experience is vital in implementing the changes you assume.


I admit I tend to agree, though it is not a lay down mezzaire because of supply issues for the allies as they advance further west. But unlikely that Rommel could stop Monty after alamein.

I dont think this is the critical question though. The issue is, what happens after Tripoli falls? You cant leave North Africa and the middle East ungarisoned, whilst the italians are still in the ring, and without US support in the med, it is not possible to contemplate HUSKY or Salerno. Italy given the chance to take breath gives back the initiative to the Axis and prevents the allies from concentrating their forces. it has the same effect as if Rommel was holed up in Tripoli......
 
The coastal defense divisions were not capable of much else but that. So they weren't a real option to use elsewhere. Also the mobile combat divisions in France were also there to keep the French in line and weren't actually available for other duty for fear of France becoming restive.

As to landing choices they'd be covered by thousands of Allied fighters, in excess of 4k IIRC, while the Germans save about 1k from the Mediterranean and still need to defend Germany. They'd be at least outnumbered by 2:1 over the beachheads if not even more. Trying to have heavily armed fighters to shoot down Allied bombers then would not be able to survive the Allied fighter sweeps.
 
wiking85 said:
What 20-30 division? There weren't that many German ones in North Africa and Sicily combined and that's including Rommel who cannot go anywhere and his divisions are worn down and will probably need German reinforcements.
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Note that I said Axis divisions, not only German

The 20 or 30+ additional divisions available be sent to the Soviet front would be divisions that are NOT lost in 1943 from 3 places

1.) Tunisia - Rommel had about 115,000 troops (including Italian) in Egypt, and loses 50 to 60 thousand by the time he's defending at Mareth. The Axis send at least 250,000 additional troops to Tunisia, as Allied forces capture some 300,000 troops there in Mar/April '43.

Without any Torch/Husky/Avalanche most of troops are not lost - nor even sent.
Perhaps 50 - 100 thousand might be sent (mainly Italians) to stop Monty's drive, but there would be at least 150 thousand troops available that wouldn't end up in Tunisia

2.) Med - Considerable forces are sent to Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica etc to prepare for possible invasions, made possible after Africa is cleared. Note that the HG panzer division is raised and sent twice.
These forces (including 15th, 29th motorized, 1st Parachute) end up fighting Allied forces in Italy and are not available in the East

3.) Italy, Balkans, Greece - Following the Italian surrender the Germans are forced to deploy 15+ additional divisions to occupy all of the territory previously held by the Italians, including the Dodecanese islands.
2nd Panzer is sent to Greece, 5th 10th SS Panzer end up fighting in the Balkans etc etc.

While some here will deride Italian troops, there's no doubt that they provide an important role garrisoning Southern Europe, and when Germany must do this alone it's stretched thin.



Pointblank the CBO were designed to cripple the Luftwaffe defence, the big losses inflicted on the LW weren't possible earlier than summer of 1943 as the US is still building up and the Allies lack the resources to support the effort.
In 1943 the P-47 squadrons are just getting active, IIRC there are 2 groups that begin P-47 operations in April '43, and they are using the weaker P-47B, with the poorer climb rate. Spitfires don't have the range to do the job, P-40s are badly outclassed by the FW 190's and the P-38s are phased out.

Also keep in mind that you can't just assume that you can transfer x number of divisions or air units from one theater to another, and that the situation will be the same.
For example, the Allied forces in the Med (Sicily, Italy) use fuel from the British refineries in Haifa Beiruit, however if transferred to the UK they will have to be supplied across the Atlantic, where shipping tonnage is already in critically short supply. British CW forces can use ammunition supplies South Africa India, while if it is planned to deploy Allied units from the UK it would require using cargo tonnage already stretched to the breaking point by the need to supply the UK needs, transship material through the UK to Russia, build up USAAF air operations, and stockpile for Overlord
 
freebird said:
it would require using cargo tonnage already stretched to the breaking point by the need to supply the UK needs, transship material through the UK to Russia, build up USAAF air operations, and stockpile for Overlord
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Agree Churchill was beside himself during 1943 because so many ship bottoms were filled with support for the Eighth which he considered a lost and effort. He thought the American bombers a lost cause for daylight bombing and useless for night bombing. He definitely wasn't of a mindset for another Dieppe.
 
The Italians and other Axis minor powers were quite important additions to Axis strength and their loss was sorely felt, even if the combat power was limited. Still the divisions you're talking about in the Balkans and Aegean were mostly static 3rd rate divisions only meant to hold coastline, not be deployed for major combat operations in the East. They were in fact worse than the Luftwaffe field divisions. As to the 5th Panzer army I think they're going to have to be deployed to hold even Western Libya, but then run into the very serious issue of supply with Malta astride their LOC. The most likely thing that happens is the Germans are too scared of an invasion of France without Torch to deploy to Libya and the Italians and Germans are rolled up and wiped out without reinforcement. Losing Libya then has the problem of allowing convoys to start again and take a huge burden off of Allied shipping:
HyperWar: HyperWar: War at Sea 1939-1945, Vol. II: The Period of Balance (UK--History of the Second World War)


Assuming then Libya is lost with the Africa Corps and Italian forces, then there will still need to be forces deployed to hold Sicily and Sardinia from the Germans to ensure Italy stays in the war. Beyond that whatever is not sent still needs to stay in France in case of invasion which means the 5th Panzer army including HG Division. Likely all the savings from the losses of 1942-43 that are avoided in this scenario then stay in France to defend it against a cross channel invasion.

The losses inflicted on the LW only need to be done where the Germans must fight, which means in France. They can be attritioned to death fighting over the beachheads or defending French infrastructure rather than over Germany. The P-40s, Spit VIII, and P-38 can do the job just as they did in the Mediterranean against the superior Fw190 and Me109F/G in 1942-43. As to supply issues, remember the Allied air forces in Britain in 1944 were bigger than all of the combined airpower available in 1944 and they were able to supply that and by May 1943 the Uboats had been defeated with new builds of transports exceeding losses since Autumn 1942. So they could and did supply even more aircraft and divisions out of Britain historically, so doing it in 1943 isn't really an issue. Supplying an advance off the beaches out of the Normandy region without the Mulberries is another story though.
 

There were a number of crises on the East Front where so called "coastal defence " divisions were sent to the East Front regardless of their status. The first one that calls to mind were in the crisis after the Soviet counteroffensives December 1941 through to March 1942. According to Nagorski and also Mitcham. Just because its easier to extract the data, Im going to use the data from GDWs "Unentschieden".

Between December 1941 and March 1942, the following Infantry Divs were pulled out of the Atlantic Wall defences and rushed to AGC to bolster the crumbling defences in that sector (units shown in brackets are withdrawals from the east):

Late December '41:

88th XX; this formation had extensive training elements along with 2 regts of line Infantry attached and an assortment of mostly captured artillery. It was short of wheeled transport. Artillery was at least normalised and they went into battle with between 60-75% authorised MT. They retained their two regt TOE but also had added either security detachment or a training detachment added. With the southern offensive of the following summer, it was necessary to strip the division of further MT and AT assets, and constant exposure to Soviet attrition tactics had reduced it to about 40% strength by December 1943, when it was encircled near Kiev.

216th XX: Consisted of Landwehr and garrsoned Poland during the Fall Gelb operations,. transferred to the Atlantic Wall and redesignated a "Coastal Div" in 1941. Throughout the Summer, it replaced many of its over age personell, but retained the two regt TOE of the garrison units. Transferred to the Eastern Front in that guise. It fought in many of the East front battles more or less in that TOE until losses forced it to be disbanded in late 1944.

225th XX: Another Landswehr Div with a similar form to the 216th, was designated a "Coastal Div" until December 1941, by which time its personnel age structures were normalised and the div hurriedly transferred to the East.

[162nd XX; Formed in January 1940], this formation had fought in the East from the beginning, but by December was in remannts. Its remaining personnel were brought back to Germany (initially) and then to the France, with some new fillers attached and to take over the training and security duties usiung the personnel left behind by other units transferring to the East.

Early January 1942

81st XX; Raised as a mobilization unit, it saw light combat in Fall Gelb, Remained in France on Coastal defence duties until late 41. It was almost immediately in action, even as it was de-training along the hard pressed and exposed northern flank of AGC. Despite being outflanked and then encircled at Tripelevo (as part of the Demyansk pocket) in January, it fought with distinction and held out against determined Soviet attacks. It was not relieved from this position until January 1943, and in the last 2 months of its encirclement destroyed over 170 Soviet tanks.

83rd XX; Raised as a mobilisation unit, it was used for LOC security duties in both Case white and Case Yellow. It remained in the Coastal sector of the Atlantic wall as a "Security Unit" until late '41. By then its personnel age structures had been more or less normalised and it hurriedly received some of the artillery authorised under its TOE as an infantry unit. As a security unit it was fairly well supplied with MT.

113th XX; Formed in Germany in October 1940, this formation remained in Germany as a reserve unit until late 41. It was lost at Stalingrad. It was held in Germany in reserve for two reasons, to assist in the trainng functions of the replacement army, and as a strategic reserve in case of an allied invasion. The emergency in December 1941 forced it to be transferred to the east regardless of the risk

208th XX; Formed on mobilisation in '39, it was lightly engaged in France. Its average age of the personnel at that time was 44yrs, but throughout 1940-41, the age structure of the division was normalised. It remained in the east for the remainder of the war.

246th XX; Formed in 1939 from mostly Hessian personnel, it fought in France when it assaulted frontally the Maginot line, with some success. After the formation of Vichy, it was sent back to Germany, but then was stationed in SW France to keep watch over the Vichy. It was a fully equipped unit. It left for Russia on January 3rd, but left behind its 313th III as a cadre for its replacement, picking 689th Ersatz III as it passed through Germany enroute. It was more or less immediately thrown into action where for more than three months it withstood repeated attacks by the Russian 22A. It was finally destroyed at Vitebsk in July 1944, as a result of Hitler's insane "stand fast" orders.

330th XX; Formed in October 1941 as a Coastal Defence unit, the 330th was short of MT and artillery at the time of its reassignment. It initially went into action at Demidov, where it withstood repeated attacks from the Soviet 4th Shock Army. It remained on the east front front line throughout 1942 and 1943, under the control of 9A mostly

203rd XX; Formed as a security bde for the protection of the coastal regions near the Atlantic wall, this formation was transferred to the east as a security unit, with no artilery (it had a few ATGs and basically 2 security Inf IIIs. It was finally reported as "in remnants" in March 1945, but likely was in that state for at least a year previously.

65th, 612th Ind Inf IIIs

605th, 619th Eng IIIs

Late January 1942;

211th XX;

218th XX;

331st XX

5 Jaeger XX; the Jaeger units were generally in the initial assaults as 3 regt formations but were withdrawn by September/October. most of them dropped the third Inf regt, and were then returned to the East in early 1942 with a heavier artillery park, which served them better than the initial experiences.

NDr SS Mot Bde; Dutch "Niederland" SS unit, I believe was stationed in the Netherlands before transfer in early 1942. this entry should be read as a composite of various foreign armies SS detachements that were formed and sent east at about this time

Early February 1942
22 Pz XX;

206th XX;

328th XX;

7th Gebirgjager XX;

Nor SS Inf Bde, 18 SS "Polizei" Bde, "Dirlewanger" SS Security Bde; these were SS formations of varying strengths and nationalities similar to the comments made above

686th, 693rd Ind Art IIIs, 10 Nebelwerfer III

"Sturm" Ind Para Bde,

1, 2, 3, 4, 5 LW Inf IIIs (taken from coastal Flak formations), these were generally fairly weak formations handed a rifle and sent into battle as cheap and expendable (and poorly trained) Infantry

Late February 1942
(Italian - from Coastal sector Med near the French Riviera)
"CR-Leg" Italian Inf III, "MC" Alpini ski Bn (not sure about the abbreviations used). These units belie their nationality. They were the creme de la creme of the italian army and were to fight with distinction.

(German)
329th XX

"Balbo" Cav III (not sure about this one)

Early March 1942
342 XX, first fought in Yugoslavia, was transferred to AGC in early March, nearly devoid of any MT, though with a full complement of Draft Animals (DA). The only such units to go into combat like this to date incidentally

8 Jaeger XX, the Jaeger units were generally in the initial assaults as 3 regt formations but were withdrawn by September/October. most of them dropped the third Inf regt, and were then returned to the East in early 1942 with a heavier artillery park, which served them better than the initial experiences.

51st 609th Sec IIIs; taken from the Coastal sector, NW France, they had been part of the Coastal sector defences. Im unsure of their fate.

14th LW Inf III (same as LW Inf units described above)

I apologise for not completing all of the entries here, but I think the point is well enough made. Far from being "unsuitable" for the east front operations, the erstaz, coastal, trainng, security, and all manner of other 2nd and 3rd line heer formations were readily transferred to the East as OKW dared to send them. What held them back, overwhelmingly wasnt a shortage of equipment, or at this stage of the war, even manpower, but rather a fear or concern about leaving the west undergarrisoned and vulnerable to a cross channel attack. If that threat was removed, contained, defeated, whatever, large amounts of thoise garrsion forces could be moved to the east where history shows they could and did, fight decisively at times
 
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