Airwar over France with no Operation Torch, instead 1943 invasion of France

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gjs238 said:
How did this compare with the US:Japenese?
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It depends on the situation. In open warfare, the standard Japanese Infantry Army (sort of a Corps strength unit) lacked the artillery firepower to fight a stand up fight against the western armies. Their armour in 1942 was equal to our own in quality, but Japanese armoured doctrine as a mass attack weapon was very poor. The japanese, however at the beginning of the war excelled at armoured warfare in the Jungle, or rough terrain.where the norm was to fight in small numbers.

In situations where the Japanese retained some semblance of a logistic support network, the lack of experience in the US field formations showed up very badly. When asked to engage in outright offensive warfare, such as at Gona and Sanananda, the US combat formations just fell apart, much as they did in Europe. We in the west have been brought up on an unhealthy and innaccurate view of the IJA based on a very narrow and quite unique experience on Guadacanal. One needs to look at the variable at work that led to the guadacanal fiasco. No reall suly, always short of food and ammunition, no real artillery support, attacking unsupported against a determined enemy well led and well dug in, at no stage attempting to really counterattack, in terrain heavily favouring the defence. This produced a predictably heavy defeat for the Japanese. Moreover for the remainder of the warthe US always ensured that battles against the Japanese that the defenders were well isolated and unsupported first, and then used their far superiuor firepower levels to blast out the defending Japanese. As straight up Infantry the Japanese were still superior, but in terms of supply and fire support they were just too ill-equipped to be competitive.

Give the Japanese a 6 month respite, not fight Midway, allow the Japanese time to organise their convoy systems and the story would be completely different.

There arent fpf comparisons that I know for the Japanese, though I bet they exist somewhere. But imagine if it were US formations attacking at Guadacanal and Japanese with the secure supply lines and dug in. Instead of fighting doggedly for 4 months as the Japanese did, I give a US formation in a similar situation about a fortnight......
 
Good old Wikepedia! The devil is in the detail. I said that the landings were largely unopposed. At Algiers there was NO significant resistance on any of the beaches. Two destroyers attempting to land US Ranger to prevent sabotage of the port etc at the Port of Algiers did meet significant resistance. Nonetheless a local ceasefire was in place by the afternoon of the 8th.

At, or rather around, Oran there was resistance from French naval forces, but again the landings were largely unopposed. The weather and unexpected shallowness of the unsurveyed beaches was a bigger problem than the French.There was some fierce fighting on the road from Azeu to Oran and at La Senia airfield as well as elsewhere post landing.

At Casablanca there was a significant naval battle (100 of the nearly 500 KIA were lost on USS Joseph Hewes alone, another 74 were lost on troopships sunk by U-130 on the 11th, long after the initial landings) but only on one occasion were the landing craft themselves engaged, by the French destroyer Milan. Casablanca itself surrendered shortly before the American attack without a shot being fired.

This thread isn't about 'Torch' and I'll leave it at that

Cheers

Steve
 
The Med had to be cleared to enable shipping though there via the Suez canal, that saved as much as 2 million tons of shipping, without which an invasion of France was impossible.

To do that NA and Sicily had to be invaded (plus it built up desperately needed experience). Italy is a moot point and you can argue either way on that one. From a convoy air protection point of view Malta, Sicily and NA were enough to guarantee that.

At that point the western allies shipping situation was critical, the U-Boats had their peak success and the US shippng production had not yet come fully on-line.

The logistic requirements for the build of forces for the D-Day invasion were immense (with the US bomber requirements added), plus the needed extra requirements to supply them in France itelf. The Pacific and USSR needs also drained shippng.
The western allies simpy didn't have enough then.
Plus the German forces were just too strong, it needed more time for the USSR to grind them down more.
 

Thats what a couple of us have been saying. A Normandy invasion didn't take place in 1942 or 1943 because of this very issue.
 

Re-read the order of battle and the force structure of August 1942 at Guadalcanal to re-examine that premeise. You have no real facts to back that supposition up regarding the poor fighting will and resolve of US troops at Guadalcanal - or thereafter. Kasserine Pass is your only supporting example of poor behavior of US troops under massive attack scenario.
 

Examples that come to mind in 1942 are Buna, Gona and Sanananda, where the americans were fighting on a more or less even playing field against the Japanese, alongside the units of the AIF and also militia units of the Australian Army. Australians referred to them (the Americans) as 'chocos', literally that they melted in any sort of heat. it was a valid criticism at the time.

Macarthur had not worked out his island hopping strategy in 1942. In fact it was a solution more or less forced on him by the resources allocated to his cartwheel strategy in 1943, and the refusal by the chif supplier of ground troops in the TO, the Australian Army, to bow to his unimaginative direct frontal assault tactics. we had to. we did not have the manpower to be quite that haphazard.

Monty has nothing to do with American Army battle performance in the Pacific, neither does Monty have anything to do with the Australians and their relative success in the same TO. you need to compare apples to apples here, and a better comparison would be harder to find than two armies fighting side by side, one eventually achieving forward movement and solving the problems, and the other sitting on the side of the track totally unreliable and unable to rise to the challenge.

The allies, particularly the Americans, learnt from this. many of their units were pulled out of the line and spent time learning the tricky science of jungle warfare at the Australian army's Jungle Warfare centre at Canungra and also at Townsville, receiving critical training in what to do and what not to do when faced by Japanese infiltration tactics.

The following are extracts from The Bloody Beachheads – The Battles of Gona, Buna and Sanananda, November 1942 – January 1943, James Brien, AWM Scholar 2013.

On 20 November, MacArthur told Blamey that "all columns will be driven through to the objectives regardless of losses". The next day he told General Harding to "take Buna today at all costs". Such reckless and ill-informed orders continued when MacArthur replaced Harding with General Robert Eichelberger to hasten the capture of Buna. He informed Eichelberger that:

I want you to remove all officers who won't fight. Relieve regimental and battalion commanders if necessary, put sergeants in charge of battalions and corporals in charge of companies –anyone who will fight. Time is of the essence, the Japs might land reinforcements any night. I want you to take Buna or not come back alive.

On 24 December MacArthur issued another unreasonable order to Eichelberger at Buna, that he should be attacking "by regiments, not companies, by thousands not hundreds". This shows a complete ignorance of the tactical situation on the ground, not to mention the disposition and capabilities of the US ground forces at the time.

While the campaign began optimistically, it soon became clear that the Japanese defenders were not prepared to relinquish the beachheads, and were generally superior soldiers to the inexperienced Americans. Constantly under pressure, battalion commanders were forced to push their already exhausted troops into battle with little preliminary intelligence, no time for reconnaissance, and without adequate supplies. They were not able to follow standard operating procedures, to concentrate their forces or be provided with adequate fire support for the operations they were undertaking. In most cases, units were committed to piecemeal frontal assaults against well-concealed strongpoints manned by experienced and well led defenders. The battle experience of the AIF units could not save them from a terrible rate of casualties, while the inexperienced American National Guardsmen received a brutal and bloody baptism of fire for little or no material gains. Infantry would attack shortly after a preliminary artillery or air bombardment, but this pattern was frequently repeated and the Japanese defenders came to recognise it. They would seek shelter out of the fire and then reoccupy the forward positions in time to meet the Australian attacks. The lack of experience meant that it was the Australian formations who shouldered the majority of offensive actions. When the infantry reached the Japanese defences they had usually sustained too many casualties to hold the position, and there were rarely reserves to bring up. …..American forces were on hand but could not be relied upon to hold the ground so bloodily won by the Australian forces.

Success at Gona came on 8 December, when Honner's 39th Battalion did not follow the pattern laid down before. Honner used a delay in his attack to scout an approach through jungle which led right up to the Japanese

The American National Guardsmen were not well trained or prepared for the tasks that faced them along the beachhead front. They were generally outclassed by their Japanese opponents in open battle.


The Japanese defenders combined this fanatical resistance with numerous clever ploys which thwarted the Allies for the duration of the campaign. They were experts at the use of terrain and the construction and camouflage of their bunkers. The defenders moved between these positions using shallow crawl trenches to change firing positions, giving the impression that there was overwhelming fire power deployed against the attackers. The Japanese
also exploited the terrain by positioning snipers in the treetops. These snipers had a commanding view of the battlefield and were able to pick off high value targets like officers and machine-gunners. The attachment of 70mm Infantry gun support directly to the battalion ToE was a master stroke that immediately gave their Bn commanders an in built firepower advantage.

The untried American troops had suffered heavily, learnt a great deal, but not achieved much in the actual battle. Casualties in their limited fighting role amounted to 687 men killed in action and 1,918 wounded, surprisingly heavy given their limited combat exposure and effectiveness.
 
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Is this a complaint against US strategy to attack in strength and bypass when possible and starve the isolated Japanese? Or should the US (and Allies always choose to attack when odds were not in favor or a low casualty achievement?
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neither, because it is based on a false premise. The Americans in 1942 had not fully worked out the "wither on the vine" strategy, much less marry it into their battlefield tactics. The Americans in 1942 were still firmly wedded to the concept of bringing superior firepower, concentration of force and direct confrontation to destroy the war making potential of the opponent. only when confronted with the severe limits of manpower and other resources, and the quiet refusal by the Australians to put their army through such a meat grinder were they forced to think differently. confronted with their own lack of success in the jungle they realised that the only important things in the jungle were the airfields, and anchorages. isolate an objective, smother it with firepower, concentrate your own forces to achieve a local superiority and then blast the enemy out of existence. These were tactics worked out only after the 1942 experiences.

IJA failed at Guadalcanal as Straight Up Infantry with superior numbers and temporarily better logistics. The Aussies defeated them in the Owen Stanley range. What were the IJA superior to?
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There are so many misconceptions here, its hard to know where to start. The Japanese in their fight in PNG were not defeated by the Australians so much as they were defeated by the terrain and the breakdown of their logistic system. 8500 men of the SSF went ashore but by the time they were stopped they were down to under 1000 effectives, against around 5000-6000 Australians on that ridge.

in Guadacanal, the Japanese were defeated as much by the collapse of their supply system and the terrain as they were by the defenders. The Americans as defenders fought well but defending, from prepared positions, against an unsupported enemy, is not a level playing field on which to assess the relative capabilities of each army.
 
Re-read the order of battle and the force structure of August 1942 at Guadalcanal to re-examine that premeise. You have no real facts to back that supposition up regarding the poor fighting will and resolve of US troops at Guadalcanal - or thereafter
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All I said about guadacanal was that it was not a level playing field on which to judge the fighting capabilities of the japanese army. One marine div is also not representative of the overall capabilities of the US forces at that time.

This is not a critique of the American Army as such, merely that studies have been done for battlefield performance in Europe, but not (that im aware of) for the pacific.
 
parsifal said:
Their armour in 1942 was equal to our own in quality, but Japanese armoured doctrine as a mass attack weapon was very poor.
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Their armor in 1942 was nowhere near the US's. namely because they had no need for anything over a light tank.

The japanese, however at the beginning of the war excelled at armoured warfare in the Jungle, or rough terrain.where the norm was to fight in small numbers.
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The IJA rarely used tanks in the jungles because they had no logistical support for them. And the few times they did use them (Mariana's and Peleliu) , they were torn to pieces.



For 1942, the Marines did fine at Guadalcanal. The Army at Buna. In 1943, the situation was reversed. In Europe, Kasserine Pass was a seminal event for the USA. Wholesale changes in tactics and leadership turned things around in short order and the results were seen at Sicily and Italy. In 1943 in the Pacific, there were no places where the IJA had logistics in place to support the offensive, so they were dug in on defense. Where the USA and marines did fine until the end of the war.

We in the west have been brought up on an unhealthy and innaccurate view of the IJA based on a very narrow and quite unique experience on Guadacanal. One needs to look at the variable at work that led to the guadacanal fiasco.
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Fiasco? Say's whom? At the end of the campaign, we had won. With far longer supply lines than the Japanese. And had beaten them in three major divisional sized attacks. And did you know that in warfare, there is no such thing as a fair fight?

Give the Japanese a 6 month respite, not fight Midway, allow the Japanese time to organise their convoy systems and the story would be completely different.
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. But they didnt because they couldnt.


And you base this on what? The performance of a couple of National Guard divisions with mediocre logistics support for a few months in 1942? There are lots of examples to prove you wrong with that silly assertion.
 
Their armor in 1942 was nowhere near the US's. namely because they had no need for anything over a light tank.
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The US heavy armoured div TOE, of which just two were raised, were authorised from the 15 November 1940, but the first of the units themselves were not ready until March 1942, and even then at less than 50% authorised TOE, with equipment such as Grants and Stuarts that were not the equal of the Shinhoto Chi Ha tanks then in service with the IJA. As I said they were about equal in 1942. By the end of that year, there was no comparison.


The IJA rarely used tanks in the jungles because they had no logistical support for them. And the few times they did use them (Mariana's and Peleliu) , they were torn to pieces.
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Tanks were thought totally unsuitable in the Jungle until the Japanese pioneered their use. They were used to some effect in the Phillipines, Malaya, Burma, Milne Bay, Buna that I know of.



Never claimed that the US did not fight well on Guadacanal. But in other places, not so well. My point about Guadcanal is that it is not a representative sample of either japanese, or US fighting qualities, for opposite reasons.

I agree that after 1942, the Americans defeated the dug in positions on the atolls by the use of overwhelming firepower. What does this prove? Give the US forces fpf advantages of 6 or 8:1 and they might win. i dont have any argument with that. in situations whee they could not do that, such as on the Phillipinnes 1945, Biak, Palau and even Okinawa, all of which are battles after 1942, and therefore outside the parameters, and the US could struggle .


Fiasco? Say's whom? At the end of the campaign, we had won. With far longer supply lines than the Japanese. And had beaten them in three major divisional sized attacks. And did you know that in warfare, there is no such thing as a fair fight?
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Read the comment again. Fiasco, absolutely.....for the Japanese (doh!). In relation to the last comment, of course, but that is not the purpose of this discussion. The question is what firepower advantage the US (and allied) forces needed to make progress. In Europe, in 1942, how far will the US forces get against dug in German positions @ 3:1. Id suggest, nowhere, except dead and defeated. In the Pacific, what advantages were needed to defeat determined and prepred Japanase positions. You are suggesting it was easy, with the US forces barely working up a sweat to do it. Id suggest differently out of respect for the enormous effort needed to defeat the Japanese in the pacific.

But they didnt because they couldnt.
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I agree. Though my reason for the "Couldnt" is because of materiel shortages.

And you base this on what? The performance of a couple of National Guard divisions with mediocre logistics support for a few months in 1942? There are lots of examples to prove you wrong with that silly assertion
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US forces in PNG were significantly larger than on Guadacanal (edit: there is a differene of opinion on this point. based on unit deployments alone im correct, based on troop numbers, no. max deployment strength on guadacanal for US forces reached 55000 at peak, whereas maximum mUS force commitment in the buna battles only topped about 38000. its a moot point I guess). But here we are basing US army performance on the lesser sized campaign. Why not dismiss the Guadacanal success in the same way? There arent many other experiences to draw from Im afraid in the PTO, unless we want to look at the earlier efforts. Later on we have New Georgia, then Lae, New Georgia was a strictly limited affair, and at Lae US ground forces involvement as limited to 1 or 2 regiments. Better performance, but still small scale.

What example, in 1942, can you name, other than Guadacanal and Buna for the US forces in the PTO? Burma? Philipinnes? Guam?, Wake? Any others?
Im not making claims for any period after 1942, so id very much like to hear about "lots of examples" pertinent to the original premise, namely, US army combat readiness in 1942. Silly assertions indeed!
 
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Here are some pretty good quality analyses of Japanese armoured usage in 1942. no country in 1942 could field a divisional sized armoured unit in the PTO, so necessarily we need to look at small unit actions for the most part. For the first half of 1942 it was almost exclusively a Japanese deployment, though there were exceptions.

Japanese armour in the NEI

The Japanese Armoured Units in the Dutch East Indies 1941-1942

A general account of IJA tank tactics and armour
https://books.google.com.au/books?i...#v=onepage&q=Japanese armour in 1942&f=false

British tanks in the far east

Singapore:

The British had the 100th Independent Squadron, RAC in Singapore, equipped with Mk IV and Mk VI Light Tanks. These were no match for the weight of Japanese armour sent against them, however. The Malays also had a squadron of Lanchester Armoured Cars, while the Indian 3rd Light Cavalry were equipped with Marmon-Herrington Armoured Cars. However, the 3rd LC do not seem to have managed to get the M-Hs unloaded from their ship and fought instead as motorised infantry. The Australians however, managed to get their hands on some India Pattern MkII Wheeled Armoured Carriers.

Hong Kong:

No tanks, but the HKVDC had a very active squadron of Lanchester armoured cars and a squadron of Carriers (the Indians and Royal Scots also had some Carriers), against which the invading Japanese had very little defence, having lost the bulk of their antitank guns during the landing

Burma (1942 - the Japanese Invasion):

There were initially no tanks in Burma, though the Burma Auxiliary Force had a squadron of antiquated Rolls Royce India Pattern Armoured Cars. However, the 7th Armoured Brigade soon arrived in Rangoon (straight from North Africa) and performed sterling service throughout the long retreat to the Chindwin. The brigade was equipped with two regiments of Stuart, plus a 25pdr battery and an antitank battery, though it was hampered by a near-complete lack of 37mm HE ammo and the fact that the thirsty Stuarts required rather specialised aviation fuel.

7th Armoured Brigade made short work of their initial armoured opposition at Pegu (five Type 95 Ha Go light tanks of the Japanese 2nd Armoured Regiment that had survived the long march from Thailand), though the balance was redressed once the Japanese gained air superiority and was tipped even further when they took Rangoon and landed their reinforcement army, which included the 1st 14th Tank Regiments, plus a number of independent tankette companies and armoured cavalry squadrons. The Japanese also rapidly made use of captured Stuarts.

7th Armoured Brigade managed to reach the Chindwin with over seventy Stuarts, but only managed to successfully ferry one of them across the river. This surviving Stuart, named 'The Revenge of Scotland' actually returned across the Chindwin in 1945, minus its turret, as the command tank for an Indian Light Cavalry Regiment. The remaining tanks were 'scuttled' reasonably successfully, with only a few being recovered by the Japanese. Five of these recovered Stuarts later fought at Imphal in 1944, where they formed the 5th Company of the Japanese 14th Tank Regiment (along with a freshly-captured 3rd Carabiniers' Lee).

Burma 1942/43 - the First Arakan Campaign:

A single regiment of Valentines from 50th Indian Tank Brigade (I think it was 150th RAC?) was involved in Irwin's disastrous Arakan offensive. Only a single half-squadron saw any action.

India/Burma 1943-45:

With the elevation of Slim to command 14th Army, three Indian Armoured Brigades were placed in direct support. These details are from memory, but the full details are available on that Fire Fury Games link above (which I wrote, but can't access here from work):

50th Indian Tank Brigade supported XV Corps on the Arakan Coast, though was never committed to battle as a unified brigade due to the very difficult, swampy nature of the Arakan coastal strip. It had a regiment each of Stuart, Lee and Sherman, with each regiment being committed to battle in rotation - Lee/Grants in the Second Arakan Campaign, Shermans in the Third Arakan Campaign and Stuarts in between. XV Corps also had the use of the 81st West African Recce Regiment (Carriers and LRCs) under direct command while 81st Div was engaged on light infantry operations in the Kaladan Valley.

254th Indian Armoured Brigade supported IV Corps at Imphal and was equipped with (if I recall) two regiments of Lee/Grant and a regiment of Stuarts. IV Corps also had at least one regiment of armoured cars at all times, though other regiments came and went (equipped with Daimlers, Humbers or occasionally both, as well as Dingos and dismountable elements in Carriers and/or Jeeps). There were also armoured replacement squadrons (each of 5 tanks) at the Dimapur depot, which were rushed into action when the Japanese cut the Imphal-Dimapur road at Kohima.

255th Indian Armoured Brigade was assigned to XXXIII Corps, which spent a long time sitting around in India (with the amphibious assualt divisions - 2nd 36th), waiting for the planned Operation 'Dracula' - the reconquest of Malaya. However, 'Dracula' never came and XXXIII Corps was transferred to the Imphal theatre of operations, to spearhead the pursuit of the defeated Japanese armies into Burma. The brigade had two Sherman regiments and an armoured car/recce regiment.

After disastrous beginnings, the British/Indian armour supporting 14th Army proved itself time and time again. Its finest hour came in 1945, when 255th Indian Armoured Brigade and 17th Indian Division launched their 'Blitzkrieg' actross the Irrawaddy and thrust deep into the central Burmese plain, taking the city of Meiktila, cutting the Japanese Burma Area Army in two and then launching armoured operations out from the city, defeating each of the counter-attacking Japanese divisions in detail, one after the other, in a battle of 'interior lines' reminiscent of Frederick the Great or Napoleon at their best.
 
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If you define the US offensive competence for only 1942, I will concur to some of your outlandish claims. The German army was the best in the world that year and would have mauled any US force. In the PTO, The IJA was proven to not be the supermen you seem to give credit to. The USMC proved that at Guadalcanal. And the USA did well in New Guinea once the tactics of the IJA being on the defense were figured out.
 
what major land campaigns did the US undertake independantly in PNG, not including the amphibious assaults. I can think of one, Nadzab, a rather specialised and limited committment as it was. Another was the assault on Hollandia, where on the 22 April 1944 the 24th and 41st Divisions were involved in one of the most successful US army operations of the war.

After the bitter experiences at buna and Gona for US army, they never committed anything larger than a RCT to New Guinea. The so called "minor affair" at buna was their biggest divisional sized operation they ever committed to in New Guinea until well into 1944. They seemed to struggle with the necessities behind aggressive patrolling in the jungle and couldnt prise themselves from the ideas about overwhelming firepower in the truly jungle campaigns until well after the war. This led to a certain sluggishness in their rates of advance at times.

US victory was closley linked to its bypass strategy that was gradually developed in 1943. The Americans worked out that it wasnt necessary to comprehensively defeat the Japanese army , their best bet was to concentrate on the key point and overcome them with overwhelming firepower. This does not suggest or indicate a massively superior army. It suggests an army with control of the air and sea, giving it massive mobility and firepower advantages. Combined with massively greater logistical advantages, the issue became inevitable. Full marks to the Americans for that, but in post war analyses this has been extrapolated to suggest the US army was this massive unstoppable battlefield weapon that could demolish its opposition. Truth is somewhat less impressive than that. The US army was competent and effective, but it was never the massive steamroller its made out to be at least on the battlefield. its advantages lay elsewhere, In open combat, it could struggle at times, and the IJA remained a competent dangerous foe until the end. Thats not saying they were supermen. If you want a discussion about Japanese failures, we could write a book about that....i never claimed the jpanaese to be unstoppable, just better than they are often portrayed to be, and at times hard to defeat . We are analysing American failures and limitations as a field force, concentrating on 1942. but to the very end, the US army, like the British army fought with some severe limits on its capability.

Calling the German Army the finest in the world for the whole war is also fraught with danger. The Germans at the end of the war were basically an armed rabble, but still able to place significant checks on its opponents at times, mostly because of allied limitations rather than german capability. In 1942 it was at the peak of its game, but the quality of its army as a field force also had its limits, as its experiences in front of Stalingrad and other places clearly shows.
 
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Admiralties - 1st Cav division

Aitape - 1 RCT

Hollandia - 24th and 41st divisions

Aitape (battle) - 32nd division + 1 RGT

Biak - 41st Div + 1 RGT

Morotai - 31st Div + 1 RGT

Macarthurs 6th Army had several divisions available through out 1943 and 1944. But due to the demands of shipping, he could only use one or two divisions at any given time with the others in occupation duty while awaiting their turn. Which was perfectly fine for the nature of the battles in PNG. By fall of 1944, he had multiple divisions in action in the PI in which is was now a true "army group" in the battle.

This does not account for US divisions in action in New Georgia, New Britain or Bougainville. Nor USMC divisions in action in the Solomons.
 
thanks. I should have checked a little more carefully. Having said that, and purely as a technicality, none of the examples you quote quite fit the parameters of our discussion. Moratai is an island in the halmerheras, part of the NEI, not part of NG. biak is an island off the north coast of current Irian Jaya, also part of the NEI. Aitape and Hollandia were both outside PNG, but admittedly on the island of New Guinea.

The admiralties was under Australian administration before the war, but was an island, where firepower could be concentrated in a way it could not in a regular land campaign. 35000 US Army personnel were needed to subdue 4000 Japanese defenders, in terms of simple odds that's over 8:1.

Hollandia was a great victory for the US, but it doesn't prove its massive battle superiority at all. Over 50000 men were committed to the battle, to subdue about 8000 defenders, of which about 800 were combat troops. at 50000:8000, the basic odds needed for the victory is 6:1+

At biak, 15000 US troop were needed to subdue 10500 Japanese defenders. Casualties were heavy. the Japanese lost 6100 dead, of which nearly all should be considered battle casualties. US losses amounted to 3000 (500 killed) and a further 3500 serious disease related casualties. Sure, the ratio of dead is heavily in favour of the US, but whereas escape and recovery was an option for the Allies, it was not an option for the Japanese. more than half the japanese casualties were suicides, or men who were already wounded. Whilst the US "won" its hard for me to view Biak as a victory of any substance. Pyrrhic victory perhaps.

Aitape is impossible to analyse in this way, since a significant, I think dominant, role was played by the Australian Army fighting alongside the US forces. 13000 combat personnel were committed to the battle on the Allied side, against an estimated 35000 sick, debilitated and starving Japanese defenders . The Japanese are known to have lost over 9000 men, to the allied losses of about 1500 men. hard to see how this is a representative battle showing the relative fighting skills of each opposing army, when the the Japanese are so poorly supplied

Moratai saw over 57200 ground troops used in the initial landings, to subdue just 500 defenders. Odds of more than 100:1 .....


Disregarding the very substantial help the US army received earlier, these battle selections are revealing. it took 135200 US soldiers (some of that number fighting more than one battle) to defeat 58500 Japanese defenders. Despite all the advantages weve previously argued about, it still required a numerical advantage of 2.32:1 to defeat a foe clearly on the rope as far as supply and mobility was concerned.

I don't see this claimed massive (qualitative) superiority at all. How do those odds, and those circumstance compare to the land battles the US was immersed in in the ETO. ETO casualties for the US were much higher, we know that, but what were the typical odds ratios they were exposed to in their battles across france for instance.
 
so, to try and be as objective as I can, I thought I might try and select three random battles in the ETO to try and make some sort of comparison of the relative strengths of the heer vis a viz the US Army. We would need to develop this analysis a little further to consider the possibilities of a 1942 or 43 cross channel attack, but for the moment im just curious about doing a rough comparison of US combat effectiveness versus the alleged german effectiveness

first battle ive selected was the battle of Nancy, fought in September 1944, between three divs of US XII Corps (4th armoured, 35th and 80th inf XXs) and German 47 pz XXX, consisting of 3 PG, 557th VG XXs and two regts

It was a 10 day battle. Casualties were 2800 US to just under 5000 germans, killed, wounded or captured. The capture of Nancy provided the Allies an important communications center in France and the city later served as the garrison of U.S. 3rd Army Headquarters. The German defenders of Nancy, however, largely escaped the encirclement of the city and were available for further operations during the Lorraine Campaign. The XII Corps' successful assault across the Moselle around Nancy also prompted the subsequent German counter-attack at Arracourt by the 5. Panzerarmee. unfortunately, ive not been abale to nail the troop numbers , but my rough guess is about 100-110000 US : 30-35000 Germans, or around 2.85:1 to 3.66;1 in favour of the Us forces. remarkably similar to the odds we found against the Japanese

In January 1944, the Us 36th Inf Xx, a Texan National guard unit, considered well experienced, with combat in both NA and Sicily, assaulted a well prepared position held by 15 PG XX. it was a difficult river crossing undertaken at divisional strength (but only 4000 who actually crossed the Rapido). In a bloody 2 day battle, the 36th suffered at least 2000 (permanent) casualties to about 500 German. The combat odds for the forces actually engaged were about 1:3 against the American forces.

In st lo and vicinity, July 1944, 2500 US tanks took on 190 german tanks organised into 3 inf divs and 5 mech divs at cadre strength. 8 more or less full strength US divs attacked and achieved a vital break through at St Lo. They were heavily supported by airforces. in an area measuring no more than 6000yds x 2500 yds, 3000 bombers, including 1800 heavies unloaded on the defenders. Despite these massive advantages, and undeniable success, actual losses were quite heavy for the US forces, about 1800 killed, to something like 500 Germans (we just don't have reliable figures on german losses however, so it could well be more)
 
So whats your point? The Germans provided the best infantry men of the war. The Japanese were the worst. The US way of war was firepower.

You can take anyone off the streets. Show him how to operate a machine gun, put him in a fortified position, and that same person could hold off dozens of well experienced soldiers.

Every army of the war had its fine moments and sub par moments.

As battles go in the SW Pacific (NG or the Solomons), there were three division vs division battles where the US came on top because of great soldiers and doctrine.
 
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Perhaps this comparisons are materail for another thread?

I've posted this before, the availablility of Flak for German armed forces; most of the heavy Flak was located West of Poland.
 

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The Battle of St. LO isn't a very good example to use for comparison.

That's the battle where the USAAF heavy bombers bombed our own troops, 2 days in a row. About 200 of those deaths, and I don't know how many tanks lost due to those friendly fire incidents. Lt. Gen. McNair was one of those deaths.
And then they decided to go on with the original attack plan, after they'd given the Germans 2 days warning.
Not exactly the US Army's finest moment.
 
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