B-17 vs. He-177 vs. Lancaster

B-17 or He 177 or Lancaster


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I don't disagree with your points and I would love to see a detailed breakdown of Operation Steinbock, but the two main differences are obviously:-

a) Range, these are all a lot further than 50 miles away from Allied lines unlike French Coast to London
b) The frequency with which the bombers found the targets.

The loss ratio is impressive but not a fair comparison with Steinbock, as by the end of 1944 German defences were under huge pressures from fuel etc, unlike British defences in early 1944.
 
Yes, some Lancasters retrofitted with Rose-Rice Turrets late '44 and production switched to FN 82 turrets with or without AGLT ("Village Inn") fire control radars. Both turrets fitted with 2 x .5s but with much reduced ammunition supplies.

The Rose R No 2 turret.



...and the Fraser Nash FN82 turret.

 
Some more information on the Rose turret from the June 1980 (!) edition of Air International...

The turret was big enough to accommodate 2 gunners; see second picture,
 

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I tossed a coin between B17 and Lancaster, B17 won.
I studied the thread for upward firing the guns I knew the Luftwaffe fitted to exploit the blind spot on the Lancaster, and found it at the end, I didn't know the name of it.
I know a very few Lancaster's did have a ball turret below, that would suggest it was needed.....so the Lancaster was a good ship spoilt for a Pennies worth of tar?
The heavily B17 on the other hand was supposed to be able to look after it self but was taking unsustainable losses in daylight raids until the Mustang was developed to fly with it.
For this purpose I'd deem the Mustang an extension of the B17.
If a gunner was a look out first on the Lancaster then it should have carried one below.
 
Heh Kurfürst
on the table in Appendix 2 in the Griel's and Dressel's book the specs to different protos and production machines
for all three He 177A-3 versions (/R1, /R2 and /R3) max speed is given as 480km/h, Cruising speed as 410km/h, that for A-5/R2 was 440 max and 380 cruising and A-5/R-7 as 520 and 440km/h but A-5/R-7 had reduced/much reduced armament (the book gives 2 different armament specs to A-5/R7). And in Eric Brown's Wings of the Luftwaffe He 177A-5 specs are given as following Max speed at max loaded weight 440km/h at 5700m, how it happened to be the same as that for A-5/R2 in Griel's and Dressel's book with same armament than given in Brown's book.
Browm gives also the speed at 80% max loaded weight as 487km/h at 5700m.

Griel's and Dressel's book gives 510km/h max speed for V9 and V14 ie for a couple prototypes.

And explanation for 565 km/h. From A. Price He 177 Profile.
After turning towards London at 17.000ft halfway between Wash and London...crews dropped bombs over London at 15500ft and after that continued their descent at appr. 600ft per min and by such means we able to keep up speeds of over 350mph during their withdrawal phase…The bombers crossed the French coast at Boulogne at an altitude of 2500ft. So 565 km/h is a speed attained during A LONG SHALLOW DIVE. One can find the same also from Griel's and Dressel's book.

Those speed 600-650km/h were attained in a bit steeper dive, one can look that for ex. Price's Luftwaffe Handbook. I wonder why to post max speeds attained in dive without clearly stating that they were speed attained in dive.

"note the change in subject from max bombload and range at 7 tons carried of the He 177 to what aircraft carried in given raids.

Of course. If a plane could carry 7 tons, it could carry less, too."

If you sometimes bothered to read on subject on question, 4 t was a load for average service pilots, some experienced pilots could took of with higher t/o weights but IMHO what counts was the load average service pilot could deliver.

"I will have to ignore you on this board from now on."
Oh, nice to hear that, much appraised! And not surprising, I'm not mind if you want to continue your rosy dreams.

Juha
 
That is intereting, 400mi range at maximum load.

Taking off from Bordeaux at that weight, the He177 could barely reach the English coast. I reality it could maybe reach Tours and be able to return to Bordeaux.
 

In brief, the popular books list all sorts of specs for the plane, there`s only one thing common, and that is that the power output used, the altitude, loading it refers to is rather obscure. Groehler, for example, lists the A-5 at 565 km/h.

I wouldn`t put much faith in Griehl`s accompanying text and specs. They have proven to be most unreliable in cases, ie. Griehl/Drassel on one of their books appearantly believes things like the 109K-8 with the MK 103, K-10, K-12 and K-14 being delivered in 'small numbers' in the 'closing months of the war'.

Which is pure hogwash of course.


Compare with :

So 565 km/h is a speed attained during A LONG SHALLOW DIVE. One can find the same also from Griel's and Dressel's book.

Reading comprehension troubles, appearantly.

Alfred Price - appearantly qoting Greif crews? - notes over 350mph/565kph were kept up during shallow dives. You would wonder if they specify that 350 mph... and why speeds over 350 mph could be reached in shallow dives. Why not 300... or 330?


Those speed 600-650km/h were attained in a bit steeper dive, one can look that for ex. Price's Luftwaffe Handbook. I wonder why to post max speeds attained in dive without clearly stating that they were speed attained in dive.

Because that would be a lie, and that`s appearantly your department, see above.

If you sometimes bothered to read on subject on question, 4 t was a load for average service pilots,

Source for that please.

"I will have to ignore you on this board from now on."
Oh, nice to hear that, much appraised!

I certainly I won`t miss this frustrated ruckuss. So please consider yourself ignored from now on, and please note that also means I will not respond if you start your barking at me next time only point out that you have a short memory or trouble understanding what 'being ignored' means.

And not surprising, I'm not mind

Well, THAT is certainly the last thing I would accuse you with.

Cheerio.
 
Kurfürst
350mph=c. 565kmh, very simple!
Why that speed, probably tried to make life as difficult as possible to British night-fighters. Again simple.
4t sources already given.

And there are some text on Oper Steinbock
for ex Ken Wakefield's article in The Blitz then and Now and according to it
in Jan loss rate was 7,8%, 57a/c lost
in Feb 5,2%, 72a/c
in March 8,3% , 75a/c
in April 8,7%, 75a/c

so the operation seemed to be a disaster to LW bomber arm, as has been claimed.

Juha
 
Off-topic type of start but as i have commented on other threads the Steinbock raids were an unwise decision that further contributed to dramatize the situation of Germany´s dwindling resources (fuel -precious-, pilots/crews/groundcrews/, raw materials, aviation labor force, etc)....i however will agree with Kurfurst the Steinbock raids are yet to be fully researched and published. Other than the classical allied prescription of "utter failure" and "repulsed with catastrophic losses" we do not come across any indepth analysis.

I will agree the Luftwaffe achieved little if anything but something´s missing about such episode

In the dozens of books i have about aerial warfare in the ETO, the Steinbock raids deserve only a few lines or paragraphs. Something that i could compare with Luftflotte 4 -under von Richtofen- devastating bombing raids against soviet oil facilities in Grozny during the advance to the Caucasus...hardly known, hardly mentioned yet brutally successful taking minimum losses (less than 1% of bomber force committed).

In this type of threads there will always be this sort of automatic tendency to consider the Allied hardware the best.

I am sure the He 177 was a very fine craft with lots of potential -and not necessarily more technical problems than the B-29- but saw service in limited numbers and did not have any chance for making any measurable contribution in favor of Germany´s war effort.

I have studied operations of KG 40 and KG 100 in the past -two units that used the He 177 in operations- and their loss ratio seemed anything but "catastrophic". In fact, and as i seem to recall, loss rate for the B-29 is worse: a total of ~1,950 ships delivered losing ~650 from all causes...consider timeframes for B-29 operations in the PTO and the result ain´t very flattering: first bombing runs were flown from India and China (June 1944); first combat missions flown in the Pacific did not occur until late 1944 (October) involving B-29s based in the Marianas...during said period of time the Japanese aerial forces of the time were in real poor shape, nowhere near close to the type of fighter opposition faced by the 8th and 15th AFs in the ETO during the same time. Of the approximate ~650 B-29´s lost in operations, something around ~120 were due to enemy action, less than 25% of the total losses...this leaves a 75% of losses due to causes other than enemy actions: accidents, technical problems...could this lead us to assume the B-29 was not as good as portrayed?

Correct me if necessary but while i could not mention details on the matter, there were some technical problems on the B-29 that were never solved during the time the model saw combat operations.

If you consider the fact a large number of the He 177s deployed in operations flew their missions over the sea it would then be reasonable to assume the He 177 was a reliable plane, reliable enough to allow for such type of missions -this to counter the other classical tale of "never ending engine problems that plagued the bomber"-.
 
Excellent points Udet....

I think when all gathered the B-29 had an overall combat loss rate of something like 10% in both WW2 and Korea. The aircraft did have a high accident attrition rate (when compared to day's world) as much was asked of it in it's early deployment. I would also throw in that some of those lost to "accidents" might of been subjected to destruction while performing ferret missions - this may only take up a small amount but may play slightly into that attrition rate.

Imagine being a 22 year old 1Lt. with maybe 300 hours and maybe with 100 hours in B-17s or B-24s and then suddenly finding yourself in an aircraft like the B-29. As the old saying goes "an accident waiting to happen." But that was the way of the world 60 years ago.
 
Udet
if you are interested in KG40 and Kg 100 in Griehl's and Dressel's book there are pp. 123-137 on He 177 in service with KG 40 and pp. 137-150 on He 177 in service with KG 100, some of the pages has only pictures. If you can read German then IMHO the original is better than the English translation.

While checking the service history pages I found the info on he 177's Reichweite bei 1000 kg Bomben 4750 km for A-3 and 4650 km for A-5.

Juha
 
There`s some interesting info popping up in a thread over TOCH boards started by one of the alts of KK/ALS, appearantly in search of a bit fuel.

Since he is either unable/unwilling to share this information with this board, let me quote the reply of 'Adam' from over TOCH about LW Steinbock sorties and losses.

Operation Steinbock question - Luftwaffe and Allied Air Forces Discussion Forum


A reasonable summary IMHO. This works out as :

1 January - 31 May 1944, LW Steinbock operations

4,426 bomber sorties
243 lost to enemy action
5.49 % loss rate

227 Jabo sorties
12 lost to enemy action (+ 7 crashed, +1 friendly fire)
5.28% enemy / 8.81 % total loss (though the statistical base is very small

4400 + RAF night fighter sorties

This in five month period. To put it into context, in the four month period of BoB (July-October) 488 level bombers were lost to enemy action.

The RAF BC`s parallel campaign on Berlin : Battle of Berlin (air) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The 16 raids on Berlin cost Bomber Command more than 500 aircraft, with their crews killed or captured, which was a loss rate of 5.8%, well above the 5% threshold that was considered the maximum sustainable operational loss rate by the RAF.[11] Daniel Oakman makes the point that "Bomber Command lost 2,690 men over Berlin, and nearly 1,000 more became prisoners of war. Of Bomber Command's total losses for the war, around seven per cent were incurred during the Berlin raids. In December 1943, for example, 11 crews from No. 460 Squadron RAAF alone were lost in operations against Berlin; and in January and February, another 14 crews were killed. Having 25 aircraft destroyed meant that the fighting force of the squadron had to be replaced in three months. At these rates Bomber Command would have been wiped out before Berlin."[12]
 

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