Battle of Gettysburg

[timshatz]

PLan_D, the Emancipation Proclimation in 1862 made it impossible for the English to intervene. As long as the war was politically defined as a war against slavery, then the UK was going to stay on the sidelines. QUOTE]


Sys has it pretty neatly summerized. Foriegn countries weren't coming into this fight due to the Emmancipation Proclamation. Before the Proclamation, the argument that the South was fighting a war to be free of the North in the way the Colonies seperated from England. After it, there was no way anyone was going to get involved in a war to continue Slavery. That was the true brilliance of Lincoln. He changed a war to seperate the states into a war against Slavery.

 

[renrich]

Before we stray too far afield from the main subject which is the battle at Gettysburg and could the South have won it and how, let us not get too entangled as to whether and how the South could have accomplished it's war aims. The mission that Lee hoped to accomplish by his invasion of Pennsylvania was twofold. One of it's goals was to move the conflict away from Northern Virginia for a while and relieve the civilian population of that region of the burdens of war. It was hoped that the Army of Northern Virginia could live off of the land while in Pennsylvania and they did, and lived well. The army was happy for a while and well fed. They paid for the food and fodder and were expected to behave in a civilised manner. The other goal was to get Hooker and his army out in the open( Meade had not taken over yet) administer a defeat and then negotiate with a war weary and apprehensive North. It was certainly not beyond reason that Lee could bring off another victory against the Army of the Potomac. He had proven that on several occasions. As Plan D pointed out the politics of the matter were playing a salient role at this time. As a matter of fact, when Hooker discovered that Lee and the bulk of the army were no longer in front of Richmond one of his plans of action was to start an offensive to take Richmond. He was overuled by Halleck and Lincoln and in fact the defenses of Washington were weakened by taking men from them and giving them to Hooker to give him even more superiority of numbers over Lee. I think another point to remember in this discussion is that warfare in that time was not primarily about taking and holding territory but mainly about destroying the foe's army. I think the South was not unreasonable to think that a decisive defeat and destruction of a portion of the Union army might bring about some good results. However, whether or not the war could have been "won" by a victory at Gettysburg is really a part of another thread.

 

[timshatz]

The destruction of the opponents Army was an extension of Napoleonic tactics (line up and have at it guys). Lee was always looking to destroy the Army of the Potomic but did not look at the war making potential of the North as a viable target. Jackson understood it, but the Government of the South shied away from his vision of going North and destroying the factories.

Lee was the last of the great "Old Style" Generals. A General of manuver. He could get inside the head's of his apponents and convince them they were beaten (even if the Army of the Potomic thought otherwise). When Grant showd up, he ran into a General who really didn't care what Lee did. He was going South. He took the initiative from Lee and never gave it back. Grant was the first of the "New Style" of Generals. These were guys that held onto the enemy and just kept at it, banging away with whatever they could get their hands on. They fought battles of attrition and usually won in the end.

Lee wins Gettysburg. Sure. Could've happened several times. But he does not and can not destroy the Army of the Potomic. If he gets into the Union rear at Culp's Hill or Little Round Top, he has a force in the middle of a Union Army, disorganized and worn out. The Union Army falls back to Pipe Creek and the whole thing starts all over again but this time with the Union Army stronger (by virtue of being closer to it's bases and reinforcement) and the Army of Northern Virginia weaker (due to battle losses that can not be made up and greater distance to supply).

The Lost Cause that Faulkner spoke about is a dream that still exists today. In truth, it is a fiction. At Gettysburg, everything was against him. Lee wanted Hooker (Meade) out in the open but in truth, he was the one who was out in the open. He was attacking established defensive lines held by veteran troops. He attacked those lines and pretty much wrecked his army. It is a tribute to the dedication of his men and the character of the man that they both went on after the fight. But that battle, coupled with Vicksburg was the begining of the end of the Confederacy. It was still a ways off, but it was definitely coming.

In truth, I think Lee should've been fired after Gettysburg. It was not a well fought or imaginative battle plan. It was simply line up and have at it. For the man who was considered the master of tactics, it was really a poor showing.

 

[renrich]

As for the order to execute any white officers serving with black units, that order was rapidly retracted. Back to the battle. It sounds as if emac said that Longstreet made a mistake by not taking Little Round Top. It was a mistake but not out of ignorance of it's importance. His division tried to take it but hard fighting by the Blues( once it was fortified) prevented him from taking it. The point being that if Longstreet had started his attack earlier rather than waiting for Law's Brigade to come up, the hill would have been unfortified and could have been taken without a struggle. Certainly the Union armies had the benefit of better logistical support but, in my opinion logistics were not of primary concern at this juncture. Lee's army was well fed and had plenty of food supplies for at least a few days. They also had plenty of ammunition and would capture more if they destroyed and routed a portion of Meade's army. This would have been similar to Second Manassas where Pope was routed and left Lee in possession of the battlefield.

 

[renrich]

Certainly, if you wanted the war to be over quickly, you would have wanted Lee to be fired after Gettysburg. As a matter of fact Lee tried to resign after Gettysburg and Davis would not accept his resignation. Would you have fired Grant after Cold Harbor? I doubt it. Lee's true brilliance as a tactician and as a leader really shows after Gettysburg in 1864 and early 1865. His leadership at Wilderness, North Anna, Spotsylvania, Petersburg, etc kept the War going long past the time when it should have been over. We have a saying in Texas about great football coaches, "he can take his'n and beat your'n and take your'n and beat his'n." Lee was that kind of general. How long do you think the war would have lasted if Lee had been in command of the Army of the Potomac and McDowell or McClellen or Pope or Burnside or Hooker commanded the Army of Northern Virginia?

 

[syscom3]

Tim, I disagree with your assesment of Gen Grant. he was a brilliant "maneuverist" style of general when the strategy dictated it.

Do not forget the battle against Vicksburg was nothing but maneuvering all over Missisippi and (small parts of) Arkansas for a few months.

Plus, his maneuvering in Northen Virginia from the Wilderness ultimatly to Petersberg, was nothing but a series of left flanking attacks trying to turn Lee's corners.

 

[renrich]

I apologise to youall who have contributed to this thread. I did not think that we were supposed to be discussing whether the outcome of the battle might have influenced the overall outcome of the war. Upon going back and reading the first post I realise that the question was asked that if the Union lost the battle would they have sued for peace. Pardon me! I thank you for such an informed and spirited discussion.

 

[plan_D]

Do you want us to go through the discussion of the Royal Navy against the USN again, syscom? I don't have to remind everyone that the Royal Navy was larger, better trained and technically superior to the USN with bases in the Carribean, Cuba and Haiti. I understand Americans are very patrotic, but that would be a fight they could not win.

In 1863, there were hardly any merchant ships attending Confederate ports anyway. It was all British run blockade runners, which the USN only stopped 18% of. But I don't deny history; this did reduce 95% of the cotton trade.

The Emancipation Proclimation meant nothing, I am sorry to announce. In the first half of 1862, Napoleon III told his foreign minister "Ask the English government if it does not believe the time has come to recognise the South". At this time US Consul in Liverpool; "...we are in more danger of intervention than we have been at any previous period...They are all against us and would rejoice at our downfall."

In October 1862, Chancellor of the exchequer says in a speech; "Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made what is more than either; they have made a nation."

Prime Minister Palmerston wrote to Lord Russell that Union "...got a complete smashing...and it seems not all together unlikely that still greater disasters await them, and that even Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the Confederates. If this should happen, would it not be time for us to consider whether in such a state of things England and France might not address the contending parties and recommend an arrangment on the basis of separation?".

Lord Russell replied; "...with a view to the recognition of the Independence of the Confederates." If the North refused "...we ought ourselves to recognise the Southern States as an independent State."

The English, French and Austrians were all ready to step in on the side of the Confederacy, Emancipation Proclamation or not.

 

[timshatz]

Tim, I disagree with your assesment of Gen Grant. he was a brilliant "maneuverist" style of general when the strategy dictated it.

Do not forget the battle against Vicksburg was nothing but maneuvering all over Missisippi and (small parts of) Arkansas for a few months.

Plus, his maneuvering in Northen Virginia from the Wilderness ultimatly to Petersberg, was nothing but a series of left flanking attacks trying to turn Lee's corners.

Sys, agree that Grant did an excellent job at Vicksburg. Same can be said at Fort Doneldson. Also, at Shiloh as well (thought he gets little credit for it). But I do not see Grant as a great (and I am a great fan of Grant) in his capability. I see Sherman as great/brilliant. He was head and shoulders above anybody else except maybe Forrest.

Grant's greatest attribute was he was unbeatable. His was the type of war the Union could fight. As he put it when he went into the Wilderness, "I intend to fight along this line if it takes all summer". He did just that. He was a competent General who took advantage of what was given to him and used it very well. Plenty of people at the time thought of Grant as a butcher. Interestingly enough, Lee was not one of them. When someone mentioned something to that effect, Lee said, "I think General Grant has managed his affairs very well". Lee understood that Grant had taken away the initiative and would wear down his army to destruction just as he had others before him.

But Grant was not brilliant. He did not have the vision of the ability of the Confederacy to wage war as being his target. He saw the armies as his target and was competent in his applications.

Grants was, in the shortest terms, a tough SOB. He would take a pounding and come back again and again. Lose a fight today, move on and fight again tomorrow. I admire his character, his mental toughness and his ability to hide in a crowd. He fought the war in a very workmanlike way. No glory, no sweeping moves for benefit of battlefield strategy. Grant was driven by the need to find the enemy and destroy him. In that, he was a very deadly general.

 

[timshatz]

I apologise to youall who have contributed to this thread. I did not think that we were supposed to be discussing whether the outcome of the battle might have influenced the overall outcome of the war. Upon going back and reading the first post I realise that the question was asked that if the Union lost the battle would they have sued for peace. Pardon me! I thank you for such an informed and spirited discussion.

No worries dude, interesting thread no matter how it gets turned.

 

[timshatz]

Do you want us to go through the discussion of the Royal Navy against the USN again, syscom? I don't have to remind everyone that the Royal Navy was larger, better trained and technically superior to the USN with bases in the Carribean, Cuba and Haiti. I understand Americans are very patrotic, but that would be a fight they could not win.

In 1863, there were hardly any merchant ships attending Confederate ports anyway. It was all British run blockade runners, which the USN only stopped 18% of. But I don't deny history; this did reduce 95% of the cotton trade.

The Emancipation Proclimation meant nothing, I am sorry to announce. In the first half of 1862, Napoleon III told his foreign minister "Ask the English government if it does not believe the time has come to recognise the South". At this time US Consul in Liverpool; "...we are in more danger of intervention than we have been at any previous period...They are all against us and would rejoice at our downfall."

In October 1862, Chancellor of the exchequer says in a speech; "Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South have made an army; they are making, it appears, a navy; and they have made what is more than either; they have made a nation."

Prime Minister Palmerston wrote to Lord Russell that Union "...got a complete smashing...and it seems not all together unlikely that still greater disasters await them, and that even Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the Confederates. If this should happen, would it not be time for us to consider whether in such a state of things England and France might not address the contending parties and recommend an arrangment on the basis of separation?".

Lord Russell replied; "...with a view to the recognition of the Independence of the Confederates." If the North refused "...we ought ourselves to recognise the Southern States as an independent State."

The English, French and Austrians were all ready to step in on the side of the Confederacy, Emancipation Proclamation or not.

Plan D. Not so sure this one is a slam dunk. Couple of points to consider.

Napoleon 3rd made his statement (going on your notes here) in early 1862. The Emancipation Proclimation was not made until late September of 1862. If the statement had been made in October or so of 1862, the point would be more valid. But I doubt the country that made the expression "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity" would go to war to support a regime that existed on slavery.

The same could be said of the British. Especially the British Navy. To have ships running up and down the coast of Africa on patrol for Slave ships while sending a Fleet of to fight for a regime that was slave based would've been directly contridictory to the policies of the Govt. Recognizing and aiding the Confederacy (openly, not secretly- an open one at that) would've gone against roughly 50 years of British Law and Policy. Keep in mind, England had outlawed Slavery in her country. Now, was it to go to war to support it in another? Unlikely.

As for the British Navy going to war against the US Navy, the math favors the British on the open seas, less so in coast US. The British Fleet was the power above all others in the 1800s when it came to naval matters. It was made for the open sea and to keep the trade routes open. Against that fleet, the US Navy would not be able to do much for long. The Brits had bases, shipe and qualified seamen. Strategic and tactical advantages, plus the fact that the US Navy was occupied with blockading the South, would've mean Union shipping would've been pretty much swept from the seas.

However, in coastal waters, the advantage is less pronounced. In Union was building a fleet of iron clads based on the Monitor design. These ships weren't particularly good in the open ocean but worked well in close. A wooden hulled ship (of which the British Navy was primarily using) was less useful against such a vessel. Could the Brits break the blockade? Yes. Could they blockade northern ports? Probably not. But it definitely would've been an interesting fight.

 

[plan_D]

Timshatz, you seem to forget here that the comments made by the British government were in October and beyond. It would be nice to imagine that the British were willing to take pride and allow the Union to win the war for what is right, but the British, French and Austro-Hungarian textile trade was suffering due to the Union blockade.

The British government showed secret and public support for the Confederate cause of independance after their victories over the Army of Potomac. Europe wanted their cotton and even if it meant the U.S.A being split in two.

I don't know if you're aware or not but the Royal Navy was using off-duty officers to run the blockade runners that supported the Confederates. It, in fact, goes against all sense to assume that Europe would not support a nation that still wanted slavery. As the European populace gave support to the Confederacy, the European powers provided weapons and, as I say, Royal Navy officers crewed the blockade runners.

I must point out that slavery wasn't abolished in the British Empire until 1833; so at most Royal Navy fleets were not patrolling for 50 years before 1862 as far as I'm aware.

On the naval conflict; this discussion has been had.

I admire your realistion at the supremecy of the Royal Navy in the open seas. But I must point out that Britain had been using close blockades for centuries which required coastal vessels. The Royal Navy knew how to operate in coastal waters, and were not solely built and trained for the high seas.

In the case of ironclads; these were easily dealt with. The Royal Navy had already produced superior weaponary - the HMS Warrior and HMS Black Prince. Both of which were iron-hulled ships whose armoured belts were impervious to any cannon at the time. Both were steam or sail powered and had a screw; which gave it a top reported speed of 17.5 knots. They out-gunned, out-armoured and out-matched anything, anyone could throw at them.

In the event of a war between the U.S.N and Royal Navy; the blockade would be smashed comfortably. As the only options open to any US vessel against the might of iron hulls was to aim for the rudder or run away. Blockading the ports would have been harder, maybe, in the case of a close blockade. But the Royal Navy would have adopted a stance that had them further off. This would have swept any US fleet or merchantmen from the seas.

The Royal Navy fleet combined with that of the French Navy would rendered the USN destroyed or worthless by keeping them in port.

 

[syscom3]

The monitors were of low profile and would have been very difficult to just sweep away contrary to what you think.

You also think that the British people would rally to support a nation built on slavery and its practice? Ha! Think again, as the abolitionist's in Britain were strong and had the moral high ground. A British intervention to support the south would have been a political blunder of monumental proportions. The PM and Queen knew that and was in no mood to intervene. And even if Britain had decided to interven, it wouldnt have been untill sometime in the fall that they could do anything, all the while the Union scores more victories in the west and regroups.

And you are forgetting we are talking about July 1863. Even if Lee won Gettysburg, he would have been in no position to exploit it. Grant had just opened up the Misssissippi. Theres plenty of "what if's" for Grant to follow up his victory with a march through the southern states along the Gulf and eliminate a few important ports. And that is probably what would have happened had Gettysburg been a failure.

 

[timshatz]

Plan D, the Brits outlawed the slave trade in 1807. Thereafter, they were the only country to really put any teeth into an Anti-Slavery patrol. I am not sure of the specifics of the patrol but I do know a sizeable number of ships were in it (from the British side) while the US committed only a token force (while supplying the majority of the slave runners that tried to avoid the squadrons). A link to some of the details of the story can be found in the following story from American Heritage Magazine:

AmericanHeritage.com / "Nil Disprandum"

Declaring the Emancipation Proclaimation irrelevent would've been going against close to 60 years of English Governmental policy.

Regarding the affect of the Union blockade and it's ability to force the Europeans into the Civil War, that was one of the theories running around the South on how they could gain recognition. Called "King Cotton", it was believed that the Union blockade would force the factories in Europe into economic hardship and thereby bring the European powers (mostly Britian) into the war on the side of the South. It didn't happen. The factories in Europe did face some hardship but Cotton was supplied from other sources (mostly Egypt) and life went on.

As far as the Moral stance on Slavery being an inhibitor to European intervention, I agree that most of Europe could probably have cared less what happened to Slaves in America. In truth, most Union people cared less as well. They were neither pro nor anti slavery. It simply didn't concern them. But like the Human Rights movement of today, the Abolitionists were loud in both England and the US. England going to war against the Union for the defacto support of slavery would be about the same as England going to war against Ethiopia today for the support of Somalia (Somalia in this case having some economic reason for a tie to England, which it doesn't but it is meant as a loose example).

As far as the two British Ironclads are concerned, I am sure they were excellent ships. But they were only two ships. The Confederacy had iron clads as well. More than two. In the end, they were swamped by the Union fleets. And I do not doubt the Royal Navy's prowless. But once such a war would've been declared, the trade routes for England (France and the Union) would've been open to attack as well from any number of threats. One only need look at the cruise of the CSS Alabama to see what one steam powered Frigate going on a raiding cruise and avoiding battle, can do. The Union had plenty of ships like that. Privateers operating from foriegn ports is another option.

Lastly, the Union Navy was not a "blue water" navy. It was a coastal and riverine force. The Monitor and others like her fought in the rivers and bays of the Continental US. A "brown water" force. The Royal Navy was the epitome of a "blue water" navy.

 

[renrich]

The political situation in the North was the overiding factor as far as a victory at Gettysburg forcing the US government into negotiations with the CSA. The main concern of Lincoln and Halleck was to defeat Lee, at all costs. That was evidenced by their decision to deny Hooker the right to start an offensive against Richmond and by their weakening of the defenses of Washington in order to reinforce the Army of the Potomac. Because of the fragile political will and spirit in Washington it was imperative that Meade defeat Lee. Therefore, a failure of Meade to defeat Lee would have had severe political ramifications. That was what the CSA's strategy was based on. I believe that Lee realised that this was his last best chance to end the war. Short of breaking the will of the North to continue the war, the South had no chance. It was a long shot but still possible.I think that what ever the North could do with their armies in the west would not be a consideration if Lee had won at Gettysburg. In a situation, as I earlier pointed out, like Second Mannasas where Pope pulled back from the battlefield with his army defeated, he felt like he must preserve what remained of his army rather than stay and fight it out to the last man. He knew that Washington would be in hysterics if his army was destroyed. He stopped to fight on good ground at Chantilly and possibly was saved by a rainstorm. If Lee had ruined 5 or 6 of Meade's corps, Meade would have had to abandon the battlefield in order to preserve the rest of the army. Lee would have moved toward Washington. The morale of the CSA would have been sky high, the newspapers in the North would have been bordered in black and the politicians in Washington would been have fleeing the city. Lee would have not needed to invade Washington, much less occupy it. The CSA already had a note prepared to present to the US government and if negotiations were begun there would have been a truce declared and all hostilities would have ceased. Then, the attitudes of the governments in Europe would have played a role with even possibly Britain playing a role as a mediator. All of this is speculative, of course and a long shot but still possible. The situation today in the war on terrorism is very similar. The only way the US can lose the war is if we lack the will to win.

 

[syscom3]

Remember Renrich, your scenario depends on Lee NOT taking prohibitive loss's in his victory. An unlikely scenario.

 

[davparlr]

Tim, I disagree with your assesment of Gen Grant. he was a brilliant "maneuverist" style of general when the strategy dictated it.

Do not forget the battle against Vicksburg was nothing but maneuvering all over Missisippi and (small parts of) Arkansas for a few months.

Plus, his maneuvering in Northen Virginia from the Wilderness ultimatly to Petersberg, was nothing but a series of left flanking attacks trying to turn Lee's corners.

Grant's strength was in his tenaciousness, not his tactical ability. I doubt that Grant was ever in a battle where he did not have significantly superior forces, weapons, and provisions available. In addition, as time went on, Grant's losses were more than made up while his opponent's losses were not. In these circumstances, he should win, and to his credit, he did (even with this advantage, he did lose battles). None of his predecessors could do this. At Vicksburg, while his raids into Mississippi were effective in freezing what small forces were available to aid Vicksburg, the battle was won by simple siege induced starvation. This was smart (but caused by lack of success in assaults), but not brilliant. In the Wilderness, as was mention earlier, Grant was just using flanking maneuvers. Lee easily anticipated this and effectively countered Grant's move with a depleted army. The results of this effort was months of stalemate that was a precursor of WWI.

Grant was a bulldog and was successful at it. However, the price was paid by a lot of dead and wounded soldiers. Perhaps Grant's method was the quickest way to win the war, perhaps there was a better way. We will never know.

As for Lee, surely he knew that the cause was lost as the house was falling in around him. If he had surrendered sooner, more lives would have been saved.

Now if the Union had the same mentality in their media as we have today, the South would now be it own nation. Can you imagine the reaction of the citizens on seeing the thousands of bodies that were a result of Bull Run, Fredericksburg, and the many other battles where Union force struggled? With our type of media, I would imagine that the Union would have agreed to succession long before the battle of Gettysburg ever happened.

 

[davparlr]

Lee was the last of the great "Old Style" Generals. A General of manuver. He could get inside the head's of his apponents and convince them they were beaten (even if the Army of the Potomic thought otherwise). When Grant showd up, he ran into a General who really didn't care what Lee did. He was going South. He took the initiative from Lee and never gave it back. Grant was the first of the "New Style" of Generals. These were guys that held onto the enemy and just kept at it, banging away with whatever they could get their hands on. They fought battles of attrition and usually won in the end.

When you have more forces, better weapons, and more provisions, attrition is a no brainer type of victory and indeed is probably more Napoleanic than what Lee did. You only win a war of attrition when you have more resouces to loose. It takes far more flexibility, maneuver, and strategy to hold off a vastly superior enemy for over a year, the way Lee did.

The Civil War was a transistional war linking Napoleanic to the Modern (well at least to WWI). Lee was an advanced general in that he knew how to use both maneuver and battlefield fortifications. His maneuvers in the Wilderness, using a largely depleted army, effectively countered the much larger Union forces crude attemts at flanking, fighting it to a stalemate at Petersburg when, by all rights, it should have been crushed.

 

[renrich]

The Army of Northern Virginia took heavy losses in every battle, even in victory. Some comparisons and these are KIA, WIA and MIA : Seven Days-Union,9796 CSA,19,739, Second Manassas-Union,10,096 CSA,9108, Sharpsburg-Union,11657 CSA,11724, Fredricksburg- Union,10884 CSA, 4656, Chancellorsville-Union,11,116 CSA, 10,746 Gettysburg-Union,17,684 CSA, 22,638. Remember, at Second Manassas, a victory, we had losses of 9108 which amounted to 18.8 per cent of our army. That was in August after the heavy losses in June during the Seven Days yet in September we marched into Maryland, took Harpers Ferry and fought McClellan's 90,000 to a draw with no more than 40,000 men on the field at Sharpsburg. Assuming that we did not do Pickett's charge and had ruined 3 or more Federal corps on that second day, Lee would have had around 55,000 men present for duty and a few thousand more showing up in a few days(stragglers) and would have had a formidable army.

 

[syscom3]

Some good points davprl.

However, you arent giving Grant credit for his maneuver strategy at various pints in the war.

Take Vicksburg for instance, the events leading up to the seige was nothing but manuevering in the countryside that managed to confuse the confederates, divide up their forces so as to defeat them in detail and finally to try everything possible prior to laying a seige on the city. he even attempted to dig a canal to divert the Misssissippi around the city so as to render the city strategically worthless.

You can sum up his generalship as this: From start to finish, he never lost a battle.