Battle of Gettysburg

[timshatz]

You can sum up his generalship as this: From start to finish, he never lost a battle.

And he never stopped coming after you. That was his true strength. In a couple of battles, he was close to even with his opponent (I think but am not sure it was that way at Doneldson and at Cold Harbor, he had a numerical superiority but not by much). He just took the initative and kept going.

In truth, he was a scary little guy to have after you. He never stopped, he never gave up and he would try just about anything.

But, in a different line of thought. Anybody have any idea what a battle between Lee and Sherman would've looked like? Not the early Sherman, and not the late Lee. But when both were in their prime (Sherman in 1864 and Lee in the Spring of 1863). Lee has the services of Jackson and Longstreet. Sherman has Sheridan and Thomas.

Any thoughts?

 

[syscom3]

.....Anybody have any idea what a battle between Lee and Sherman would've looked like? Not the early Sherman, and not the late Lee. But when both were in their prime (Sherman in 1864 and Lee in the Spring of 1863). Lee has the services of Jackson and Longstreet. Sherman has Sheridan and Thomas.

Any thoughts?

Sherman was another tenacious bulldog type of fighter. He wanted a win, and wasnt tied down by orthodoxy and tradition to get it.

He and Grant were of the same mold and same way of thinking. perhaps because they were in the same commands for so long.

Total war and total destruction of the opposing Army.

 

[syscom3]

Lets assume that Lee won Gettysburg, but was bled so hard doing it, he couldnt exploit the situation, allowing Meade to escape and regroup ready to block Lee's advances.

What should the Union do in the west? Send Grant eastwards to take Chatanooga? Or send him along the Gulf coast to take out the ports, and cut Florida off from the Confederacy?

 

[Bernhart]

Have to mention Burfords part at beginning of the battle too, would have been a very different fight had he and the union Calvary units didn't hold up the confederates until more of the army showed up.

 

[syscom3]

Have to mention Burfords part at beginning of the battle too, would have been a very different fight had he and the union Calvary units didn't hold up the confederates until more of the army showed up.

Good point.

It seems that lee's best chances were on Day 2 of the battle. If he was going to win, he had to do it on that day.

 

[renrich]

Buford did a good job with two brigades of cavalry along with some guns holding off Harry Heth until Reynolds with I Corps and Howard with XI Corps could get on the field. Then Ewell began to arrive and along with elements of Hill's Corps they pushed the Federals hard. By the end of the day Reynolds was dead and the two Blue corps had lost 50 per cent. Then Ewell should have taken Culps hill. It commanded Cemetary ridge and if Ewell had taken it as Lee asked him to do and as Trimble pleaded with him to do the South could have rendered Cemetary Ridge untenable, they would have had the good ground and the next day the Federals would have been attacking up hill. That was a possible opportunity to win the battle the first day. If as Syscom postulates Lee beats Meade but is so weakened he cannot pose a threat to Washington ( which I don't see happening) then the strategy in the West can go as it did and the War is lost for the CSA. Mind you I don't say it is a foregone conclusion if Lee prevails over Meade that the South gets an armistice out of the US. I only say the South had two possibilities to win at Gettysburg, one the first day and on the second day. Ewell had lost a leg in the Shenandoah and some of his fire seemed to be missing thereafter. If Jackson had been leading his Corps then Culp's Hill may have been taken but he was gone. How unlucky could the CSA be to lose two of it's best generals in combat, Albert Sydney Johnston in 62 and Jackson in 63, not to mention Longstreet being disabled( by friendly fire) for months in 64. I don't believe that Sherman on his best day could have taken the measure of Lee in any battle if the armies were anything like evenly matched. It wasn't until J E Johnston was replaced by Hood ( with one arm useless and one leg missing and living on Laudunum) that Sherman's march to the sea began to really click.

 

[davparlr]

Some good points davprl.

However, you arent giving Grant credit for his maneuver strategy at various pints in the war.

Take Vicksburg for instance, the events leading up to the seige was nothing but manuevering in the countryside that managed to confuse the confederates, divide up their forces so as to defeat them in detail and finally to try everything possible prior to laying a seige on the city. he even attempted to dig a canal to divert the Misssissippi around the city so as to render the city strategically worthless.

Grant expected to take Vicksburg quickly, but soon realized it would be tougher than he figured. He tried a foolish attempt at a canal which wasted a lot of time. He did send out wise and successful raids throughout the Southern areas around Vicksburg which worked well indeed, although the Southern forces in the area were probably too small to stop Grant in any event. The South had 30-40,000 troops verses Grants 70,000. The capture of Vicksburg was a big event and fatally wounded the South. Kudos to Grant.

You can sum up his generalship as this: From start to finish, he never lost a battle.

I can't sum that up reasonably. At the Wilderness, Grant, with 102,000 troops was surprised by Lee with 61,000 troops. After hard fighting, Grant withdrew from the field with 18,400 casualties (Burnside lost his job when he lost 12,653 soldiers at Fredericksburg and withdrew from the field). Since Grant's plan was to wear Lee down by attrition, why did he just continue to fight here? The answer, of course, was that Lee's lines were too well defended to achieve success, so he had to move somewhere else. Since Grant withdrew from the field, I would call this a tactical defeat (like just about every other battlefield loss).

Unlike previous generals and stuffed with a flow of incoming cannon fodder, Grant moved to flank Lee. Lee anticipated this move and beat Grant to Spotsylvania Court House. Again, Lee with only 52,000 troops met Grant who had 100,000 troops. Again, after severe fighting, Grant, with 18,000 casualties, withdrew from the field. In my eye, this was another tactical loss.

Grant moved again to flank Lee, but at Cold Harbor, Grant with 108,000 troops met Lee, who had anticipated this move also, with 62,000 troops. I suspect even Grant would consider Cold Harbor a defeat and something he regretted. He withdrew from the field with 13,000 casualties compared to the 2,500 for Lee. After these three battles, Grant gave up the attempt to attack Richmond directly and directed his attention to Petersburg. He was finally able to outflank Lee, although Petersburg turned into a different war.

In all fairness, Lee lost nearly 29,000 troops in these three battles, losses he could not sustain, but I believe that this campaign did not end up in a manner Grant had planned. I believe he fully expected to beat Lee and take Richmond directly and these three battles ended up with a defeat of that plan.

In the end, Grant was a great general who understood what it took to defeat of the South, and deserves the honor (and he was also an honorable victor). I would not consider him one of the four or five greatest generals who ever lived, as the History Channel portrayed him once.

 

[davparlr]

But, in a different line of thought. Anybody have any idea what a battle between Lee and Sherman would've looked like? Not the early Sherman, and not the late Lee. But when both were in their prime (Sherman in 1864 and Lee in the Spring of 1863). Lee has the services of Jackson and Longstreet. Sherman has Sheridan and Thomas.

Any thoughts?

Actually, It probably would be more appropiate and interesting for Sherman to meet Jackson at both their heights. Both were a different breed although as a commanding general, I would trust Jackson more, not because of his incredible military ability, but for his loyality.

 

[mkloby]

Actually, It probably would be more appropiate and interesting for Sherman to meet Jackson at both their heights. Both were a different breed although as a commanding general, I would trust Jackson more, not because of his incredible military ability, but for his loyality.

Hmmm... Jackson's loyalty...

 

[plan_D]

In Great Britain itself slavery was banned in 1807 but it wasn't banned throughout the Empire until 1833.

syscom, you seem so sure that Great Britain would not support the Confederacy. You seem to be forgetting that Britain was supporting the Confederacy throughout the war; I have already stated that they supplied weapons, military advisors and they crewed the blockade runners. This, in itself, provides proof that Europe was willing to support the Confederacy.

Moniters were designed to fight on the coast or in rivers; in the case of stopping a Royal Navy blockade they're pointless. All the Royal Navy needed to do was stay out in the open waters and catch the shipping before it got to the coast.
The USN, if maintaining a blockade, would be forced to fight as the Royal Navy would aim to break the siege. Whether the Royal Navy just provided heavy escort for any large merchant fleet or went out hunting the Union blockading ships, the blockade would be broken.

The Warrior class was only two ships but, Tim, the Royal Navy had 22 iron-clads laid down in 1863 and 5 sailing. Three of those were iron-hulled and considered superior to anything else sailing at the time, HMS Warrior, HMS Black Prince and HMS Achilles. Achilles being faster and more stable than the Warrior class.

In 1862, British shipyards were even building two ships for the CSA. These were seized by the Royal Navy and became the Scorpion class. The Scorpion were iron-clad turreted ships superior most of the Union navy. The CSS Alabama was even built in Britain.

While Britain at the time was actually sending out mixed signals (nothing is clear cut in history), I believe the only reason Europe didn't step in was because the higher end of the political system was cautious. The Union knew they would, the Confederates knew they would and a lot of Europe thought it was going to happen - but I seriously believe Gettysburg made Britain, France and Austria think there was no point.

 

[davparlr]

Hmmm... Jackson's loyalty...

Jackson had devoted loyalty to Lee. The real issue is Sherman, who, I understand ,tended to try to undermine Grant and did some things that really made Grant angry.

 

[syscom3]

Jackson had devoted loyalty to Lee. The real issue is Sherman, who, I understand ,tended to try to undermine Grant and did some things that really made Grant angry.

I have never heard anything like that. If that was true, then why did Grant allow him unrestricted command of his forces after he (Grant) was made commanding general?

 

[timshatz]

Sherman was another tenacious bulldog type of fighter. He wanted a win, and wasnt tied down by orthodoxy and tradition to get it.

He and Grant were of the same mold and same way of thinking. perhaps because they were in the same commands for so long.

Total war and total destruction of the opposing Army.

Sherman, to my mind anyway, was a guy who could find a weak spot. Same with Lee. Had good vision. I think Sheridan and Jackson had that same "go in for the kill" instinct.

Would've been an interesting fight.

 

[timshatz]

Jackson had devoted loyalty to Lee. The real issue is Sherman, who, I understand ,tended to try to undermine Grant and did some things that really made Grant angry.

Grant didn't see the war in the same terms as Sherman. That was where Sherman was way ahead of Grant. Grant went after and destroyed every army he went up against. Sherman could and would ignore the opposing army. His target during the Atlanta Campaign was not the Confederate Army but the South's will to fight. When Hood moved west after Sherman took Atlanta, it opened the road for Sherman. He could now go where he chose and prove to the South that their Armies could not protect them.

Grant didn't see the point of Sherman's March and worried he would be cut off and destroyed. That's what bugged Grant.

 

[timshatz]

Plan D. A lot to comment on but have short time to work with so I'll just focus on Britian supplying the South. They were also supplying the North. It was common sense from the British perspective to make a buck (Okay, a pound) on the war by selling to the combatants. It was common then, it is common now.

But there is a big difference between selling to a side and joining them. I agree with the perspective that the sypathies of England were with the South but think there is big difference between hoping someone will win and sending your own people to fight in the war. For all concerned, the American Civil War stayed just that. Europe took advantage of it by making money and, in the case of France, taking control of Mexico. But in the end, the Europeans recoginized it as an American affair and not really their problem (an attitude that would permiate American Politics some 50 years later when Europe had it's first Modern Civil War and Woodrow Wilson got re-elected on the slogan, "He kept us out of the war").

 

[mkloby]

Jackson had devoted loyalty to Lee. The real issue is Sherman, who, I understand ,tended to try to undermine Grant and did some things that really made Grant angry.

I was thinking of loyalty on a larger scale...

 

[davparlr]

I was thinking of loyalty on a larger scale...

I think I got Sherman mixed up with one of the Navy commander, probably Porter, who did not like Grants plans. I do think Sherman did do some things that irritated Grant, however.

Grant didn't see the point of Sherman's March and worried he would be cut off and destroyed. That's what bugged Grant.

It was very risky. Sherman was lucky that the South at that time was already depleted of forces and materiel. Had the Confederates be able to engage Sherman in any kind of lenghty fight, Sherman would have quickly run out of ammunition. He could have then been stuck a long way from his base in dire straits.

 

[timshatz]

It was very risky. Sherman was lucky that the South at that time was already depleted of forces and materiel. Had the Confederates be able to engage Sherman in any kind of lenghty fight, Sherman would have quickly run out of ammunition. He could have then been stuck a long way from his base in dire straits.

You are seeing it the way Grant saw it. Having Sherman's Army cut off and destroyed doubtless kept Grant awake more than one night. Especially when Sherman dropped from site (which in this case means telegraph contact) and went off toward the south east/east. But that is the true brillance of Sherman.

It was very risky. So was running your Panzer divisions through the Ardenne. So was landing at Inchon. But it was a master stroke at the heart of the enemy. It broke their backs, as the other master strokes did.

He understood the South lived only on it's Armies. The real base of the war for the South was the people. When letters started arriving in camps throughout the South telling the soliders that the Yankees were burning houses and farms, the morale of the Rebel soliders would suffer. So goes the Army. So goes the South. So goes the Confederacy.

 

[syscom3]

The reason Sherman made his march was his knowing that there wasn't any confederate forces who could stop him, and the land was rich in booty to supply his troops.

 

[timshatz]

The reason Sherman made his march was his knowing that there wasn't any confederate forces who could stop him, and the land was rich in booty to supply his troops.

Yeah, Sys, read the same thing. Nothing but militia and some calvary. Nothing to slow him down. Definitely a major part of his reasoning.