Bournemouth raid 1943.

[Crumpp]

So, to sum up thus far, you believe neither the people who witnessed the attack take place in good weather, nor the allied authorities who reported casuaulties on the 23rd.

No mhuxt.

I just pointed out that eyewitness accounts from the opposite side of the channel do not invalidate Jafu 2's orders.

The first three links were humor.

On a side note, this will help you understand the value of eyewitness testimony and its place.

Eyewitness Testimony

http://www.ncjrs.gov/nij/eyewitness/188678.pdf

Eyewitness testimony of the weather in England has no bearing on SKG 10 flying the mission. So no, my contention is not that the eyewitness accounts are wrong. It is just that they have no bearing on the German side of events or Jafu 2 Orders.

Additionally, it is entirely possible for any IFR conditions to have pockets of VFR weather. That more than likely is what happened.

Understand now?

All the best,

Crumpp

 

[mhuxt]

I take it then that you concede that Hastings and Bournemouth were attacked on the 23rd, and that statements such as "Germans records show no daylight air activity other than a recon of the English coast on 23 May 1943 due to weather!" and "I am just saying that is hard for the Germans to be bombing Bournemouth when their airplanes are not flying" are inaccurate at best.

 

[Crumpp]

I take it then that you concede that Hastings and Bournemouth were attacked on the 23rd, and that statements such as "Germans records show no daylight air activity other than a recon of the English coast on 23 May 1943 due to weather!" and "I am just saying that is hard for the Germans to be bombing Bournemouth when their airplanes are not flying" are inaccurate at best.

No, read the thread please and accurate quote what I say in this thread. My position is clearly outlined. You choose not to read or understand my position not me. Don't pick and choose selective quotes out of context to fit your interpretation.

That is juvenile, flamer, gaming board argumentitive styles. Let's act like an adult, using logic and reason.

The context of the thread was about SKG 10. From the 9th posting in this thread:

So its possible that the unit involved would be IV./SKG 10 with Lt. Wenger leading.

http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/bournemouth-raid-1943-a-11371.html#post312550

Crumpp says:
All I have done is point out a fact. On 23 May 1943 daylight operations for the French based GAF units were restricted. JG26 conducted the only operational flight in the region on the daily evening recon of the English coast. Some administrative flights where conducted that transferred units. These flew in the opposite direction of England toward Northern Germany and clearer skies.

Everyone seemed to agree that SKG 10 had to be the German unit. When I pointed out that there was a snag to the SKG 10 theory, it was convienantly ignored.

Once the original posters attention was given however we quickly worked it out.

SKG 10 could not have been a part of this raid unless it took place on a different day.

All the best,

Crumpp

 

[pbfoot]

I've seen lots of guys flying VMC in Imc weather and i assume in WW2 it was not as much of a concern . The weather could be IMC but if you have a ceiling of 1oo ft that is totally flyable over the channel mind you there is always the cumulus granite when not over the water

 

[Crumpp]

I've seen lots of guys flying VMC in Imc weather and i assume in WW2 it was not as much of a concern . The weather could be IMC but if you have a ceiling of 1oo ft that is totally flyable over the channel mind you there is always the cumulus granite when not over the water

What?

I am confused by your posting as it makes no sense to me.

You realize that flight into IMC by a non-proficient pilots is one of the leading causes of death in aviation right?

 

[Crumpp]

FAA report on VFR into IMC accidents:

 

[pbfoot]

What?

I am confused by your posting as it makes no sense to me.

You realize that flight into IMC by a non-proficient pilots is one of the leading causes of death in aviation right?

I'm saying that VMC is visual meteo Conditions if your ceiling is 100 feet and you fly at 89ft you are visual . I'm quite familiar with the difference in legal terms but I don't believe the boys waited at all times for 1000 and 3. It's 1943 wartime the limits used were probably very flexible ref the operational requirements.

 

[Crumpp]

I'm saying that VMC is visual meteo Conditions if your ceiling is 100 feet and you fly at 89ft you are visual .

Not really. This is fantasy in fact.

An airplane is traveling at a high rate of speed. This is what dictates our visual limitations.

You can see that even the most unrestricted airspace with the fewest obstacles; class G, still requires a minimum of 1 statue mile visibility to be considered VFR conditions.

We have no distance restrictions in Class G but still must remain clear of any clouds.

VFR Minimums

Let's look at a typical instrument approach from the time period. You can clearly see the minimum approach altitude is 1300 feet. This means if the approach is performed correctly, the pilot will be at 1300 feet, 3.3NM from the cone. The pilot must then have a visual on the TDZE at minimum altitude or the approach cannot be performed.

 

[Wildcat]

For what its worth here is part of the passage from the book "Hatching an Air Force" by Peter Ilbery, which prompted me to ask the questions in the first place.

There was to be a Sunday he would not forget, the date being fixed years later by the death of Flight Sergeant Kerrigan. It was 23 May 1943. Early that afternoon he was enjoying the outlook over the channel when he saw a cloud of spray approaching very quickly. From it emerged a flight of FW 190s which did a climbing turn and descended onto the centre of Bournemouth strafing and bombing

Am I wrong to assume this indicated clear weather, as he was "enjoying the outlook over the channel" and was able to see the FW's approaching at very low level?

 

[Crumpp]

Even modern precision approaches have limitations. For example, KISM ILS-15 requires a 282ft and 3/4 mile visiability minimums to perform the approach.

http://204.108.4.16/d-tpp/0713/05793IL15.PDF

They did not have the benefit of precision approach during the war.

Precision means both heading and glideslope signals are used.

All the best,

Crumpp

 

[Crumpp]

Am I wrong to assume this indicated clear weather, as he was "enjoying the outlook over the channel" and was able to see the FW's approaching at very low level?

Read the whole thread please before contributing. It will cut down on the "stupid factor" so we do not have to cover the same ground when the page turns! That gets tiresome quickly.

Thanks.

No mhuxt.

I just pointed out that eyewitness accounts from the opposite side of the channel do not invalidate Jafu 2's orders.

The first three links were humor.

On a side note, this will help you understand the value of eyewitness testimony and its place.

Eyewitness Testimony

http://www.ncjrs.gov/nij/eyewitness/188678.pdf

Eyewitness testimony of the weather in England has no bearing on SKG 10 flying the mission. So no, my contention is not that the eyewitness accounts are wrong. It is just that they have no bearing on the German side of events or Jafu 2 Orders.

Additionally, it is entirely possible for any IFR conditions to have pockets of VFR weather. That more than likely is what happened.

Understand now?

All the best,

Crumpp

 

[pbfoot]

Not really. This is fantasy in fact.

An airplane is traveling at a high rate of speed. This is what dictates our visual limitations.

You can see that even the most unrestricted airspace with the fewest obstacles; class G, still requires a minimum of 1 statue mile visibility to be considered VFR conditions.

We have no distance restrictions in Class G but still must remain clear of any clouds.

VFR Minimums

Let's look at a typical instrument approach from the time period. You can clearly see the minimum approach altitude is 1300 feet. This means if the approach is performed correctly, the pilot will be at 1300 feet, 3.3NM from the cone. The pilot must then have a visual on the TDZE at minimum altitude or the approach cannot be performed.

Having a few thousand PAR?GCA runs under my belt I know the rules all I'm saying is I'll bet on many occasions the rules went out the door. There was an American Airline that used to claim visual on the aerodrome the WX was 200 and 1/2 but to save fuel(bonus for fuel consumption from the carrier) they used to call visual cut the approach short 2-3 mile turn on pick up the ILS and continue .Who the hell is the controller to tell him what or what he cannot see.

 

[Crumpp]

I'll bet on many occasions the rules went out the door.

The problem with that line of thinking and airplanes is that the rules are not made to keep you from having a bit of fun.

They are in place simply to keep the pilot alive. So while the few success make for some spectacular tales for the telling, those that are not successful are dead. We only get to hear a small sample and only from the successful ones.

There was an American Airline that used to claim visual on the aerodrome the WX was 200 and 1/2 but to save fuel(bonus for fuel consumption from the carrier) they used to call visual cut the approach short 2-3 mile turn on pick up the ILS and continue .Who the hell is the controller to tell him what or what he cannot see.
__________________

Nice story. I would put this right up with urban legend and myth.

Landing a large cargo jet takes a considerable amount of both skill and planning. If you screw it up, you are dead.

Take a C9 in standard conditions for example, at 70,000lbs our threshold speed is Vref+5 or 112KIAS with flaps/slats.

Our V2 or take off safety speed in the C9 is 119 KIAS at 70,000lbs. Jets are thrust limited at low velocity. It takes all of our thrust to maintain our 112 KIAS and we have no more thrust available to devote to increasing speed. Only a configuration change to lower drag can give us the thrust required to make take off safety speed.

You can see why the go around in a large transport jet can be problematic and requires prior planning.

It's called the "Sabre Dance" and generally a symptom of early rotation. It will happen in any jet that is behind the power curve.


View: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iOamnWpLtO8

All the best,

Crumpp

 

[Crumpp]

Who the hell is the controller to tell him what or what he cannot see.

The controller does not tell you a thing about approach minimums. That is published on the plate and for you as the PIC to follow.

You can try violating them in your airplane and your life if you want.

All the best,

Crumpp

 

[pbfoot]

The controller does not tell you a thing about approach minimums. That is published on the plate and for you as the PIC to follow.

You can try violating them in your airplane and your life if you want.

All the best,

Crumpp

I was the controller . Maybe I'll get you to tell me about an aural null approach or one using the AI radar

 

[evangilder]

Read the whole thread please before contributing. It will cut down on the "stupid factor" so we do not have to cover the same ground when the page turns! That gets tiresome quickly.

Thanks.

Tone it down, Crumpp. Wildcat started this thread and was clarifying his question.

 

[Crumpp]

I was the controller . Maybe I'll get you to tell me about an aural null approach or one using the AI radar

The controller does not tell you a thing about approach minimums. The PIC is responsible for the safe conduct of the flight.

Radar approach minimums which the PIC is responsible for maintaining:

http://204.108.4.16/d-tpp/0713/SE2RAD.PDF

If it is a no gyro approach, your airline crew would be total idiots to disregard the tower as it is the tower calling all the shots for the approach. Using VOX, the tower puts you on glide path and heading.

PAR is used for emergencies such as vacuum pump failure.

I would say that was a really narrow example that is not applicable to any WWII flying and quite rare to the majority of aviation today.

Long story short, the Airline crew story is one big fish tail.

All the best,

Crumpp

 

[mhuxt]

For what its worth here is part of the passage from the book "Hatching an Air Force" by Peter Ilbery, which prompted me to ask the questions in the first place.

Am I wrong to assume this indicated clear weather, as he was "enjoying the outlook over the channel" and was able to see the FW's approaching at very low level?

No, I don't think you're wrong. Several of the accounts in the book talk about nice weather - off the top of my head I think one mentions it being a day like summer should be, or something similar. I donn't have the book in front of me right now, so that may actually have been one of the comments on the People's War site. Will check later.

 

[Crumpp]

No, I don't think you're wrong. Several of the accounts in the book talk about nice weather - off the top of my head I think one mentions it being a day like summer should be, or something similar. I donn't have the book in front of me right now, so that may actually have been one of the comments on the People's War site. Will check later.

Additionally, it is entirely possible for any IFR conditions to have pockets of VFR weather. That more than likely is what happened.

Is this confusing to anyone?

 

[Njaco]

To clear it up alittle, I hypothesized that it was SKG 10 based on Pb's post about a Lt. Leoplold Wenger leading the flight. It could have been another unit.

I have found out that a Malcolm V. Lowe, author of several warbird books including one on the Fw 190, was taking personal experiences of that day to write a book about it. Haven't found out if its completed or not.