Bournemouth raid 1943.

[Njaco]

mhuxt, great stuff. Where are you getting this? Is it scanned from a book?

 

[Crumpp]

Sure looks like the Luftwaffe was flying on the 23rd and Crumpp is a freakin moron...

Wow!

Never claimed they were not flying but don't let the truth stop you from making wild distortions.

In fact if you look at the same sources Goss uses, which I also have you will find a unit called SG101 listed that was outside of the weather restricted areas.

AFAIK, the Luftwaffe does not award any type of credit or make any distinction for "operational" taxing. A taxi accident is a taxi accident with no connection to "administrative" or "operational" flying.

Otherwise you could simply abort every mission before take off and get sortie credit.

I don't how many Luftwaffe aircraft you have worked on, restored or own but the few I have offer many more mysteries than they do answers regarding the history.

The "tip and run" raiders are a very challenging research area and are not very well documented.

 

[lesofprimus]

Hmmmm.....

Sure looks like the Luftwaffe was flying on the 23rd and Crumpp is a freakin moron...

Never claimed they were not flying but don't let the truth stop you from making wild distortions.

The German data shows daylight missions were socked in due to weather on the 23 May 1943.

I guess we can just ignore the fact the Germans records show no daylight air activity

I am just saying that is hard for the Germans to be bombing Bournemouth when their airplanes are not flying.

On 23 May 1943 daylight operations for the French based GAF units were restricted. JG26 conducted the only operational flight in the region on the daily evening recon of the English coast.

Once again, SKG 10 was stationed in France. The units in France daylight operations were restricted due to weather.

The other point is the weather severely curtailed GAF operations during the day for the French based units.

Aint no fu*kin wild distortion as*hole, u base ur more knowledgeable opinion on one thing, Jafu2 orders.... Others here have supplied 8 times more than u, and u havent even posted any sort of quote/pic that backs up ur statement other than "saying so".... I guess ur word of mouth is more relevant and believable than a historians researched information....

Stick that sh!t up ur ass and spin.... Ur attitude in this thread is horssh!t, and I find ur presence here to be a waste of ur time and ours...

 

[pbfoot]

I don't how many Luftwaffe aircraft you have worked on, restored or own but the few I have offer many more mysteries than they do answers regarding the history.

.

1 thats flying
But back on thread it seems the bombing of Bournemouth was a common occurence with the raids coinciding with meal times as they were aware the hotels were used as billets for the airmen. another successful was on June 6 42 with 5 killed

 

[Crumpp]

Lets put it context:

No, read the thread please and accurate quote what I say in this thread. My position is clearly outlined. You choose not to read or understand my position not me. Don't pick and choose selective quotes out of context to fit your interpretation.

That is juvenile, flamer, gaming board argumentative styles. Let's act like an adult, using logic and reason.

The context of the thread was about SKG 10. From the 9th posting in this thread:



http://www.ww2aircraft.net/forum/aviation/bournemouth-raid-1943-a-11371.html#post312550



Everyone seemed to agree that SKG 10 had to be the German unit. When I pointed out that there was a snag to the SKG 10 theory, it was conveniently ignored.

Once the original posters attention was given however we quickly worked it out.

SKG 10 could not have been a part of this raid unless it took place on a different day.

All the best,

Crumpp

Others here have supplied 8 times more than u,

All the evidence comes from the same source. Like I said, I have most of the documents Chris Goss references. I don't see any smoking guns in them for SKG 10. I suppose you can hate me and personally attack me but that does not change what I see in the evidence.

In fact I wish it was different. Then I wouldn't be subjected to your personal attacks. I could say, "I was wrong! Learn something everyday and I am glad you guys helped me out!"

Stick that sh!t up ur ass and spin.... Ur attitude in this thread is horssh!t, and I find ur presence here to be a waste of ur time and ours...

What are you a child?? You are indignant that I referred to you as a kiddy? Note that your response proves my point.

 

[Crumpp]

1 thats flying

Which one?

 

[Njaco]

Then I wouldn't be subjected to your personal attacks.

You are indignant that I referred to you as a kiddy?

ummm, whats the difference?

 

[Crumpp]

ummm, whats the difference?

The difference is generalization vs specifics. I simply stated that some of the behaviors exhibited in these internet arguments are childish.

No where did I personally call the "Minister of Whoopass" a child until his behavior made it obvious and did that for him.

 

[lesofprimus]

All the evidence comes from the same source.

And urs doesnt???

It dont make a difference numbnuts, u fell into my trap... Now ur banned.... Ur attitude towards Senior Members here is unacceptable... U behavior to the Mods and Admins in PMs is unacceptable...

Im sick and tired of ur sh!t on this board, so I went out of my way to agitate u to the point of being a cu*t to the wrong swingin dick... It worked and now ur gone....

 

[mhuxt]

I definately have to increase my library! Great stuff.

Hi Njaco:

Some of the stuff is from Chris Goss' research, the Combat Report I downloaded from the U.K. National Archives site, which has a library of CRs which can be downloaded (for a fee) from here:

The National Archives | DocumentsOnline | WW2 air combat reports

I see now however that the report is reproduced in the book, though without the introductory summary details.

The book really is a marvelous piece of work – it is full of photographs and original accounts, especially from the German side. I should stress that it's the story primarily of the German units, as opposed to the story of the coastal towns under attack. It's really aided by the presence of the diary of Lt Wenger, along with his letters home and pictures which he took, both on the ground and in the air. For 23rd May, as noted above, Lt Wenger wrote that the attack was against the centre of the town, that he faced light and heavy flak, and that he spotted four Spitfires, which did not however interfere. (These were likely Spitfires of 616 Squadron, who were scrambled but who failed to intercept.)

The book covers the history of daylight Jabo attacks against southern England up until the middle of 1943. The last of the SKG 10 attacks described took place on 4 June 1943 (IV SKG 10) and 6 June (II SKG 10). Lt Wenger took part in the 4 June attack, and his description of the attack on Eastbourne is included, as is the report from the air-raid authorities and information on the aircraft lost in the attack. This latter was piloted by the Gruppen Adjutant Oblt. Kurt Hevler, who was shot down onto marshland at Normans Bay. The June 6 operation was once again against Eastbourne, and here there is a diagram of the attack as well as information on the aircraft lost by 7/SKG 10.

The point is made that some daylight attacks continued to be carried out on a sporadic basis, using gunfire only.

I'm trying to upload the Hastings report for 23rd May, however that nice Mr. Trujillo and his impish minions are not cooperating (sorry, Aussie internet humour). It's possible the 190 claimed by the 1 Sqn Typhoon was the single aircraft which is shown as having broken away to starboard, and therefore to the East, from which direction the Tiffies were already inbound (Rye lies to the east of Hastings).

I believe Chris Goss is continuing his work on the Luftwaffe Jabos, next book due mid-2008 IIRC.

 

[Njaco]

Thanks mhuxt! I noticed Mr. Goss posts on another forum - in fact there is a thread about these attacks. I may post him and find more - once I can compose an intelligent question!

Well, it looks like this is book #3 on the "Got to Have" list behind "Fighters in Tunisia" and the JG 300 books.

The gunfire aspect is interesting as when I searched for anything related to this there were a few websites from witnesses who stated that mostly the Fws just shot up the towns that were attacked. Doesn't seem to be an effect use of resources.

 

[mhuxt]

Hi Njaco:

Looks like I've finally been able to upload the map of the Hastings attack on the 23rd:



As I say, the Tiffies were coming from the east, though whether or not they bounced the single 190 which peeled away to starboard, I don't know.

 

[Njaco]

So this whole attack has been documented - witnesses, flight plans, bomb drops, etc. What was the b*tching earlier? Jeez!

Thanks.

 

[DerAdlerIstGelandet]

Because you all were kiddies....

 

[Njaco]

 

[mhuxt]

What was the b*tching earlier?

Thanks.

To paraphrase The Matrix: "That, Mr. Njaco, was the sound of the inevitable."

No worries.

 

[davparlr]

Having a few thousand PAR?GCA runs under my belt I know the rules all I'm saying is I'll bet on many occasions the rules went out the door. There was an American Airline that used to claim visual on the aerodrome the WX was 200 and 1/2 but to save fuel(bonus for fuel consumption from the carrier) they used to call visual cut the approach short 2-3 mile turn on pick up the ILS and continue .Who the hell is the controller to tell him what or what he cannot see.

I have a lot of questions about this whole situation (why weren't they flying the ILS to start with, were they on a procedure turn?). I don't see where fuel would be saved if they weren't on a procedure turn. Anyway, if the field was in sight, this is no problem. If it is not, I'll fly another airline. I don't want my pilots lying about conditions. As Crumpp has said, rules are made for a reason. Lots of people died to generate rules. I wouldn't doubt that some pilots would try this.

The 8th AF flew as well. However the Average Allied pilots had the training and experience to handle IMC conditions.

It's hard to imagine a German pilot with any experience at all not being very familiar and proficient with instrument flying since all of their flying is in Europe and in '43 many had several years experience with this weather. I suspect you could find many that were very good, and probably daring, at it. In war, IFR does not apply, only military operating procedures.

I know Crumpp has been removed but I do want to clarify some things about flying large cargo aircraft.

Landing a large cargo jet takes a considerable amount of both skill and planning. If you screw it up, you are dead. Take a C9 in standard conditions for example, at 70,000lbs our threshold speed is Vref+5 or 112KIAS with flaps/slats.

Over the threshold means landing is assured and the flaps have been moved to the full down position and you are effectively slowing from final approach airspeed to touchdown. Flaps are never placed in this position until the pilot is "assured" that a safe landing is apparent. This position generates high drag and little lift so it is effectively air brakes for stopping. Prior to this, the aircraft is flown in the approach condition with approach flaps set, which is easily flyable and maneuverable. For slow, low altitude maneuvering, approach flaps are always deployed. None of this would apply to the American Airline approach example since they would have been configured for approach and not for landing when they were breaking off the approach.

Our V2 or take off safety speed in the C9 is 119 KIAS at 70,000lbs. Jets are thrust limited at low velocity.

Thrust to weight of a C-9 at this configuration is .4 or about the same an F-86F at takeoff. Modern jets have plenty of power but you DO NOT try to climb until you have climb airspeed.

It takes all of our thrust to maintain our 112 KIAS and we have no more thrust available to devote to increasing speed. Only a configuration change to lower drag can give us the thrust required to make take off safety speed.

I am not sure of what Crumpp is saying here (unfortunately Crumpp is gone before I could respond). He seems to be implying that, on approach, power is limited such that maneuver is impossible without reconfiguration (he is assuming the aircraft is in final configuration for landing). First, in a C-141 (three times the weight of a C-9), I have never used anything near takeoff rated thrust (TRT) on approach and landing and I highly doubt TRT is ever used on final for a C-9. I also have no doubt that, with TRT, or even normal rated thrust (NRT), and configured for landing, with flaps set at landing, that I could increase airspeed in level flight and climb, when climb airspeed was obtained. Of course, this applies at normal landing weights, at max gross weight, this would be sporty and TRT might be required. Second, for any maneuvering at low level other than landing assured, flaps are always placed in an approach setting. Normally, low and slow maneuvering is no problem. I have flown an at-minimums circling approach, fully configured with approach flaps (at Keflavik, Iceland) at 500 ft AGL (altitude above ground) and my only concern, other than basic aircraft control, was keeping the field in sight.

You can see why the go around in a large transport jet can be problematic and requires prior planning.

All go-arounds require prior planning. In a C-141, go-arounds were simple, Throttles at NRT, flaps approach, and let those magnificent TF33s eat huge chunks out of the air and accelerate to climb airspeed and then follow missed approach instructions (on the approach plate, which you had previously reviewed). If you are very slow, after throttles are reduced, settling on the runway may be required while you are accelerating, primarily due to engine speed up. Now, large heavy aircraft do take some special attention similar to that of a truck driver's. It turns slower, climbs slower, accelerates slower (certainly unlike the T-38 that just jumps when you light the burners), etc. and therefore some more planning and patience is required. Once you become use to it, it is comes natural and not problematic.

It's called the "Sabre Dance" and generally a symptom of early rotation. It will happen in any jet that is behind the power curve.

That is why it is important to maintain a safe airspeed unless landing is assured.

 

[pbfoot]

I think I should clarify it was an american registered airline not AA the airline is no longer flying . I can't call the pilot a liar all I can go one is what was the wx and RVR etc he may of had the rwy visual but aircraft behind him and in front didn't and I had no windows . I'm sure in all the years flying you have observed someone stretching the truth , pilots are no different

 

[davparlr]

I think I should clarify it was an american registered airline not AA the airline is no longer flying . I can't call the pilot a liar all I can go one is what was the wx and RVR etc he may of had the rwy visual but aircraft behind him and in front didn't and I had no windows . I'm sure in all the years flying you have observed someone stretching the truth , pilots are no different

Most of the guys I flew with in the AF were pretty by-the-book pilots. I have read things about commercial pilot that make me wonder. I did work with a man who was a WWII B-26 pilot who commuted to work in Navion. The FAA was always after his license for busting minimums. He'd fly an approach in Hawthorne, Ca. and would just continue down till he saw the ground, he could recognize his position and fly to the runway. He also drug his tail across down the runway once because he had the wrong fuel tank selected. He quickly change tanks and the plane pulled up. And then there was the time he crashed on top of a mountain and he and his wife and mother-in-law walked away. He died while commuting by running into a mountain with a fellow commuter.

Could you explain to me how the airliner could save fuel by executing the maneuver you were talking about.

Where did you work as a controller?

I've flown into Gander, Goose Bay, and St. Johns.

 

[pbfoot]

Rather then doing the whole ILS he'd be given radar vectors to about a 9-11 mile final we'd turn him on and they'd call the ILS . This particular crew called visual (passed him off to tower)made a 3-4 mile turn on picked up the ILS (you could watch on the PAR as he corrected) and landed this saved him about 10 miles flying . If he had remained IMC doing the ILS we would have flight followed him on the PAR .This was at Goose circa 8o-83 .