British Debts

Should British WWII debts be written off?


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SIN? The US sat on its @$$ during this period too!
The British French high command did not think that an attack into Germany would be successful, so the were building up their forces (especially air!) preparing for the expected attack on France. Why should the British French be held responsible for the defence of Poland? They did declare war, yes, but they are under no "obligation" to pursue war other than how they see fit, in their own national interests. Why should the US not also be responsible for protecting a fellow democracy?

Regardless of whether you think the US should or should not have intervened, the case is not even remotely close to the relationship between Poland and the UK and France. Just out of curiosity Freebird - when did the US pledge that they would enter a European war to defend any democracy????

Correct me if I'm wrong - but didn't both the UK and France have alliances with Poland in case they were attacked by Germany? Mutual assistance!? Hardly.
 
The UK did not have as close an alliance with the poles that France did. The UK alliance with Poland did not specifically state that the UK would be obligated to invade Germany, and they were not capable of landing in Poland. They warned Germany that an attack on Poland would lead to war, and they declared war. The US did not pledge to help any democracy or defend against Fascism, you can judge that any way you like.

My point was that to expect that the British to pursue the war in any particular way is not for any other nation to decide. I did not understand where the "Sin" came from. The British lived up to the agreement, which did not call for any specific remedy, and Poland was eventually liberated from the Nazi's

Mutual assistance, what exactly do you think the British could have done? (remember that the French were the larger allied army and refused to leave the "Magiot line") Parachute 10 UK divisions into Warsaw?
 
The UK did not have as close an alliance with the poles that France did. The UK alliance with Poland did not specifically state that the UK would be obligated to invade Germany, and they were not capable of landing in Poland. They warned Germany that an attack on Poland would lead to war, and they declared war. The US did not pledge to help any democracy or defend against Fascism, you can judge that any way you like.

My point was that to expect that the British to pursue the war in any particular way is not for any other nation to decide. I did not understand where the "Sin" came from. The British lived up to the agreement, which did not call for any specific remedy, and Poland was eventually liberated from the Nazi's

Mutual assistance, what exactly do you think the British could have done? (remember that the French were the larger allied army and refused to leave the "Magiot line") Parachute 10 UK divisions into Warsaw?

The British and the French in 1939 had FAR different capabilities. I wasn't supposing the British launch a major ground offensive into Germany. However, France was certainly capable of launching an offensive into western Germany, and Britain would have been able to support such an operation.
 
You are right about that, the French were capable, unfortunately many of them had lost the will to fight. And they did not have strong political or military leadership either. It was a bit brazen for Chamberlain to "draw a line in the sand" so to speak, when Britain did not have a large army, but it was a bluff Hitler called it.
 
SIN? The US sat on its @$$ during this period too!

Was it the United State's war at that point?

NO! It was a European Regional conflict.

freebird said:
The British French high command did not think that an attack into Germany would be successful, so the were building up their forces (especially air!) preparing for the expected attack on France.

Whole lot of good that did them! :lol:

If the French and British governments had not followed a policy of appeasement, none of it would have ever happened anyhow.

freebird said:
Why should the British French be held responsible for the defence of Poland?

Because they guaranteed the independence of Poland prior to the invasion. They chose to give an ultimatum to Germany to withdraw from Poland.

Did the United States do this? No because it was at that point a regional European conflict and remained so until Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and Germany declared war on the United States.

Ever heard of the Franco-Polish Military Alliance

France guaranteed she would grant Poland military credit in case of a war between Poland and Germany. It also stated that it would start minor air and land offensive immediatly and to start a major offensive with 15 days after the declaration of war.

France declared war on Germany on Sept 3, 1939.

Now for the United Kingdom.

On March 30, 1939, the government of the United Kingdom pledged to defend Poland, in the event of a German attack, and Romania in case of other threats. The British "guarantee" of Poland was only of Polish independence, and pointly excluded Polish territorial integrity.

"This declaration was further amended in April, when Poland's minister of foreign affairs Colonel Józef Beck met with Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. In the aftermath of the talks, a mutual assistance treaty was signed. On August 25 the Polish-British Common Defence Pact was signed as an annex to Polish-French alliance. Like the "guarantee" of March 30, the Anglo-Polish alliance committed Britain only to the defence of Polish independence. It was clearly aimed against German aggression. In case of war, United Kingdom was to start hostilities as soon as possible; initially helping Poland with air raids against the German war industry, and joining the struggle on land as soon as the British Expeditionary Corps arrived in France. In addition, a military credit was granted and armament was to reach Polish or Romanian ports in early autumn.

However, both British and French governments had other plans than fulfilling the treaties with Poland. On May 4, 1939, a meeting was held in Paris, at which it was decided that the fate of Poland depends on the final outcome of the war, which will depend on our ability to defeat Germany rather than to aid Poland at the beginning. Poland's government was not notified of this decision, and the Polish–British talks in London were continued. A full military alliance treaty was ready to be signed on August 22, but His Majesty's Government postponed the signing until August 25, 1939."
Western betrayal - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

freebird said:
They did declare war, yes, but they are under no "obligation" to pursue war other than how they see fit, in their own national interests.

Read above...

freebird said:
Why should the US not also be responsible for protecting a fellow democracy?

Read above again....
 
You are right about that, the French were capable, unfortunately many of them had lost the will to fight. And they did not have strong political or military leadership either. It was a bit brazen for Chamberlain to "draw a line in the sand" so to speak, when Britain did not have a large army, but it was a bluff Hitler called it.

And how is that the fault of the United States?
 
Freebird, your arguments are a the reverse of many who today are against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. You said the US should of stood up to Nazism and Fascism - so we attack countries who did nothing to us except rattle their sabers? Some argue today that the war on terror (especially in Iraq) was being fought to prevent radical Islam from growing, but those against it have always maintained that there was no reason to go into Iraq. Wouldn't the US been accused of entering a conflict for no reason in 1939 just as we are being accused today?

Bottom line is the European War didn't concern the US in 1939 but we still helped in the form of Lend Lease that eventually affected our neutrality and sovereignty. So with that said "loaning" the materials of the trade to our allies were more than justified. At the end of it all (and as stated earlier) we didn't ask for a dime back from the Marshal Plan, and I rarely see those who got assistance through that plan actually thank the US for their generosity.
 
Arsenal - you have good points in your post, but nothing to sustain the notion that the French couldn't have launched a successful invasion.

Did you actually read anything I wrote? Those were but a few of the more important reasons why the French could not have launched a successful invasion. Perhaps their Saar offensive should have pressed harder, or deeper, maybe relieve some pressure on Poland, who knows? I feel I've pointed out some hard facts before and at the beginning of the war to explain why the French were unable to do much of anything.


Now how in God's name can you say that French officer's didn't seem to care about their troops????

While the French 1st Armee and Maginot Line troops were fairly well looked after and well treated (and well respected too), the same cannot be said for the reserve and Class B troops holding the crucial Ardennes sector. They were the weakest elements of the whole army, treated most poorly, and ill-equipped. There is plethora of written evidence of French troops complaining that their officers were nowhere to be seen. Indeed, during the Phoney War training was neglected, leaves were disrupted, food was often left for the troops to forage or barter with local farmers, boredom and even cabin-fever set in some cases, all while their Lt. or Cpt. was resting comfortably in the town hotels having nice dinners going to the theatre. This kind of officer-soldier disconnect is exemplified by the French CnC Gamelin who posted himself in a huge and dreary chateau located in Vincennes. He was far from the front and shut from the outside world except for the occassional courrier on motorcycles that would deliver news and send orders. Again, NO RADIOS!

It's also worth keeping in mind the highly political nature of the troops themselves, who were often at odds over eachother in their treatment. At the height of the Phoney War, there was a genuine fear among the lower-medium ranks of repeat of the 1917 mutiny because of communistic inspired dissent.

Come on - no basis for saying regardless of what someone wrote in a book.

I think I've discovered the crux of the problem. Thanks for spelling it out.
 
and I rarely see those who got assistance through that plan actually thank the US for their generosity.


This is simply not true, and I think you know that. Most Europeans are plainly aware that post-war recovery would have been extremely difficult or even impossible without the Marshall Plan. In a way, I would argue that it WAS paid off too, by simply preventing western Europe from falling into political and economical chaos and not adopting a Stalinist communists ideals. Wasn't that afterall, one of the main goals for the success of the Marshall Plan? As for the war debts, lend lease and reverse lend lease with re-loans and etc., I think that subject has been fairly well covered here already.
 
"(Then Colonel Charles de Gaulle had published 2 books considered somewhat avant-garde among contemporary military thinkers, and which also made him many enemies. Few people will acknowledge that Guderian actually pinched a few ideas from de Gaulle's book "The Edge of the Sword" for his own "Achtung Panzer")."

These people who don't acknowledge de Gaulle most likely haven't read Achtung Panzer because Guderian clearly mentions de Gaulle, and the French and British leadership in armoured tactics during the 1920s.

"French troops were almost immediately caught in minefields and mine detecting equipment was not to be found. Also, the further they went into Germany, the closer they came to the Seigfreid Line. Again, contrary to popular opinion, this line was not abandoned and it's artillery was fully manned and operational."

Read Panzer Battles by Maj. Gen. von Mellenthin and you'll discover what the Seigfreid Line was really like. The German propaganda machine had a great effect on the French strategy; they seemed to believe it was actually a strong defensive line when the Germans knew all along it was poorly manned and even less well built.

I do have to say the post was good but as mkloby stated it gives no real reason for a lack of French invasion in 1939 when the Wehrmacht and its armour was in Poland. The failings of French equipment and planning are all a failing of the French military and a failing of France. The strategy of France should have been one based around fighting on her own for the cases where she didn't have allies, instead of basing the war strategy around allied efforts.
 
These people who don't acknowledge de Gaulle most likely haven't read Achtung Panzer because Guderian clearly mentions de Gaulle, and the French and British leadership in armoured tactics during the 1920s.

I would agree.

Read Panzer Battles by Maj. Gen. von Mellenthin and you'll discover what the Seigfreid Line was really like. The German propaganda machine had a great effect on the French strategy; they seemed to believe it was actually a strong defensive line when the Germans knew all along it was poorly manned and even less well built.

I have this book and read it several times. It is a good book. However, isn't this what I already said, about French intel believing it was fully manned? They, nor the British knew that skeleton crews remained and that the full weight of German armor was in Poland. Given their poor intel, it is understandable why they didn't advance any further. We seem to agree on this.


I do have to say the post was good but as mkloby stated it gives no real reason for a lack of French invasion in 1939 when the Wehrmacht and its armour was in Poland. The failings of French equipment and planning are all a failing of the French military and a failing of France. The strategy of France should have been one based around fighting on her own for the cases where she didn't have allies, instead of basing the war strategy around allied efforts.

Again, I point to the fact that French military thinking knew since even before WW 1 that they could not possibly win a major conflict coming from the east without large numbers of allies/allied troops. Yes, I agree they had major failings, but what I'm trying to say is that under their circumstances it is easy for us today using 20/20 hindsight to clearly see these failings and thus pass judgement on what went wrong and why. To fully appreciate those difficulties, we must imagine ourselves in their shoes with the knowledge they had.

I appreciate you thoughts on the matter.
 
I agree in the sense that France was in a bad situation internally in 1939.

Blame must rest on the French administration through the pre-war years, however, as they failed to prepare France for a war. To me it seems bizarre that France would take a line of thought that puts them at a disadvantage against any European power - after all, through the centuries France had been a major player in European politics through force.

I don't see where the belief came from that they could not defeat Germany on their own. France should have been in a position to defeat Germany in 1939, and even in 1940... it's not so much an attack on France but an attack on its government for failing their own nation in preparation for defence.

I recognise the French would not have been aware of the lack of ability in the Western Wall - but I've never seen any far stretch of effort on the French behalf to gain more information on German positions.
 
I agree in the sense that France was in a bad situation internally in 1939.

Blame must rest on the French administration through the pre-war years, however, as they failed to prepare France for a war. To me it seems bizarre that France would take a line of thought that puts them at a disadvantage against any European power - after all, through the centuries France had been a major player in European politics through force.

Absolutely, the French inter-war governments must bear the larger burden of blame for this. That is a good point, though I do not believe they would have intentionally put themselves at a disadvantage vis-a-vis Germany or anyone else. Thats the problem about winning a war (WW 1), it gives the victors a sense that what they had done before was the way to do it, therefore there was no reason to believe it couldn't work again.

I don't see where the belief came from that they could not defeat Germany on their own. France should have been in a position to defeat Germany in 1939, and even in 1940... it's not so much an attack on France but an attack on its government for failing their own nation in preparation for defence.

This pre-WW 1 study was based a lot on the geographical weakness of France, and they saw it as the tip of a funnel through which enemies could come pouring through, and the fact that at the time of the study, Alsace and Lorraine were firmly in German hands, was another great disadvantage. For the French, the biggest threat came from the east, though at the same time it had overseas colonies to protect. This required a large navy. Every franc spent on the ships was one franc less for the army. Lastly, the common belief that Germany would again attack through the lowlands was pretty much ingrained by the time WW 2 came around, as it was the best grounds to move large armies, and always has been.

I recognise the French would not have been aware of the lack of ability in the Western Wall - but I've never seen any far stretch of effort on the French behalf to gain more information on German positions.

Very true. Of all the areas of French intel, perhaps the one that was most reliable was the airforce which kept up a constant stream of reports, much of which would be confirmed via other reports. Yet, Gamelin and his gang wouldn't listen. If anything, I think that had French PM Reynaud been able to sack Gamelin, things could have had a different outcome. Reynaud was certainly a more forward think politician and he hated Gamelin, but unfortunately Gamelin had too many friends in high places, so Reynaud was thwarted. It wasn't until things became irreversibly bad that Gamelin was botted and in came Weygand, who wasn't much better.

In all, the French were forced to correct bad mistakes with other bad mistakes. Much of it caused by themselves when the war started, but I would also say that they found themselves with their hands tied on the world diplomatic front during the interwar years.
 
This is simply not true, and I think you know that. Most Europeans are plainly aware that post-war recovery would have been extremely difficult or even impossible without the Marshall Plan. In a way, I would argue that it WAS paid off too, by simply preventing western Europe from falling into political and economical chaos and not adopting a Stalinist communists ideals. Wasn't that afterall, one of the main goals for the success of the Marshall Plan? As for the war debts, lend lease and reverse lend lease with re-loans and etc., I think that subject has been fairly well covered here already.
Notice my choice of words...

"and I rarely see those who got assistance through that plan actually thank the US for their generosity."

From what you describe I agree 100%, but let's face it, there are many in the European continent a lot less grateful....

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Did you actually read anything I wrote? Those were but a few of the more important reasons why the French could not have launched a successful invasion. Perhaps their Saar offensive should have pressed harder, or deeper, maybe relieve some pressure on Poland, who knows? I feel I've pointed out some hard facts before and at the beginning of the war to explain why the French were unable to do much of anything.
I read your entire post. Again - some very good points regarding hardships facing the French, but there was nothing that supported that they were unable to launch an offensive. Poor senior leadership does not equate with being unable to lauch an offensive operation. If our MEF failed to launch an operation based upon that logic - heads would be rolling.

While the French 1st Armee and Maginot Line troops were fairly well looked after and well treated (and well respected too), the same cannot be said for the reserve and Class B troops holding the crucial Ardennes sector. They were the weakest elements of the whole army, treated most poorly, and ill-equipped. There is plethora of written evidence of French troops complaining that their officers were nowhere to be seen. Indeed, during the Phoney War training was neglected, leaves were disrupted, food was often left for the troops to forage or barter with local farmers, boredom and even cabin-fever set in some cases, all while their Lt. or Cpt. was resting comfortably in the town hotels having nice dinners going to the theatre. This kind of officer-soldier disconnect is exemplified by the French CnC Gamelin who posted himself in a huge and dreary chateau located in Vincennes. He was far from the front and shut from the outside world except for the occassional courrier on motorcycles that would deliver news and send orders. Again, NO RADIOS!
I was speaking specifically about the part about many of there officers seemed to not care about the troops. I don't think you, or anyone else, is qualified to make such a generalization, even if there is writing by troops that stated such things. We're talking about thousands of men here.


I think I've discovered the crux of the problem. Thanks for spelling it out.
Not sure what you mean by that. I wasn't disparaging those accounts, but rather commenting on the use of these (which is a small number of men in the whole scheme of things) to draw such a brash generalization on the judgment of character of the corps of officers.
 
Freebird, your arguments are a the reverse of many who today are against the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. You said the US should of stood up to Nazism and Fascism - so we attack countries who did nothing to us except rattle their sabers? Some argue today that the war on terror (especially in Iraq) was being fought to prevent radical Islam from growing, but those against it have always maintained that there was no reason to go into Iraq. Wouldn't the US been accused of entering a conflict for no reason in 1939 just as we are being accused today?

Bottom line is the European War didn't concern the US in 1939 but we still helped in the form of Lend Lease that eventually affected our neutrality and sovereignty. So with that said "loaning" the materials of the trade to our allies were more than justified. At the end of it all (and as stated earlier) we didn't ask for a dime back from the Marshal Plan, and I rarely see those who got assistance through that plan actually thank the US for their generosity.

If the US had intervened in 1939 it would not have been against sabre-rattling, it would be after the Nazi's invaded a sovereign country. However, as you and other correctly point out they were not obligated. I do not agree with many who say the US should not have done anything in Iraq, I just take issue with the plans for post-war Iraq, which were very poor (or absent!)
 
Was it the United State's war at that point?

NO! It was a European Regional conflict.

I did not say that the US was obligated, I only took issue with the idea that it was wrong for the British to "sit" during the 8 months from sept 39 - May 40, they were not capable of attacking the Germans without the co-operation of the French, who declined to push too far into Germany

Whole lot of good that did them! :lol:



The period WAS put to good use, as the British fighters in 1940 were Hurricanes, in 1939 they still had bi-planes! The winter was also put to good use, at least by the BEF, training preparing defences. (that were later abandoned by the forward swing into Belgium - see "inept planning" below) The BEF and to some extent the French were capable of defending against the Germans in 1940 it was the inept planning leadership of the French high command that allowed the stunning german victory.

If the French and British governments had not followed a policy of appeasement, none of it would have ever happened anyhow.

There was some feeling that the Germans were too harshly punished after WWI. It was also felt by some that if they redressed some German complaints, a major war could be avoided. They did not expect that Hitler would turn out to be a mad warped dictator (obviously they had not read his book!) I'm not going to defend appeasment here, I didn't agree with it, although it was a very complicated question, not black white as some make it out to be.

Because they guaranteed the independence of Poland prior to the invasion. They chose to give an ultimatum to Germany to withdraw from Poland.

And Poland was eventually liberated from the Germans. They had hoped that an ultimatum would force Hitler to back down, turned out it didn't work

Did the United States do this? No because it was at that point a regional European conflict and remained so until Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and Germany declared war on the United States.

Ever heard of the Franco-Polish Military Alliance

France guaranteed she would grant Poland military credit in case of a war between Poland and Germany. It also stated that it would start minor air and land offensive immediatly
and to start a major offensive with 15 days after the declaration of war.
France declared war on Germany on Sept 3, 1939.

I'm not going to answer for the French here, someone else can take up the torch.:confused:

Now for the ]United Kingdom.

On March 30, 1939, the government of the United Kingdom pledged to defend Poland, in the event of a German attack, and Romania in case of other threats. The British "guarantee" of Poland was only of Polish independence, and pointly excluded Polish territorial integrity.

"This declaration was further amended in April, when Poland's minister of foreign affairs Colonel Józef Beck met with Neville Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. In the aftermath of the talks, a mutual assistance treaty was signed. On August 25 the Polish-British Common Defence Pact was signed as an annex to Polish-French alliance. Like the "guarantee" of March 30, the Anglo-Polish alliance committed Britain only to the defence of Polish independence. It was clearly aimed against German aggression. In case of war, United Kingdom was to start hostilities as soon as possible; initially helping Poland with air raids against the German war industry, and joining the struggle on land as soon as the British Expeditionary Corps arrived in France. In addition, a military credit was granted and armament was to reach Polish or Romanian ports in early autumn.

OK, I will have to state that puting a treaty on paper with the Poles was a bad idea considering the British position. They still could have given Hitler an ultimatum without tying themselves down with a treaty.

Hostilities "As soon as possible" was not feasable without the larger partner, the French, and "ASAP" turned out to be May 1940


However, both British and French governments had other plans than fulfilling the treaties with Poland. On May 4, 1939, a meeting was held in Paris, at which it was decided that the fate of Poland depends on the final outcome of the war, which will depend on our ability to defeat Germany rather than to aid Poland at the beginning. Poland's government was not notified of this decision, and the Polish–British talks in London were continued. A full military alliance treaty was ready to be signed on August 22, but His Majesty's Government postponed the signing until August 25, 1939."
Western betrayal - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

I guess the French can say that the "Saar" offensive fulfilled their "15 day clause"
 
I guess the French can say that the "Saar" offensive fulfilled their "15 day clause"


Hardly. By the time they pulled out, the French had realized fully well that the Saarland adventure was a futile offensive. If anything, they were smacked with the harsh realities of discovering that their armies and especially their doctrines were sorely out of date, and unfortunately for them, there were no quick fixes to be found, at least not in time for May 1940.


Moderator: is it possible to create a new Blitz 1940 thread and move these last 2-3 pages of relevant postings to it? The debt discussion seems to have run it's course and the thread has gone way off topic. Just wondering...
 
I guess the French can say that the "Saar" offensive fulfilled their "15 day clause"

I will get back to this post when I get back after the weekend.

The only thing I will say now is again that it was not the Responsibility of the US in 1939 to do anything at all. If it was anyones responsibility it was Britian and France and the rest of Europe.

So the arguement that US sat on there ass holds zero weight.
 
Moderator: is it possible to create a new Blitz 1940 thread and move these last 2-3 pages of relevant postings to it? The debt discussion seems to have run it's course and the thread has gone way off topic. Just wondering...

I can do so but it will have to wait until I get back from Stuttgart this weekend. I am only on for a very short time at the moment.
 

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