Could the Japanese have captured Hawaii if they had won the battle of Midway?

Schweik said:

Where is all the fuel (and ammo etc.) coming from to supply the subs and B-17s and hundreds of fighters operating out of Hawaii? Doesn't Hawaii itself have to be resupplied? Don't the Hawaiian Islands have a large civilian population with it's own needs?

I don't foresee B-17s and Catalinas flying night raids being a major problem for small island airstrips. They weren't that easy for Japanese pilots to shoot down (usually) but they never hit much either in most cases.

With the capture of Atolls the Japanese could, in theory, use army planes and army pilots, who were not as rare as trained carrier capable navy pilots.

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Yes, Hawaii would have to be resupplied but, and it's a BIG but, there were already substantial resources on in the islands. There was fuel oil for the ships which the Japanese failed to destroy on 7 Dec 1941. There were large airfields which were already equipped to operate large numbers of aircraft, including sufficient supplies for long-range reconnaissance forces. Yes stocks would be depleted and need replacement, but that's a lot different than having to establish those capabilities from scratch, as the Japanese would have to do for any atoll-based airfields.

The US could out build the Japanese 6 ways till sunday when it came to making bases and airfields.

"General Dwight D. Eisenhower: "Incidentally, four other pieces of equipment that most senior officers came to regard as among the most vital to our success in Africa and Europe were the bulldozer, the jeep, the 2-1/2 - ton truck and the C-47 airplane." "

"Admiral Halsey offered: "If I had to give credit to the instruments and machines that won us the war in the Pacific, I would rate them in this order: Submarines first, radar second, planes third, bulldozers fourth." "

Caterpillar alone built over 9600 crawler tractors in 1942, Oahu had it's own narrow gauge steam railways,

give the US 3 months to fortify the Hawaiian Islands after Midway, and the month of June for the Japanese is just getting their forces back from Midway and refueling and setting out on their first trip back or to one of the hypothetical bases.

Yeah those are good points.

The French Frigate Schoal airfield was small and cramped. Intended only as a refueling stop for small aircraft heading to and from Midway. A squadron of B-17's could obliterate the island if the Japanese decided to seize it. As for Johnston Atoll, same thing. Totally undeveloped with a small runway. No room to put anything. It wasn't even worthy of a fleet anchorage.

As for the IJN using their subs to interdict shipping between Hawaii and the US mainland? It wasn't in their doctrine. They saw the sub force as a means to go after warships. They would rather let a convoy of fat juicy freighters and tankers go by and to take on a destroyer.

For anyone who thinks that the French frigate Schoals would have been useful for the Japanese.

Pacific Airfields

syscom3 said:

For anyone who thinks that the French frigate Schoals would have been useful for the Japanese.

Pacific Airfields

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In other words the Japanese need
1. a lot dredging equipment
2. a lot of construction equipment
3. a lot of time (an awful lot of time)

To have anything more than a sheltered anchorage at this location.
Putting a flying boat/float base within range of land based air from Hawaii doesn't sound like a good idea.
Not to mention that cruisers could run in under cover of darkness, bombard and get back to land based fighter coverage by dawn.

I believe I stipulated the limitations of French Frigate shoals when I brought it up.

I don't think most of the raids Saburo Sakai was talking about were actually B-17s, some of them were but most were B-25s and B-26s based at Port Morseby or later, Milne Bay and other South-eastern New Guinea airfields. Quite a few of them were lost doing these kinds of raids. B-17s were indeed hard for the Japanese to shoot down, though certainly not impossible. However B-17s did not have a great record for bombing accuracy in the Pacific. Especially when you are just sending a squadron or two to attack something. Yest they could improve those odds by bombing at low-level during the day, but that also greatly increases the likelihood of being shot down by Zeros if there are any there.

SBDs could kill that atoll if you wanted to risk getting your Carriers close enough. A-36s could hit targets pretty well but they did not seem to have the range of the later P-51 series. Maybe P-38s flying as fighter-bombers could pull it off.

Shortround6 said:

In other words the Japanese need
1. a lot dredging equipment
2. a lot of construction equipment
3. a lot of time (an awful lot of time)

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Like I said, I think I acknowledged French Frigate shoals was quite limited, Johnston Atoll seems to have been a more substantial facility (and there was definitely more room to park aircraft and billet troops and support personnel) but it too had limitations. Both did already have airfields in 1942 contrary to what someone claimed upthread. So they could be used. As I acknowledged already, it would take an organizational genius on the Japanese side (Yamamoto?) to succeed in putting something plausible together with these limited assets but I don't think it can be entirely ruled out - except for the fuel problem.

To have anything more than a sheltered anchorage at this location.

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Basically that is what I saw FFS as, a sheltered anchorage, room for seaplane fighters, and a small number of medium bombers.

Putting a flying boat/float base within range of land based air from Hawaii doesn't sound like a good idea.

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I'm not sure about that, A6M2-N seemed to do reasonably well against Allied land based fighters. If you had a lot of them it could be a pretty hairy sortie. Also 500 miles away isn't really quite in range for most of the US fighters in 1942 except maybe the aforementioned P-38.

Not to mention that cruisers could run in under cover of darkness, bombard and get back to land based fighter coverage by dawn.

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Sure they could, and they probably would because they didn't know any better at that time, but they'd be risking night engagements with the Japanese fleet that might be lurking. Even just a few destroyers with deadly long-lance torpedoes could do immense damage to US heavy cruisers as we saw in the unfortunate Battle of Tassafaronga on Nov 30, 1942 where a force of 5 x US CA and 4 x US DD encountered 8 x Japanese DD and got wrecked, with 1 CA sunk and 3 crippled, for the loss of 1 IJN DD.

Some of those Japanese Destroyers at Tassafaronga were also modified for transport duties just like some US warships had been - I didn't have time to address this comment upthread but no they didn't just put cots on the deck of those ships. So the Japanese force was not even really a full strength Destroyer squadron.

Schweik said:

Some of those Japanese Destroyers at Tassafaronga were also modified for transport duties just like some US warships had been - I didn't have time to address this comment upthread but no they didn't just put cots on the deck of those ships. So the Japanese force was not even really a full strength Destroyer squadron.

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Must be a different battle of Tassafaronga than described on Wiki.

Battle of Tassafaronga - Wikipedia

according to Wiki (which could very well be wrong) the Japanese destroyers in that battle were not carrying any troops but rather supplies in steel drums.
The "modifications" to some of the destroyers were simply leaving the extra reload torpedoes at the base, no mention of set of tubes taken out, all tubes on the ships were loaded?

If true this proves very little about the ability of the Japanese to move troops on voyages of several weeks on destroyers.

Twist this a bit: Suppose the Kido Butai had a sealift for 3 divisions to hit the Oahu beaches on 7Dec? US Ground troops are all excited and active, but uncoordinated and busy with the events at Pearl Harbor, AAF is knocked out, and the Navy is on fire.

The objective of these 3 divisions is NOT to HOLD the new IJN territory of Hawaii, but to deny its use to the US.

If the IJN/IJA held Hawaii for 6 months only, how would that have affected Guadalcanal, or the defense of Australia?

A week of mortar fire on the oil tanks would have had a bigger cost to the US than the eventual loss of the 3 divisions would have to the IJA.

I opine here, that the IJN would have been helped more by sending both Kirishima and Hiei into the Pearl channel both to shoot themselves empty blowing up everything "Navy" there, and then scuttling themselves across the channel as blockships, than they could hope to gain by the service of those two ships. Other ships might do the job (Furutaka class) as well. The point is that killing Pearl for the 6 months the divisions hold plus time required to repair the harbor and facilities would be much greater than the value of those two battleships.

Hawaii can grow the food the garrison needs, and the captured troops/Americans can work those fields; ammo resupply would be needed.

The cost to the US is not just what's at Pearl ... it's the (new) minimum distance to support Australia or South Pacific actions.

Now: What would it take to re-take Hawaii? What was left in the Pacific? Could the IJN make a deal: USA neutral and Hawaii returned? The Yorktown and Saratoga carriers could harry the Garrison, but the others would be stretched to do so (range must cover out and back since there's no refueling at Pearl). The Destroyer and Sub fleets are trapped by the blockships...

Interesting and bold (and not a little horrifying) proposition there.

The madder the plan the more it might work.

I admire the enthusiasm.

But why waste Kongos like that?

This is all bets in on the turn of a card. The Japanese could lose the whole of the IJN if this goes south.

This operation could make the Charge of the Light Brigade look like a sensible military exercise!

That's a no from me.

This has cropped up in a few threads before. For the Japanese launching an air attack from several hundred miles away is one thing. it is another thing entirely to get an invasion force (especially three divisions) 5-10 miles off the coast without being detected. Even coming in darkness in the night means the invasion fleet (troops ships and freighters) would have had to have been 100-130 miles away from Oahu the evening before (depending on speed)

If spotted the surprise is gone and the whole Pearl Harbor attack becomes a fiasco. The American may not have been the best fighters going at the time or even the sharpest tools in the box but give them 9-10 hours of warning and what would the reception have been like?

People argue over how much difference 30 minutes of warning would have made.

The problem with the plan is the same as most plans. It strictly depends on the enemy doing nothing or somehow paralysed into passivity.

But that's what happened to France in 1940 and the Channel Dash in 1942.

So there are examples where hairbrained schemes do actually work.

Considering the way the war ended I would give this the green light cos war gonna end bad anyway so may as well go for broke.

Although the Japanese loved their suicide but 2 Kongos and their crew on the death sleigh ride to oblivion is too much for 1941.

Smaller destroyers with Long Lance akimbo would be effective. The Kongos armour was poorly equipped for battleship guns so could easily go bang in any kind of big gun duel. Hiei proved that even cruiser guns caused damage. Kirishima took 16 inch pills that even Yamato would have problems with so don't hold that against the Kongos.

But I admire this plan for sheer undiluted lunacy. It's so insane, it has to work.

"2 Kongos and their crew on the death sleigh ride "

Name 2 others that could block the channel? Name 2 others that, showing up while all are busy with a harbor on fire, could cause as much destruction?
And after the firing, and the block & scuttle, the crews join the ground troops in taking Oahu. These are WWI dreadnaught-era battlecruisers upgraded to Fast Battleships in name, at least...

and if the IJN couldn't afford to sacrifice these two ancient ships to blockade/trap/bottle-up the whole 7th fleet, then the IJN is playing at the wrong table.

The Basket said:

But I admire this plan for sheer undiluted lunacy. It's so insane, it has to work.

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+1 on this! I really love how daffy it is.

I agree though that it may be too suicidal for 1941. But it's a really interesting idea and I think I'd love to see in a movie or a video game.

Also in 1941 American aircraft aren't going to be as good and American infantry / marines aren't either (compared to a year or 18 months later)

The Kongos were modernised so certainly not ancient or useless.

Any ship can be a block ship. An old tanker would do.

If a Kongo goes into Pearl Harbour its going to meet a battleship of some variety. Not all battleships were knocked out and there was no guarantee that all the battleships would be. So at the literal point blank range, it's going to get pulverised.

Naval guns can be fired from miles away so the Kongos could be used in a shore bombardment role which again offers better safety.

A night attack by destroyers firing long lances at point blank range would be devastating.

This is what happened at Port Arthur so the Japanese have form.

Also if the land invasion is successful then they can bring in heavy guns and shell the ships from overlooking vantage points. Again this happens at Port Arthur.

Hyuga and Ise would probably be better than the Kongos if you want to get shot of obsolete junk.

Wars are not won in an afternoon and there would be a good chance the IJN naval assets would be needed against the Royal Navy or a resurgent USN down the line.

The Kongos were fast enough to be carrier escort and I would not be willing to throw away useful assets.

"Hyuga and Ise would probably be better than the Kongos if you want to get shot of obsolete junk. "

Having looked over the wisdom and accuracy of Wikipedia *cough* I do agree Ise and Hyuga would be less of a sacrifice than any two Kongos. Heavier and deeper draft, they'd block better.

"Any ship can be a block ship. An old tanker would do. "

Check the width (c. 1000ft) and depth (c. 50ft) of the channel, and the equipment available to clear the channel.

Seems like a plan. By throwing everything they have at a forward base with no resources that they can use they would really be well situated to get that oil they totally need that's thousands of miles in another direction. Plus they simultaneously have no impact on their now enraged enemy's industrial capacity nor their ability to become the planet's only nuclear power in less than 4 years.

The follow up solves all the problem. We invade Hawaii and then use it as a forward base.

Then we invade west coast of USA.

And then we don't stop until we get to the White House.

A point of discussion is whether we have to invade Canada at the same time. I am not a fan of this.

Once America is fully occupied then all the oil is ours and all them manufacturing goods too.

I hope this soothes any question that you may have.