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As for the subs - they don't aim at warships. They hit the supply ships that are all heading to the small number of available docks on Oahu.
That is just factually incorrect. As I already stated uptrhead not very far, the Japanese landed 5,000 troops on a defended beach at Kota Bharu facing sighted in artillery, barbed wire, mines, and concrete pillboxes, and they captured the beachhead while only suffering about 70 Kia and 500 casualties in total. It's a much smaller scale than what is contemplated here, but it does demonstrate their ability to take a well defended and prepared position (and bode well for their success therein).
The Japanese did attack a few defended beaches but the defences were nothing like what existed on Oahu (let alone what might have been put there if Midway was lost).
I would suggest that resupplying Hawaii would be a challenge during those 3 months if the Japanese had 5 or 6 fleet aircraft carriers and the US had none left (or just 1 or 2). How do you send supply ships, troops, fuel, guns even airplanes to Hawaii with those carriers roaming around wherever they please?
I know in WW2 attrition generally favored the Americans but with no way to get fuel, spares, ammunition etc. to Hawaii, how long would they be able to endure an intermittent campaign of air strikes (even night-time bombing raids), shore bombardments, and (also probably night time) naval engagements around the islands? How long would those radar sets last under repeated attacks?
The Japanese would have no problems at all fighting on the ground of Oahu. Because they would never get soldiers on the ground of Oahu.
We should move on to more plausible topics like the what-if the Buffalo fighter got the same development follow ons as the Wildcat? What do the Hellcat and Bearcat follow on equivalents look like if Brewster designs them? Something like that which might have happened.
Its occurred to me more than once that Brewsters management must have been secretly working for the Axis.Considering how appallingly bad Brewster's management was, any Brewster-designed follow-on designs to the Buffalo would have helped the Axis more than the Allies.
Logistics were never the strong part of the Japanese. Just because they had carriers, it didn't mean they could stay at sea indefinitely. The US could easily supply Hawaii without worrying to much about IJN interference.It would probably take a while to bring in troops, supplies and gather all the ships and planes necessary. 2- 3 months is reasonable. But keep in mind those Atolls and Islands I mentioned were because they already had airstrips and other facilities on them.
I would suggest that resupplying Hawaii would be a challenge during those 3 months if the Japanese had 5 or 6 fleet aircraft carriers and the US had none left (or just 1 or 2). How do you send supply ships, troops, fuel, guns even airplanes to Hawaii with those carriers roaming around wherever they please?
I know in WW2 attrition generally favored the Americans but with no way to get fuel, spares, ammunition etc. to Hawaii, how long would they be able to endure an intermittent campaign of air strikes (even night-time bombing raids), shore bombardments, and (also probably night time) naval engagements around the islands? How long would those radar sets last under repeated attacks?
As for the notion that US submarines would automatically shut down any Japanese efforts to prep for an invasion. Aside from the fact that US Submarines did not have a decisive effect during the Guadalcanal or New Guinea campaigns, in part due to problems with torpedoes etc., WW2 submarines in general had a somewhat random element in how well they did in combat, and for the USN this lasted right until the end of the war. Sometimes they could be pretty deadly, sometimes rather shockingly ineffective.
For example, the fate of the Japanese hybrid Carrier-Battleship Ise is instructional. After participating in the Battle of the Philippine Sea and the Battle of Cape Engaño, the Ise was relocated for a while to Cam Ranh bay in what is now Vietnam, as the flagship of the IJN 5th fleet. They decided to send Ise to Singapore to pick up a load of critical supplies (rubber, aviaton fuel, tin, and strategic metals) which it was to bring back to Japan. The US codebreakers got wind of the plan so they positioned 15 submarines along the route back to Japan, which were then joined by another 11 submarines during the Ise's voyage for 26 submarines in total. All to get one ship. Only three managed to attack Ise along the way, and none of the attacks hit anything. Ise reached Kure after a 14 day trip, unscathed.
Ise at this time was an obsolete ship with very little ASW capability no more than a couple of seaplanes as an air contingent.
Logistics were never the strong part of the Japanese. Just because they had carriers, it didn't mean they could stay at sea indefinitely. The US could easily supply Hawaii without worrying to much about IJN interference.
Also note that the French Frigate Schoals didnt have a landing strip until 1943. At one time I posted a bunch of info on that island. Same with Johnston Atoll. It pretty much was a small atoll of small size prior to the navy increasing the size of the islands.