davparlr
Senior Master Sergeant
I tend to think that after all Roosevelt did to manipulate US emotions to provide vital assets to England before US involvement in the war, Churchill would be quite compliant to a Roosevelt request for support.
Could the P51A been made available for the Battle of Midway?
- Thread starter pinsog
- Start date
Ad: This forum contains affiliate links to products on Amazon and eBay. More information in Terms and rules
Shortround6
Major General
How compliant?
The US had already "requisitioned" almost 200 P-39s (P-400s) that the British had paid cash for (British had ordered 675 P-39s for cash almost 11 months before lend-lease was signed). British had another 150 ordered lend-lease. Either gave them to the Russians or relinquished claims on production.
In April 1940, the Anglo-French Purchasing Committee ordered 667 P-38 fighters. The British took over the entire order. "...the original contract was amended to provide for the delivery of 143 Lightning Is (British military serials AE978/999 and AF100/220) with the originally-specified V-1710-15 un-turbosupercharged engines, with the remaining 524 aircraft (serials AF221/AF744) to be delivered as Lightning IIs (Model 322-60-04) with turbosupercharged V-1710-F5L and -F5R engines."
"The remaining 140 Lightning Is of the British contract were completed by Lockheed and were taken over by the USA and designated P-322"
"Twenty-eight other British-ordered aircraft were completed as P-38F-13-LO for the USAAF, 121 as P-38F-15-LO, 174 as P-38G-13-LO, and 200 as P-38G-15-LO."
Granted these two aircraft did not come up to British expectations But it seems the British were willing to help the US to some extent by giving up aircraft (or places in the production queue) they didn't want/need. Not sure what happened to the money.
There was quite a bit of swapping around deliveries of lend-lease aircraft but then the British hadn't actually paid for those.
Swiping their Mustangs may have been going a bit too far. And to do any real good at Midway they would have had to have been swiped in Feb-March in order for training to happen, both for pilots and mechanics, and for the deployment on the squadrons/group.
The US had already "requisitioned" almost 200 P-39s (P-400s) that the British had paid cash for (British had ordered 675 P-39s for cash almost 11 months before lend-lease was signed). British had another 150 ordered lend-lease. Either gave them to the Russians or relinquished claims on production.
In April 1940, the Anglo-French Purchasing Committee ordered 667 P-38 fighters. The British took over the entire order. "...the original contract was amended to provide for the delivery of 143 Lightning Is (British military serials AE978/999 and AF100/220) with the originally-specified V-1710-15 un-turbosupercharged engines, with the remaining 524 aircraft (serials AF221/AF744) to be delivered as Lightning IIs (Model 322-60-04) with turbosupercharged V-1710-F5L and -F5R engines."
"The remaining 140 Lightning Is of the British contract were completed by Lockheed and were taken over by the USA and designated P-322"
"Twenty-eight other British-ordered aircraft were completed as P-38F-13-LO for the USAAF, 121 as P-38F-15-LO, 174 as P-38G-13-LO, and 200 as P-38G-15-LO."
Granted these two aircraft did not come up to British expectations But it seems the British were willing to help the US to some extent by giving up aircraft (or places in the production queue) they didn't want/need. Not sure what happened to the money.
There was quite a bit of swapping around deliveries of lend-lease aircraft but then the British hadn't actually paid for those.
Swiping their Mustangs may have been going a bit too far. And to do any real good at Midway they would have had to have been swiped in Feb-March in order for training to happen, both for pilots and mechanics, and for the deployment on the squadrons/group.
Shortround6
Major General
Tomo, Please see:
Lightning I for RAF
In spring/summer of 1940 the US may have been unwilling to sell the turbochargers ( or simply unable to supply the needed amount)but apparently by the summer of 1941 things had changed. Of course actually Delivery might not have occurred until 1942 or 43.
On Page 137 of AHT there is a chart of Lighting orders. Model number 322-60-19 is listed as an export model and British 524 aircraft "canceled". 1 plane "delivered" April 1942.
How production was to be divided up I have no idea but obviously the US got some benefit from the British order, long lead items, allocation of materials, expanded work force etc. In Oct of 1940 Lockheed held orders for 1000 Lightnings (including British) but had delivered only 80.
Lightning I for RAF
In spring/summer of 1940 the US may have been unwilling to sell the turbochargers ( or simply unable to supply the needed amount)but apparently by the summer of 1941 things had changed. Of course actually Delivery might not have occurred until 1942 or 43.
On Page 137 of AHT there is a chart of Lighting orders. Model number 322-60-19 is listed as an export model and British 524 aircraft "canceled". 1 plane "delivered" April 1942.
How production was to be divided up I have no idea but obviously the US got some benefit from the British order, long lead items, allocation of materials, expanded work force etc. In Oct of 1940 Lockheed held orders for 1000 Lightnings (including British) but had delivered only 80.
What I think we need to do here is get a grip on things. Supposing they were available. So what? Do we really think subbing them for our F4Fs would have held off that incoming wave to Midway? They hit that wave, they'd have been running like rats. Even if they'd have stuck, they'd have been shot down to the last plane, and the bulk of that wave would have got through. Simply put, they wouldn't have saved that island. Neither would they have been of any use to us against those carriers.
davparlr
Senior Master Sergeant
Yes. I would assume the decision to prioritize defending the PTO would have happened not long after Pearl Harbor.
I didn't say it would be easy. I said all the "ifs" were incredible, meaning not believable to happen.
VBF-13 said:
The P-51 is 60 MPH faster than the Zero, and the F4F, from SL to 15k and is a better climber than the F4F, 40 mph faster at 20k. The Zero is difficult to turn above 250 mph. All the 1st AVG pilots, who would think they were in hog heaven being in a P-51, would have to do is keep their speed up, which they know to do thanks to Chennault who would have taught them that, as they attacked the bombers. The Zeros could not catch them nor turn with them as they cut up the bombers, as they actually demonstrated in China, although not against Zeros, but against similar performing Army fighters.
- Thread starter
- #67
The P-51 is 60 MPH faster than the Zero, and the F4F, from SL to 15k and is a better climber than the F4F, 40 mph faster at 20k. The Zero is difficult to turn above 250 mph. All the 1st AVG pilots, who would think they were in hog heaven being in a P-51, would have to do is keep their speed up, which they know to do thanks to Chennault who would have taught them that, as they attacked the bombers. The Zeros could not catch them nor turn with them as they cut up the bombers, as they actually demonstrated in China, although not against Zeros, but against similar performing Army fighters.[/QUOTE]
I believe this hit the nail on the head.
You don't have to shoot down the entire raid to be successful. You could shoot down a few and break up the raid, or ruin their accuracy, harrass them. Plus, even if you only shoot down a few, every one you shoot down is one less that will be back to bomb Midway or attack a US carrier or defend a Japanese carrier. Attrition and lack of resupply is huge in carrier warfare. A carrier that is low or out of aircraft is a moot point.
I believe this hit the nail on the head.
You don't have to shoot down the entire raid to be successful. You could shoot down a few and break up the raid, or ruin their accuracy, harrass them. Plus, even if you only shoot down a few, every one you shoot down is one less that will be back to bomb Midway or attack a US carrier or defend a Japanese carrier. Attrition and lack of resupply is huge in carrier warfare. A carrier that is low or out of aircraft is a moot point.
The F4Fs weren't as helpless against the A6Ms as historians perhaps who have but a speaking acquaintanceship with same would have us believe. Still, I want to be in a P51, too, there's no question. But that island was a goner, P51s or no P51s. The P51s could engage strengths the F4Fs didn't have. Conceded. In the final analysis, though, that outcome would have been just the same.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
From Wiki;
"In all, 7,860 Wildcats were built. During the course of the war, Navy and Marine F4Fs and FMs flew 15,553 combat sorties (14,027 of these from aircraft carriers), destroying 1,327 enemy aircraft at a cost of 178 aerial losses, 24 to ground/shipboard fire, and 49 to operational causes (an overall kill-to-loss ratio of 6.9:1)."
"In all, 7,860 Wildcats were built. During the course of the war, Navy and Marine F4Fs and FMs flew 15,553 combat sorties (14,027 of these from aircraft carriers), destroying 1,327 enemy aircraft at a cost of 178 aerial losses, 24 to ground/shipboard fire, and 49 to operational causes (an overall kill-to-loss ratio of 6.9:1)."
GregP
Major
According to the US Navy WWII Summary Report dated 1946:
Wildcats flew 15,553 action sorties, lost 86 to AAA, 191 to enemy aircraft, and 125 oeprational losses on action sorties for a total of 402 losses on action sorties.
Meanwhile they lost 395 on other flights, 139 on ships or on the ground, and 534 on non-action sorties for a total of 936 lost not on action sorties.
They destroyed 612 enemy bombers and 715 enemy fighters for a total of 1,327 aerial victories and dropped 154 tons of bombs.
That gives a kill to loss ratio of 6.9 : 1 for air-to-air losses to enemy aircraft and kill to loss ratio of 3.3 : 1 for all combat losses including enemy aircrft, AAA, and action sortie operational losses. Most people, regardless of nationality, stick with the kill to loss ratio for enemy aircraft only. While I happen to have the numbers for the US Navy and USAAF, I do NOT have the same numbers for the British, German, Japanese, Italians, Soviets, or anyone else.
For combat losses, I tend to stay with action sortie numbers only, while the overall losses figure into aggregate ratios including combat, training, operations, losses on ship that sunk on destroyed on the ground in attacks, and losses while being ferried into a or out of a combat theater of operations.
If you add in ALL the losses, including non-action sorties losses, training, etc., you'd get 1,327 victories and 1,338 total losses for an overall kill to loss ratio of 0.992.
Of course, if you figure it that way the Ta-152 had 7 victories and 4 losses in combat, but only two were flyable when the war ended out of 43 delivered. So you have 7 kill and 41 total losses to all causes including mechanical failure for an overall kill to loss ration of 0.171, making the Wildcat about 5.8 times better than the vaunted Ta-152 overall. Interestingly the data for victories and losses is at least somewhat available for the Ta-152 but I have never seen data on Ta-152 operational losses, other than a mention in a couple of books that only two Ta-152C's were left flyable when the war ended in Europe.
Since it is somewhat ludicrous to suppose the Ta-152 was about 1/6 as effective as a Wildcat, I submit that the kill ratios be confined to either losses against enemy aircraft only or losses on combat action sorties only as a means for a fair comparison. Now if we could only get these data for Axis and Soviet operations!
However you decide to put it, the F4F wasn't a bad little fighter and was a tough customer for it's opponents to shoot down, but apparently had its own weaknesses operationally, as did ALL the WWII fighters. Normal operations took a toll on ALL war equipment including rifles, ships, tanks, etc.
Go buy a family car today and drive it for 4 years; I bet you'd have a few failures to deal with, too. And that isn't even CLOSE to combat. To make it closer to combat, assume there are no roads and you have to cross streams, sand, and rocky fields with your family car. Now how many failures would you think in 4 years?
So operations are not "easy" on equipment ... just easier on equipment than combat.
Wildcats flew 15,553 action sorties, lost 86 to AAA, 191 to enemy aircraft, and 125 oeprational losses on action sorties for a total of 402 losses on action sorties.
Meanwhile they lost 395 on other flights, 139 on ships or on the ground, and 534 on non-action sorties for a total of 936 lost not on action sorties.
They destroyed 612 enemy bombers and 715 enemy fighters for a total of 1,327 aerial victories and dropped 154 tons of bombs.
That gives a kill to loss ratio of 6.9 : 1 for air-to-air losses to enemy aircraft and kill to loss ratio of 3.3 : 1 for all combat losses including enemy aircrft, AAA, and action sortie operational losses. Most people, regardless of nationality, stick with the kill to loss ratio for enemy aircraft only. While I happen to have the numbers for the US Navy and USAAF, I do NOT have the same numbers for the British, German, Japanese, Italians, Soviets, or anyone else.
For combat losses, I tend to stay with action sortie numbers only, while the overall losses figure into aggregate ratios including combat, training, operations, losses on ship that sunk on destroyed on the ground in attacks, and losses while being ferried into a or out of a combat theater of operations.
If you add in ALL the losses, including non-action sorties losses, training, etc., you'd get 1,327 victories and 1,338 total losses for an overall kill to loss ratio of 0.992.
Of course, if you figure it that way the Ta-152 had 7 victories and 4 losses in combat, but only two were flyable when the war ended out of 43 delivered. So you have 7 kill and 41 total losses to all causes including mechanical failure for an overall kill to loss ration of 0.171, making the Wildcat about 5.8 times better than the vaunted Ta-152 overall. Interestingly the data for victories and losses is at least somewhat available for the Ta-152 but I have never seen data on Ta-152 operational losses, other than a mention in a couple of books that only two Ta-152C's were left flyable when the war ended in Europe.
Since it is somewhat ludicrous to suppose the Ta-152 was about 1/6 as effective as a Wildcat, I submit that the kill ratios be confined to either losses against enemy aircraft only or losses on combat action sorties only as a means for a fair comparison. Now if we could only get these data for Axis and Soviet operations!
However you decide to put it, the F4F wasn't a bad little fighter and was a tough customer for it's opponents to shoot down, but apparently had its own weaknesses operationally, as did ALL the WWII fighters. Normal operations took a toll on ALL war equipment including rifles, ships, tanks, etc.
Go buy a family car today and drive it for 4 years; I bet you'd have a few failures to deal with, too. And that isn't even CLOSE to combat. To make it closer to combat, assume there are no roads and you have to cross streams, sand, and rocky fields with your family car. Now how many failures would you think in 4 years?
So operations are not "easy" on equipment ... just easier on equipment than combat.
Last edited:
Hey, Greg, I must respectfully disagree. You've never driven with my 17-year-old nephew in the driver's seat.
GregP
Major
Hah!
No I haven't, maybe that IS close to combat ...
No I haven't, maybe that IS close to combat ...
bobbysocks
Chief Master Sergeant
that is why most fighters were "war weary" after only 300 hours of flight. my wife did drive her car for over 4 years and only replaced wiper blades a couple of times. an off road atv or dirt bike might be a better comparison....they take a good honest beating.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Non-combat related accidents (including training) is known as attrition and is not included in the overall combat record of an aircraft, at least in today's military bean counting world, I strongly suspect it was similar if not the same during WW2.
GregP
Major
Attrition huh? I like that word and think it should definitely not be counted in combat statistics.
Now whether or not to include losses to AAA or operational losses while on action sorties is another matter. I wouldn't argue too hard about including or not including either in combat statistics, but we probably SHOULD arrive at a preferred method ... as soon as data other than US data appear broken out into the various categories. At that time, maybe we could agree on the best method for comparison. Until we have something to compare the US data with, though, the question is probably moot.
I'm still digging.
Now whether or not to include losses to AAA or operational losses while on action sorties is another matter. I wouldn't argue too hard about including or not including either in combat statistics, but we probably SHOULD arrive at a preferred method ... as soon as data other than US data appear broken out into the various categories. At that time, maybe we could agree on the best method for comparison. Until we have something to compare the US data with, though, the question is probably moot.
I'm still digging.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
That word is even used when weather or maintenance prevents a mission from being flown.
GregP
Major
At least we don't have a lot of people who want to include attrition in the victory to loss ratio.
FLYBOYJ
"THE GREAT GAZOO"
Don't give bean counters any ideas!
oldcrowcv63
Tech Sergeant
I'll introduce some heresy into the discussion. I doubt the P-51/Mustang would have done any better than the 'obsolete' F2A-3's everyone seems so anxious to dump into the ocean to make room for a 'real non-obsolescent fighter'. First let's consider the mission. The F2A-3s, for better or worse, were committed to act as interceptors. I submit that speed is one of the least useful attributes of an interceptor. In order of importance I'd list
1. Rate of climb: I can't say it any better than Bedford Forrest: "get thar fustus with the mostest" Not fastest, just fustest. How long does it take the Mustang I to climb to the enemy aircraft altitude before it can accelerate to its speed advantage? I believe the F2A-3 and Mustang had very similar to nearly the same rate of climb to the altitude of the engagement. Above that altitude, advantage F2A-3. Shocking, I know but the lighter weight F2A-3 had a single stage, 2 speed supercharged Wright 1830 radial engine of 1,200 SL hp. The Mustang/P-51 was laboring with an Allison 1710-39 engine of 1,150 SL hp with a single stage, ONE-speed supercharger.
2. Ceiling: This is not a critical factor at Midway since the combat was fought at intermediate altitude (I think about 20,000 '), but in general you want to get an interceptor high so it can quickly convert that potential energy into kinetic when it sees the enemy, but the tendency would be to maintain the climb as long as possible until you have to engage.
3. Acceleration: Once you've engaged in a first pass, the interceptor is going to find itself in a fur ball when the enemy escorts jump you. If you've built up speed so much the better, but I suspect that may be problematic in an interception. What you need before speed is to get to max speed quickly. The Mustang (2 cannon version) is about 1,000 lbs heavier than an F2A-3 (the 4 cannon mustang is nearer 1,500 lbs) with a similar powered engine. Simple physics says the same force applied to a smaller mass will accelerate it faster. I admit that the F2A's higher drag limits this advantage and its ultimate speed. But in the pinch, I suspect the P-51 is going to be bit slower off the mark. Not a good thing vs the IJN Vet piloted A6M.
4. Maneuverability: I expect the F2A may have held an edge over the Mustang but they were both at a disadvantage compared to the A6M.
I see raw speed as having relatively less importance in an interception than these other attributes. Consider that the worst raw-performing fighter (and oddly the most successful) flown at the Battle of Midway was not the F2A-3 but rather the F4F-4 but it turned out to be a superb interceptor at Guadalcanal as well as a solid bar-room-brawl fighter. The Fairey Fulmar was no speed demon but it was a decent interceptor in the circumstance. I submit (and I believe the limited data suggests) that the few marine F4F-3s were probably better interceptors than the F2A, F4F-4 and probably even the P-51/Mustang. If you are going to exchange F2A-3s for an aircraft, I'd suggest replacing them with more F4F-3s. There was a recently deposited supply at Pearl Harbor that had been tapped for the 7 Wildcats sent aboard the Kitty Hawk to reinforce Midway. If the Kitty Hawk could have carried more aircraft, I expect it would have been F4F-3s.
On its return from Coral Sea, I believe the Yorktown had about 12-15 flyable F4F-3 on board when it entered Pearl Harbor on May 27. That would have taken a herculean effort to get them to Midway by June 3. Beyond that, I imagine many of the F4F-3 turned over to the USMC VMF units went to Samoa and other islands in the Pacific, so perhaps the 7 actually sent were all that were immediately available. Kitty Hawk departed Midway on the 29th arriving PH on June 1. It was only a two day trip (Ooops.. miscounted! A 4 day 1 way trip!!) so it seems unlikely that more of these F4F-3s could have been subsequently shipped to arrive on or before June 3. Even if accomplished, there's that pesky matter of pilot training in an unfamiliar type.
USS Kitty Hawk, AKV-1 photo from Wikipedia, carrying a folded wing F4F on deck in October 1942.
1. Rate of climb: I can't say it any better than Bedford Forrest: "get thar fustus with the mostest" Not fastest, just fustest. How long does it take the Mustang I to climb to the enemy aircraft altitude before it can accelerate to its speed advantage? I believe the F2A-3 and Mustang had very similar to nearly the same rate of climb to the altitude of the engagement. Above that altitude, advantage F2A-3. Shocking, I know but the lighter weight F2A-3 had a single stage, 2 speed supercharged Wright 1830 radial engine of 1,200 SL hp. The Mustang/P-51 was laboring with an Allison 1710-39 engine of 1,150 SL hp with a single stage, ONE-speed supercharger.
2. Ceiling: This is not a critical factor at Midway since the combat was fought at intermediate altitude (I think about 20,000 '), but in general you want to get an interceptor high so it can quickly convert that potential energy into kinetic when it sees the enemy, but the tendency would be to maintain the climb as long as possible until you have to engage.
3. Acceleration: Once you've engaged in a first pass, the interceptor is going to find itself in a fur ball when the enemy escorts jump you. If you've built up speed so much the better, but I suspect that may be problematic in an interception. What you need before speed is to get to max speed quickly. The Mustang (2 cannon version) is about 1,000 lbs heavier than an F2A-3 (the 4 cannon mustang is nearer 1,500 lbs) with a similar powered engine. Simple physics says the same force applied to a smaller mass will accelerate it faster. I admit that the F2A's higher drag limits this advantage and its ultimate speed. But in the pinch, I suspect the P-51 is going to be bit slower off the mark. Not a good thing vs the IJN Vet piloted A6M.
4. Maneuverability: I expect the F2A may have held an edge over the Mustang but they were both at a disadvantage compared to the A6M.
I see raw speed as having relatively less importance in an interception than these other attributes. Consider that the worst raw-performing fighter (and oddly the most successful) flown at the Battle of Midway was not the F2A-3 but rather the F4F-4 but it turned out to be a superb interceptor at Guadalcanal as well as a solid bar-room-brawl fighter. The Fairey Fulmar was no speed demon but it was a decent interceptor in the circumstance. I submit (and I believe the limited data suggests) that the few marine F4F-3s were probably better interceptors than the F2A, F4F-4 and probably even the P-51/Mustang. If you are going to exchange F2A-3s for an aircraft, I'd suggest replacing them with more F4F-3s. There was a recently deposited supply at Pearl Harbor that had been tapped for the 7 Wildcats sent aboard the Kitty Hawk to reinforce Midway. If the Kitty Hawk could have carried more aircraft, I expect it would have been F4F-3s.
On its return from Coral Sea, I believe the Yorktown had about 12-15 flyable F4F-3 on board when it entered Pearl Harbor on May 27. That would have taken a herculean effort to get them to Midway by June 3. Beyond that, I imagine many of the F4F-3 turned over to the USMC VMF units went to Samoa and other islands in the Pacific, so perhaps the 7 actually sent were all that were immediately available. Kitty Hawk departed Midway on the 29th arriving PH on June 1. It was only a two day trip (Ooops.. miscounted! A 4 day 1 way trip!!) so it seems unlikely that more of these F4F-3s could have been subsequently shipped to arrive on or before June 3. Even if accomplished, there's that pesky matter of pilot training in an unfamiliar type.
USS Kitty Hawk, AKV-1 photo from Wikipedia, carrying a folded wing F4F on deck in October 1942.
Attachments
Last edited:
davparlr
Senior Master Sergeant
Well, to avoid any heresy, let's look at some data.
Forrest got there fustus because he was fastus (he was a cavalry man). To correct history however, he did not say this. His quote was, in answer to a question, "Ma'am, I got there first with the most men." He was certainly an impressive man and ferocious warrior.
At Midway, PBYs reported Japanese inbound to Midway at 5:45 AM. Marine fighters engaged the Japanese at 6:20 AM, or 35 minutes after contact. P-51s could reach 20k in 10 minutes, 25k in 17 minutes giving them plenty of time to reach combat speed at altitude.
No argument here but not relevant since there was sufficient time as already discussed.
Again, sufficient warning was given for the fighters to obtain desired airspeed and altitude.
1st AVG did not do this. They were warned by Chennault to avoid this type of combat. Slash and run was used and proved effective. P-38s also perfected this combat.
The F3A-3 will do 284 mph with 1200 hp at SL and the F4F-4 would do 279 mph with the same engine. The P-51 will do 340 mph with 1150 hp at SL. The F3A and F4F-3/4 will use far more hp to maintain any given airspeed than the P-51 and thus the P-51 will have much more power excess to aid in acceleration. In fact the P-51 cruised (307mph) at almost the max speed of the F4F-4 (312mph). However, if the P-51 is flown correctly and maintains airspeed, acceleration is a moot point.
The Mustang was very maneuverable at high speeds. The Zero was very poor at speeds above 250 mph. It the P-51 pilot keeps his airspeed high and avoids turning fights, he will have little trouble with the Zero as he attacks the heavily loaded bombers, they will not be able to catch them nor turn with them as they make hit and run attacks against the bombers.
I believe your arguments are unsupportable. There was plenty of time, 35 minutes, for P-51s to obtain fighting altitude and airspeed. If flown by well trained and experienced pilots as was the 1st AVG, and flew the AVG doctrine in the much better P-51, the outcome would be the same as experienced in China.
