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Actually the Aust. Government had a hard time trying to recall its forces from the Middle East. Churchill was against the idea but intense pressure from the Aust, Prime Minister, John Curtin, saw the 6th and 7th Divisions returned home in '42. However Churchill ordered the convoy to Burma against the will and knowledge of the Aust. Government. Owing to more pressure applied by Curtin, these Divisions eventually made it to Australia (minus a few Infantry Brigades deployed to Ceylon and Java) where they quickly deployed to new Guinea. The 9th Division didn't return home untill '43 where they too were deployed to New Guinea. It must be remembered that it was the inexperianced and ill equipped Australian Militia that was doing the fighting in the early days in New Guinea. This is why the Australian Government was screaming out to have its battle hardened Divisions returned home from the Middle East. After the loss of the entire 8th Division at singapore, we were virtually undefended (the majority of the RAAF and RAN were also overseas). IMO the fact that Churchill was willing to abandon Australia and deal with our problems after the Germans had been defeated doesn't sit well with me. We were willing to send all we had in the Defence of England and in the fight against tyranny, yet in our hour of need Churchill basically turned his back at us, hence why Australia turned to America.
In my earlier postings I outlined the basis on which I believe this could have been achieved. By diverting the long range aircraft to A/S warfare, losses would have significantly reduced to acceptable levels.
The 50 old destroyers were of some benefit but has been pointed out they were old, unreliable and needed a lot of maintanence and updating. 50 long range aircraft would have been of more benefit and tragically were available but not released by bomber command. The aircraft used in Coastal Command at the time were obsolete bombers, Whitley, Hampden plus Hudsons and a few Wellingtons.
Those that could have been used are Sterlings and Halifax's.
Got this off some BB somewhere, sometime.
1939:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines 509,321 tons (127,330.25/month)
British merchant ship construction capacity from 1939-1941 did not exceed 1.2 million GRT per year.
1940:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines 2,462,867 (205,238.91/month)
Thus for 1940, an average of 3.77 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 28.89 ships sunk.
1941:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines 2,298,714 (191,559.5/month)
Thus for 1941, an average of 1.59 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 18.28 ships sunk.
1942:
# Ships/tonnage
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines 6,158,473 (513,206.08/month) {2 million US + 4 million Allies}
British and Canadian merchant ship construction 1942 1.8 million GRT
US merchant ship construction 1942 5.433 million GRT
Thus for 1942, an average of 2.14 ships were sunk per patrol and one U-Boat was lost per 16.99 ships sunk.
1943:
Allied and Neutral ship tonnage sunk by German and Italian submarines 2,510,304 (209,192/month)
So, overall, the most successful year for the U-Boats was 1940, before the expansion of the force allowed for an increase of more than about a dozen patrols sailing per month, and well prior to the entry of the US and its shipbuilding capacity into the war. Worse, the performance of the U-Boat force in 1941 and 1942 never exceeded its performance in the first months of the war. And, after 1943 the U-Boat campaign became ever less relevent to the outcome of the war.
U-Boat Fleet to 1 Sep 42
On 19 Aug 39 there were 57 U-Boats in commission
Total number U-Boats deployed to 1 Sep 42 275
Total number lost 94
Total number retired 10
Total number available 171
U-Boat Fleet '42 to '45
Total number deployed 1 Sep 42 to 1 May 45 531
Total number lost 1 Sep 42 to 1 May 45 568
British controlled merchant shipping over 1,600 GRT (gross tons)
3Sep39 17,784,000
30Sep40 21,373,000*1940 add 5.6 million tons Dutch/Norw*
30Sep41 20,552,000
31Dec41 20,693,000
Thus, despite the 'success' of the U-Boat force in 1940 (relative to its performance in 1941 and 1942) it had no appreciable effect in reducing the size of the British merchant fleet.
Just in this post I identified a couple of patronizing remarks, here are a couple more:
Study the war in east abit and you'll see that I aint being unreasonable in my assumptions.
Your small remarks such as "Facts Soren ???" are pretty worthless and really don't even deserve an answer, so please refrain from using these again.
By any chance do you know what 'patronizing' means?
Soren said:Bill the last remark is completely of the "You get what you give" nature, posting remarks such as "Facts Soren ???" is patronizing so you can't expect anything less in return. The next isn't really patronizing as you've said yourself some time ago that your strong side isn't the history of the eastern front.
But yes I can patronize and I sometimes do, no doubt, but only when I've been patronized myself - you give what you recieve and you get what you give, right ?
If I write something which I later find wrong, unjust or unnecessarily patronizing I will always apologize (Just did recently in another thread if you don't remember)
PS: Discussing my supposed habbits behavior openly with other member IS patronizing.
Freebird a couple of major points to ponder with your theory
1) the guages of the raillines in Africa were of several guages it would take years to conform the track I believe it is still different today
2) the assistance pf the Americans in building the airports in Newfoundland and Iceland remember many of these non existant at the time airports were part of the swap for the 50 destroyers
3) the pack ice in Labrador and Greenland would force your routs south still leaving the gap in the middle of the Atlantic
4) where are we getting the training aircraft from to train aircrew
Stearmans , Cornells , Harvards/T6,s C45's C47's Cessna Cranes and the list would be endless, . Then we can move over to aviation engines
. The result is without the US we would be screwed , blued ,and tatooed
You asked Drgondog, so here is the British plan (in some detail!!!)
So how does the UK survive the war without the US?
Glider has already mentioned the first point,
#1 The UK needed to put far more effort into command of the oceans using long range A/S patrols.
I would take it a step further, do as the Army Navy (Brooke Pound) had proposed, that Coastal Command and Army air support be taken from the RAF, just as the Fleet Air Arm was taken from the RAF in 1937.
The problem was that all of the top RAF brass (Newall, Portal, Harris) were all followers of the "Trenchard Doctrine" which believed that the war could be won with only a heavy-bombing campaign, which later proved to be wrong. There were earlier reports of the lack of results, and a comprehensive study (Butt report) in Aug 1941 showed that over the Ruhr only 10% of the bombers hit within FIVE miles of their targets! Since the top RAF brass controled development production, the lion's share went to Bomber Command Fighter Command, but there was not nearly enough effort made in providing army support, and Coastal Command had to get by on hand-me-down aircraft. (Whitley's, Hampden's etc.)
Thanks to Glider for his earlier excellent post!
#2 Complete the rail network in Africa Arabia to Russia
This is probably one of the most overlooked solutions.
From June 1940 - June 1943 the British could not use the Mediterranean and were forced to go around the cape of South Africa. This used up an extra 1 - 2 million tons for the longer journey. In 1941 the German submarines started to suffer high losses in the North Atlantic, so they moved to more fruitful distant areas, like the S. Atlantic. The British would have done well to eliminate all excess shipping routes by using rail instead.
I propose that in 1940 after the Battle of Britain the British realize that they cannot count on any US support, so they start making plans to maintain communication, by linking their Empire rail systems.
The best option to reduce shipping is to link the Nigerian rail network with the one in Egypt/Sudan, by building 1,100 miles of track across Chad, from Ft. Lamy to Egypt. (Chad is in Free French control, from Aug 1940) I would also finish the last 500 miles of the Cairo - Capetown railway to link up with the South African system. From my information, a railway party of 50 - 60 men with horses can build 3 - 5 miles per day over normal terrain. 8 or 10 such parties could finish the track in about 2 - 3 months. This would allow for the elimination of the "round the cape route", the cargo would off-load in Nigeria or Cameroon, and men, tanks planes could be sent to Egypt, oil would be transported the other direction. Canada S. Africa could supply the equip + skilled labour, with surplus track from Namibia, Botswana etc.
I would also complete the 600 miles of Baghdad - Beirut railway through Jordan to Persia. This would give a rail link from Nigeria through Egypt Persia to Russia, allowing the elimination of the costly Murmansk convoys, as supplies could be sent much more quickly by rail. (the Allies did send the greatest % of lend-lease through Persia in 1942-1943)
#3 Reduce the number of convoy routes, but increase their protection
The British would then move all goods by rail, except 3 heavily protected convoy routes (+ 1 aux) Each waypoint on the routes would have an airbase operating a squadron (or more) of long range A/S patrols (except Hawaii). None of the legs are more than 800 - 900 miles from an airbase, except the two from Guiana, S. America to Gambia, Africa (2500 miles) and Vancouver - Fanning Isl. which is about 3500 miles. So the longest A/S patrol would have to be 1,300 miles (No sub activity expected (Vancouver - Fanning)
Route 1 UK Liverpool - Iceland - Greenland - St. John's - Montreal
Route 2 Halifax - Bermuda - Virgin Is - Trinidad - Guiana - Gambia - Nigeria
Route 3 Bombay - Ceylon - Sumatra - Java - Perth - Adelaide - Auckland
(Aux) 4 Vancouver - (Hawaii) - Fanning - Tahiti - Tonga - Auckland - Sydney
I would calculate that in 1942 the concentration of shipping routes, + the increased A/S patrols, + elimination of Murmansk convoys should reduce the losses from U-boats by at least half, to under 2 million tons. This would almost match the Commonwealth construction (1.8 million tons in '42) Even if the British lose 3 million tons in 1942 and in 1943 they are STILL ahead of their pre-war total. With the reduction in the # of shipping routes they have surplus capacity.
In answer to your question about Allied shipping Drgondog, the British Allied shipping losses in '39 - '41 were about 5.3 millon tons, while the UK/Commonwealth built about 2.6 millon tons '39 - '41. However the British also picked up about 5.6 million tons, mainly from the Norwegian Dutch merchant marine. So by Dec 1941 they are actually 3 million tons ahead of when they started the war.
Thanks for the info AL Schlageter
So that is what I calculate is the best solution to the Shipping/U-boat problem, next I'll post the British Military strategies
The airports are really very complex things to build especially in places like Labrador and Newfoundland the climate has a huge effect on construction you have to dig down to the frostline otherwise its a wasted effort. Look at the Alaska Highway which was the 2nd largest project by the US after the Manhattan project in WW2 it took the US army 2 months to build the first 60 miles , and your talking about buildimg railways across continents in weeks , deserts , rivers , jungle etc it's not all savanah,
Plopping down airports with fuel farms etc is a fools paradise because much of the year its impossible to bring fuel in because of ice. I lived in Goose Bay one of the airports your talking about we could only bring in fuel from the end of May til the end of Oct because of ice , the same could be said of every item needed for an airport.
Without US engines not one of the aircraft that Canada made in your list would be worth a damm the Lanc ,Mosquito etc were all powered by Packard Rolls engines . Would the US even make the Packard Rolls?
One of the reasons Canada declared war 7 days after the UK was so they could order aircraft without screwing the neutrality of the US
4) where are we getting the training aircraft from to train aircrew
Stearmans , Cornells , Harvards/T6,s C45's C47's Cessna Cranes and the list would be endless, .
4.) The British had loads of obsolete aircraft that they could use for training. Brewster Buffalos, Fairey Battles, Vildebeests, Blackburn Rocs, B.P. Defiants, Vultees, Gladiators etc. Instead of throwing these aircraft away in futile combat they should be used for training. I would also station a mix of experienced trainee pilots at the various A/S bases, to give them more training. It would be possible for some experienced pilots to take trainees along on A/S missions in the Indian Ocean, South Atlantic, Pacific etc. This was not possible in the high-intensity bombing missions over Germany.
Sorry Soren but you bring 90 percent of it on.
Normally you start it was things such as "Thats Hogwash!
You dont know what you are talking about.
Another perfect example of Allied Propaganda and how the Allies write History!"
Soren that is what causes 90 percent of the problems people have with you because if someone disagrees with you, you start saying things like that. Whether you realize that or not, it is kind of insulting and people dont appreciate it and then they start throwing things at you and you start the "Oh poor me! Stop Patronizing me!"
Good point. It may also be worth mentioning that in 1940 the RAF placed an order for 245 engine-less Wirraways ( CAC was building P&W Wasps for the Wirraway in Aust., but incase of shortages the RAF were going to install US built Wasps on there arrival in the UK). The order was also increased to 500 a/c in Oct 1940.
Obviously this never happened because in the end the RAF got Harvards from the US, but it goes to show there was another option available to them.
Just out of curiosity Wildcat, how useful would the Wirraway been? Obviously in this scenario the Commonwealth will have to play a much bigger role, Canada was making Hurricanes, what about producing them there? Or was the wirraway adequate?
As long as we are playing what if on the course of Britain, USSR, Germany and Japan - take into account possible course of action for Britain (and France) not declaring War in September 1939.
Possibility exists that while Germany consolidates Poland - that he decides NOT to attack westward. There were enough Generals that didn't want the war to continue arguing against it. So say Britain says 'not me'.
France continues to build, expecting war. US already in wartime increase of military capability. US declares alliance with France and USSR
What if Hitler strikes East earlier than he did and does not declare war on France? He might have defeated USSR with few reserves in West.. but France was capable military force - just outflanked in 1940. What if France strikes Germany in middle of Russian campaign?
The political leaders in France were divided, they were so intent on avoiding WWI type battles, would they not just stay behind Maginot line?
So who knows what the public mood is in the US. In this scenario I think it is higher probability that Germany defeats USSR, then consolidates and defeats France, then attains complete control of the air over channel.
Next question, who protects oil in Middle East from Germany? or Rumania?
If Britain is still neutral and refuses an overture as 'peaceful partner' from Hitler - hitler plays trump card and cuts off Britain from ME oil and as Britain isn't an ally of the US, US doesn't supply Britain but continues to assist France if they are still fighting..
Britain still has oil from Borneo Burma, and they would have to buy on the open market from Venezuela Dutch E. Indies. ***Assuming Japan has not attacked yet***
Does Britain survive 'neutrality?
US has better chance of keeping Russia in the war than Britain had we engaed Germany in 1939 (i.e replace Britain scenario).. the supply lines were long but we could put more tonnage into Eastern Siberia (except winter) than we did via Murmansk... have to sort out whether Russia, US and China could put together a cohesive strategy to align 700,000,000 people together to defeat 60,000,000 in west and about same in east.
Think it could be done but all speculation on pivotal political and military decisions in 1940 after fall of Poland.
Interesting to contemplate Britain and France not declaring war in sept 1939 and Germany deciding to not attack? But US declare war as soon as Germany attacks either USSR or France. Gives Germany time to continue U-Boat build up, US to consolidate ties with USSR (forget politics in this game - just one big happy family on both sides but Allies replace Britain with France and have more time to build up..
I cannot see much possibility of Britain being neutral unless France is out of the war. If France then suddenly attacked Germany after Hitler goes east, I think Britain would assist at that point.
Even this scenario favors Axis with Britain out - Britain a tougher strategic problem for Germany with 26 miles of water separating them and far easier to build for an invasion than go theough USSR
Good to chat